date:20020815


http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/08/10/1028158034347.html
Health records base a step closer
By Jenny Sinclair
August 13 2002
Next
Data quality and security are emerging as key issues for computerisation of 
patient health records around the world.
Last week's Health Informatics Conference (HIC 2002) in Melbourne heard 
that patient records were increasingly becoming computerised but the 
transfer of information between systems still caused problems.
The issues could have ramifications for an ambitious project under 
consideration for a supercomputing organisation.
The Victorian Partnership for Advanced Computing (VPAC), aims to use 
patient records as a massive database for health research.
Speakers at an HIC session on electronic patient records told of four 
projects, all aimed at finding the perfect solution for the masses of 
information needed in health care.
William Goossen, a researcher and consultant to a Dutch attempt to set up a 
national electronic patient records model, said the Netherlands had needed 
to combine many attempts at creating such systems.
The answer was to set up a national effort, bringing together the 
government, health providers and nursing associations in a single body.
Major factors in a successful patient records system were identified as the 
information structure or content, the technical infrastructure, safety and 
security issues, and having the new body do the work of developing a 
workable solution.
Professor Bill Appelbe, chief executive of supercomputing group VPAC, has 
said he would like to see standards set up for bringing together all kinds 
of medical records and tests.
Speaking before the conference, he said that most information from clinical 
trials was only available in hard copy and recorded manually.
This made data mining impossible, depriving researchers of potentially 
valuable sources of information. Similarly, having the general population's 
health records available electronically (in an anonymous form) would allow 
the possibility of faster and more accurate medical research.
He said VPAC had had interest from large software vendors in developing 
such systems, acting as a trusted third party to broker between the 
medical research industry and large database developers.
VPAC could take part in developing such specialised systems by applying 
modern software development (principles) to scientific software and hiring 
out its supercomputer's data-crunching facilities.
In Victoria work has been under way on a universal health-care database for 
mental health patients for five years.
The database project has been slowed by problems with messaging systems 
transferring data and by user feedback on early versions. The Victorian 
mental health-care approach has been to develop a centralised database with 
a unique patient indentifier, and to link it to clinic and hospital systems 
via an intermediary interface, pending development of a universal solution.
The database was divided into an archive database and an operational data 
store for current work.
Speaking for the project, Damian Curran said issues of training, 
insufficient bandwidth to local clinics and corruption of records had all 
needed to be overcome.
The department is about to move to a new phase of trying to connect clinics 
and hospitals directly to the central database.
Curran said key lessons from the project included the need to have proper 
documentation to allow for staff moving on, close monitoring of 
subcontractors, making sure the work kept up with current practices in the 
medical field, and it's not cheap - costs could be high.
At the Distributed Systems Technology Centre (DSTC) in Queensland, trials 
of a so-called Good Electronic Health Record (GEHR) are about to move to 
real-world testing. The GEHR is a worldwide attempt to standardise the way 
medical records are kept. Researcher Andrew Goodchild said the group had 
had excellent feedback from doctors participating in the trial.
The DSTC has helped develop editing software that allows medical 
practitioners to create simple archetypes or templates in which to store 
different kinds of information. The templates have parameters built into 
them that allow practitioners to specify what information must be entered, 
and what ranges are normal; so a template used to report blood tests, for 
instance, can automatically identify results out of the normal range.
Goodchild said that anyone setting up a records system for doctors should 
first find out what's politically and culturally, and work-wise acceptable 
for the clinicians.
The trial editor will be available for free download from the DSTC's site soon.
A working electronic patient records system has already been set up at the 
busy emergency section of the Austin and Repatriation Medical Centre in 
Melbourne.
The hospital engaged Sydney software company TrakHealth for the pilot 
scheme, which has allowed the emergency room to replace its giant 
whiteboard showing patient

Telepsych.2000.


Introduction 
The Victorian Telepsychiatry Program was established in 1996
to improve access to mental health services for rural Victorians. 
The Program funded the establishment of 27 telepsychiatry facilities
located at Area Mental Health Service sites in rural base hospitals,
mental health centres and community-based locations across regional
Victoria, and facilities at six specialist service locations. 
The specialist services targeted by the Program were: 
·The
Mental Health Review Board (MHRB) 
·Forensic
Mental Health Service 
·Early
Psychosis Prevention and Intervention Centre (EPPIC) Statewide Service

·Child
and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) at three locations: Austin
and Repatriation Medical Centre, Royal Children's Hospital and Monash
Medical Centre. 
The Program established linkages of two types: 
·Intra-service:
from major rural centres such as Bendigo, to smaller rural communities such as Swan Hill and Kyneton 
More on
http://www.health.vic.gov.au/mentalhealth/publications/telepsychiatry/

(±¤°í) ÁßÇ³.Ä¡¸Å Àü¹®¿ä¾ç¿øÀÔ´Ï´Ù.

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2002-08-15 Thread MALIK ABACHA


ATTN:SIR,

My wish at its peak is that you're in good health
because health is wealth.


I know you dont know me so I have to introduce myself
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late Nigerian Head of state Gen.Sani Abacha who rule
between 1993 and 1998. For more reference to me I would
love you to know more about my uncle. Please view this
site and read it contents carefully;

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_741000/741506.stm

During the 4th year of his rule, he gave me a sum of
US$23M to boost my business which I just opened in Ogba
area of Lagos. Unfortunately, the complex which I was
using as a ware-house got burnt by a very ragious
inferno. I decided to keep the money until the next
year when I would start importing new goods from a
contractor in Germany which I had signed earlier before
the incident.

My uncle died the next year and everything blew up, the
new government started probing the whole family members
and freezed most of the family accounts.

To cut the long story short, they have not detected the
money which I secured in a Security company in Holland.
Please, I would need you to assist me in retrieving the
fund from the company because if I want to retrieve it
and they know my identity they would definitely freeze
the money in their account.

What you have to do is very simple, you will claim the
fund as a beneficiary from a contract which was
executed by an uncle of yours. All paper works would
be put in place for you to claim the money for me.

The total amount involved is US$16.5M. 10% would be for
any expenses incured during the transaction, 30% would
be for your support, while the remaining 60% remains
mine. I'm an African who believes in divine direction
and you have been divinely chosen to handle this
transaction.

I hope to hear from you soon.

Thanks.

Yours 
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2002-08-15 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]


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K7T266Pro (SocketA,KT266,3DDR,AC97) 310Ôª
K7T266Pro2-LE(SocketA,AC97,ATA100) 270Ôª
K7t266Pro2(SocketA,Ö§³ÖXP,3DDR,AC97) 310Ôª
815EPT Pro-NL(Socket370,i815EP,Ö§³ÖÐÂPIII,AC97,ATA100) 270Ôª
815EP Pro-R (Socket370,i850EP,IDE RAID) 280Ôª
815EP-NL (Socket370,i815EP,AC97) 250Ôª 
815ET Pro (Socket370,i815E,ÐÂPIII,i752,AC97) 340Ôª
694D Pro2-IR (Socket370,VIA694X/686B,RAID) 320Ôª
6309NL100 (Socket370,VIA694X/686B,AC97) 160Ôª
6309NL/-A (Socket370,VIA694X/686B,AC97,´´ÐÂ5880 190Ôª
ÃÀ´ï KT133B (SocketA,KT133/686B,ATA100,AC97) 180Ôª
6VA694XB (Socket370,VIA694x/686B,AC97,ATA100) 135Ôª
°º´ï VP266+128M DDR 295Ôª
VP266 (Socket370,VIA/APOLLO/PRO266/AC97) 200Ôª
VK266 (SocketA,KT133A/686B/AC97/ATA100) 190Ôª
VT-133PLUS(SocketA,KT133/686B/AC97/ATA100) 190Ôª
ID815E (Socket370,i815E/i752/AC97/ATA100) 195Ôª
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VP-133 (Socket370,VIA693A/596B/CMI8738Éù¿¨/ATA66) 150Ôª
SIS730S (SocketA,SiS300/AC97/10/100MÍø¿¨) 155Ôª
SIS630E (Socket370,SIS630E/SiS300ÏÔ¿¨/AC97) 175Ôª
B:Ó²ÅÌ
Maxtor(ÂõÍØ)
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40.9GB£¨ VL40/É¢£©5400×ª\»º´æ:2MB 160Ôª 
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120GB£¨D540X/É¢£©5400×ª\»º´æ:2MB 350Ôª 
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81.9GB£¨ 80/É¢£©5400×ª\»º´æ:2MB 250Ôª 
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80GB£¨ Plus D740X/ºÐ£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 350Ôª 
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80GB£¨ D540X/ºÐ£©5400×ª\»º´æ:2MB 280Ôª 
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40GB£¨ 536DX/ºÐ£©5400×ª\»º´æ:2MB 190Ôª 
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60GB£¨ Plus 60/ºÐ£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 250Ôª
120GB£¨D540X/ºÐ£©5400×ª\»º´æ:2MB 400Ôª 
81.9GB£¨ 80/ºÐ£©5400×ª\»º´æ:2MB 270Ôª
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160GB£¨ D540X/ºÐ£©5400×ª\»º´æ:2MB 900Ôª 
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40GB£¨Barracuda ATA IV£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 170Ôª 
60GB£¨Barracuda ATA IV£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 200Ôª 
20.4GB£¨U Series 6£©5400×ª\»º´æ:512KB 140Ôª 
80GB£¨Barracuda ATA IV£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 250Ôª 
20GB£¨Barracuda ATA IV£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 160Ôª
30GB£¨Barracuda ATA III£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 170Ôª 
20GB£¨U Series 5£©5400×ª\»º´æ:512KB 130Ôª
40GB£¨U Series 5£©5400×ª\»º´æ:512KB 160Ôª
20GB£¨Barracuda ATA III£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 160Ôª 
40GB£¨Barracuda ATA III£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 170Ôª 
10.2GB£¨Barracuda ATA III£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 135Ôª 
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15.3GB£¨Barracuda ATA III£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 165Ôª
30GB£¨U Series 5£©5400×ª\»º´æ:512KB 200Ôª
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60GB£¨Deskstar 60GXP£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 190Ôª 
10GB£¨Travelstar 20GN£©4200×ª\»º´æ:512KB 140Ôª
40GB£¨Deskstar 60GXP£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 170Ôª
40GB£¨Deskstar 120GXP£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 170Ôª 
80GB£¨Deskstar 120GXP£©7200×ª\»º´æ:2MB 230Ôª
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FWD: CAN YOU READ THIS PLEASE

2002-08-15 Thread Timothy Wayne





  
  

  


  

  

  


  
  
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2002-08-15 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]


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240T/ 24.06\Òº¾§°åµã¾à:0.270mm\ÁÁ¶È:230cd/m2\¶Ô±È¶È:500:1 19000 
151B/15\Òº¾§°åµã¾à:0.297mm\ÁÁ¶È:250cd/m2\¶Ô±È¶È:330:1 1000 
SONY
SMD-M51/15.1\Òº¾§°åµã¾à:0.3mm\ÁÁ¶È:200 cd/m2\¶Ô±È¶È:300:1 980
SMD-M81/18.1\Òº¾§°åµã¾à:0.3mm\ÁÁ¶È:200 cd/m2\¶Ô±È¶È:300:1 3200 
SDM-N50/15\Òº¾§°åµã¾à:0.297mm\ÁÁ¶È:200cd/m2\¶Ô±È¶È:300:1 3000 
B:CPU
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1.5G£¨Socket 423/É¢£©
Ö÷Æµ:1.5GHz\ÍâÆµ:400MHz\²å²ÛÀàÐÍ:Socket 423\¶þ¼¶»º´æ:256KB 460 
1.7G£¨Socket

Re: CDR: status of various projects?



It's more than 'distributed publishing', it's distributed everything. Have
your grid and eat it too!

Use Plan 9:

http://plan9.bell-labs.com

The Hangar 18 Co-Op:

http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]


On Wed, 14 Aug 2002, Miles Fidelman wrote:

 It seems like a lot of interesting projects haven't been active for a
 while - notably Free Haven and Eternity Usenet.  Where is the most active
 work, these days,  on distributed publishing systems?
 
 
 **
 The Center for Civic Networking   PO Box 600618
 Miles R. Fidelman, President Newtonville, MA 02460-0006
 Director, Municipal Telecommunications
 Strategies Program617-558-3698 fax: 617-630-8946
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]http://civic.net/ccn.html
 
 Information Infrastructure: Public Spaces for the 21st Century
 Let's Start With: Internet Wall-Plugs Everywhere
 Say It Often, Say It Loud: I Want My Internet!
 **
 


 --


  Conform and be dull..J. Frank Dobie

 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]  www.open-forge.org

SSZ Downtime - Schedule Change



Hi,

We're facing a last minute change in our scheduled downtime. The current
window is from Fri., Aug. 16 through Sun., Aug. 25. This is from tomorrow
(Fri.) through Sunday of next weekend.

I apologize for the short notice on the change and any inconvenience this
might cause. We do not expect to experience such extended downtimes in the
(near) future.

See you in about a week!


 --


  Conform and be dull..J. Frank Dobie

 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]  www.open-forge.org

Insight on the News Email Edition

2002-08-15 Thread Insight on the News

INSIGHT NEWS ALERT!

New stories from Insight on the News are now online.

http://insightmag.com/

...

Folks, we really struck a nerve with Mike Wallers cover story on the ways many
in power are turning the war on terror to their own ends. In case you missed it,
we still have it posted http://insightmag.com/news/260503.html. The same goes
for Doug Burtons pro and con on whether the NAACP should lose its tax
exemption (because its an arm of the Democratic Party)
http://insightmag.com/news/260519.html. Thats it for today. Check out our
website then go sit in the shade. From the Bunker, I remain your newsman in
Washington.

...

SYMPOSIUM PRO CON

SHOULD THE NAACP LOSE ITS TAX EXEMPTION?

ARMSTRONG WILLIAMS SAYS -- YES: It's time the IRS investigated the NAACP for
advancing a clearly partisan agenda.

http://insightmag.com/news/260519.html

REP. SHEILA JACKSON LEE SAYS -- NO: The NAACP's decades-long fight for justice
does not amount to political partisanship.

[By: Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee]

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http://insightmag.com/news/260513.html

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MEDIA MANUFACTURE CLOUD OF SUSPICION OVER HATFILL

Nicholas Stix asks where did all the rumors about the bioweapons expert
originate?

http://insightmag.com/news/260804.html

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HAVE YOU BEEN DECEIVED?

Discover Buckleys promotion of liberal causes and how he has been leading
Americans away from true conservatism since the 1960s.

http://www.jbs.org/buckley/insight2.htm

KYOTO ALL OVER AGAIN

Martin Walker tells us that the U.S. is about to become the Global Warming
Meanie one more time.

http://insightmag.com/news/260776.html

...

TWO CHEERS FOR TRIAL LAWYERS

Christopher Whalen writes that their critics liken them to parasites, but others
say trial lawyers are the only remaining champions of consumer rights thanks
to the federal government's indifference.

http://insightmag.com/news/260508.html

...

FERC SAYS POWER FIRMS MAYBE GAMED MARKETS

Hill Anderson asks if energy companies did manipulate the western electricity
markets.

http://insightmag.com/news/260778.html

...

A CONSTANT THORN IN CLINTONS SIDE

Stephen Goode tells us that whether hes investigating Bill Clinton's
skulduggery or the effects of lax immigration control, David Bossie and Citizens
United aim to be timely, tough and truthful.

http://insightmag.com/news/260517.html

...

HOW THE WEST BECAME NUMBER 1

Hans Nichols says Dinesh D'Souza defangs the multiculturalists.

http://insightmag.com/news/260512.html

INSIGHT SUBSCRIPTION SPECIAL!

Save $50.83 (Off Our Newsstand Price)

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Search

2002-08-15 Thread Donna Rossi




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JOSEPH 
CHRIS PARTNERS
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SEARCH
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Underwriter 
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DESCRIPTION:
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TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)


[resend via different node: [EMAIL PROTECTED] seems to be dead --
primary MX refusing connections]

Phew... the document is certainly tortuous, and has a large number of
similarly and confusingly named credentials, certificates and keys,
however from what I can tell this is what is going on:

Summary: I think the endorsement key and it's hardware manufacturers
certificate is generated at manufacture and is not allowed to be
changed.  Changing ownership only means (typically) deleting old
identities and creating new ones.

The longer version...

- endorsement key generation and certification - There is one
endorsement key per TPM which is created and certified during
manufacture.  The creation and certification process is 1) create
endorsement key pair, 2) export public key endorsement key, 3)
hardware manufacturer signs endorsement public key to create an
endorsement certificate (to certify that that endorsement public key
belongs to this TPM), 4) the certificate is stored in the TPM (for
later use in communications with the privacy CA.)

- ownership - Then there is the concept of ownership.  The spec says
the TPM MUST ship with no Owner installed.  The owner when he wishes
to claim ownership choose a authentication token which is sent into
the TPM encrypted with the endorsement key.  (They give the example of
the authentication token being the hash of a password).  Physical
presence tests apply to claiming ownership (eg think BIOS POST with no
networking enabled, or physical pin on motherboard like BIOS flash
enable).  The authentication token and ownership can be changed.  The
TPM can be reset back to a state with no current owner.  BUT _at no
point_ does the TPM endorsement private key leave the TPM.  The
TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair function is allowed to be called once
(during manufacture) and is thereafter disabled.

- identity keys - Then there is the concept of identity keys.  The
current owner can create and delete identities, which can be anonymous
or pseudonymous.  Presumably the owner would delete all identity keys
before giving the TPM to a new owner.  The identity public key is
certified by the privacy CA.

- privacy ca - The privacy CA accepts identity key certification
requests which contain a) identity public key b) a proof of possession
(PoP) of identity private key (signature on challenge), c) the
hardware manufacturers endorsement certificate containing the TPM's
endorsement public key.  The privacy CA checks whether the endorsement
certificate is signed by a hardware manufacturer it trusts.  The
privacy CA sends in response an identity certificate encrypted with
the TPM's endorsement public key.  The TPM decrypts the encrypted
identity certifate with the endorsement private key.

- remote attestation - The owner uses the identity keys in the remote
attestation functions.  Note that the identity private keys are also
generated on the TPM, the private key also never leaves the TPM.  The
identity private key is certified by the privacy CA as having been
requested by a certified endorsement key.


The last two paragraphs imply something else interesting: the privacy
CA can collude with anyone to create a virtualized environment.  (This
is because the TPM endorsement key is never directly used in remote
attestation for privacy reasons.)  All that is required to virtualize
a TPM is an attestation from the privacy CA in creating an identity
certificate.

So there are in fact three avenues for FBI et al to go about obtaining
covert access to the closed space formed by TCPA applications: 

(A) get one of the hardware manufacturers to sign an endorsement key
generated outside a TPM (or get the endorsement CA's private key), or

(B) get a widely used and accepted privacy CA to overlook it's policy
of demanding a hardware manufacturer CA endorsed endorsement public
key and sign an identity public key created outside of a TPM (or get
the privacy CA's private key).

(C) create their own privacy CA and persuade an internet server they
wish to investigate the users of to accept it.  Create themselves a
virtualized client using their own privacy CA, look inside.


I think to combat problem C) as a user of a service you'd want the
remote attestation of software state to auditably include it's
accepted privacy CA database to see if there are any strange Privacy
CAs on there.

I think you could set up and use your own privacy CA, but you can be
sure the RIAA/MPAA will never trust your CA.  A bit like self-signing
SSL site keys.  If you and your friends add your CA to their trusted
root CA database it'll work.  In this case however people have to
trust your home-brew privacy CA not to issue identity certificates
without having seen a valid hardware-endorsement key if they care
about preventing virtualization for the privacy or security of some
network application.

Also, they seem to take explicit steps to prevent you getting multiple
privacy CA certificates on the same identity key.  (I'm not sure why.)

Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA

2002-08-15 Thread Anonymous


[Repost]

Joe Ashwood writes:

 Actually that does nothing to stop it. Because of the construction of TCPA,
 the private keys are registered _after_ the owner receives the computer,
 this is the window of opportunity against that as well.

Actually, this is not true for the endoresement key, PUBEK/PRIVEK, which
is the main TPM key, the one which gets certified by the TPM Entity.
That key is generated only once on a TPM, before ownership, and must
exist before anyone can take ownership.  For reference, see section 9.2,
The first call to TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair generates the endorsement
key pair. After a successful completion of TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair
all subsequent calls return TCPA_FAIL.  Also section 9.2.1 shows that
no ownership proof is necessary for this step, which is because there is
no owner at that time.  Then look at section 5.11.1, on taking ownership:
user must encrypt the values using the PUBEK.  So the PUBEK must exist
before anyone can take ownership.

 The worst case for
 cost of this is to purchase an additional motherboard (IIRC Fry's has them
 as low as $50), giving the ability to present a purchase. The
 virtual-private key is then created, and registered using the credentials
 borrowed from the second motherboard. Since TCPA doesn't allow for direct
 remote queries against the hardware, the virtual system will actually have
 first shot at the incoming data. That's the worst case.

I don't quite follow what you are proposing here, but by the time you
purchase a board with a TPM chip on it, it will have already generated
its PUBEK and had it certified.  So you should not be able to transfer
a credential of this type from one board to another one.

 The expected case;
 you pay a small registration fee claiming that you accidentally wiped your
 TCPA. The best case, you claim you accidentally wiped your TCPA, they
 charge you nothing to remove the record of your old TCPA, and replace it
 with your new (virtualized) TCPA. So at worst this will cost $50. Once
 you've got a virtual setup, that virtual setup (with all its associated
 purchased rights) can be replicated across an unlimited number of computers.
 
 The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an owner,
 and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this was
 designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a point of
 attack.

Actually I don't see a function that will let the owner wipe the PUBEK.
He can wipe the rest of the TPM but that field appears to be set once,
retained forever.

For example, section 8.10: Clear is the process of returning the TPM to
factory defaults.  But a couple of paragraphs later: All TPM volatile
and non-volatile data is set to default value except the endorsement
key pair.

So I don't think your fraud will work.  Users will not wipe their
endorsement keys, accidentally or otherwise.  If a chip is badly enough
damaged that the PUBEK is lost, you will need a hardware replacement,
as I read the spec.

Keep in mind that I only started learning this stuff a few weeks ago,
so I am not an expert, but this is how it looks to me.

Re: Spam blocklists?

2002-08-15 Thread Marcel Popescu


From: Sunder [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 None of those things work.  Most spammers don't give a shit if you don't
 receive email.  I can attest to this by the slew of spam going to
 hostmaster, webmaster, and the like on many networks.  What they're really
 selling is ten million addresses and spam software.  Even if 9 million
 of those are bullshit, they couldn't care less.  The more things with @
 signs in'em the more money they make off clueless businesses.

We talk about different things then :) I don't care that they make money off
clueless businesses... I care that they don't send ME spam. If I can solve
the second problem, the first one will take care of itself.

Mark

CT-RSA 2003 -- preliminary call for papers

2002-08-15 Thread Trei, Peter

[From sci.crypt -pt]

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Marc Joye)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt.research, sci.crypt
Subject: CT-RSA 2003 -- preliminary call for papers
Date:  Thu, 15 Aug 2002 12:20:39 + (UTC)

===

   Preliminary Call for Papers -- CT-RSA 2003

   Submission deadline: Oct. 1, 2002

  Cryptographers' Track, RSA Conference 2003 (CT-RSA 2003)
   April 13-17, 2003, Moscone Center, San Francisco, USA
   http://reg2.lke.com/rs3/rsa2003/crypto.html
(see also http://www.rsaconference.net/)

===

Following the success of the two previous editions, the
Cryptographers' Track of RSA Conference 2003 (CT-RSA 2003)
will be run as an anonymously refereed conference with
proceedings. The proceedings of CT-RSA 2001 and CT-RSA 2002 were
published in Springer-Verlag's Lecture Notes in Computer Science
series as LNCS 2020 and LNCS 2271, respectively.

Original research papers pertaining to all aspects of cryptography
as well as tutorials are solicited. Submissions may present theory,
techniques, applications and practical experience on topics
including, but not limited to: fast implementations, secure
electronic commerce, network security and intrusion detection,
formal security models, comparison and assessment, tamper
resistance, certification and time-stamping, cryptographic data
formats and standards, encryption and signature schemes, public
key infrastructure, protocols, elliptic curve cryptography,
cryptographic algorithm design and cryptanalysis, discrete
logarithms and factorization techniques, lattice reduction, and
provable security.

IMPORTANT DATES:

  Submission deadline: Oct. 1, 2002
  Acceptance notification: Nov. 1, 2002
  Proceedings version: Nov. 17, 2002

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS:

The program committee invites research contributions and tutorials
in the broad area of applications and theory of cryptography.
Correspondence, including submissions, will take place entirely
via e-mail. All submissions will be blind refereed. To make a
submission, please send two separate e-mail messages to

   [EMAIL PROTECTED]

(the first message should contain the paper's title, the names and
affiliations of the authors and should identify the contact author,
including e-mail and postal addresses; the second message should
contain the submission itself in PostScript or in PDF).

The paper must be anonymous, with no author names, affiliations,
acknowledgements, or obvious references.  It should begin with a
title, a short abstract, and a list of keywords.  The paper should
be at most 12 pages (excluding the bibliography and clearly marked
appendices), and at most 18 pages in total, using at least 11-point
font and reasonable margins.  Submissions not meeting these
guidelines risk rejection without consideration of their merits.

PROCEEDINGS

For an accepted paper to be included in the proceedings, the
authors of the paper must guarantee that at least one of the
co-authors will attend the conference and deliver the talk
(registration fees will be waived for the co-author delivering
the talk).

PROGRAM COMMITTEE:

  Giuseppe Ateniese  Chi-Sung Laih
  John Black Tatsuaki Okamoto
  Daniel Bleichenbacher  David Pointcheval
  Rosario GennaroBart Preneel
  Stuart Haber   Jean-Jacques Quisquater
  Helena Handschuh   Tsuyoshi Takagi
  Markus Jakobsson   Gene Tsudik
  Antoine Joux   Serge Vaudenay
  Marc Joye (Chair)  Sung-Ming Yen
  Kwangjo KimMoti Yung
  Seungjoo Kim   Yuliang Zheng

TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)


Phew... the document is certainly tortuous, and has a large number of
similarly and confusingly named credentials, certificates and keys,
however from what I can tell this is what is going on:

Summary: I think the endorsement key and it's hardware manufacturers
certificate is generated at manufacture and is not allowed to be
changed.  Changing ownership only means (typically) deleting old
identities and creating new ones.

The longer version...

- endorsement key generation and certification - There is one
endorsement key per TPM which is created and certified during
manufacture.  The creation and certification process is 1) create
endorsement key pair, 2) export public key endorsement key, 3)
hardware manufacturer signs endorsement public key to create an
endorsement certificate (to certify that that endorsement public key
belongs to this TPM), 4) the certificate is stored in the TPM (for
later use in communications with the privacy CA.)

- ownership - Then there is the concept of ownership.  The spec says
the TPM MUST ship with no Owner installed.  The owner when he wishes
to claim ownership choose a authentication token which is sent into
the TPM encrypted with the endorsement key.  (They give the example of
the authentication token being the hash of a password).  Physical
presence tests apply to claiming ownership (eg think BIOS POST with no
networking enabled, or physical pin on motherboard like BIOS flash
enable).  The authentication token and ownership can be changed.  The
TPM can be reset back to a state with no current owner.  BUT _at no
point_ does the TPM endorsement private key leave the TPM.  The
TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair function is allowed to be called once
(during manufacture) and is thereafter disabled.

- identity keys - Then there is the concept of identity keys.  The
current owner can create and delete identities, which can be anonymous
or pseudonymous.  Presumably the owner would delete all identity keys
before giving the TPM to a new owner.  The identity public key is
certified by the privacy CA.

- privacy ca - The privacy CA accepts identity key certification
requests which contain a) identity public key b) a proof of possession
(PoP) of identity private key (signature on challenge), c) the
hardware manufacturers endorsement certificate containing the TPM's
endorsement public key.  The privacy CA checks whether the endorsement
certificate is signed by a hardware manufacturer it trusts.  The
privacy CA sends in response an identity certificate encrypted with
the TPM's endorsement public key.  The TPM decrypts the encrypted
identity certifate with the endorsement private key.

- remote attestation - The owner uses the identity keys in the remote
attestation functions.  Note that the identity private keys are also
generated on the TPM, the private key also never leaves the TPM.  The
identity private key is certified by the privacy CA as having been
requested by a certified endorsement key.


The last two paragraphs imply something else interesting: the privacy
CA can collude with anyone to create a virtualized environment.  (This
is because the TPM endorsement key is never directly used in remote
attestation for privacy reasons.)  All that is required to virtualize
a TPM is an attestation from the privacy CA in creating an identity
certificate.

So there are in fact three avenues for FBI et al to go about obtaining
covert access to the closed space formed by TCPA applications: 

(A) get one of the hardware manufacturers to sign an endorsement key
generated outside a TPM (or get the endorsement CA's private key), or

(B) get a widely used and accepted privacy CA to overlook it's policy
of demanding a hardware manufacturer CA endorsed endorsement public
key and sign an identity public key created outside of a TPM (or get
the privacy CA's private key).

(C) create their own privacy CA and persuade an internet server they
wish to investigate the users of to accept it.  Create themselves a
virtualized client using their own privacy CA, look inside.


I think to combat problem C) as a user of a service you'd want the
remote attestation of software state to auditably include it's
accepted privacy CA database to see if there are any strange Privacy
CAs on there.

I think you could set up and use your own privacy CA, but you can be
sure the RIAA/MPAA will never trust your CA.  A bit like self-signing
SSL site keys.  If you and your friends add your CA to their trusted
root CA database it'll work.  In this case however people have to
trust your home-brew privacy CA not to issue identity certificates
without having seen a valid hardware-endorsement key if they care
about preventing virtualization for the privacy or security of some
network application.

Also, they seem to take explicit steps to prevent you getting multiple
privacy CA certificates on the same identity key.  (I'm not sure why.)
It seems like a bad thing as it forces you to trust just one CA, it
prevents web of trust which

Re: trade-offs of secure programming with Palladium (Re: Palladium: technical limits and implications)

2002-08-15 Thread Russell Nelson


Adam Back writes:
  So there are practical limits stemming from realities to do with code
  complexity being inversely proportional to auditability and security,
  but the extra ring -1, remote attestation, sealing and integrity
  metrics really do offer some security advantages over the current
  situation.

You're wearing your programmer's hat when you say that.  But the
problem isn't programming, but is instead economic.  Switch hats.  The
changes that you list above may or may not offer some security
advantages.  Who cares?  What really matters is whether they increase
the cost of copying.  I say that the answer is no, for a very simple
reason: breaking into your own computer is a victimless crime.

In a crime there are at least two parties: the victim and the
perpetrator.  What makes the so-called victimless crime unique is that
the victim is not present for the perpetration of the crime.  In such
a crime, all of the perpetrators have reason to keep silent about the
comission of the crime.  So it will be with people breaking into their
own TCPA-protected computer and application.  Nobody with evidence of
the crime is interested in reporting the crime, nor in stopping
further crimes.

Yes, the TCPA hardware introduces difficulties.  If there is way
around them in software, then someone need only write it once.  The
whole TCPA house of cards relies on no card ever falling down.  Once
it falls down, people have unrestricted access to content.  And that
means that we go back to today's game, where the contents of CDs are
open and available for modification.  Someone could distribute a pile
of random bits, which, when xored with the encrypted copy, becomes
an unencrypted copy.

-- 
-russ nelson  http://russnelson.com |
Crynwr sells support for free software  | PGPok | businesses persuade
521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | governments coerce
Potsdam, NY 13676-3213  | +1 315 268 9201 FAX   |

Re: status of various projects?

2002-08-15 Thread Myers W. Carpenter


On Wed, 2002-08-14 at 10:58, Miles Fidelman wrote:
 It seems like a lot of interesting projects haven't been active for a
 while - notably Free Haven and Eternity Usenet.  Where is the most active
 work, these days,  on distributed publishing systems?

Try Mnet (http://mnet.sf.net/).  It's the continuation of the Mojo
Nation code base.  We are close to a stable release (0.5.1), but there
are a lot of known bugs that we are leaving in the system (because we
are rewriting the code that the bugs are found in).

Our main goal for the next release is to make it easier for new coders
to understand what's going on under the hood.  That and replacing the
single point of failure metatracker system with a distributed hash
table. 

The old mojo token based system is no longer in use, but we hope to
replace it with an OpenDBS based system, or a stamp based system.

myers

Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA


Joe Ashwood writes:

 Actually that does nothing to stop it. Because of the construction of TCPA,
 the private keys are registered _after_ the owner receives the computer,
 this is the window of opportunity against that as well.

Actually, this is not true for the endoresement key, PUBEK/PRIVEK, which
is the main TPM key, the one which gets certified by the TPM Entity.
That key is generated only once on a TPM, before ownership, and must
exist before anyone can take ownership.  For reference, see section 9.2,
The first call to TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair generates the endorsement
key pair. After a successful completion of TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair
all subsequent calls return TCPA_FAIL.  Also section 9.2.1 shows that
no ownership proof is necessary for this step, which is because there is
no owner at that time.  Then look at section 5.11.1, on taking ownership:
user must encrypt the values using the PUBEK.  So the PUBEK must exist
before anyone can take ownership.

 The worst case for
 cost of this is to purchase an additional motherboard (IIRC Fry's has them
 as low as $50), giving the ability to present a purchase. The
 virtual-private key is then created, and registered using the credentials
 borrowed from the second motherboard. Since TCPA doesn't allow for direct
 remote queries against the hardware, the virtual system will actually have
 first shot at the incoming data. That's the worst case.

I don't quite follow what you are proposing here, but by the time you
purchase a board with a TPM chip on it, it will have already generated
its PUBEK and had it certified.  So you should not be able to transfer
a credential of this type from one board to another one.

 The expected case;
 you pay a small registration fee claiming that you accidentally wiped your
 TCPA. The best case, you claim you accidentally wiped your TCPA, they
 charge you nothing to remove the record of your old TCPA, and replace it
 with your new (virtualized) TCPA. So at worst this will cost $50. Once
 you've got a virtual setup, that virtual setup (with all its associated
 purchased rights) can be replicated across an unlimited number of computers.
 
 The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an owner,
 and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this was
 designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a point of
 attack.

Actually I don't see a function that will let the owner wipe the PUBEK.
He can wipe the rest of the TPM but that field appears to be set once,
retained forever.

For example, section 8.10: Clear is the process of returning the TPM to
factory defaults.  But a couple of paragraphs later: All TPM volatile
and non-volatile data is set to default value except the endorsement
key pair.

So I don't think your fraud will work.  Users will not wipe their
endorsement keys, accidentally or otherwise.  If a chip is badly enough
damaged that the PUBEK is lost, you will need a hardware replacement,
as I read the spec.

Keep in mind that I only started learning this stuff a few weeks ago,
so I am not an expert, but this is how it looks to me.

You deserve a vacation

2002-08-15 Thread a10ecun










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RE: trade-offs of secure programming with Palladium (Re: Palladiu m: technical limits and implications)

2002-08-15 Thread Trei, Peter


 Russell Nelson[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] writes:
 
 You're wearing your programmer's hat when you say that.  But the
 problem isn't programming, but is instead economic.  Switch hats.  The
 changes that you list above may or may not offer some security
 advantages.  Who cares?  What really matters is whether they increase
 the cost of copying.  I say that the answer is no, for a very simple
 reason: breaking into your own computer is a victimless crime.
 
 In a crime there are at least two parties: the victim and the
 perpetrator.  What makes the so-called victimless crime unique is that
 the victim is not present for the perpetration of the crime.  In such
 a crime, all of the perpetrators have reason to keep silent about the
 comission of the crime.  So it will be with people breaking into their
 own TCPA-protected computer and application.  Nobody with evidence of
 the crime is interested in reporting the crime, nor in stopping
 further crimes.
 
[...]

Russ: 

Take off your economic hat, and try on a law-enforcement one.

With DMCA, etal, the tools to get around TCPA's taking of your
right to use your property as you please have been criminalized.
(Don't argue that TCPA will always be voluntary. I don't beleive 
that).

I have little patience with arguments which say 'Yeah, they can
make X against the law, but clever people like me can always
get around it, and won't get caught, so I don't care.'

Maybe you can, some of the time, but that's not the point. Most
people won't, either because it's too hard, they don't know what
they've lost, or because of a misplaced respect for the whims of 
The Men with Guns. This is not a Good Thing.

A freedom to skulk in the shadows, hoping not to be noticed, is not
the legacy I wish to leave behind.

Peter Trei

Re: 2seks

2002-08-15 Thread Ser Bilgin


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TCPA hack delay appeal


It seems that there is (a rather brilliant) way to bypass TCPA (as spec-ed.) I learned 
about it from two separate sources, looks like two independent slightly different 
hacks based on the same protocol flaw.

Undoubtedly, more people will figure this out.

It seems wise to suppress the urge and craving for fame and NOT to publish the 
findings at this time. Let them build the thing into zillion chips first. If you must, 
post the encrypted time-stamped solution identifying you as the author but do not 
release the key before TCPA is in many, many PCs.

Re: TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)

2002-08-15 Thread Mike Rosing


On Thu, 15 Aug 2002, Adam Back wrote:

 Summary: I think the endorsement key and it's hardware manufacturers
 certificate is generated at manufacture and is not allowed to be
 changed.  Changing ownership only means (typically) deleting old
 identities and creating new ones.

Are there 2 certificates?  One from the manufacturer and one from
the privacy CA?

 - endorsement key generation and certification - There is one
 endorsement key per TPM which is created and certified during
 manufacture.  The creation and certification process is 1) create
 endorsement key pair, 2) export public key endorsement key, 3)
 hardware manufacturer signs endorsement public key to create an
 endorsement certificate (to certify that that endorsement public key
 belongs to this TPM), 4) the certificate is stored in the TPM (for
 later use in communications with the privacy CA.)

So finding the manufacturers signature key breaks the whole system
right?  Once you have that key you can create as many fake TPM's
as you want.

 TPM can be reset back to a state with no current owner.  BUT _at no
 point_ does the TPM endorsement private key leave the TPM.  The
 TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair function is allowed to be called once
 (during manufacture) and is thereafter disabled.

But it's easier to manufacture it by burning fuse links so it
can't be read back - ala OTP.  so the manufacturer could have a
list of every private key (just because they aren't supposed to
doesn't prevent it.)  It still meets the spec - the key never leaves
the chip.

 - identity keys - Then there is the concept of identity keys.  The
 current owner can create and delete identities, which can be anonymous
 or pseudonymous.  Presumably the owner would delete all identity keys
 before giving the TPM to a new owner.  The identity public key is
 certified by the privacy CA.

 - privacy ca - The privacy CA accepts identity key certification
 requests which contain a) identity public key b) a proof of possession
 (PoP) of identity private key (signature on challenge), c) the
 hardware manufacturers endorsement certificate containing the TPM's
 endorsement public key.  The privacy CA checks whether the endorsement
 certificate is signed by a hardware manufacturer it trusts.  The
 privacy CA sends in response an identity certificate encrypted with
 the TPM's endorsement public key.  The TPM decrypts the encrypted
 identity certifate with the endorsement private key.

How does the CA check the endorsement certificate?  If it's by
checking the signature, then finding the manufacturer's private
key is very worthwhile - the entire TCPA for 100's of millions
of computers gets compromised.  If it's by matching with the
manufacturer's list then anonymity is impossible.

Thanks for the analysis Adam.  It seems like there are a couple of
obvious points to attack this system at.  I would think it's easy
to break for a large enough government.

Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike

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enforcement officer who has repeatedly called for constitutional revisions. 
Regulatory agencies are filled with those previously regulated. Soldiers 
patrol transportation centers. International treaties are abrogated. 
International legal organizations are shunned. Roles of police and military 
are blurred. Law enforcement agencies are centralized. Individual civil 
rights are reduced. A shadow government is created.
Domestic surveillance is increased. People are encouraged to spy on each 
other. Military budgets are increased. The military establishes a 
disinformation program. Media access to government is limited. 
Consultations with the legislative branch decline. Connections to corrupt 
corporate sponsors are disavowed. Efforts to further plunder natural 
resources for profit are initiated. Access to past administrations' 
documents is limited. A war mentality is established with imprecise 
enemies. Nebulous fear- inducing alerts are periodically released. National 
level profiling is introduced. People are imprisoned without public charges 
and unknown others are disappeared.
http://www.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=198145group=webcast
Don't mention the war.

Re: TCPA hack delay appeal

2002-08-15 Thread John Young


Well, it's probably safer to publish the hack anonymously
and see if it withstands counter-hacking. Could be Microsoft
is baiting and waiting for just such attacks. The giant might
even leak and spread a few itself in order to shoot them down, 
to boost its eye-mote credibility.

Send the hack to Cryptome anonymously if there's no better 
way to test its effectiveness. Keeping snakeoil secret is a sure
way to uncontested success, aka the way of Redmond.

Re: TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)


I think a number of the apparent conflicts go away if you carefully
track endorsement key pair vs endorsement certificate (signature on
endorsement key by hw manufacturer).  For example where it is said
that the endorsement _certificate_ could be inserted after ownership
has been established (not the endorsement key), so that apparent
conflict goes away.  (I originally thought this particular one was a
conflict also, until I noticed that.)  I see anonymous found the same
thing.

But anyway this extract from the CC PP makes clear the intention and
an ST based on this PP is what a given TPM will be evaluated based on:

http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/PPentries/CCEVS-020016-PP-TPM1_9_4.pdf

p 20:
| The TSF shall restrict the ability to initialize or modify the TSF 
| data: Endorsement Key Pair [...] to the TPM manufacturer or designee.

(if only they could have managed to say that in the spec).

Adam
--
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/

Apply For a Cell Phone And Get a FREE VACATION!!!

2002-08-15 Thread Special Deals

Title: Free Phone Search
   



 
 
 
   You have
signed up with one of our network partners to receive email providing you
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employment market for applied cryptographers?


On the employment situation... it seems that a lot of applied
cryptographers are currently unemployed (Tim Dierks, Joseph, a few
ex-colleagues, and friends who asked if I had any leads, the spate of
recent security consultant .sigs, plus I heard that a straw poll of
attenders at the codecon conference earlier this year showed close to
50% out of work).

Are there any more definitive security industry stats?  Are applied
crypto people suffering higher rates of unemployment than general
application programmers?  (From my statistically too small sample of
acquaintances it might appear so.)

If this is so, why is it?

- you might think the physical security push following the world
political instability worries following Sep 11th would be accompanied
by a corresponding information security push -- jittery companies
improving their disaster recovery and to a lesser extent info sec
plans.

- governments are still harping on the info-war hype, national
information infrastructure protection, and the US Information Security
Czar Clarke making grandiose pronouncements about how industry ought
to do various things (that the USG spent the last 10 years doing it's
best to frustrate industry from doing with it's dumb export laws)

- even Microsoft has decided to make a play of cleaning up it's
security act (you'd wonder if this was in fact a cover for Palladium
which I think is likely a big play for them in terms of future control
points and (anti-)competitive strategy -- as well as obviously a play
for the home entertainment system space with DRM)

However these reasons are perhaps more than cancelled by:

- dot-com bubble (though I saw some news reports earlier that though
there is lots of churn in programmers in general, that long term
unemployment rates were not that elevated in general)

- perhaps security infrastructure and software upgrades are the first
things to be canned when cash runs short?  

- software security related contract employees laid off ahead of
full-timers?  Certainly contracting seems to be flat in general, and
especially in crypto software contracts look few and far between.  At
least in the UK some security people are employed in that way (not
familiar with north america).

- PKI seems to have fizzled compared to earlier exaggerated
expectations, presumably lots of applied crypto jobs went at PKI
companies downsizing.  (If you ask me over use of ASN.1 and adoption
of broken over complex and ill-defined ITU standards X.500, X.509
delayed deployment schedules by order of magnitude over what was
strictly necessary and contributed to interoperability problems and I
think significantly to the flop of PKI -- if it's that hard because of
the broken tech, people will just do something else.)

- custom crypto and security related software development is perhaps
weighted towards dot-coms that just crashed.

- big one probably: lack of measurability of security -- developers
with no to limited crypto know-how are probably doing (and bodging)
most of the crypto development that gets done in general, certainly
contributing to the crappy state of crypto in software.  So probably
failure to realise this issue or perhaps just not caring, or lack of
financial incentives to care on the part of software developers.
Microsoft is really good at this one.  The number of times they
re-used RC4 keys in different protocols is amazing!


Other explanations?  Statistics?  Sample-of-one stories?

Adam
--
yes, still employed in sofware security industry; and in addition have
been doing crypto consulting since 97 (http://www.cypherspace.net/) if
you have any interesting applied crypto projects; reference
commissions paid.

Fw: A faster test for PRIMALITY?

2002-08-15 Thread Gary Jeffers

- Original Message - 
From: Gary Jeffers [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2002 5:47 PM
Subject: Fw: A faster test for PRIMALITY?

 - Original Message -
 From: Gary Jeffers [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2002 9:25 PM
 Subject: A faster test for PRIMALITY?

  My fellow Cypherpunks,

  Lucky Green says:
  AFICT, the proposed algorithm is for a test for primality and does not
  represent an algorithm to factor composites.

  Well, pardon me!  I was in a hurry and should have proof read. As a
 save,
  however, I did put a question mark at the end  :-)

  Yours Truly,
  Gary Jeffers

  Beat State!!!
  And the other oppressors.

Re: TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change

2002-08-15 Thread James A. Donald


--
On 15 Aug 2002 at 15:26, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
 Basically I agree with Adam's analysis.  At this point I 
 think he understands the spec equally as well as I do.  He 
 has a good point about the Privacy CA key being another 
 security weakness that could break the whole system.  It 
 would be good to consider how exactly that problem could be 
 eliminated using more sophisticated crypto.

Lucky claims to have pointed this out two years ago, proposed 
more sophisticated crypto, and received a hostile reception.

Which leads me to suspect that the capability of the powerful 
to break the system is a designed in feature.  

--digsig
 James A. Donald
 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
 JjoH8U8qZ1eOdT/yGjfV7Xz9andBZPeYWaOLC+NP
 2/OJG2MZSnAqcyuvUsNZTsQAcffGGST6LJ7e9vFbK

.. the productive and most profitable way to organize is to disintegrate.


The Declustering of America:
With the new telecommunications technology, it is increasingly easy
for a firm to operate in a dispersed manner. Although only really
discussing geography, I find articles like this fascinating, of course,
because today are living early forms of the next company
described by Peter Drucker: By
now the new information technology  Internet and e-mail  have
practically eliminated the physical costs of communications. This has
meant that the most productive and most profitable way to organize is to
disintegrate.
6:36:27 AM 
http://www.ozzie.net/blog/

Re: TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)

2002-08-15 Thread lynn . wheeler


I arrived at that decision over four years ago ... TCPA possibly didn't
decide on it until two years ago. In the assurance session in the TCPA
track at spring 2001 intel developer's conference I claimed my chip was
much more KISS, more secure, and could reasonably meet the TCPA
requirements at the time w/o additional modifications. One of the TCPA guys
in the audience grossed that I didn't have to contend with the committees
of hundreds helping me with my design.

There are actually significant similarities between my chip and the TPM
chips.

I'm doing key gen at very first, initial power-on/test of wafer off the
line (somewhere in dim past it was drilled into me that everytime something
has to be handled it increases the cost).

Also, because of extreme effort at KISS, the standard PP evaluation stuff
gets much simpler and easier because most (possibly 90 percent) of the
stuff is N/A or doesn't exist

early ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#staw

or refs at (under subject aads chip strawman):
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#aads

brand  other misc. stuff:
http://www.asuretee.com/

random evauation refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#13 anybody seen (EAL5) semi-formal
specification for FIPS186-2/x9.62 ecdsa?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#86 formal fips186-2/x9.62 definition
for eal 5/6 evaluation



[EMAIL PROTECTED] on 8/15/2002 6:44 pm wrote:

I think a number of the apparent conflicts go away if you carefully
track endorsement key pair vs endorsement certificate (signature on
endorsement key by hw manufacturer).  For example where it is said
that the endorsement _certificate_ could be inserted after ownership
has been established (not the endorsement key), so that apparent
conflict goes away.  (I originally thought this particular one was a
conflict also, until I noticed that.)  I see anonymous found the same
thing.

But anyway this extract from the CC PP makes clear the intention and
an ST based on this PP is what a given TPM will be evaluated based on:

http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/PPentries/CCEVS-020016-PP-TPM1_9_4.pdf

p 20:
| The TSF shall restrict the ability to initialize or modify the TSF
| data: Endorsement Key Pair [...] to the TPM manufacturer or designee.

(if only they could have managed to say that in the spec).

Adam
--
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/

au PROMIS

Searched the web for
police realtime online management
system. Results 1 - 10 of about 2,740. Search took 0.23 seconds.

Rapport de l'OICS pour 2001 - Table des matières- [Translate this page ]
... PNUCID Programme des Nations Unies pour le contrôle international des drogues
PROMIS Police Realtime Online Management Information System (Australie) SADC ...
www.incb.org/f/ar/2001/menu.htm - 18k - Cached - Similar pages
Informe de la JIFE de 2001 - Índice- [Translate this page ]
... PNUFID Programa de las Naciones Unidas para la Fiscalización Internacional de
Drogas PROMIS Police Realtime Online Management Information System (Australia ...
www.incb.org/s/ar/2001/menu.htm - 18k - Cached - Similar pages
[ More results from www.incb.org ]
July 1996 - Technology Snapshot
... Local police and sheriffs' departments in Louisiana now ... access to the Louisiana Law
Enforcement Management System, ... to implement CAD/Partner, a realtime, online ...
www.govtech.net/magazine/gt/1996/ july/snapjuly/snapjuly.phtml - 20k - Cached - Similar pages
May 1997 - Raising Highway IQ
... general office, Emergency Management Agency, State Police, ... will be able to obtain
realtime, online ... system, a relational database management system, realtime ...
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[ More results from www.govtech.net ]
Intelligent Enterprise Magazine - Smarter, Faster, More ...
... of an overall effort by the state to provide online ... by defrauders, Target hopes to
profit handsomely from realtime, ... The West Midlands, UK, Police Department. ...
www.intelligententerprise.com/ 011004/415smarter1_2.shtml - 27k - Cached - Similar pages
Enterprise Systems | Past Issues Archive
... logistics and procurement functions for all Royal Canadian Mounted Police assets ... An
Online Transaction Processing (OLTP) allows realtime management ...
www.esj.com/back_issues/toc.asp?MON=11YR=2000 - 35k - Cached - Similar pages
News - Global Telematics Announces 100th Order for Online Vehicle ...
... Global Telematics announces 100th order for online ... fleet markets, including local
authorities and police, ... include vehicle and equipment load tracking, realtime ...
www.itsa.org/ITSNEWS.NSF/4e0650bef6193b3e852562350056a3a7/ 0872c3daee4e54b885256a6a0066ea61?OpenDocument - 12k - Cached - Similar pages
SchlumbergerSema | Public Sector: Criminal Justice Management
... The movement and management of secure ... are part of this new system and ... Commission;
Lord Chancellor's Department; Police ...
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[RTF]Title
File Format: Rich Text Format - View as HTML
... Development Environment. NATURAL. Core Applications. Interfaces. Online feed to ... PROMIS
- Police Realtime Management System. Interfaces. Issues. Have approval to be ...
www.law.gov.au/crimtrac/app5.rtf - Similar pages

seized computers case.


http://www.eastsidejournal.com/sited/story/html/101835
Police must return library computers
2002-08-14
by Nora Doyle
Journal Reporter
SEATTLE -- A U.S. District Court judge said Tuesday that Kent police must
return the two computers they took from the Kent library without a search
warrant. 
In taking the computers, police did irreparable harm to both privacy and
property rights, said Judge Marcia Pechman.

Jim Bell system 2.


http://www.anti-state.com/vroman/vroman9.html
The Jim Bell System Revisited

by Robert Vroman

Ed. note: This article reflects the views of the author ONLY, not the 
editors. We have no official opinion whatsoever on the Jim Bell System, aka 
Assassination Politics.

Please see Robert Vroman's original AP article, as well as both Bob 
Murphy's and Adam Young's response.





Let me re-emphasize that I have neither the knowledge nor the will to 
implement this system. I certainly don't like the State, but I would rather 
concentrate my energies on constructive rather than destructive solutions. 
That said, I still think governments everywhere are going to be staring 
down the barrel of an encrypted gun in the near future, and this article 
attempts to explain why, in response to numerous objections received since 
my last article.

I also want to point out some areas where I think Jim Bell is completely 
off base. First of all, his insistence that AP is somehow residing in a 
loophole of the American legal system that only he is aware of, is absurd, 
as rightly pointed out by many of his critics. I have no delusions that AP 
would somehow survive its day in court or that even if, due to some 
arcane technicality, AP is a legal enterprise that that would stop the 
State from pursuing it relentlessly. Furthermore, I am mystified by Bell's 
fascination with confrontation and martyrdom (as exemplified by his 
personal life) and do not think AP will be started by the self sacrificing, 
or that it's even necessarily a good idea to have that mindset when 
designing the system. Bell also overestimates the enthusiasm that ordinary 
people will have for AP by a long shot. I still have reasons to believe 
there will sufficient customers, but they are not going to be primarily 
heartland regular Joes, who Bell envisions watching AP's deadly progress 
with amusement. Bell also gives some slightly cockeyed responses to a 
number of the objections to his invention. In fact really the main thing I 
take away from his writing is the system itself, not necessarily any of his 
justifications.

My friend and business partner, Bob Murphy presented some powerhouse 
arguments against my pet theory in our recent columnist debate over the 
infamous Assassination Politics concept. I contend that under closer 
examination, his insightful questions can be answered satisfactorily.

Additionally, Adam Young has presented a thoroughly researched historical 
analysis against AP, which I will address first.

Young has three main points. First, that assassination has been ineffectual 
in the past for destroying states. Second, assassinations will instead 
create a backlash against anarchism by government and citizens alike. Third 
he does not like the moral implications of the very likely possibility of 
collateral damage from sloppy AP prize-hunters, given the relatively poor 
caliber of historical attempts.

The first point, despite all its exhaustive research, is I'm afraid to say, 
totally erroneous, because the mechanism by which AP kills its victims is 
fundamentally different then assassination campaigns of the past. I am not 
at all surprised to read that a handful of suicidal ideologues gunning down 
a few unlucky aristocrats failed to exorcise the nation state. Assume for 
the moment that AP's basic functions materialize (I will get to Murphy's 
objections later). The pool of assassins has instantaneously expanded from 
only insane political extremists, to every single violent opportunist in 
the world who can access a computer. AP represents a veritable full scale 
war against the State, fought by the scum of society and funded by every 
partisan malcontent across the political spectrum. A dozen assassinations 
per century is certainly not going to give any politicians second thoughts 
about their career choice, any more than the dozen or so plane hijackings 
in the past 50 years makes me nervous seeing a turban in business class. 
However, logically speaking there must be some tipping point at which the 
body count is the most pressing statistic a politician has in mind. AP will 
surpass this tipping point, where history's basket case revolutionaries 
were doomed to fail. The State will of course respond in nasty ways, but 
inevitably these will prove ineffective in the face of an impenetrable 
network supporting a sustained and wide spread offensive.

Secondly, Young fears that AP will re-enforce the stereotype of anarchists 
as the 19th century mad bomber and 20th century Starbucks arsonist. This 
will then erase any chance of our winning hearts and minds via soul 
stirring online essays, and worst of all, get the lot of us gulagged.

What he fails to realize is the absolute lack of a reason for there to be 
any connection between anarchists and AP. If AP were actually launched, I 
for one would certainly not be publicly cheering it on (I probably wouldn't 
even risk staying in the country, having written this article). The

Millicent Ghetto

http://www.generossextreme.com/Whack Attack 16: Sweet Ass Butt Kisses
Kinky
D. Tom Byron. Ashley Blue, Veronica Caine, Nikita Denise, Kinky, Savanna
Rain, Brooke Daze
The opening montages are working better than ever, but as he winds up the
lest leg of his illustrious sexual world tour, Tom Byron couldn't go out
with a bang better than the one he gets with the team of Kinky and Nikita
Denise. In a scene that establishes both blistering genital and
ass-to-mouth contact ratio, the ladies join forces to give the Icon's
arsehole the tongue bath of its life. And for most guys being played for a
butt trumpet would be a pleasant enough way of ending a day- akin to
settling back in a rocking chair with a tall mint julep on the veranda at
sunset. But because he's not a plantation owner but a video company owner
with a pressing new release schedule, Byron's hot footing it in Denise's
snatch splitting the beard and fucking her accent loose prio to taking a
whack at Kinky's vowels and syllables. The British lass is first to get it
in the ass as Nikita laps the residue off Byron's cock between strokes.
Kinky reciprocates when it's Nikita's turn for a crowbar in the ass. And
for the pop shot, both girls have their eager tongues out.

Besides offering the viewer one of the last opportunities he'll have of
watching a legendary craftsman at work in a woman's rectum, what makes this
tape particularly noteworthy is the fact that Brooke no show Daze and
hers actually showed up for it. Yes, it's true. No mistaking the Tiffany
Mynx resemblance, Daze resides in the flesh and Dale Dabone resides in her
ass before all's said and done. A lusty pile driver with Dale taking the
shit chute to cocoa town highlights a pairing that caps with another ass to
mouth finisher.

Very pretty with an asshole as wholesome as her face, Ashley Blue's the
leadoff girl in this sparking ensemble. Although Blue's tits are near to
non existent, it's her trimmed vagina that Mark Davis is cuddling up to.
Then, with a throttling choke hold, Davis is all romance as he handles her
basically like a marionette on Quaaludes. Ashley displays an unbridled
vocal enthusiasm for having her snatch French kissed. And with more love
and kisses in the offing, Mark spits down her throat and fucks her
esophagus. Their anal time together is also considerable with
penis-to-mouth love very much a part of the goodwill vibe. No stranger to a
man being in her ass, or, for that fact, many strangers being in her ass,
Veronica Caine and Joey Ray re-enact the bun fight at the BM corral. Like a
man on a mission, the mission being one of excavating a new shit hole, Joey
runs some major cable through Veronica their best statement being a side
saddler with a rim-to-maw finale. Savanna Rain, who opts for a black
evening dress, warns Lee Stone that she's got a tight ass which is like
warning a huge hand about a small glove. Nevertheless Lee makes it fit and
Rain's got to quit but only after some wincing gestures, a great pile
driver and another ATM puts any chance of Rain having second thoughts out
of the way.

The Porn Industry is a Dirty Business

From the Palm Beach Post: Six weeks into her new job, Jessica Lee is still
giddy with her good fortune. I work three to five hours a day naked at
home, says Lee, 24, a UCLA grad living in Miami. I can't believe the
money. Lee claims she's making $2,000 a day as an entry-level Internet
porn star.

For more read:
http://www.gopbi.com/partners/pbpost/epaper/editions/thursday/accent_d395587185f5426700c2.html

Netdog to porn valley intercept.


JoJo Rufus Writes: I'm the owner of a rather large paysite and always 
wanted to get my head in the door to those people out in Porn Valley. Until 
I went to Internext in Florida. I was invited to an invite-only party with 
some of the bigger names on the Internet. We're talking people who run 
massive paysites scaling millions of dollars a year, tremendous TGP 
players, PHP programmers, traffic masters, AVS marketers. Everyone is 
lowkey and real. They're just like average people yet wear Rolex watches 
but drink domestic beer. Then I realize how fucked up porn people really are.

All I ever hear in the Valley are all these motherfuckers whining and 
complaining and bitching and moaning. This guy ripped me off, my 
distributor is taking too much of a cut, I never have enough money, maybe 
I'll make some money by referring this whore I picked up in Palmdale.

It's funny. Nobody ever has any money. And I'll tell you why. For a person 
to start a new venture and try to set up and own his own titles, you have 
about as fat a chance of making money than a clam trying to grow a pearl. 
You know why? Cause you'll never get paid. Term deals? Great! There are 
really only a few talented filmmakers who have enough talent to create good 
product without dishing out a bunch of generic crap. Everything's been done.

Meanwhile, the boys who are ruling the Internet are fucking liquid. They 
have cash. And they have the cash to go after the biggest and brightest 
people. They don't deal with these fuckups in porn who flunk out of company 
after company and somehow always land a job. Chuck Martino. Kid Vegas. John 
T. Bone. The list goes on and on. You know why? The Internet requires 
skills and accountability. Porn Valley has nothing but a bunch of 
backstabbing cunts with IQs of room temperature trying to figure out how 
they can skim off the top. But guess what? You rip someone off and it 
fucking lasts.

Also, you shoot a brand new girl on the Internet and it's up that day. You 
shoot a brand new girl on video and it's up in a few months but who cares. 
She's on the box of a dozen titles to boot. How new is that?

The immediacy is what matters. Shoot with the Net in mind. Don't pigeonhole 
yourself into thinking about measly video distribution. So you sell 1000 
units out the door if you're lucky. Half the distributors don't pay you on 
time. You have to beg, borrow and steal. Then you wait. Meanwhile you ain't 
got enough money to pay rent and you're left eating cheese and crackers 
like some starving Third World buffoon. You are fucking stuck.

The Internext tells us one thing. If you don't embrace the net, you are 
doomed. Like when people didn't embrace the VCR. Or the camcorder. Or DVDs. 
But guess what? The Internet requires a hell of alot more skills that those 
past technological advances and, of course, Porn Valley tends to attract 
scumbags. Ain't that about a bitch.

Mike Allen back in the news.


For being a dipshit of course...Scooped AVN: Cincinnati
Couple Go to Trial August 19
Remember what I said a couple of days ago what was going to
happen in Cincinnati in wake of adult movies being pulled from
pay-per-view. I'm sure we'll be seeing more of the following cases with
attorney Lou Sirkin working overtime: This time a Cincinnati couple-
Jennifer Dute, 31, and her husband Alan, 61 will be going to trial next
week. The Dutes were indicted by a Hamilton County grand jury this past
April on four counts of pandering obscenity, charges that carry a maximum
sentence of four years in prison. Their company, AJ Specialty, also
was indicted on four counts of pandering obscenity and faces a maximum
fine of $40,000. 
The search warrant was served March 21. Hamilton County Prosecutor Mike
Allen said the pair sold pornographic videos by mail despite a court
order prohibiting such sales to or from Hamilton County. Authorities
said sales were made Feb. 11, March 4, March 7, and March 21. Officials
said the Dutes pleaded guilty to similar charges three years ago. 
In 1999, Jennifer Dute faced two counts of pandering obscenity and a
possible three years in jail. At that time she was accused of starring in
two videos  Jennifer 2 and Jennifer 3  and then marketing
them on a Web site and in a local newspaper, Everybody's News- now
defunct. Prosecutor Mike Allen said the Hamilton County Sheriff's office
investigated the case and purchased copies of the videos. Allen said
investigators determined they may violate community standards for
obscenity. Dute avoided going to prison when she swore she'd never again
sell her home-made porn tapes in or from Hamilton County. But Hamilton
County officials say she lied because they bought more home-made porn
tapes - starring the 31-year-old Ms. Dute - from her Anderson Township
home at least four times in February and March.
Allen was the brains trust behind the great professor rat hunt of
2001.

TIPS San diego style.


Dave Cummings posts: If any of you have involved any government authorities 
in any aspect of the past emails from pornstar hater, zodia killer (aka: 
bryan sullivan?), please let FBI Special Agent Mike Wagoner at the San 
Diego FBI office (858-499-7736) know so that he can contact those agencies 
and integrate information and coordinate with them on any ongoing 
investigations the San Diego FBI has now opened an active investigation 
into the below email, and others of a threatening nature that seem of 
concern to them. I've advised FBI Agent Wagoner that there was a posting a 
few months ago about the St Louis FBI office supposedly having contacted 
the individual; I also advised him that I reported the below email to the 
Army's Criminal Investigative Division and Department of Defense, in case 
war crimes might be involved. And, that my copy of the Chad Luke latter 
was faxed, as requested by them, to Postal Inspectors (just in case, as 
some folks have speculated, the letters many of us received might possibly 
have actually been from bryan sullivan). The FBI asked that I place my 
letter and envelope into a sealed plastic bag in case it might later be 
needed for examination for fingerprints and
other tracings of evidence--if you still have your copy, you might want to 
do likewise? If sullivan gets wind of this email, I imagine that there 
might soon be emails forthcoming from him (possibly disguised as another 
name/sender?) with disparaging remarks about me; but, though I strongly and 
wholeheartedly defend his right of free speech and right to voice his 
opinions, I feel that we all have a responsibility to report info of a 
possible criminal nature to the authorities.
Again, so that the FBI has access to ALL info that might be being processed 
presently by other agencies, please advise FBI Agent Wagoner of anything 
you might have initiated--to email him, use [EMAIL PROTECTED] and make the 
subject For Special Agent Mike Wagoner, or phone him at 858-499-7736
If any of you have received any emails from Mr Sullivan in the last three 
weeks (I have NOT), would you forward them to me---I'll then forward one 
copy of each new email to Agent Wagoner (in that way, he's not getting 
separate emails from many of us, all with the same info).
I also advised the FBI that one of the Internet writers might have a copy 
of the (posted) email Sullivan sent to him regarding the past visit he 
received from the FBI--they are interested in seeing Sullivan's comments. I 
gave him the phone number to the writer who probably has it in his files. Dave
Gene sez: Coincidentally to the fact, I just received a call from agent 
Wagoner and will be of assistance in any way possible. Now I have a reason. 
Person or persons [Sullivan?] is using my name to send viruses to select 
people in the business.End.
As long as the filth is there,why not use the fucks for some honest labor.I 
have done this myself once when assaulted and its Mongo approved.Mind you 
APster IS the future of law enforcement.

Sex.com update


Sex.com Saga Continues- At Least for a Couple More
Weeks
That Gary Kremen, the owner of sex.com will never see the $65
million the courts have awarded him in his legal battles against Stephen
Cohen is almost a given. Now Kremen will have to wait a few more weeks to
see what the 9th District Court of Appeals will come up with. Kremen
yesterday presented a case in San Francisco in which he holds Network
Solutions, a division of VeriSign accountable for the whole sex.com mess
to begin with. It's Kremen's contention that Network Solutions never
bothered to verify Cohen's forged request to transfer the domain from
Kremen.
Kremen is saying that the largest U.S. domain name registry should be
held accountable for an error that put the Internet address in the hands
of Cohen, a known con artist. In a hearing before a federal appeals court
panel, Kremen's lawyers argued that Network Solutions committed a breach
of contract when it failed to verify the forged request. This all
could have been prevented with a simple call or e-mail to Mr. Kremen
saying: Did you authorize this? said James Wagstaffe, the attorney
for Kremen, who's seeking monetary damages. 
This is Kremen's second try at a court judgment against Network
Solutions. Kremen lost the first case in May, 2000 when federal judge
James J. Ware in San Jose, California ruled against him basing his
decision in part on the fact that at the time Kremen registered the site,
in 1994, domains were free. Ware contended that because Network Solutions
was offered nothing of value in exchange for its efforts, it not should
be held financially liable for its error. But Ware also held Cohen,
liable to the tune of $65 million in largely uncollected damages. Cohen's
attorneys were also in appellate court Tuesday, seeking to undo that
ruling.
In yesterday's appellate hearing, attorney Wagstaffe argued that even
though Network Solutions didn't get money for registering the domain, it
did get personal information about Kremen for its database. Wagstaffe
said that should count as something of value. The company was also able
to begin charging registrants shortly afterward, having developed its
initial database of free registrations.
Attorneys for Network Solutions, disagreed rejecting the argument that a
domain name's entry in Network Solutions central domain name server, or
DNS, constitutes proof of ownership of that Internet address.
http://www.generossextreme.com/
Is this guy the matt Drudge of the naughties or what?
http://www.newarchitectmag.com/documents/s=2443/na0902f/index.html
Study carefully,there will be questions.
ICANN of Worms
The Internet governing body is short on answers and out of time.

RE: TCPA hack delay appeal

2002-08-15 Thread Lucky Green


AARG! Wrote:
 
 It seems that there is (a rather brilliant) way to bypass 
 TCPA (as spec-ed.) I learned about it from two separate 
 sources, looks like two independent slightly different hacks 
 based on the same protocol flaw.
 
 Undoubtedly, more people will figure this out.

Hopefully some of those people will not limit themselves to hypothetical
attacks against The Spec, but will actually test those supposed attacks
on shipping TPMs. Which are readily available in high-end IBM laptops.

--Lucky Green

Create A PAYCHECK With Your COMPUTER

2002-08-15 Thread jackie533cn3


Hello

You get emails every day, offering to show you how to make money.
Most of these emails are from people who are NOT making any money.
And they expect you to listen to them?

Enough.

If you want to make money with your computer, then you should
hook up with a group that is actually DOING it.  We are making
a large, continuing income every month.  What's more - we will
show YOU how to do the same thing.

This business is done completely by internet and email, and you
can even join for free to check it out first.  If you can send
an email, you can do this.  No special skills are required.

How much are we making?  Below are a few examples.  These are
real people, and most of them work at this business part-time.
But keep in mind, they do WORK at it - I am not going to 
insult your intelligence by saying you can sign up, do no work,
and rake in the cash.  That kind of job does not exist.  But if
you are willing to put in 10-12 hours per week, this might be
just the thing you are looking for.

N. Gallagher: $3000 per month
T. Hopkins: $1000 per month
S. Johnson: $6000 -$7000 per month
V. Patalano: $2000 per month
M. South: $5000 per month
J. Henslin: $7000 per month 

This is not income that is determined by luck, or work that is
done FOR you - it is all based on your effort.  But, as I said,
there are no special skills required.  And this income is RESIDUAL -
meaning that it continues each month (and it tends to increase
each month also).

Interested?  I invite you to find out more.  You can get in as a
free member, at no cost, and no obligation to continue if you
decide it is not for you.  We are just looking for people who still
have that burning desire to find an opportunity that will reward
them incredibly well, if they work at it.

To grab a FREE ID#, simply reply to:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
and write this phrase:
Email me details about the club's business and consumer opportunities
Be sure to include your:
1. First name
2. Last name
3. Email address (if different from above)

We will confirm your position and send you a special report
as soon as possible, and also Your free Member Number.

That's all there's to it.

We'll then send you info, and you can make up your own mind.

Looking forward to hearing from you!

Sincerely, 

Jackie Brunson

P.S. After having several negative experiences with network
marketing companies I had pretty much given up on them.
This is different - there is value, integrity, and a
REAL opportunity to have your own home-based business...
and finally make real money on the internet.

Don't pass this up..you can sign up and test-drive the
program for FREE.  All you need to do is get your free
membership.

Unsubscribing: Send a blank email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED]  with
Remove in the subject line.

9487kwZB7-524uPtX3642FwxG9-046rKJT2577lxnU5-467TWRx7466xMvJ9-446HjNL4l65

A faster test for PRIMALITY.

2002-08-15 Thread Gary Jeffers


OK, the following addition is a little cleaner than the 1st edition.

 My fellow Cypherpunks,

  Lucky Green says:
AFICT, the proposed algorithm is for a test for primality and does not
represent an algorithm to factor composites.

 Well, pardon me!  I was in a hurry and should have proof read. As a
 save,
 however, I did put a question mark at the end  :-)

 Yours Truly,
 Gary Jeffers

 Beat State!!!
 And the other oppressors.

A faster algorithm for finding primality.

2002-08-15 Thread Gary Jeffers



OK, this edition is probably cleaner than the 1st edition.

My fellow Cypherpunks,

Tim May writes:

Faster even than the usual algorithm?

The factors of a prime number are 1 and the number itself.

   Always the gracious one, Tim May takes time out of his busy schedule to
assist me. Well, now, I posted quickly and didn't take time to
make a neat statement. In a recent post I mentioned that the ? mark is a
save.  I'll go even further than this! An algorithm attempting to
factor a prime would fail. - Thusly, implying primality :-) I believe that I
would be literally correct even without the ?  :-) And, yes, the factors
of a prime are 1 and the number itself. In some circles this is considered
trivial.

Yours Truly,
Gary Jeffers

BEAT STATE!!!

Give Mongo his due.


 Pay attention to the antitrust angle. I guarantee you that Microsoft  
believes Pd is a way to extend its market share, not to increase competition
Bruce.

This was the first thing our resident state hater Mong picked up on.Its 
would be under ACCC investigation down here in 5 nanoseconds...I prefer to 
pay attention to the anti-state angle me self ala APster.Its time to leave 
the nest.(I will miss judge jackson a little.)

Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can 
change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead

SSZ Downtime - Schedule Change



Hi,

We're facing a last minute change in our scheduled downtime. The current
window is from Fri., Aug. 16 through Sun., Aug. 25. This is from tomorrow
(Fri.) through Sunday of next weekend.

I apologize for the short notice on the change and any inconvenience this
might cause. We do not expect to experience such extended downtimes in the
(near) future.

See you in about a week!


 --


  Conform and be dull..J. Frank Dobie

 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]  www.open-forge.org

Re: Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA

2002-08-15 Thread Joseph Ashwood


- Original Message -
From: Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an
owner,
  and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this
was
  designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a point
of
  attack.

 If this is true, I'm really happy about it, and I agree it would allow
 virtualisation. I'm pretty sure it won't be for Palladium, but I don't
 know about TCPA - certainly it fits the bill for what TCPA is supposed
 to do.

I certainly don't believe many people to believe me simply because I say it
is so. Instead I'll supply a link to the authority of TCPA, the 1.1b
specification, it is available at
http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/main%20v1_1b.pdf . There are other
documents, unfortunately the main spec gives substantial leeway, and I
haven't had time to read the others (I haven't fully digested the main spec
yet either). From that spec, all 332 pages of it, I encourage everyone that
wants to decide for themselves to read the spec. If you reach different
conclusions than I have, feel free to comment, I'm sure there are many
people on these lists that would be interested in justification for either
position.

Personally, I believe I've processed enough of the spec to state that TCPA
is a tool, and like any tool it has both positive and negative aspects.
Provided the requirement to be able to turn it off (and for my preference
they should add a requirement that the motherboard continue functioning even
under the condition that the TCPA module(s) is/are physically removed from
the board). The current spec though does seem to have a bend towards being
as advertised, being primarily a tool for the user. Whether this will remain
in the version 2.0 that is in the works, I cannot say as I have no access to
it, although if someone is listening with an NDA nearby, I'd be more than
happy to review it.
Joe

status of various projects?

2002-08-15 Thread Miles Fidelman


It seems like a lot of interesting projects haven't been active for a
while - notably Free Haven and Eternity Usenet.  Where is the most active
work, these days,  on distributed publishing systems?


**
The Center for Civic Networking PO Box 600618
Miles R. Fidelman, President   Newtonville, MA 02460-0006
Director, Municipal Telecommunications
Strategies Program  617-558-3698 fax: 617-630-8946
[EMAIL PROTECTED]  http://civic.net/ccn.html

Information Infrastructure: Public Spaces for the 21st Century
Let's Start With: Internet Wall-Plugs Everywhere
Say It Often, Say It Loud: I Want My Internet!
**

Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA

2002-08-15 Thread Ben Laurie


Joseph Ashwood wrote:
 - Original Message -
 From: Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
Joseph Ashwood wrote:

There is nothing stopping a virtualized version being created.

 
What prevents this from being useful is the lack of an appropriate
certificate for the private key in the TPM.
 
 
 Actually that does nothing to stop it. Because of the construction of TCPA,
 the private keys are registered _after_ the owner receives the computer,
 this is the window of opportunity against that as well. The worst case for
 cost of this is to purchase an additional motherboard (IIRC Fry's has them
 as low as $50), giving the ability to present a purchase. The
 virtual-private key is then created, and registered using the credentials
 borrowed from the second motherboard. Since TCPA doesn't allow for direct
 remote queries against the hardware, the virtual system will actually have
 first shot at the incoming data. That's the worst case. The expected case;
 you pay a small registration fee claiming that you accidentally wiped your
 TCPA. The best case, you claim you accidentally wiped your TCPA, they
 charge you nothing to remove the record of your old TCPA, and replace it
 with your new (virtualized) TCPA. So at worst this will cost $50. Once
 you've got a virtual setup, that virtual setup (with all its associated
 purchased rights) can be replicated across an unlimited number of computers.
 
 The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an owner,
 and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this was
 designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a point of
 attack.

If this is true, I'm really happy about it, and I agree it would allow 
virtualisation. I'm pretty sure it won't be for Palladium, but I don't 
know about TCPA - certainly it fits the bill for what TCPA is supposed 
to do.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html   http://www.thebunker.net/

Available for contract work.

There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff

Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA

2002-08-15 Thread Joseph Ashwood


- Original Message -
From: Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Joseph Ashwood wrote:
  There is nothing stopping a virtualized version being created.

 What prevents this from being useful is the lack of an appropriate
 certificate for the private key in the TPM.

Actually that does nothing to stop it. Because of the construction of TCPA,
the private keys are registered _after_ the owner receives the computer,
this is the window of opportunity against that as well. The worst case for
cost of this is to purchase an additional motherboard (IIRC Fry's has them
as low as $50), giving the ability to present a purchase. The
virtual-private key is then created, and registered using the credentials
borrowed from the second motherboard. Since TCPA doesn't allow for direct
remote queries against the hardware, the virtual system will actually have
first shot at the incoming data. That's the worst case. The expected case;
you pay a small registration fee claiming that you accidentally wiped your
TCPA. The best case, you claim you accidentally wiped your TCPA, they
charge you nothing to remove the record of your old TCPA, and replace it
with your new (virtualized) TCPA. So at worst this will cost $50. Once
you've got a virtual setup, that virtual setup (with all its associated
purchased rights) can be replicated across an unlimited number of computers.

The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an owner,
and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this was
designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a point of
attack.
Joe

CATO evacuation plans


a)Tell declan and other media whores and shills to stay,Its just a drill.
b) Shred all tobacco documents
c) Ditto all wind farming cruft,global warming malarky.
d) All donation information must be burned.(and I don't mean on to a 
dvd,goddamit.)
e) Don't run or drive fast,act nonchalant,but get the hell 40k out.AT LEAST.
d) Don't go freakin' near RR.
e) Don't pick up hitchers.Even if they look like Fawn Hall and are 
topless.(exceptions may be made if they are waving money,we are free 
enterprise remember.
f) Be glad you invested in a SUV with a bullbar.

Re: CDR: status of various projects?



It's more than 'distributed publishing', it's distributed everything. Have
your grid and eat it too!

Use Plan 9:

http://plan9.bell-labs.com

The Hangar 18 Co-Op:

http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]


On Wed, 14 Aug 2002, Miles Fidelman wrote:

 It seems like a lot of interesting projects haven't been active for a
 while - notably Free Haven and Eternity Usenet.  Where is the most active
 work, these days,  on distributed publishing systems?
 
 
 **
 The Center for Civic Networking   PO Box 600618
 Miles R. Fidelman, President Newtonville, MA 02460-0006
 Director, Municipal Telecommunications
 Strategies Program617-558-3698 fax: 617-630-8946
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]http://civic.net/ccn.html
 
 Information Infrastructure: Public Spaces for the 21st Century
 Let's Start With: Internet Wall-Plugs Everywhere
 Say It Often, Say It Loud: I Want My Internet!
 **
 


 --


  Conform and be dull..J. Frank Dobie

 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]  www.open-forge.org

Re: A faster way to factor prime numbers found?

2002-08-15 Thread Tim May


On Tuesday, August 13, 2002, at 03:07  PM, Gary Jeffers wrote:

 A faster way to factor prime numbers found?


Faster even than the usual algorithm?:

The factors of a prime number are 1 and the number itself.


--Tim May
That the said Constitution shall never be construed to authorize 
Congress to infringe the just liberty of the press or the rights of 
conscience; or to prevent the people of the United States who are 
peaceable citizens from keeping their own arms. --Samuel Adams

Re: Signing as one member of a set of keys

2002-08-15 Thread Ben Laurie


Anonymous User wrote:
 This program can be used by anonymous contributors to release partial
 information about their identity - they can show that they are someone
 from a list of PGP key holders, without revealing which member of the
 list they are.  Maybe it can help in the recent controvery over the
 identity of anonymous posters.  It's a fairly low-level program that
 should be wrapped in a nicer UI.  I'll send a couple of perl scripts
 later that make it easier to use.

Hmm. So has anyone managed to get the signature to verify? Doesn't work 
for me! But perhaps things got mangled in the mail? Or I chose the wrong 
subset of the email to verify (I tried all the obvious ones)? Sending 
this stuff as attachments instead of inline would work better, of course.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html   http://www.thebunker.net/

Available for contract work.

There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff

Re: Spam blocklists?

2002-08-15 Thread Marcel Popescu


From: Sunder [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 None of those things work.  Most spammers don't give a shit if you don't
 receive email.  I can attest to this by the slew of spam going to
 hostmaster, webmaster, and the like on many networks.  What they're really
 selling is ten million addresses and spam software.  Even if 9 million
 of those are bullshit, they couldn't care less.  The more things with @
 signs in'em the more money they make off clueless businesses.

We talk about different things then :) I don't care that they make money off
clueless businesses... I care that they don't send ME spam. If I can solve
the second problem, the first one will take care of itself.

Mark

TCPA hack delay appeal


It seems that there is (a rather brilliant) way to bypass TCPA (as spec-ed.) I learned 
about it from two separate sources, looks like two independent slightly different 
hacks based on the same protocol flaw.

Undoubtedly, more people will figure this out.

It seems wise to suppress the urge and craving for fame and NOT to publish the 
findings at this time. Let them build the thing into zillion chips first. If you must, 
post the encrypted time-stamped solution identifying you as the author but do not 
release the key before TCPA is in many, many PCs.

Re: status of various projects?

2002-08-15 Thread Myers W. Carpenter


On Wed, 2002-08-14 at 10:58, Miles Fidelman wrote:
 It seems like a lot of interesting projects haven't been active for a
 while - notably Free Haven and Eternity Usenet.  Where is the most active
 work, these days,  on distributed publishing systems?

Try Mnet (http://mnet.sf.net/).  It's the continuation of the Mojo
Nation code base.  We are close to a stable release (0.5.1), but there
are a lot of known bugs that we are leaving in the system (because we
are rewriting the code that the bugs are found in).

Our main goal for the next release is to make it easier for new coders
to understand what's going on under the hood.  That and replacing the
single point of failure metatracker system with a distributed hash
table. 

The old mojo token based system is no longer in use, but we hope to
replace it with an OpenDBS based system, or a stamp based system.

myers

TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)


Phew... the document is certainly tortuous, and has a large number of
similarly and confusingly named credentials, certificates and keys,
however from what I can tell this is what is going on:

Summary: I think the endorsement key and it's hardware manufacturers
certificate is generated at manufacture and is not allowed to be
changed.  Changing ownership only means (typically) deleting old
identities and creating new ones.

The longer version...

- endorsement key generation and certification - There is one
endorsement key per TPM which is created and certified during
manufacture.  The creation and certification process is 1) create
endorsement key pair, 2) export public key endorsement key, 3)
hardware manufacturer signs endorsement public key to create an
endorsement certificate (to certify that that endorsement public key
belongs to this TPM), 4) the certificate is stored in the TPM (for
later use in communications with the privacy CA.)

- ownership - Then there is the concept of ownership.  The spec says
the TPM MUST ship with no Owner installed.  The owner when he wishes
to claim ownership choose a authentication token which is sent into
the TPM encrypted with the endorsement key.  (They give the example of
the authentication token being the hash of a password).  Physical
presence tests apply to claiming ownership (eg think BIOS POST with no
networking enabled, or physical pin on motherboard like BIOS flash
enable).  The authentication token and ownership can be changed.  The
TPM can be reset back to a state with no current owner.  BUT _at no
point_ does the TPM endorsement private key leave the TPM.  The
TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair function is allowed to be called once
(during manufacture) and is thereafter disabled.

- identity keys - Then there is the concept of identity keys.  The
current owner can create and delete identities, which can be anonymous
or pseudonymous.  Presumably the owner would delete all identity keys
before giving the TPM to a new owner.  The identity public key is
certified by the privacy CA.

- privacy ca - The privacy CA accepts identity key certification
requests which contain a) identity public key b) a proof of possession
(PoP) of identity private key (signature on challenge), c) the
hardware manufacturers endorsement certificate containing the TPM's
endorsement public key.  The privacy CA checks whether the endorsement
certificate is signed by a hardware manufacturer it trusts.  The
privacy CA sends in response an identity certificate encrypted with
the TPM's endorsement public key.  The TPM decrypts the encrypted
identity certifate with the endorsement private key.

- remote attestation - The owner uses the identity keys in the remote
attestation functions.  Note that the identity private keys are also
generated on the TPM, the private key also never leaves the TPM.  The
identity private key is certified by the privacy CA as having been
requested by a certified endorsement key.


The last two paragraphs imply something else interesting: the privacy
CA can collude with anyone to create a virtualized environment.  (This
is because the TPM endorsement key is never directly used in remote
attestation for privacy reasons.)  All that is required to virtualize
a TPM is an attestation from the privacy CA in creating an identity
certificate.

So there are in fact three avenues for FBI et al to go about obtaining
covert access to the closed space formed by TCPA applications: 

(A) get one of the hardware manufacturers to sign an endorsement key
generated outside a TPM (or get the endorsement CA's private key), or

(B) get a widely used and accepted privacy CA to overlook it's policy
of demanding a hardware manufacturer CA endorsed endorsement public
key and sign an identity public key created outside of a TPM (or get
the privacy CA's private key).

(C) create their own privacy CA and persuade an internet server they
wish to investigate the users of to accept it.  Create themselves a
virtualized client using their own privacy CA, look inside.


I think to combat problem C) as a user of a service you'd want the
remote attestation of software state to auditably include it's
accepted privacy CA database to see if there are any strange Privacy
CAs on there.

I think you could set up and use your own privacy CA, but you can be
sure the RIAA/MPAA will never trust your CA.  A bit like self-signing
SSL site keys.  If you and your friends add your CA to their trusted
root CA database it'll work.  In this case however people have to
trust your home-brew privacy CA not to issue identity certificates
without having seen a valid hardware-endorsement key if they care
about preventing virtualization for the privacy or security of some
network application.

Also, they seem to take explicit steps to prevent you getting multiple
privacy CA certificates on the same identity key.  (I'm not sure why.)
It seems like a bad thing as it forces you to trust just one CA, it
prevents web of trust which

Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA

2002-08-15 Thread Anonymous


[Repost]

Joe Ashwood writes:

 Actually that does nothing to stop it. Because of the construction of TCPA,
 the private keys are registered _after_ the owner receives the computer,
 this is the window of opportunity against that as well.

Actually, this is not true for the endoresement key, PUBEK/PRIVEK, which
is the main TPM key, the one which gets certified by the TPM Entity.
That key is generated only once on a TPM, before ownership, and must
exist before anyone can take ownership.  For reference, see section 9.2,
The first call to TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair generates the endorsement
key pair. After a successful completion of TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair
all subsequent calls return TCPA_FAIL.  Also section 9.2.1 shows that
no ownership proof is necessary for this step, which is because there is
no owner at that time.  Then look at section 5.11.1, on taking ownership:
user must encrypt the values using the PUBEK.  So the PUBEK must exist
before anyone can take ownership.

 The worst case for
 cost of this is to purchase an additional motherboard (IIRC Fry's has them
 as low as $50), giving the ability to present a purchase. The
 virtual-private key is then created, and registered using the credentials
 borrowed from the second motherboard. Since TCPA doesn't allow for direct
 remote queries against the hardware, the virtual system will actually have
 first shot at the incoming data. That's the worst case.

I don't quite follow what you are proposing here, but by the time you
purchase a board with a TPM chip on it, it will have already generated
its PUBEK and had it certified.  So you should not be able to transfer
a credential of this type from one board to another one.

 The expected case;
 you pay a small registration fee claiming that you accidentally wiped your
 TCPA. The best case, you claim you accidentally wiped your TCPA, they
 charge you nothing to remove the record of your old TCPA, and replace it
 with your new (virtualized) TCPA. So at worst this will cost $50. Once
 you've got a virtual setup, that virtual setup (with all its associated
 purchased rights) can be replicated across an unlimited number of computers.
 
 The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an owner,
 and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this was
 designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a point of
 attack.

Actually I don't see a function that will let the owner wipe the PUBEK.
He can wipe the rest of the TPM but that field appears to be set once,
retained forever.

For example, section 8.10: Clear is the process of returning the TPM to
factory defaults.  But a couple of paragraphs later: All TPM volatile
and non-volatile data is set to default value except the endorsement
key pair.

So I don't think your fraud will work.  Users will not wipe their
endorsement keys, accidentally or otherwise.  If a chip is badly enough
damaged that the PUBEK is lost, you will need a hardware replacement,
as I read the spec.

Keep in mind that I only started learning this stuff a few weeks ago,
so I am not an expert, but this is how it looks to me.

TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)


[resend via different node: [EMAIL PROTECTED] seems to be dead --
primary MX refusing connections]

Phew... the document is certainly tortuous, and has a large number of
similarly and confusingly named credentials, certificates and keys,
however from what I can tell this is what is going on:

Summary: I think the endorsement key and it's hardware manufacturers
certificate is generated at manufacture and is not allowed to be
changed.  Changing ownership only means (typically) deleting old
identities and creating new ones.

The longer version...

- endorsement key generation and certification - There is one
endorsement key per TPM which is created and certified during
manufacture.  The creation and certification process is 1) create
endorsement key pair, 2) export public key endorsement key, 3)
hardware manufacturer signs endorsement public key to create an
endorsement certificate (to certify that that endorsement public key
belongs to this TPM), 4) the certificate is stored in the TPM (for
later use in communications with the privacy CA.)

- ownership - Then there is the concept of ownership.  The spec says
the TPM MUST ship with no Owner installed.  The owner when he wishes
to claim ownership choose a authentication token which is sent into
the TPM encrypted with the endorsement key.  (They give the example of
the authentication token being the hash of a password).  Physical
presence tests apply to claiming ownership (eg think BIOS POST with no
networking enabled, or physical pin on motherboard like BIOS flash
enable).  The authentication token and ownership can be changed.  The
TPM can be reset back to a state with no current owner.  BUT _at no
point_ does the TPM endorsement private key leave the TPM.  The
TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair function is allowed to be called once
(during manufacture) and is thereafter disabled.

- identity keys - Then there is the concept of identity keys.  The
current owner can create and delete identities, which can be anonymous
or pseudonymous.  Presumably the owner would delete all identity keys
before giving the TPM to a new owner.  The identity public key is
certified by the privacy CA.

- privacy ca - The privacy CA accepts identity key certification
requests which contain a) identity public key b) a proof of possession
(PoP) of identity private key (signature on challenge), c) the
hardware manufacturers endorsement certificate containing the TPM's
endorsement public key.  The privacy CA checks whether the endorsement
certificate is signed by a hardware manufacturer it trusts.  The
privacy CA sends in response an identity certificate encrypted with
the TPM's endorsement public key.  The TPM decrypts the encrypted
identity certifate with the endorsement private key.

- remote attestation - The owner uses the identity keys in the remote
attestation functions.  Note that the identity private keys are also
generated on the TPM, the private key also never leaves the TPM.  The
identity private key is certified by the privacy CA as having been
requested by a certified endorsement key.


The last two paragraphs imply something else interesting: the privacy
CA can collude with anyone to create a virtualized environment.  (This
is because the TPM endorsement key is never directly used in remote
attestation for privacy reasons.)  All that is required to virtualize
a TPM is an attestation from the privacy CA in creating an identity
certificate.

So there are in fact three avenues for FBI et al to go about obtaining
covert access to the closed space formed by TCPA applications: 

(A) get one of the hardware manufacturers to sign an endorsement key
generated outside a TPM (or get the endorsement CA's private key), or

(B) get a widely used and accepted privacy CA to overlook it's policy
of demanding a hardware manufacturer CA endorsed endorsement public
key and sign an identity public key created outside of a TPM (or get
the privacy CA's private key).

(C) create their own privacy CA and persuade an internet server they
wish to investigate the users of to accept it.  Create themselves a
virtualized client using their own privacy CA, look inside.


I think to combat problem C) as a user of a service you'd want the
remote attestation of software state to auditably include it's
accepted privacy CA database to see if there are any strange Privacy
CAs on there.

I think you could set up and use your own privacy CA, but you can be
sure the RIAA/MPAA will never trust your CA.  A bit like self-signing
SSL site keys.  If you and your friends add your CA to their trusted
root CA database it'll work.  In this case however people have to
trust your home-brew privacy CA not to issue identity certificates
without having seen a valid hardware-endorsement key if they care
about preventing virtualization for the privacy or security of some
network application.

Also, they seem to take explicit steps to prevent you getting multiple
privacy CA certificates on the same identity key.  (I'm not sure why.)

Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA


Joe Ashwood writes:

 Actually that does nothing to stop it. Because of the construction of TCPA,
 the private keys are registered _after_ the owner receives the computer,
 this is the window of opportunity against that as well.

Actually, this is not true for the endoresement key, PUBEK/PRIVEK, which
is the main TPM key, the one which gets certified by the TPM Entity.
That key is generated only once on a TPM, before ownership, and must
exist before anyone can take ownership.  For reference, see section 9.2,
The first call to TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair generates the endorsement
key pair. After a successful completion of TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair
all subsequent calls return TCPA_FAIL.  Also section 9.2.1 shows that
no ownership proof is necessary for this step, which is because there is
no owner at that time.  Then look at section 5.11.1, on taking ownership:
user must encrypt the values using the PUBEK.  So the PUBEK must exist
before anyone can take ownership.

 The worst case for
 cost of this is to purchase an additional motherboard (IIRC Fry's has them
 as low as $50), giving the ability to present a purchase. The
 virtual-private key is then created, and registered using the credentials
 borrowed from the second motherboard. Since TCPA doesn't allow for direct
 remote queries against the hardware, the virtual system will actually have
 first shot at the incoming data. That's the worst case.

I don't quite follow what you are proposing here, but by the time you
purchase a board with a TPM chip on it, it will have already generated
its PUBEK and had it certified.  So you should not be able to transfer
a credential of this type from one board to another one.

 The expected case;
 you pay a small registration fee claiming that you accidentally wiped your
 TCPA. The best case, you claim you accidentally wiped your TCPA, they
 charge you nothing to remove the record of your old TCPA, and replace it
 with your new (virtualized) TCPA. So at worst this will cost $50. Once
 you've got a virtual setup, that virtual setup (with all its associated
 purchased rights) can be replicated across an unlimited number of computers.
 
 The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an owner,
 and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this was
 designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a point of
 attack.

Actually I don't see a function that will let the owner wipe the PUBEK.
He can wipe the rest of the TPM but that field appears to be set once,
retained forever.

For example, section 8.10: Clear is the process of returning the TPM to
factory defaults.  But a couple of paragraphs later: All TPM volatile
and non-volatile data is set to default value except the endorsement
key pair.

So I don't think your fraud will work.  Users will not wipe their
endorsement keys, accidentally or otherwise.  If a chip is badly enough
damaged that the PUBEK is lost, you will need a hardware replacement,
as I read the spec.

Keep in mind that I only started learning this stuff a few weeks ago,
so I am not an expert, but this is how it looks to me.

Re: TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)

2002-08-15 Thread Mike Rosing


On Thu, 15 Aug 2002, Adam Back wrote:

 Summary: I think the endorsement key and it's hardware manufacturers
 certificate is generated at manufacture and is not allowed to be
 changed.  Changing ownership only means (typically) deleting old
 identities and creating new ones.

Are there 2 certificates?  One from the manufacturer and one from
the privacy CA?

 - endorsement key generation and certification - There is one
 endorsement key per TPM which is created and certified during
 manufacture.  The creation and certification process is 1) create
 endorsement key pair, 2) export public key endorsement key, 3)
 hardware manufacturer signs endorsement public key to create an
 endorsement certificate (to certify that that endorsement public key
 belongs to this TPM), 4) the certificate is stored in the TPM (for
 later use in communications with the privacy CA.)

So finding the manufacturers signature key breaks the whole system
right?  Once you have that key you can create as many fake TPM's
as you want.

 TPM can be reset back to a state with no current owner.  BUT _at no
 point_ does the TPM endorsement private key leave the TPM.  The
 TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair function is allowed to be called once
 (during manufacture) and is thereafter disabled.

But it's easier to manufacture it by burning fuse links so it
can't be read back - ala OTP.  so the manufacturer could have a
list of every private key (just because they aren't supposed to
doesn't prevent it.)  It still meets the spec - the key never leaves
the chip.

 - identity keys - Then there is the concept of identity keys.  The
 current owner can create and delete identities, which can be anonymous
 or pseudonymous.  Presumably the owner would delete all identity keys
 before giving the TPM to a new owner.  The identity public key is
 certified by the privacy CA.

 - privacy ca - The privacy CA accepts identity key certification
 requests which contain a) identity public key b) a proof of possession
 (PoP) of identity private key (signature on challenge), c) the
 hardware manufacturers endorsement certificate containing the TPM's
 endorsement public key.  The privacy CA checks whether the endorsement
 certificate is signed by a hardware manufacturer it trusts.  The
 privacy CA sends in response an identity certificate encrypted with
 the TPM's endorsement public key.  The TPM decrypts the encrypted
 identity certifate with the endorsement private key.

How does the CA check the endorsement certificate?  If it's by
checking the signature, then finding the manufacturer's private
key is very worthwhile - the entire TCPA for 100's of millions
of computers gets compromised.  If it's by matching with the
manufacturer's list then anonymity is impossible.

Thanks for the analysis Adam.  It seems like there are a couple of
obvious points to attack this system at.  I would think it's easy
to break for a large enough government.

Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike

Re: trade-offs of secure programming with Palladium (Re: Palladium: technical limits and implications)

2002-08-15 Thread Russell Nelson


Adam Back writes:
  So there are practical limits stemming from realities to do with code
  complexity being inversely proportional to auditability and security,
  but the extra ring -1, remote attestation, sealing and integrity
  metrics really do offer some security advantages over the current
  situation.

You're wearing your programmer's hat when you say that.  But the
problem isn't programming, but is instead economic.  Switch hats.  The
changes that you list above may or may not offer some security
advantages.  Who cares?  What really matters is whether they increase
the cost of copying.  I say that the answer is no, for a very simple
reason: breaking into your own computer is a victimless crime.

In a crime there are at least two parties: the victim and the
perpetrator.  What makes the so-called victimless crime unique is that
the victim is not present for the perpetration of the crime.  In such
a crime, all of the perpetrators have reason to keep silent about the
comission of the crime.  So it will be with people breaking into their
own TCPA-protected computer and application.  Nobody with evidence of
the crime is interested in reporting the crime, nor in stopping
further crimes.

Yes, the TCPA hardware introduces difficulties.  If there is way
around them in software, then someone need only write it once.  The
whole TCPA house of cards relies on no card ever falling down.  Once
it falls down, people have unrestricted access to content.  And that
means that we go back to today's game, where the contents of CDs are
open and available for modification.  Someone could distribute a pile
of random bits, which, when xored with the encrypted copy, becomes
an unencrypted copy.

-- 
-russ nelson  http://russnelson.com |
Crynwr sells support for free software  | PGPok | businesses persuade
521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | governments coerce
Potsdam, NY 13676-3213  | +1 315 268 9201 FAX   |

Re: status of various projects?

2002-08-15 Thread Gabriel Rocha


On Wed, Aug 14, at 10:58AM, Miles Fidelman wrote:
| It seems like a lot of interesting projects haven't been active for a
| while - notably Free Haven and Eternity Usenet.  Where is the most active
| work, these days,  on distributed publishing systems?

I forwarded this to Roger Dingledine who heads up the FreeHaven project.
His answer is below.


From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thu Aug 15 16:46:59 2002
Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2002 16:46:59 -0400
From: Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: free haven status

At this point, Free Haven has 3 major flaws, and I'm putting it on the
back burner while I address them:

* The reputation system is tricky and won't work. We need to replace the
gossip/credibility system with a mechanism for verifiable transactions.
See http://freehaven.net/doc/cfp02/cfp02.html for more details.

* Retrieval is currently broadcast, which is insane. I'm letting other
projects work on solutions here (eg Chord), and I'll pick my favorite
when the time comes.

* There is no anonymous communications infrastructure. This is the area
we're focusing on currently. See http://mixminion.net/minion-design.pdf
and http://pdos.lcs.mit.edu/tarzan/

--Roger

Re: TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change


Basically I agree with Adam's analysis.  At this point I think he
understands the spec equally as well as I do.  He has a good point
about the Privacy CA key being another security weakness that could
break the whole system.  It would be good to consider how exactly that
problem could be eliminated using more sophisticated crypto.  Keep in
mind that there is a need to be able to revoke Endorsement Certificates
if it is somehow discovered that a TPM has been cracked or is bogus.
I'm not sure that would be possible with straight Chaum blinding or
Brands credentials.  I would perhaps look at Group Signature schemes;
there is one with efficient revocation being presented at Crypto 02.
These involve a TTP but he can't forge credentials, just link identity
keys to endorsement keys (in TCPA terms).  Any system which allows for
revocation must have such linkability, right?

As for Joe Ashwood's analysis, I think he is getting confused between the
endorsement key, endorsement certificate, and endorsement credentials.
The first is the key pair created on the TPM.  The terms PUBEK and PRIVEK
are used to refer to the public and private parts of the endorsement
key.  The endorsement certificate is an X.509 certificate issued on the
endorsement key by the manufacturer.  The manufacturer is also called
the TPM Entity or TPME.  The endorsement credential is the same as the
endorsement certificate, but considered as an abstract data structure
rather than as a specific embodiment.

The PRIVEK never leaves the chip.  The PUBEK does, but it is considered
sensitive because it is a de facto unique identifier for the system,
like the Intel processor serial number which caused such controversy
a few years ago.  The endorsement certificate holds the PUBEK value
(in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field) and so is equally a de facto unique
identifier, hence it is also not too widely shown.

Schneier on Arming Airplane Pilots (was Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, August 15, 2002)

2002-08-15 Thread R. A. Hettinga


-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

My sister-in-law had a brilliantly simple answer to the problem of
hijacking which was, close, but, um, no spliff, :-), to Vin
Suprynowicz's notorious Ganja and Guns Airline column of a few
years back.

She said, on September 12 or so last year, Why don't you have a
certification on your concealed-carry permit that allows you to carry
on an airplane?

That means, like a hazmat certificate on a commercial driver's
license, you've been trained. You know how to shoot on a plane: what
kinds of frangible bullets to use, who to shoot at :-), and so on.
At check-in time, the firearm owner pulls out her concealed-carry
license with the cabin-carry certificate, shows someone the frangible
ammo she's using, and is checked through to the gate.

I figure if even Tim May thinks armed passengers are a bad idea, :-),
and Bruce thinks even arming the *pilots* is a bad idea, I'm
certainly leaning into the wind a bit here, but, I think it's a
*great* idea, myself.

It doesn't matter if someone smuggles a *machine gun* onto the plane,
they don't know *who* is on the plane, with a gun, and *qualified* to
take them out.

Think of it as statistical process control for the rest of us.

Or evolution in action.

Or geodesic warfare.

Cheers,
RAH

PS: I think we're going to *need* counter-attack scenarios on the
net. Like Whit Diffie said, infowar will be fought between
businesses. Governments are too slow, and not, paradoxically, nearly
ubiquitous enough to do the job. All we need is bearer cash, :-),
and, someday, machines even can handle it themselves...

- -





At 3:53 PM -0500 on 8/15/02, Bruce Schneier wrote:


  Arming Airplane Pilots



 It's a quintessentially American solution: our nation's commercial
 aircraft  are at risk, so let's allow pilots to carry guns.  We
 have visions of these  brave men and women as the last line of
 defense on an aircraft, and  courageously defending the cockpit
 against terrorists at 30,000 feet.  I  can just imagine the
 made-for-TV movie.

 Reality is more complicated than television, though. Sometimes,
 security  systems cause more problems than they solve.  Putting
 guns on aircraft will  make us more vulnerable to attack, not less.

 When people think of potential problems with an weapons in a
 cockpit, they  think of accidental shootings in the air, holes in
 the fuselage, and  possibly even equipment shattered by a stray
 bullet.  This is a problem,  certainly, but not a major one. A
 bullet hole is small, and doesn't let a  whole lot of air out.  And
 airplanes are designed to handle equipment  failures -- even
 serious failures -- and remain in the air.  If I ran an  airline, I
 would worry more about accidents involving passengers, who are
 much less able to survive a bullet wound and much more likely to
 sue.

 The real dangers, though, involve the complex systems that must be
 put in  place before the first gun can ride along in the cockpit.
 There are major  areas of risk.

 One, we need a system for getting the gun on the airplane.  How
 does the  pilot get the gun? Does he carry it through the airport
 and onto the  plane?  Is it issued to him after he's in the cockpit
 but before the plane  takes off?  Is it secured in the cockpit at
 all times, even when there is  no one there?  Any one of these
 solutions has its own set of security  vulnerabilities.  The last
 thing we want is for an attacker to exploit one  of these systems
 in order to get himself a gun.  Or maybe the last thing we  want is
 a shootout in a crowded airport.

 Second, we need a procedure for storing the gun on the airplane.
 Does the  pilot carry it on his hip?  Is it locked in a cabinet?
 If so, who has the  key?  Is there one gun, or do the pilot and
 co-pilot each have
 one?  However the system works, it's ripe for abuse.  If the gun is
 always  at the pilot's hip, an attacker can take it away from him
 when he leaves  the cockpit.  (Don't laugh; policemen get their
 guns taken away from them  all the time, and they're trained to
 prevent that.)  If the guns remain in  the cockpit when it is
 unoccupied, we have a whole new set of problems to  worry about.

 Third, we need a system of training pilots in gun handling and
 marksmanship.  Guns require training to use well; how much training
 can we  expect our pilots to have?  This is different from training
 sky
 marshals.  Security is the primary job of a sky marshal; they're
 expected  to learn how to use a gun.  Flying planes is the primary
 job of a pilot.

 Giving pilots guns is a disaster waiting to happen.  The current
 system  spends a lot of time and effort keeping weapons off
 airplanes and out of  airports; the proposed scheme would inject
 thousands of handguns into that  system.  There are just too many
 pilots and too many flights every day;  mistakes will happen.
 Someone will do an inventory one night and find a gun  missing, or
 ten.  Someone will find one left in a

Re: TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)


I think a number of the apparent conflicts go away if you carefully
track endorsement key pair vs endorsement certificate (signature on
endorsement key by hw manufacturer).  For example where it is said
that the endorsement _certificate_ could be inserted after ownership
has been established (not the endorsement key), so that apparent
conflict goes away.  (I originally thought this particular one was a
conflict also, until I noticed that.)  I see anonymous found the same
thing.

But anyway this extract from the CC PP makes clear the intention and
an ST based on this PP is what a given TPM will be evaluated based on:

http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/PPentries/CCEVS-020016-PP-TPM1_9_4.pdf

p 20:
| The TSF shall restrict the ability to initialize or modify the TSF 
| data: Endorsement Key Pair [...] to the TPM manufacturer or designee.

(if only they could have managed to say that in the spec).

Adam
--
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/

employment market for applied cryptographers?