RE: WSJ Encrypted Laptop
> http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news_features/ > this_just_in/documents/02093041.htm > > The Boston Phoenix, January 3-10, 2002 > > How the Journal got Al Qaeda's computers > > By Dan Kennedy > > This past Monday's Wall Street Journal led with an > astounding story about a personal computer that > had apparently been used by Al Qaeda terrorists to > plot the September assassination of Northern Alliance > leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. The computer's hard > drive also reportedly contained bioterrorism information > and a 23-minute video clip of Osama bin Laden > denouncing the United States and enthusing over > the September 11 attacks. > > How the computer came to be acquired by the Journal > is a pretty amazing story in itself. > > The article by staff reporters Alan Cullison and > Andrew Higgins offers a few details. A "Journal > reporter" purchased the IBM desktop computer, as well > as a Compaq laptop, in Kabul for a total of $1100 after > being told that they had been looted from an Al Qaeda > > office following a US bombing raid. The article goes > on to say that US officials confirmed the authenticity > of the files, "and say they provide a trove of > information about the inner workings of the secretive > organization." > > Intrigued, I sent e-mails to both reporters. Cullison, the > paper's Moscow correspondent, temporarily ensconced > in Washington, wrote back within a few hours. > > "I was in need of a computer, because the one that the > Wall Street Journal issued me was smashed when the > car I was taking over the Hindu Kush Mountains lost > its brakes and rolled," Cullison said. "I was looking for > one, and was much more interested in this laptop and > the hard drive [from the IBM] when I heard it was used > by al Qaeda." Moscow correspondent. Computer destroyed. Shopping. Offer/Acceptance. At some point, this is not a "trail of evidence" this is a propaganda diversion "campaign" conducted through evidence. You think they were preparing for a damn documentary instead of a terrorist attack. They keep leaving evidence that suits political agendas. > "Sometimes chance and happenstance play an > incredible part in an incredible story," Bussey says. Bullshit. ~Aimee
RE: WSJ Encrypted Laptop
We've noted here the rise in "lost" and "stolen" laptops containing sensitive and classified information. First, one or two disappeared while a spook was drunk or was left behind in a taxi or taken from an unidentified location. Then amazing reports of more losses, the number rising quickly, finally with surveys revealing hundreds of laptops have been lost by spooks, cops, senior officals, nuclear labs, state departments, and so on. Now and then encryption is mentioned. We can see that the lost laptop, and its recent corollary, the discovered laptop, has become as useful for disinformation as what is being found in newly revealed secret archives like those reported today in the Wash Post, "Spies, Lies and the Distortion of History:" http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55522-2002Feb23.html To be sure, the flood of lost laptops both diminishes the credibility of what is on the laptops and increases it. One way to increase credibility is to claim files are encrypted. What we also know is that encrypted files are now a leading indicator of credibility, along with the shadowy and enticing methods used to decrypt by unidentified parties, and to then carefully distribute the decrypted, authenticated thereby, if demonized, material. Whether there is actually sensitive material in the demonized files is hard to determine so long as access to the original files, and a credible account of how they were comeby is not made available. As with the long history of astonishing revelations of secrets, lies and videotapes. Moving to a related topic, is the use of the Internet for leaking and/or psyopping disinformation, in particular the use of honeypots. Cryptome is occasionally charged with being a honeypot, and it could be, wittingly so if we are succesful in putting up lurid material to bring in more luridities. A question though is what information is being gathered by Cryptome honeypot? The access logs, the pattern and content of publication, the receipt of hot material, the distribution of lies and deceptions? And if these are the profits of the honeypot how is the data collection about them being done? We dream of being able to watch the honeypot harvestors at work, which accounts for admitting to running a honeypot, our lost laptop if you will. This hoary rabbit-running practice, you being the rabbit, as we see here with several practitioners, carries a Daniel Pearl-like risk. You may well lose your head to somebody who believes you are a wolf not merely a headgames-player.
RE: WSJ Encrypted Laptop
> > "Sometimes chance and happenstance play an > > incredible part in an incredible story," Bussey says. > > Bullshit. > > ~Aimee Al-Q must have taken a relationship-selling course. (The Psychology of Relationship Selling : Developing Repeat and Referral Business; Relationship Selling: The Key to Getting and Keeping Customers. Available on Amazon.) I seriously fear these people are playing to the ego, mutual interest and performance pressure. There has never been a successful strategic terrorist (by my definition of terrorism). Illusion of movement/momentum for recruitment? Diversion? This is all very stinky. In past wars, you could predict axes by examining flare ups in resistance/guerrilla movements, since agitation was a diplomatic card. (The underground wars preceded the real ones.) Our counterterrorism deployments are interesting, as is where we are exerting coercive diplomacy. We've got insurgency, conflict and protests in some damn interesting spots. I question how well we correlate strike, protest, subversive activity/agitation/propaganda, and sabotage/IW inferences these days -- especially at home, due to domestic constraints. I would think that would keep a "war room" quite busy with inference scanning. With today's coordination, it's possible to see shadows of influence, instead of "just our imagination." That's essential defense, and with the aftermath of Church & Pike, I wouldn't be surprised if we don't have much. The shift of power has changed since Vietnam, and when it comes to domestic security, I don't think it works in our favor. (As if Vietnam was good for us, and they wanted us to leave.) If our domestic restrictions (guidelines and jurisdiction) are tying hands, I think the American public will support changing them. What do you think the reaction will be? Are some of you just going to "go direct action" if that happens? Serious questions. ~Aimee
Re: WSJ Encrypted Laptop
At 09:06 AM 2/24/2002 -0800, John Young wrote: >According to the report below, the WSJ hired its own >computer consultant to examine the Al Qaeda laptop. >But there is no mention of the consultant helping with >decrypts. I don't think we can depend on the accuracy of the WSJ in reporting the true chain of events. They should have immediately published a MD of each encrypted file and later the extracted keys, that way it would be possible to more confidently verify the story. In fact, this procedure should become necessary disclosure for future reports of discovered encrypted materials with news application. steve
Re: WSJ Encrypted Laptop
On Sun, Feb 24, 2002 at 10:55:49AM -0800, Steve Schear wrote: > I don't think we can depend on the accuracy of the WSJ in reporting the > true chain of events. They should have immediately published a MD of each > encrypted file and later the extracted keys, that way it would be possible > to more confidently verify the story. In fact, this procedure should > become necessary disclosure for future reports of discovered encrypted > materials with news application. I agree, but you must realize this is not the way traditional news organizations run. They generally operate on the principle that they know what is best for readers to know and, again generally, do not reproduce source documents. In some cases this is adequate (reporters *are* good at summarizing); when you have an Internet site with ample space to post materials, it is not. -Declan
Re: WSJ Encrypted Laptop
On Sun, 24 Feb 2002, Aimee Farr wrote: > I question how well we correlate strike, protest, subversive > activity/agitation/propaganda, and sabotage/IW inferences these days -- > especially at home, due to domestic constraints. I would think that would > keep a "war room" quite busy with inference scanning. With today's > coordination, it's possible to see shadows of influence, instead of "just > our imagination." Considering the level of inside agents and provocateurs, not only for this sort of stuff but tax evasion and monopolies; pretty damn good I'd guess. Or are you proposing that the FBI agent who provokes an illegal act is also working for somebody besides the FBI? Not likely at the scale you would suggest. Or perhaps you mean that the people in the unions are being infiltraited without the FBI knowing? I suspect that when they run the various background checks they get a clue (assuming they did them and reviewed them). -- When I die, I would like to be born again as me. Hugh Hefner [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.open-forge.org
Re: WSJ Encrypted Laptop
This sort of stuff will only go on for a few more years until the distributed process and universal namespace sorts of approaches replace the current paradigms. When that happens losing a laptop will mean nothing because it won't have the data 'on it' in the conventional sense. On Sun, 24 Feb 2002, John Young wrote: > We've noted here the rise in "lost" and "stolen" laptops > containing sensitive and classified information. First, > one or two disappeared while a spook was drunk or > was left behind in a taxi or taken from an unidentified > location. > > Then amazing reports of more losses, the number rising > quickly, finally with surveys revealing hundreds of laptops > have been lost by spooks, cops, senior officals, nuclear > labs, state departments, and so on. Now and then encryption > is mentioned. > > We can see that the lost laptop, and its recent corollary, > the discovered laptop, has become as useful for disinformation > as what is being found in newly revealed secret archives > like those reported today in the Wash Post, "Spies, Lies and > the Distortion of History:" > > > http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55522-2002Feb23.html > > To be sure, the flood of lost laptops both diminishes the > credibility of what is on the laptops and increases it. One way > to increase credibility is to claim files are encrypted. > > What we also know is that encrypted files are now a leading > indicator of credibility, along with the shadowy and enticing > methods used to decrypt by unidentified parties, and to then > carefully distribute the decrypted, authenticated thereby, > if demonized, material. > > Whether there is actually sensitive material in the demonized > files is hard to determine so long as access to the original > files, and a credible account of how they were comeby is > not made available. As with the long history of astonishing > revelations of secrets, lies and videotapes. > > Moving to a related topic, is the use of the Internet for > > leaking and/or psyopping disinformation, in particular > the use of honeypots. > > Cryptome is occasionally charged with being a honeypot, > and it could be, wittingly so if we are succesful in putting > up lurid material to bring in more luridities. A question > though is what information is being gathered by Cryptome > honeypot? The access logs, the pattern and content of > publication, the receipt of hot material, the distribution > of lies and deceptions? And if these are the profits of the > honeypot how is the data collection about them being > done? > > We dream of being able to watch the honeypot harvestors > at work, which accounts for admitting to running a honeypot, > our lost laptop if you will. This hoary rabbit-running practice, > you being the rabbit, as we see here with several practitioners, > carries a Daniel Pearl-like risk. You may well lose your head > to somebody who believes you are a wolf not merely a > headgames-player. >
