Re: Constant Encrypted Stream
On Thu, 19 Dec 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > The main problem to solve as I see it would be for legitimate recipients to > be able to determine when a message is real and not trash, without letting > an adversary know. Access such page via http. Sometimes it's a streamed webcam, sometimes it's an image with a stegano payload. mystery cam
Re: Constant Encrypted Stream
At 10:10 PM 12/19/02 -0600, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >Nothing serious, just throwing a quick thought out... > >It has been mentioned that you should always use crypto. If you wait until >you actually have something private to send, then an adversary will know >exactly which message is important. Encrypting everything gives equal >suspicion to each message and nobody has the resources to attack all of your >mail. > >So, I was thinking that rather than just encrypt each message, why not just >keep a constant encrypted stream open? So, even when you are asleep, >computers at each node are bombarding each other with encrypted "junk" >files. Your noise to signal ratio would be phenomenal. Very good, sir. Your next assignment is to read about Mixmaster anonymous remailer networks. Generally sending uniformly-sized (padded or fragmented or noise) blocks at regular intervals is preferable (and equivalent) to your suggestion of keeping connections open all the time. -- "Intended only for lawful uses." -HP Computer Advert
Re: Constant encrypted stream
On Fri, 20 Dec 2002, Anonymous wrote: > And I wonder...with international companies now cracking down on > "Power-Users" of networks like Gnutella, one would think that > building-in some crypto capabilities (say into Kazaa) could be > something "regular" people might be willing to pay for. (Or, at the > very least, if the Kazaa crypto add-on itself became a shared file, > why it would spread like wildfire!) You're misunderstanding things here. If I'm a member of a file sharing network I can quite easily prove violations by pulling up copyrighted content from a given user's IP. The user can more or less plausibly deny responsibility by claiming she's been h4x0red, or that he's running an adaptive swarm delivery p2p client which uses encryption that no one but the end user who knows the document's cryptohash is commiting the (c) violation by assembling scattered content slivers on his system. The technical issues are clear enough -- so it's how your local legislation (and the individual reptile-tailed judge) are seeing it. Clearly you can make it illegal, so users will rely on more hardened prestige-based designs, and packaging delivey infrastructure into semistealthy worms. I hear China is getting plenty of DSL now.
Re: Constant encrypted stream
At 03:01 PM 12/20/02 -0600, Anonymous wrote: >Or, alternatively, if Crypto use by "everyday folks" was as common as, saying, Gnutella file sharing, then it would be a HELL of a lot harder for invisible ears to pick out potentially interesting encrypted files (how many Gnutella files are shared each day?). That's simply hiding in a crowd. What you want is to wear a disguise, too. Kazaa + stego, dude. -- "Intended only for lawful uses." -HP Computer Advert
Re: Constant Encrypted Stream
On Thu, Dec 19, 2002 at 10:10:25PM -0600, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: | Nothing serious, just throwing a quick thought out... | | It has been mentioned that you should always use crypto. If you wait until | you actually have something private to send, then an adversary will know | exactly which message is important. Encrypting everything gives equal | suspicion to each message and nobody has the resources to attack all of your | mail. | | So, I was thinking that rather than just encrypt each message, why not just | keep a constant encrypted stream open? So, even when you are asleep, | computers at each node are bombarding each other with encrypted "junk" | files. Your noise to signal ratio would be phenomenal. | | The main problem to solve as I see it would be for legitimate recipients to | be able to determine when a message is real and not trash, without letting | an adversary know. And then there's economics. Someone has to pay for that noise to signal ratio. Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume
Re: Constant Encrypted Stream
On Fri, 20 Dec 2002, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > Very good, sir. Your next assignment is to read about Mixmaster > anonymous remailer networks. Generally sending uniformly-sized (padded > or fragmented or noise) blocks at regular intervals is preferable (and > equivalent) > to your suggestion of keeping connections open all the time. Also check out "The Art of War" where Sun Tzu describes using signals to confuse the enemy. We're not doing anything new here, the toys are just more fun to play with is all :-) Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
Re: Constant Encrypted Stream
On Fri, 20 Dec 2002, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > The moral equivalent of the pre-telegraph French semaphore soldiers > doing the macarena... > :-) To the tune of "I'm a lumberjack and I'm ok". :-) Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
Re: Constant Encrypted Stream
At 10:27 AM 12/20/02 -0800, Mike Rosing wrote: > >Also check out "The Art of War" where Sun Tzu describes using >signals to confuse the enemy. We're not doing anything new here, >the toys are just more fun to play with is all :-) The moral equivalent of the pre-telegraph French semaphore soldiers doing the macarena... :-) -- "Intended only for lawful uses." -HP Computer Advert
Re: Constant Encrypted Stream
At 01:35 PM 12/20/2002 -0800, Mike Rosing wrote: On Fri, 20 Dec 2002, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > The moral equivalent of the pre-telegraph French semaphore soldiers > doing the macarena... > :-) To the tune of "I'm a lumberjack and I'm ok". :-) Hey, you're hearing that more and more often in Silicon Valley these days "I never wanted to be a computer hacker in San Francisco. I wanted to be ... A Lumberjack! Out in the woods of British Columbia!"
