Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Wouter Verhelst]

On Sat, Sep 26, 2015 at 12:41:39PM +0200, Wouter Verhelst wrote:
> If you're referring to the casting vote exception in the proposal, you
> urgently need to reread §5.1.7 of the constitution: the DPL has a
> casting vote for GRs!

Actually, you were referring to sections (iv) and (v) of the proposal.
That does move the proposal from what I consider to be "coo coo crazy"
to "a terribly bad idea".

If an option 1 did not reach its supermajority requirements, but an
option 2 would win under the current rules, then due to condorcet under
your proposed scheme and due to the fact that we just spent over a month
to come to no result it is extremely likely that a next vote is going to
produce the same result, unless something major changes between the two
votes.  In other words, you'd condemn us to perpetual further
"discussion".

If option 1 did not make supermajority by a wide margin, it is possible
that its supporters will decide it's not worth getting it on the ballot
anymore, thereby resulting in option 2 being the most likely winner, in
the absense of strategic voting. But we actually do have a previous vote
outcome, so people who did not vote strategically in the previous round
due to lack of data now no longer have such a restriction. Rather than
eliminating strategic voting (as you claim you're doing), you're
actually encouraging it.

As said, I think this is a terrible idea.

-- 
It is easy to love a country that is famous for chocolate and beer

  -- Barack Obama, speaking in Brussels, Belgium, 2014-03-26


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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Wouter Verhelst]

On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 05:51:45PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Wouter Verhelst writes ("Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an 
> off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering"):
> > Having given this some more thought, I believe I've come to understand
> > why you don't see this to be such a crazy idea as I believe it is.
> 
> > This works for votes where the electorate (either the TC or all DD's for
> > a GR) wish to overrule some other developer's opinion. If the overruling
> > vote wins and makes supermajority, then the other developer in question
> > has been overruled. If the overruling vote wins but does *not* make
> > supermajority, we in effect ask the other developer in question to
> > either "please" or "pretty please, with sugar on top" (depending on
> > whether the TC or the project as a whole voted) change things, without
> > requiring said change.
> 
> Exactly.
> 
> > Things become rather murky, however, when we're voting on a change to
> > the constitution or a Foundation Document, which also requires a 3:1
> > supermajority.
> > 
> > If a vote to make a change the constitution wins, but does not make its
> > required supermajority, then what? Did we just add a paragraph "we think
> > this is a good idea, but you're not required to follow this bit of
> > procedure" to the constitution? That seems pointless, and would probably
> > make the constitution very hard to read if it happens a lot.
> 
> Which is why in those cases my proposal does not do that.

Yes it does.

> > Do we throw said change away? We probably can't, because it's still a
> > non-binding resolution, or something.
> 
> In these cases, my proposal produces `FD'.

It does not.

> > Put otherwise, the idea of a "non-binding change to the constitution"
> > seems to make no sense.
> 
> I entirely agree.

Good.

> > In other words, while I understand where you're coming from and why you
> > believe this change is desirable, I think it does have some dangerous
> > side effects that you may not have considered. I therefore strongly urge
> > you (and everyeone who's seconded the original proposal) to reconsider,
> > and decide whether you really believe the above-described scenario is in
> > any way desirable, and I further urge you to come up with a solution to
> > that problem before this is brought to a vote.
> 
> I think if you read my proposal again you will see that it doesn't
> have the bad effect you identify.

If you're referring to the casting vote exception in the proposal, you
urgently need to reread §5.1.7 of the constitution: the DPL has a
casting vote for GRs!

-- 
It is easy to love a country that is famous for chocolate and beer

  -- Barack Obama, speaking in Brussels, Belgium, 2014-03-26

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Sam Hartman]

> "Ian" == Ian Jackson  writes:

>> Do we throw said change away? We probably can't, because it's
>> still a non-binding resolution, or something.

Ian> In these cases, my proposal produces `FD'.

>> Put otherwise, the idea of a "non-binding change to the
>> constitution" seems to make no sense.

Ian> I entirely agree.

>> In other words, while I understand where you're coming from and
>> why you believe this change is desirable, I think it does have
>> some dangerous side effects that you may not have considered. I
>> therefore strongly urge you (and everyeone who's seconded the
>> original proposal) to reconsider, and decide whether you really
>> believe the above-described scenario is in any way desirable, and
>> I further urge you to come up with a solution to that problem
>> before this is brought to a vote.

Ian> I think if you read my proposal again you will see that it
Ian> doesn't have the bad effect you identify.


I think having FD win in many of these cases does itself produce exactly
the bad effect that Wouter is describing.  I'v also explained why I
think it opens up greater strategic voting problems than the current
constitution.

--Sam

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Ian Jackson]

Wouter Verhelst writes ("Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one 
error and duplicate section numbering"):
> Having given this some more thought, I believe I've come to understand
> why you don't see this to be such a crazy idea as I believe it is.
...
> This works for votes where the electorate (either the TC or all DD's for
> a GR) wish to overrule some other developer's opinion. If the overruling
> vote wins and makes supermajority, then the other developer in question
> has been overruled. If the overruling vote wins but does *not* make
> supermajority, we in effect ask the other developer in question to
> either "please" or "pretty please, with sugar on top" (depending on
> whether the TC or the project as a whole voted) change things, without
> requiring said change.

Exactly.

> Things become rather murky, however, when we're voting on a change to
> the constitution or a Foundation Document, which also requires a 3:1
> supermajority.
> 
> If a vote to make a change the constitution wins, but does not make its
> required supermajority, then what? Did we just add a paragraph "we think
> this is a good idea, but you're not required to follow this bit of
> procedure" to the constitution? That seems pointless, and would probably
> make the constitution very hard to read if it happens a lot.

Which is why in those cases my proposal does not do that.

> Do we throw said change away? We probably can't, because it's still a
> non-binding resolution, or something.

In these cases, my proposal produces `FD'.

> Put otherwise, the idea of a "non-binding change to the constitution"
> seems to make no sense.

I entirely agree.

> In other words, while I understand where you're coming from and why you
> believe this change is desirable, I think it does have some dangerous
> side effects that you may not have considered. I therefore strongly urge
> you (and everyeone who's seconded the original proposal) to reconsider,
> and decide whether you really believe the above-described scenario is in
> any way desirable, and I further urge you to come up with a solution to
> that problem before this is brought to a vote.

I think if you read my proposal again you will see that it doesn't
have the bad effect you identify.

Ian.

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Wouter Verhelst]

Hi Ian,

Having given this some more thought, I believe I've come to understand
why you don't see this to be such a crazy idea as I believe it is.

On Tue, Sep 01, 2015 at 12:20:05PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Kurt Roeckx writes ("Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one 
> error and duplicate section numbering"):
> > So I understand that if there is no winner, and so maybe not
> > even a normal majority (that doesn't even exist anymore?) for it,
> > it becomes a statement of opinion?
> 
> No.  I'm not even sure what that paragraph of yours means.  (If there
> is no winner, how could "it" become a statement of opinion ?  What
> would "it" be ?)  As for `normal' majorities, that is already dealt
> with by Condorcet.  Something that most people disagree with cannot
> become the Condorcet winner because it will be defeated by FD/SQ.
> 
> The intent of this change is that if the Condorcet(CSSD) winner does
> not meet the supermajority requirement, it is still the winning
> outcome of the whole vote, but only as a non-binding statement of
> opinion.

This works for votes where the electorate (either the TC or all DD's for
a GR) wish to overrule some other developer's opinion. If the overruling
vote wins and makes supermajority, then the other developer in question
has been overruled. If the overruling vote wins but does *not* make
supermajority, we in effect ask the other developer in question to
either "please" or "pretty please, with sugar on top" (depending on
whether the TC or the project as a whole voted) change things, without
requiring said change.

Things become rather murky, however, when we're voting on a change to
the constitution or a Foundation Document, which also requires a 3:1
supermajority.

If a vote to make a change the constitution wins, but does not make its
required supermajority, then what? Did we just add a paragraph "we think
this is a good idea, but you're not required to follow this bit of
procedure" to the constitution? That seems pointless, and would probably
make the constitution very hard to read if it happens a lot.

Do we throw said change away? We probably can't, because it's still a
non-binding resolution, or something.

If the non-winning change to the constitution just adds a few things
that aren't contradicted by the old constitution, then we could probably
get away with adding an awkward paragraph. If it wanted to change
existing procedure, however, then we effectively have to throw it away
anyway, because it can't even be there as a statement of opinion, other
than one which says "we think this is good, but you can't do it because
the constitution says it's not good", and that seems like an even worse
idea.

Put otherwise, the idea of a "non-binding change to the constitution"
seems to make no sense.

This is a problem, too.

Let's assume the desire to change the constitution is due to a crisis in
the project. Such GR's tend to have several options on the ballot,
rather than just one. Let's further assume that the change to the
constitution would resolve the crisis, as would several other options,
but that "not doing anything" would not, as I believe is most likely in
such cases.

If the condorcet winner doesn't make supermajority, it would not resolve
the situation (and might in fact make matters worse). In such cases,
under the current rules, another option would win, which presumably
would resolve the crisis as well.

In other words, while I understand where you're coming from and why you
believe this change is desirable, I think it does have some dangerous
side effects that you may not have considered. I therefore strongly urge
you (and everyeone who's seconded the original proposal) to reconsider,
and decide whether you really believe the above-described scenario is in
any way desirable, and I further urge you to come up with a solution to
that problem before this is brought to a vote.

Thanks,

-- 
It is easy to love a country that is famous for chocolate and beer

  -- Barack Obama, speaking in Brussels, Belgium, 2014-03-26


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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Wouter Verhelst]

Hi Ian,

On Tue, Sep 01, 2015 at 12:20:05PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> The intent of this change is that if the Condorcet(CSSD) winner does
> not meet the supermajority requirement, it is still the winning
> outcome of the whole vote, but only as a non-binding statement of
> opinion.
> 
> So for example, suppose in a TC vote we have:
> 
>  A "we overrule the maintainer [6.1(4)]: this patch to comply with
> policy must must be applied"
> 
>  B "we set policy [6.1(1)]: the policy is wrong and must be changed"
> 
> and votes are  5x A,B,FD   2x B,FD,A

I interpret that as:

5x "I think we should overrule the maintainer; but if we don't, then at
least updating policy to match reality is an acceptable compromise".

2x "We should update policy; overruling the maintainer is the worst
possible outcome, and I'd rather do nothing than see that happen".

> The overall Condorcet winneer is A but only by a 5:2 majority, so the
> TC does not overrule.

Right.

> With the existing rules A is eliminated early, leaving B the Condorcet
> winner.  This is a bizarre outcome: the winning option was disfavoured
> by 5/7ths of the TC !

However, on the other hand, it is the *only* outcome (in your example)
of which all voters agree that it would a preferable outcome to that of
restarting the whole process. That is also an important outcome of that
vote; it is, to all involved, an acceptable compromise position.

> With the new scheme, A is the Condorcet winner (the `prospective
> winner' in the wording proposed in the GR text).  But it fails its
> supermajority.
> 
> So `prospective winning resolution text becomes a non-binding
> statement of opinion'.  Ie, the TC is treated as having said:
> 
>   A' "we advise [6.1(5)]: we disagree with the maintainer; this patch
>   to comply with policy should be applied"
> 
> This makes a lot more sense as an outcome.

If the maintainer has previously said that he thinks A is the worst
possible option and *all* of the TC agrees that updating policy to match
reality is, at least, an acceptable compromise (as in this example),
then option A will most likely result in "nothing happens" (i.e.,
"further discussion"), whereas option B would have produced a
(suboptimal) resolution.

> The maintainer can continue to diregard the disputed policy, because
> the TC hasn't mustered the certainty needed to overrule the
> maintainer; but, the policy is not altered.

I'm not sure why "accepting the compromise position as the winner" is in
any way an undesirable outcome to you.

In effect, having a non-binding "winner" outcome is hardly different
from having "further discussion" discussion win the vote (precisely
because it's not binding). In your example, *all* voters have said that
they prefer B over FD. I fail to see how your suggested scheme is an
improvement.

-- 
It is easy to love a country that is famous for chocolate and beer

  -- Barack Obama, speaking in Brussels, Belgium, 2014-03-26


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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Tue, Sep 01, 2015 at 07:32:34PM +0200, Andreas Barth wrote:
> * Kurt Roeckx (k...@roeckx.be) [150829 16:03]:
> > (Or I might be totally confused about the effects of all the
> > changes you're doing.  Those are all non-obvious changes that seem
> > to change more than the things you want to fix.)
> 
> IMHO your questions should be answered by others already, plus the
> constitution git that OdyX posted on
> http://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/users/odyx/supermajority-GR.git/
> 
> If there is something missing, please say so.

Please use a diff between the current constitution and what you
think the new version should be, instead of describing with words
how to change from one version to the other.  This will make it
far more obvious to everybody what the changes are.


Kurt

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Andreas Barth]

* Kurt Roeckx (k...@roeckx.be) [150829 16:03]:
> (Or I might be totally confused about the effects of all the
> changes you're doing.  Those are all non-obvious changes that seem
> to change more than the things you want to fix.)

IMHO your questions should be answered by others already, plus the
constitution git that OdyX posted on
http://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/users/odyx/supermajority-GR.git/

If there is something missing, please say so.


Andi

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Andreas Barth]

* Didier 'OdyX' Raboud (o...@debian.org) [150901 13:52]:
> It'd be good if you (as well as Andreas, as GR proposer) could comment 
> on the full series of commits in that repository, to make sure we all 
> agree on a constitution diff.

Up to now
http://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/users/odyx/supermajority-GR.git/
looks consistent with what the GR says. This might change during
further discussion of course.


Thanks for setting this up.


Andi

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Ian Jackson]

Didier 'OdyX' Raboud writes ("Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an 
off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering"):
> Le mardi, 1 septembre 2015, 12.20:05 Ian Jackson a écrit :
> > I think I intended that this should read A.6(4)(0).
> > ^^^
> > That puts the definition of V(A,B) immediately before its first use in
> > A.6(4)(1).
> 
> So would the attached diff match your intent [0]?

No, although it is equivalent.  The difference is only in the
numbering and (trivially different) placement of what in your commit
is A.6(3) and in my suggestion is A.6(4)(0).

> It'd be good if you (as well as Andreas, as GR proposer) could comment 
> on the full series of commits in that repository, to make sure we all 
> agree on a constitution diff.

Good idea.

Ian.

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Didier 'OdyX' Raboud]

Le mardi, 1 septembre 2015, 12.20:05 Ian Jackson a écrit :
> Kurt Roeckx writes ("Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-
by-one error and duplicate section numbering"):
> > On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:12:41PM +0200, Andreas Barth wrote:
> > >(i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
> > >
> > >by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
> > >   - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new
> > >   subparagraph
> > >   
> > > A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
> > >   
> > >   - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
> > >   
> > > followed by A.6(4).
> 
> As the original author of this wording, this is my fault.  Sorry.
> 
> > Those 2 things conflict.  First you create a A.6(3)(0), then you
> > say there is no A.6(3) left.  Please clarify what you mean.
> 
> I think this is a numbering problem:
> 
>   (i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
>   by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
>- Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
>  A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
>^
> 
> I think I intended that this should read A.6(4)(0).
> ^^^
> That puts the definition of V(A,B) immediately before its first use in
> A.6(4)(1).

So would the attached diff match your intent [0]?

It'd be good if you (as well as Andreas, as GR proposer) could comment 
on the full series of commits in that repository, to make sure we all 
agree on a constitution diff.

Cheers,
OdyX

[0] 
http://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/users/odyx/supermajority-GR.git/commit/?id=0480d88e4ec36350541339239255261e341865cd>From 0480d88e4ec36350541339239255261e341865cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Didier Raboud 
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2015 11:28:09 +0200
Subject: Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority by
 dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:

- Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
  A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
- Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
  followed by A.6(4).
---
 constitution.txt | 10 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/constitution.txt b/constitution.txt
index bb8535d..26ac4db 100644
--- a/constitution.txt
+++ b/constitution.txt
@@ -573,14 +573,8 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
 2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other than the
default option which do not receive at least R votes ranking that
option above the default option are dropped from consideration.
-3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
-   by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
- 1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
-prefer option A over option B.
- 2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio
-N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
- 3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
-ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
+3. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
+   prefer option A over option B.
 4. From the list of undropped options, we generate a list of pairwise
defeats.
  1. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly greater
-- 
cgit v0.11.2

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Ian Jackson]

Kurt Roeckx writes ("Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one 
error and duplicate section numbering"):
> On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:12:41PM +0200, Andreas Barth wrote:
> >(i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
> >by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
> >   - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
> > A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
> >   - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
> > followed by A.6(4).

As the original author of this wording, this is my fault.  Sorry.

> Those 2 things conflict.  First you create a A.6(3)(0), then you
> say there is no A.6(3) left.  Please clarify what you mean.

I think this is a numbering problem:

  (i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
  by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
 - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
   A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
   ^

I think I intended that this should read A.6(4)(0).
^^^
That puts the definition of V(A,B) immediately before its first use in
A.6(4)(1).


> >  +   the consequences set out alongside the majority
> >  +   requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option
> >  +   wins).
> 
> Where are those consequences documented?  This is about the
> non-binding statements?

Yes.  The consequences are documented `alongside the majority
requirement'.  That is, when the constitutional text specifies a
majority requirement, it can now also specify what happens if the
supermajority fails.

In para (v) of the GR text, text is added to 6.1(4) and 4.1(4) saying
that supermajority-failing TC decisions, and supermajority-failing
attempts to use TC powers by way of GR, are advisory.

> >(v) In
> >* 6.1(4) (Technical Commitee power to overrule a Developer)
> >* 4.1(4) (Developers' use of TC powers by GR) (if another
> >constitutional amendment has not abolished that
> >supermajority requirement)
> >in each case after the "N:M majority" add
> >  +   ; failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes
> >  +   a non-binding statement of opinion.
> 
> So I understand that if there is no winner, and so maybe not
> even a normal majority (that doesn't even exist anymore?) for it,
> it becomes a statement of opinion?

No.  I'm not even sure what that paragraph of yours means.  (If there
is no winner, how could "it" become a statement of opinion ?  What
would "it" be ?)  As for `normal' majorities, that is already dealt
with by Condorcet.  Something that most people disagree with cannot
become the Condorcet winner because it will be defeated by FD/SQ.


The intent of this change is that if the Condorcet(CSSD) winner does
not meet the supermajority requirement, it is still the winning
outcome of the whole vote, but only as a non-binding statement of
opinion.

So for example, suppose in a TC vote we have:

 A "we overrule the maintainer [6.1(4)]: this patch to comply with
policy must must be applied"

 B "we set policy [6.1(1)]: the policy is wrong and must be changed"

and votes are  5x A,B,FD   2x B,FD,A

The overall Condorcet winneer is A but only by a 5:2 majority, so the
TC does not overrule.

With the existing rules A is eliminated early, leaving B the Condorcet
winner.  This is a bizarre outcome: the winning option was disfavoured
by 5/7ths of the TC !

With the new scheme, A is the Condorcet winner (the `prospective
winner' in the wording proposed in the GR text).  But it fails its
supermajority.

So `prospective winning resolution text becomes a non-binding
statement of opinion'.  Ie, the TC is treated as having said:

  A' "we advise [6.1(5)]: we disagree with the maintainer; this patch
  to comply with policy should be applied"

This makes a lot more sense as an outcome.  The maintainer can
continue to diregard the disputed policy, because the TC hasn't
mustered the certainty needed to overrule the maintainer; but, the
policy is not altered.

If you feel that the proposed wording isn't clear I'm sure Andi would
be happy to hear your suggestions for clarification.

> (Or I might be totally confused about the effects of all the
> changes you're doing.  Those are all non-obvious changes that seem
> to change more than the things you want to fix.)

The determination of when supermajority failure occurs is necessarily
entangled with the consequences.

Ian.

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Russ Allbery]

Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer  writes:
> On Wednesday 26 August 2015 15:18:36 Russ Allbery wrote:

>> I second the below text, for both changes.

> FWIW, at least on my mail client I'm failing to verify this signature.
> Not that is *that* important considering the number of seconds already
> available, but I thought it was better to make it clear.

I set an expiration time on my signing key and then periodically move it
forward, so if you have a stale keyring for whatever reason, your gpg may
think the subkey is expired.

-- 
Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org)   

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 05:30:38PM -0300, Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer 
wrote:
> On Wednesday 26 August 2015 15:18:36 Russ Allbery wrote:
> > I second the below text, for both changes.
> 
> FWIW, at least on my mail client I'm failing to verify this signature.
> Not that is *that* important considering the number of seconds already 
> available, but I thought it was better to make it clear.

It verifies for me.


Kurt

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer]

On Wednesday 26 August 2015 15:18:36 Russ Allbery wrote:
> I second the below text, for both changes.

FWIW, at least on my mail client I'm failing to verify this signature.
Not that is *that* important considering the number of seconds already 
available, but I thought it was better to make it clear.

Kinds regards, Lisandro.

-- 

Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer
http://perezmeyer.com.ar/
http://perezmeyer.blogspot.com/


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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Bdale Garbee]

Andreas Barth  writes:

>Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix

Seconded.

Bdale


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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:12:41PM +0200, Andreas Barth wrote:
>(i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
>by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
>   - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
> A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
>   - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
> followed by A.6(4).

Those 2 things conflict.  First you create a A.6(3)(0), then you
say there is no A.6(3) left.  Please clarify what you mean.

>  +   the consequences set out alongside the majority
>  +   requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option
>  +   wins).

Where are those consequences documented?  This is about the
non-binding statements?

>(v) In
>* 6.1(4) (Technical Commitee power to overrule a Developer)
>* 4.1(4) (Developers' use of TC powers by GR) (if another
>constitutional amendment has not abolished that
>supermajority requirement)
>in each case after the "N:M majority" add
>  +   ; failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes
>  +   a non-binding statement of opinion.

So I understand that if there is no winner, and so maybe not
even a normal majority (that doesn't even exist anymore?) for it,
it becomes a statement of opinion?

(Or I might be totally confused about the effects of all the
changes you're doing.  Those are all non-obvious changes that seem
to change more than the things you want to fix.)


Kurt

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:12:41PM +0200, Andreas Barth wrote:
> Hi together,
> 
> we (as the Technical Committee) have encountered two bugs in the
> constitution which we like to fix. For this reason, I propose the following
> General Resolution to change the constitution.

So I see 5 seconds, so the GR has started.  I'll set up the vote
page and mail d-d-a tomorrow.

I think I have several problems with text, I'll try to find some
time to write them down.


Kurt

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Didier 'OdyX' Raboud]

Le jeudi, 27 août 2015, 10.04:50 Stefano Zacchiroli a écrit :
> On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:12:41PM +0200, Andreas Barth wrote:
> > we (as the Technical Committee) have encountered two bugs in the
> > constitution which we like to fix. For this reason, I propose the
> > following General Resolution to change the constitution.
> 
> Can we have a diff and a word-diff please? That would help a lot in
> better reviewing the proposal.

They're hereby attached, I've pushed the git repository that I've used 
for creating these there too:

http://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/users/odyx/supermajority-GR.git/

Andreas, it would make sense to confirm that this is your understanding 
of the GR proposal. In particular, I was puzzled when trying to 
interpret:

>(i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
>by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
>- Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
>  A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
>- Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
>  followed by A.6(4).

Cheers,
OdyXdiff --git a/constitution.txt b/constitution.txt
index 6204fbe..4b9b499 100644
--- a/constitution.txt
+++ b/constitution.txt
@@ -86,7 +86,9 @@
 3. Make or override any decision authorised by the powers of the
Project Leader or a Delegate.
 4. Make or override any decision authorised by the powers of the
-   Technical Committee, provided they agree with a 2:1 majority.
+   Technical Committee, provided they agree with a 2:1 majority;
+   failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes a
+   non-binding statement of opinion.
 5. Issue, supersede and withdraw nontechnical policy documents and
statements.
These include documents describing the goals of the project, its
@@ -260,10 +262,11 @@
 4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 3:1 majority).
The Technical Committee may ask a Developer to take a particular
technical course of action even if the Developer does not wish to;
-   this requires a 3:1 majority. For example, the Committee may
-   determine that a complaint made by the submitter of a bug is
-   justified and that the submitter's proposed solution should be
-   implemented.
+   this requires a 3:1 majority; failing that, the prospective winning
+   resolution text becomes a non-binding statement of opinion. For
+   example, the Committee may determine that a complaint made by the
+   submitter of a bug is a justified and that the submitter's proposed
+   solution should be implemented.
 5. Offer advice.
The Technical Committee may make formal announcements about its
views on any matter. Individual members may of course make informal
@@ -477,7 +480,7 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
These rules apply to communal decision-making by committees and
plebiscites, where stated above.
 
-  A.1. Proposal
+  A.0. Proposal
 
The formal procedure begins when a draft resolution is proposed and
sponsored, as required.
@@ -531,8 +534,6 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
ballot that includes an option for the original resolution, each
amendment, and the default option (where applicable).
 2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
-   Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
-   have a 1:1 majority requirement.
 3. The votes are counted according to the rules in A.6. The default
option is "Further Discussion", unless specified otherwise.
 4. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters of
@@ -573,14 +574,8 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
 2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other than the
default option which do not receive at least R votes ranking that
option above the default option are dropped from consideration.
-3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
-   by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
- 1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
-prefer option A over option B.
- 2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio
-N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
- 3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
-ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
+3. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
+   prefer option A over option B.
 4. From the list of undropped options, we generate a list of pairwise
defeats.
  1. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly greater
@@ -602,10 +597,22 @@ A. Standard Resolution Procedure
 equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than V(Y,B).
  2. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat weaker
 than it. There may be more t

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Stefano Zacchiroli]

On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:12:41PM +0200, Andreas Barth wrote:
> we (as the Technical Committee) have encountered two bugs in the
> constitution which we like to fix. For this reason, I propose the following
> General Resolution to change the constitution.

Can we have a diff and a word-diff please? That would help a lot in
better reviewing the proposal.

Thanks,
Cheers.
-- 
Stefano Zacchiroli  . . . . . . .  z...@upsilon.cc . . . . o . . . o . o
Maître de conférences . . . . . http://upsilon.cc/zack . . . o . . . o o
Former Debian Project Leader . . . . . @zacchiro . . . . o o o . . . o .
« the first rule of tautology club is the first rule of tautology club »


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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Philip Hands]

I second both parts of the GR below.

Andreas Barth  writes:

> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Hi together,
>
> we (as the Technical Committee) have encountered two bugs in the
> constitution which we like to fix. For this reason, I propose the following
> General Resolution to change the constitution.
>
> Please note that we put both issues into one GR proposal; however, if we 
> notice one of the issues generates too much discussion, we will separate
> the proposals.
>
>
>
> Regards,
> Andi
>
>- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -
>
>
>Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix
>
>Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
>Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
>
>Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
>fencepost error.  In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
>only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
>greater than the supermajority ratio.
>
>In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
>developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
>dissenter.  And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
>dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that
>is no longer possible.
>
>This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
>of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
>
>Additionally, following discussion of the supermajority mechanism
>within the project, it was realised that certain situations could
>cause anomalous results:
>
>* The existing rules might result in a GR or TC resolution passing
>  which was actually the diametric opposite of the majority view.
>
>* The existing rules unintentionally privilege the default option
>  in evenly contested TC votes where no supermajority is required,
>  possibly encouraging tactical voting.
>
>Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:
>
>(i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
>by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
>   - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
> A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
>   - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
> followed by A.6(4).
>
>(ii) In A.6(8) replace all occurrences of "winner" with
>"prospective winner".  Replace "wins" in "which of those options
>wins" with "is the prospective winner".
>
>(iii) In A.6(8) add a new sentence at the end:
>  + If there is no elector with a casting vote, the default option
>  + wins.
>
>(iv) Add a new section A.6(9) after A.6(8):
>  + 9. 1. If the prospective winner W has no majority requirement,
>  +   or defeats the default option D by its majority
>  +   requirement, the prospective winner is the actual winner.
>  +2. Otherwise, the motion has failed its supermajority with
>  +   the consequences set out alongside the majority
>  +   requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option
>  +   wins).
>  +3. An option A defeats the default option D by a
>  +   majority of N:M if M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to
>  +   N * V(D,A).
>
>(v) In
>* 6.1(4) (Technical Commitee power to overrule a Developer)
>* 4.1(4) (Developers' use of TC powers by GR) (if another
>constitutional amendment has not abolished that
>supermajority requirement)
>in each case after the "N:M majority" add
>  +   ; failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes
>  +   a non-binding statement of opinion.
>
>(vi) In A.3(2) delete as follows:
>2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
>  -   Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
>  -   have a 1:1 majority requirement.
>
>For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
>votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
>Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
>
>The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and arrange that failing a
>supermajority voids the whole decision (or makes it advisory),
>rather than promoting another option.  The fencepost bugfix will
>also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions
>requiring supermajorities.  And after this change the TC chair can
>choose a non-default option even if it is tied with a default
>option.
>
>
>
>
>
>Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering.
>
>The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1.
>This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is
>undesirable.
>
>Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment:
>
> - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0.
>
>
>- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -

Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Colin Tuckley]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On 26/08/15 21:12, Andreas Barth wrote:
> 
> - GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -
> 
> 
> Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix
> 
> Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical 
> Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
> 
> Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has
> a fencepost error.  In the new text a supermajority requirement is
> met only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is
> strictly greater than the supermajority ratio.
> 
> In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a 
> developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single 
> dissenter.  And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two 
> dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that 
> is no longer possible.
> 
> This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent 
> of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
> 
> Additionally, following discussion of the supermajority mechanism 
> within the project, it was realised that certain situations could 
> cause anomalous results:
> 
> * The existing rules might result in a GR or TC resolution passing 
> which was actually the diametric opposite of the majority view.
> 
> * The existing rules unintentionally privilege the default option 
> in evenly contested TC votes where no supermajority is required, 
> possibly encouraging tactical voting.
> 
> Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:
> 
> (i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority by
> dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically: - Move
> A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph 
> A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1). - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely,
> leaving A.6(2) to be followed by A.6(4).
> 
> (ii) In A.6(8) replace all occurrences of "winner" with 
> "prospective winner".  Replace "wins" in "which of those options 
> wins" with "is the prospective winner".
> 
> (iii) In A.6(8) add a new sentence at the end: + If there is no
> elector with a casting vote, the default option + wins.
> 
> (iv) Add a new section A.6(9) after A.6(8): + 9. 1. If the
> prospective winner W has no majority requirement, +   or
> defeats the default option D by its majority +   requirement,
> the prospective winner is the actual winner. +2. Otherwise, the
> motion has failed its supermajority with +   the consequences
> set out alongside the majority +   requirement (or, if
> unspecified, the default option +   wins). +3. An option A
> defeats the default option D by a +   majority of N:M if M *
> V(A,D) is greater than or equal to +   N * V(D,A).
> 
> (v) In * 6.1(4) (Technical Commitee power to overrule a Developer) 
> * 4.1(4) (Developers' use of TC powers by GR) (if another 
> constitutional amendment has not abolished that supermajority
> requirement) in each case after the "N:M majority" add +   ;
> failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes +   a
> non-binding statement of opinion.
> 
> (vi) In A.3(2) delete as follows: 2. The default option must not
> have any supermajority requirements. -   Options which do not
> have an explicit supermajority requirement -   have a 1:1
> majority requirement.
> 
> For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any 
> votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical 
> Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
> 
> The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and arrange that failing a 
> supermajority voids the whole decision (or makes it advisory), 
> rather than promoting another option.  The fencepost bugfix will 
> also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions 
> requiring supermajorities.  And after this change the TC chair can 
> choose a non-default option even if it is tied with a default 
> option.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering.
> 
> The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1. This
> does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is 
> undesirable.
> 
> Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment:
> 
> - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0.
> 
> 
> - GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -

I second both parts of this GR.

Colin

- -- 
Colin Tuckley  |  +44(0)1223 830814  |  PGP/GnuPG Key Id
Debian Developer   |  +44(0)7799 143369  | 0x38C9D903
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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Russ Allbery]

I second the below text, for both changes.

Andreas Barth  writes:

>- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -


>Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix

>Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
>Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.

>Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
>fencepost error.  In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
>only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
>greater than the supermajority ratio.

>In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
>developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
>dissenter.  And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
>dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that
>is no longer possible.

>This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
>of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.

>Additionally, following discussion of the supermajority mechanism
>within the project, it was realised that certain situations could
>cause anomalous results:

>* The existing rules might result in a GR or TC resolution passing
>  which was actually the diametric opposite of the majority view.

>* The existing rules unintentionally privilege the default option
>  in evenly contested TC votes where no supermajority is required,
>  possibly encouraging tactical voting.

>Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:

>(i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
>by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
>   - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
> A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
>   - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
> followed by A.6(4).

>(ii) In A.6(8) replace all occurrences of "winner" with
>"prospective winner".  Replace "wins" in "which of those options
>wins" with "is the prospective winner".

>(iii) In A.6(8) add a new sentence at the end:
>  + If there is no elector with a casting vote, the default option
>  + wins.

>(iv) Add a new section A.6(9) after A.6(8):
>  + 9. 1. If the prospective winner W has no majority requirement,
>  +   or defeats the default option D by its majority
>  +   requirement, the prospective winner is the actual winner.
>  +2. Otherwise, the motion has failed its supermajority with
>  +   the consequences set out alongside the majority
>  +   requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option
>  +   wins).
>  +3. An option A defeats the default option D by a
>  +   majority of N:M if M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to
>  +   N * V(D,A).

>(v) In
>* 6.1(4) (Technical Commitee power to overrule a Developer)
>* 4.1(4) (Developers' use of TC powers by GR) (if another
>constitutional amendment has not abolished that
>supermajority requirement)
>in each case after the "N:M majority" add
>  +   ; failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes
>  +   a non-binding statement of opinion.

>(vi) In A.3(2) delete as follows:
>2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
>  -   Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
>  -   have a 1:1 majority requirement.

>For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
>votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
>Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.

>The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and arrange that failing a
>supermajority voids the whole decision (or makes it advisory),
>rather than promoting another option.  The fencepost bugfix will
>also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions
>requiring supermajorities.  And after this change the TC chair can
>choose a non-default option even if it is tied with a default
>option.





>Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering.

>The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1.
>This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is
>undesirable.

>Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment:

> - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0.


>- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -

-- 
Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org)   


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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[martin f krafft]

also sprach Andreas Barth  [2015-08-26 22:12 +0200]:
> we (as the Technical Committee) have encountered two bugs in the
> constitution which we like to fix. For this reason, I propose the
> following General Resolution to change the constitution.

Seconded.

-- 
 .''`.   martin f. krafft  @martinkrafft
: :'  :  proud Debian developer
`. `'`   http://people.debian.org/~madduck
  `-  Debian - when you have better things to do than fixing systems
 
if a man in a forest speaks his mind freely
and there is no woman to hear it
is he still wrong?


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Re: GR: Constitutional Amendment to fix an off-by-one error and duplicate section numbering

[Didier 'OdyX' Raboud]

Le mercredi, 26 août 2015, 22.12:41 Andreas Barth a écrit :
>- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -
> 
>Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix
> 
>Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
>Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
> 
>Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has
>a fencepost error.  In the new text a supermajority requirement is
>met only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is
>strictly greater than the supermajority ratio.
> 
>In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
>developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
>dissenter.  And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
>dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that
>is no longer possible.
> 
>This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
>of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
> 
>Additionally, following discussion of the supermajority mechanism
>within the project, it was realised that certain situations could
>cause anomalous results:
> 
>* The existing rules might result in a GR or TC resolution passing
>  which was actually the diametric opposite of the majority view.
> 
>* The existing rules unintentionally privilege the default option
>  in evenly contested TC votes where no supermajority is required,
>  possibly encouraging tactical voting.
> 
>Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:
> 
>(i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
>by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
>   - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new
> subparagraph A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
>   - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
> followed by A.6(4).
> 
>(ii) In A.6(8) replace all occurrences of "winner" with
>"prospective winner".  Replace "wins" in "which of those options
>wins" with "is the prospective winner".
> 
>(iii) In A.6(8) add a new sentence at the end:
>  + If there is no elector with a casting vote, the default option
>  + wins.
> 
>(iv) Add a new section A.6(9) after A.6(8):
>  + 9. 1. If the prospective winner W has no majority requirement,
>  +   or defeats the default option D by its majority
>  +   requirement, the prospective winner is the actual winner.
>  +2. Otherwise, the motion has failed its supermajority with
>  +   the consequences set out alongside the majority
>  +   requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option
>  +   wins).
>  +3. An option A defeats the default option D by a
>  +   majority of N:M if M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to
>  +   N * V(D,A).
> 
>(v) In
>* 6.1(4) (Technical Commitee power to overrule a Developer)
>* 4.1(4) (Developers' use of TC powers by GR) (if another
>constitutional amendment has not abolished that
>supermajority requirement)
>in each case after the "N:M majority" add
>+   ; failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes
>+   a non-binding statement of opinion.
> 
>(vi) In A.3(2) delete as follows:
>2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
>-  Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
>-  have a 1:1 majority requirement.
> 
>For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
>votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
>Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
> 
>The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and arrange that failing a
>supermajority voids the whole decision (or makes it advisory),
>rather than promoting another option.  The fencepost bugfix will
>also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions
>requiring supermajorities.  And after this change the TC chair can
>choose a non-default option even if it is tied with a default
>option.
> 
>Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering.
> 
>The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1.
>This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is
>undesirable.
> 
>Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment:
> 
> - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0.
> 
>- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -

Seconded.

OdyX

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