Re: [PATCH 55593] Add SSLServerInfoFile directive

2013-10-22 Thread Trevor Perrin
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 5:45 AM, Dr Stephen Henson
shen...@opensslfoundation.com wrote:
 On 21/10/2013 05:09, Trevor Perrin wrote:

 Seems like a lot of work.  For example, how would the generic
 SSLConfCmd commands get hooked-up with passphrase handling for the key
 files?


 BTW I've just added some experimental code to the OpenSSL master branch. It 
 adds
 key/certificate support to SSL_CONF and a new function 
 SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type.
 The Apache side isn't added yet but should be pretty straight forward.

Cool, if you do the Apache side I'll try to follow your footsteps and
extend ServerInfo to work with SSL_CONF (in OpenSSL and Apache).


Trevor


Re: [PATCH 55593] Add SSLServerInfoFile directive

2013-10-22 Thread Dr Stephen Henson
On 22/10/2013 20:14, Trevor Perrin wrote:
 On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 5:45 AM, Dr Stephen Henson
 shen...@opensslfoundation.com wrote:
 On 21/10/2013 05:09, Trevor Perrin wrote:


 BTW I've just added some experimental code to the OpenSSL master branch. It 
 adds
 key/certificate support to SSL_CONF and a new function 
 SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type.
 The Apache side isn't added yet but should be pretty straight forward.
 
 Cool, if you do the Apache side I'll try to follow your footsteps and
 extend ServerInfo to work with SSL_CONF (in OpenSSL and Apache).
 

http://svn.apache.org/r1534754

This needs the OpenSSL master branch. It doesn't (yet) work with 1.0.2-stable
but I'll be backporting the functionality in the near future.

I tested it against a new DH parameters directive and it seemed to work OK.

Only bit I'm not completely sure about is the use of the SSL_CONF_CTX structure
in modssl_ctx_t. It's done that way to avoid having to keep creating and
destroying the SSL_CONF_CTX for each directive but a quick test showed it was
creating several other SSL_CONF_CTX structures which were never used. Maybe
there's a better way to handle that or just create the SSL_CONF_CTX on first 
use?

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen Henson. OpenSSL Software Foundation, Inc.
1829 Mount Ephraim Road
Adamstown, MD 21710
+1 877-673-6775
shen...@opensslfoundation.com


Re: svn commit: r1534015 - /httpd/httpd/trunk/server/main.c

2013-10-22 Thread Yann Ylavic
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 2:30 AM, n...@apache.org wrote:

 Author: niq
 Date: Mon Oct 21 00:30:26 2013
 New Revision: 1534015

 URL: http://svn.apache.org/r1534015
 Log:
 Fix r55670.  Not a great idea to dereference process after pool destroy!

 Modified:
 httpd/httpd/trunk/server/main.c

 Modified: httpd/httpd/trunk/server/main.c
 URL:
 http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/httpd/httpd/trunk/server/main.c?rev=1534015r1=1534014r2=1534015view=diff

 ==
 --- httpd/httpd/trunk/server/main.c (original)
 +++ httpd/httpd/trunk/server/main.c Mon Oct 21 00:30:26 2013
 @@ -264,12 +264,17 @@ static void destroy_and_exit_process(pro
   * by us before they can do so. In this case maybe valueable log
 messages
   * might get lost.
   */
 +
 +/* If we are to print an error, we need the name before we destroy
 pool.
 + * short_name is a pointer into argv, so remains valid.
 + */
 +const char *name = process-short_name ? process-short_name :
 httpd;
 +


Shouldn't this be safe from terminal controls, eg :
const char *name = process-short_name;
if (!name ||
!*name || 
ap_has_cntrl(name)) {
name = httpd;
}
?


  apr_sleep(TASK_SWITCH_SLEEP);
  ap_main_state = AP_SQ_MS_EXITING;
  apr_pool_destroy(process-pool); /* and destroy all descendent pools
 */
  apr_terminate();
  if ((process_exit_value != 0)  isatty(fileno(stderr))) {
 -const char *name = process-short_name ? process-short_name :
 httpd;
  fprintf(stderr, %s: abnormal exit %d\n, name,
 process_exit_value);
  }
  exit(process_exit_value)


Regards.


Re: svn commit: r1534015 - /httpd/httpd/trunk/server/main.c

2013-10-22 Thread William A. Rowe Jr.
On Oct 22, 2013 5:14 PM, Yann Ylavic ylavic@gmail.com wrote:


 Shouldn't this be safe from terminal controls, eg :
 const char *name = process-short_name;
 if (!name ||
 !*name ||
 ap_has_cntrl(name)) {
 name = httpd;
 }
 ?

No.  You are thinking of untrusted user input.  The Admin started this
process under the given name.  Describe how this can be devolved to a
vulnerability?


Re: svn commit: r1533810 - in /httpd/httpd/trunk: docs/man/rotatelogs.8 docs/manual/programs/rotatelogs.html.en support/rotatelogs.c

2013-10-22 Thread Ben Reser
On 10/20/13 5:31 AM, Ruediger Pluem wrote:
 Can't we use apr_psprintf  with %pm instead of the constant length buffer 
 char [120]?

Done in r1534895, r1534896 and r1534914.