Re: Confusion about SSLProxyCheckPeerName/CN

[William A Rowe Jr]

This looks like the resulting patch.  Wordsmithing the docs changes today...

On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 1:50 PM, Ruediger Pluem  wrote:

>
> On 06/01/2016 05:45 PM, William A Rowe Jr wrote:
> >
> >   CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
> >on {ignored}CheckPeerName verification
> >unset unset CheckPeerName verification
> >unset onCheckPeerName verification?
> >unset off   no verification
> >off   on*CheckPeerCN* verification
> >off   unset | off   no verification
> >
> > Because CheckPeerName is a superset of the CheckPeerCN functionality,
> > I don't think there is any harm is using CheckPeerName in this case.
> >
>
> I think CheckPeerName is ok in this case.
>
> Regards
>
> Rüdiger
>

 Index: ssl_engine_io.c
===
--- ssl_engine_io.c (revision 1746587)
+++ ssl_engine_io.c (working copy)
@@ -1189,6 +1189,8 @@
 }
 }
 if ((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_name != SSL_ENABLED_FALSE) &&
+((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn != SSL_ENABLED_FALSE) ||
+ (sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_name == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE)) &&
 hostname_note) {
 apr_table_unset(c->notes, "proxy-request-hostname");
 if (!cert
@@ -1200,7 +1202,7 @@
   "for hostname %s", hostname_note);
 }
 }
-else if ((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn != SSL_ENABLED_FALSE) &&
+else if ((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE) &&
 hostname_note) {
 const char *hostname;
 int match = 0;

Re: Confusion about SSLProxyCheckPeerName/CN

[Ruediger Pluem]

On 06/01/2016 05:45 PM, William A Rowe Jr wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 9:46 AM, Ruediger Pluem  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 06/01/2016 04:19 PM, William A Rowe Jr wrote:
> > Correcting one typo, below...
> >
> > On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 9:19 AM, William A Rowe Jr    >> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Proposal...
> >
> > CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
> >  unset | onunset | onCheckPeerName verification
> >  off   on*CheckPeerCN* verification
> >  off   unset | off   no verification
> >  unset | off   off   no verification
> >
> > WDYT?
> >
> >
> >
> 
> In general yes plus
> 
> CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
>   onunset | offCheckPeerName verification
> 
> 
> What about one more exceptional case... where the
> 
> CheckPeerCN On
> 
> is the only directive?  Do we still want to enable CheckPeerName by default?
> 
>   CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
>on {ignored}CheckPeerName verification
>unset unset CheckPeerName verification
>unset onCheckPeerName or CheckPeerCN verification?

I think CheckPeerName is ok in this case.

>unset off   no verification
>off   on*CheckPeerCN* verification
>off   unset | off   no verification
>
> Because CheckPeerName is a superset of the CheckPeerCN functionality,
> I don't think there is any harm is using CheckPeerName in this case.
> 
>  

Regards

Rüdiger

Re: Confusion about SSLProxyCheckPeerName/CN

[William A Rowe Jr]

On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 9:46 AM, Ruediger Pluem  wrote:

>
>
> On 06/01/2016 04:19 PM, William A Rowe Jr wrote:
> > Correcting one typo, below...
> >
> > On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 9:19 AM, William A Rowe Jr  > wrote:
> >
> >
> > Proposal...
> >
> > CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
> >  unset | onunset | onCheckPeerName verification
> >  off   on*CheckPeerCN* verification
> >  off   unset | off   no verification
> >  unset | off   off   no verification
> >
> > WDYT?
> >
> >
> >
>
> In general yes plus
>
> CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
>   onunset | offCheckPeerName verification
>

What about one more exceptional case... where the

CheckPeerCN On

is the only directive?  Do we still want to enable CheckPeerName by default?

  CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
   on {ignored}CheckPeerName verification
   unset unset CheckPeerName verification
   unset onCheckPeerName or CheckPeerCN verification?
   unset off   no verification
   off   on*CheckPeerCN* verification
   off   unset | off   no verification

Because CheckPeerName is a superset of the CheckPeerCN functionality,
I don't think there is any harm is using CheckPeerName in this case.

Re: Confusion about SSLProxyCheckPeerName/CN

[Ruediger Pluem]

On 06/01/2016 04:19 PM, William A Rowe Jr wrote:
> Correcting one typo, below...
> 
> On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 9:19 AM, William A Rowe Jr  > wrote:
> 
> 
> Proposal...
> 
> CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
>  unset | onunset | onCheckPeerName verification
>  off   on*CheckPeerCN* verification
>  off   unset | off   no verification
>  unset | off   off   no verification
> 
> WDYT?
> 
> 
> 

In general yes plus

CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
  onunset | offCheckPeerName verification


Regards

Rüdiger

Re: Confusion about SSLProxyCheckPeerName/CN

[William A Rowe Jr]

Correcting one typo, below...

On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 9:19 AM, William A Rowe Jr 
wrote:

>
> Proposal...
>
> CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
>  unset | onunset | onCheckPeerName verification
>  off   on*CheckPeerCN* verification
>  off   unset | off   no verification
>  unset | off   off   no verification
>
> WDYT?
>
>
>

Re: Confusion about SSLProxyCheckPeerName/CN

[William A Rowe Jr]

On Tue, May 31, 2016 at 1:15 PM, Ruediger Pluem  wrote:

>
> On 05/31/2016 06:37 PM, William A Rowe Jr wrote:
> > It seems the behavior introduced in 2.4.5 is causing a lot
> > of confusion for users attempting to disable peer checking.
> >
> > Right now, nothing needs to be done to do deep inspection
> > (altsubjectname plus common name).  Neither directive is
> > required, both default to on.
> >
> > Disabling checking is a pain in the ass, and the docs seem
> > to be very misleading;
> >
> >
> > SSLProxyCheckPeerName Directive
> >
> > Default: <
> http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/directive-dict.html#Default>
>  |SSLProxyCheckPeerName on
> > |
> >
> > This directive configures host name checking for server certificates
> when mod_ssl is acting as an SSL client. The check
> > will succeed if the host name from the request URI is found in either
> the subjectAltName extension or (one of) the CN
> > attribute(s) in the certificate's subject. If the check fails, the SSL
> request is aborted and a 502 status code (Bad
> > Gateway) is returned. The directive supersedes |SSLProxyCheckPeerCN
> > |,
> which only checks for the expected host name
> > in the first CN attribute.
> >
> >
> > SSLProxyCheckPeerCN Directive
> >
> > Default: <
> http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/directive-dict.html#Default>
>  |SSLProxyCheckPeerCN on|
> >
> > This directive sets whether the remote server certificate's CN field is
> compared against the hostname of the request
> > URL. If both are not equal a 502 status code (Bad Gateway) is sent.
> >
> > In 2.4.5 and later, SSLProxyCheckPeerCN has been superseded by
> |SSLProxyCheckPeerName
> > |,
> and its setting is only taken into account
> > when |SSLProxyCheckPeerName off| is specified at the same time.
> >
> >
> > So under CheckPeerName, we *claim* that the directive *supersedes* the
> CheckPeerCN - but taking the only action you can
> > with CheckPeerName (turning it off) falls right back into the trap of
> CheckPeerCN, which *must* be *seperately*
> > disabled. This behavior sucks.
> >
> > I would suggest that CheckPeerCN should NOT default to "on" any longer.
> The only valid use case is for the user to
> > actively disable CheckPeerName (off), and has still wishes to actively
> enable CheckPeerCN (on).
> >
> > But we will need to improve this horrible CheckPeerName documentation
> for users of 2.4.5 through 2.4.20, even if we
> > change the behavior.
> >
> > Thoughts?
> >
> >
>
> As I felt into this trap a couple of days ago on my own a wholeheartedly
> +1.
>
> Regards
>
> Rüdiger


Thinking about this further, I don't know that this fix is correct.

A user on 2.4.3 (there are many) will be broken moving to 2.4.21 if their
config
simply reads;

SSLProxyCheckPeerCN off

Their intent was pretty clear, turn off this test. The fact that we added
the
alt subject names and wildcard domains doesn't address the fact that the
user simply wanted this turned *off* and the user is *not* supposed to ever
need to change their configuration from one subversion release to another.
We are *not* supposed to change the behavior of the server in unexpected
ways from one subversion release to another.

Proposal...

CheckPeerName  CheckPeerCN
 unset | onunset | onCheckPeerName verification
 off   onCheckPeerName verification
 off   unset | off   no verification
 unset | off   off   no verification

WDYT?

Re: Confusion about SSLProxyCheckPeerName/CN

[William A Rowe Jr]

On Tue, May 31, 2016 at 11:37 AM, William A Rowe Jr 
wrote:

> It seems the behavior introduced in 2.4.5 is causing a lot
> of confusion for users attempting to disable peer checking.
>
> I would suggest that CheckPeerCN should NOT default to "on" any longer.
> The only valid use case is for the user to actively disable CheckPeerName
> (off), and has still wishes to actively enable CheckPeerCN (on).
>
> But we will need to improve this horrible CheckPeerName documentation for
> users of 2.4.5 through 2.4.20, even if we change the behavior
>

--- ssl_engine_io.c (revision 1746297)
+++ ssl_engine_io.c (working copy)
@@ -1200,7 +1200,7 @@
   "for hostname %s", hostname_note);
 }
 }
-else if ((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn != SSL_ENABLED_FALSE) &&
+else if ((sc->proxy_ssl_check_peer_cn == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE) &&
 hostname_note) {
 const char *hostname;
 int match = 0;


Seems to be the entire patch, no?

Bill

Re: Confusion about SSLProxyCheckPeerName/CN

[Ruediger Pluem]

On 05/31/2016 06:37 PM, William A Rowe Jr wrote:
> It seems the behavior introduced in 2.4.5 is causing a lot 
> of confusion for users attempting to disable peer checking.
> 
> Right now, nothing needs to be done to do deep inspection 
> (altsubjectname plus common name).  Neither directive is
> required, both default to on.
> 
> Disabling checking is a pain in the ass, and the docs seem
> to be very misleading;
> 
> 
> SSLProxyCheckPeerName Directive
> 
> Default:    
> |SSLProxyCheckPeerName on
> |
> 
> This directive configures host name checking for server certificates when 
> mod_ssl is acting as an SSL client. The check
> will succeed if the host name from the request URI is found in either the 
> subjectAltName extension or (one of) the CN
> attribute(s) in the certificate's subject. If the check fails, the SSL 
> request is aborted and a 502 status code (Bad
> Gateway) is returned. The directive supersedes |SSLProxyCheckPeerCN
> |, 
> which only checks for the expected host name
> in the first CN attribute.
> 
> 
> SSLProxyCheckPeerCN Directive
> 
> Default:    
> |SSLProxyCheckPeerCN on|
> 
> This directive sets whether the remote server certificate's CN field is 
> compared against the hostname of the request
> URL. If both are not equal a 502 status code (Bad Gateway) is sent.
> 
> In 2.4.5 and later, SSLProxyCheckPeerCN has been superseded by 
> |SSLProxyCheckPeerName
> |, 
> and its setting is only taken into account
> when |SSLProxyCheckPeerName off| is specified at the same time.
> 
> 
> So under CheckPeerName, we *claim* that the directive *supersedes* the 
> CheckPeerCN - but taking the only action you can
> with CheckPeerName (turning it off) falls right back into the trap of 
> CheckPeerCN, which *must* be *seperately*
> disabled. This behavior sucks.
> 
> I would suggest that CheckPeerCN should NOT default to "on" any longer. The 
> only valid use case is for the user to
> actively disable CheckPeerName (off), and has still wishes to actively enable 
> CheckPeerCN (on).
> 
> But we will need to improve this horrible CheckPeerName documentation for 
> users of 2.4.5 through 2.4.20, even if we
> change the behavior.
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> 

As I felt into this trap a couple of days ago on my own a wholeheartedly +1.

Regards

Rüdiger

Confusion about SSLProxyCheckPeerName/CN

[William A Rowe Jr]

It seems the behavior introduced in 2.4.5 is causing a lot
of confusion for users attempting to disable peer checking.

Right now, nothing needs to be done to do deep inspection
(altsubjectname plus common name).  Neither directive is
required, both default to on.

Disabling checking is a pain in the ass, and the docs seem
to be very misleading;

SSLProxyCheckPeerName Directive
Default: 
SSLProxyCheckPeerName
on
This directive configures host name checking for server certificates when
mod_ssl is acting as an SSL client. The check will succeed if the host name
from the request URI is found in either the subjectAltName extension or
(one of) the CN attribute(s) in the certificate's subject. If the check
fails, the SSL request is aborted and a 502 status code (Bad Gateway) is
returned. The directive supersedes SSLProxyCheckPeerCN
,
which only checks for the expected host name in the first CN attribute.

SSLProxyCheckPeerCN Directive
Default: 
SSLProxyCheckPeerCN
on
This directive sets whether the remote server certificate's CN field is
compared against the hostname of the request URL. If both are not equal a
502 status code (Bad Gateway) is sent.

In 2.4.5 and later, SSLProxyCheckPeerCN has been superseded by
SSLProxyCheckPeerName
,
and its setting is only taken into account when SSLProxyCheckPeerName off is
specified at the same time.


So under CheckPeerName, we *claim* that the directive *supersedes* the
CheckPeerCN - but taking the only action you can with CheckPeerName
(turning it off) falls right back into the trap of CheckPeerCN, which
*must* be *seperately* disabled. This behavior sucks.

I would suggest that CheckPeerCN should NOT default to "on" any longer. The
only valid use case is for the user to actively disable CheckPeerName
(off), and has still wishes to actively enable CheckPeerCN (on).

But we will need to improve this horrible CheckPeerName documentation for
users of 2.4.5 through 2.4.20, even if we change the behavior.

Thoughts?