Re: Logotype extensions

2019-06-11 Thread Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy
On Tuesday, June 11, 2019 at 7:49:31 AM UTC-4, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> We wanted to experiment a bit with logotype extensions and trademarks, but
> we heard from the CAB Forum that whether inclusion is allowed is subject a
> bit to interpretation by the browsers.
> 
>  
> 
> >From the BRs section 7.1.2.4
> 
> "All other fields and extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280.
> The CA SHALL NOT issue a Certificate that contains a keyUsage flag,
> extendedKeyUsage value, Certificate extension, or other data not specified
> in section 7.1.2.1, 7.1.2.2, or 7.1.2.3 unless the CA is aware of a reason
> for including the data in the Certificate. CAs SHALL NOT issue a Certificate
> with: a. Extensions that do not apply in the context of the public Internet
> (such as an extendedKeyUsage value for a service that is only valid in the
> context of a privately managed network), unless: i. such value falls within
> an OID arc for which the Applicant demonstrates ownership, or ii. the
> Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data in a public
> context; or b. semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party
> about the certificate information verified by the CA (such as including
> extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to verify
> that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware due to
> remote issuance)."
> 
>  
> 
> In this case, the logotype extension would have a trademark included (or
> link to a trademark). I think this allowed as:
> 
> 1.There is a reason for including the data in the Certificate (to
> identify a verified trademark). Although you may disagree about the reason
> for needing this information, there is a not small number of people
> interested in figuring out how to better use identification information. No
> browser would be required to use the information (of course), but it would
> give organizations another way to manage certificates and identity
> information - one that is better (imo) than org information.
> 2.The cert applies in the context of the public Internet.
> Trademarks/identity information is already included in the BRs. 
> 3.The trademark does not falls within an OID arc for which the
> Applicant demonstrates ownership (no OID included).
> 4.The Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data
> in a public context. If we vet ownership of the trademark with the
> appropriate office, there's no conflict there.
> 5.Semantics that, if included, will not mislead a Relying Party about
> the certificate information verified by the CA (such as including
> extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to verify
> that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware due to
> remote issuance). None of these examples are very close to the proposal.
> 
>  
> 
> What I'm looking for is not a discussion on whether this is a good idea, but
> rather  is it currently permitted under the BRs per Mozilla's
> interpretation. I'd like to have the "is this a good idea" discussion, but
> in a separate thread to avoid conflating permitted action compared to ideal
> action.
> 
>  
> 
> Jeremy

Absent policy surrounding the validation and encoding of Logotype data, I 
believe that the use of the Logotype extension to convey identity information 
may be fraught with security and privacy problems. A brief read of RFCs 3709 
and 6170 raises several concerns:

1.  Where are the image and audio assets stored? Will the CA allow for 
Applicants to specify an arbitrary URI for assets, or will the CA host them, or 
will the assets be encoded directly in the certificate using data URIs? The 
first two options have ramifications regarding client tracking, or even 
allowing attackers to suppress the retrieval of logo assets (thus providing for 
a potentially inconsistent UI between clients). This is compounded by the fact 
that the RFCs only allow retrieval via plaintext HTTP and FTP. I’m guessing the 
third option (“data” URI) is a non-starter due to certificate size limitations.
2.  The RFCs do not put a hard requirement on the minimum size of images 
and length of audio files. What’s the minimum acceptable size of images to 
ensure that the trademark is clearly conveyed to Relying Parties? Is a 5-second 
clip from the Subject’s radio jingle sufficiently clear identity information?
3.  Perhaps minor, but RFC 3709 specifies that clients MUST support SHA-1 
for hashing assets. This is undesirable, especially given that attacks against 
SHA-1 are becoming increasingly practical.


Given the concern about suppressing the retrieval of the trademark information 
and the lack of specification to ensure clear, unambiguous images/audio, I 
believe that 7.1.2.4.b is applicable here in that there is the possibility to 
mislead Relying Parties. As such, I believe that before CAs begin embedding the 
Logotype extension in certificates, the relevant RFCs need to be profiled (or 

Logotype extensions

2019-06-11 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
We wanted to experiment a bit with logotype extensions and trademarks, but
we heard from the CAB Forum that whether inclusion is allowed is subject a
bit to interpretation by the browsers.

 

>From the BRs section 7.1.2.4

"All other fields and extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280.
The CA SHALL NOT issue a Certificate that contains a keyUsage flag,
extendedKeyUsage value, Certificate extension, or other data not specified
in section 7.1.2.1, 7.1.2.2, or 7.1.2.3 unless the CA is aware of a reason
for including the data in the Certificate. CAs SHALL NOT issue a Certificate
with: a. Extensions that do not apply in the context of the public Internet
(such as an extendedKeyUsage value for a service that is only valid in the
context of a privately managed network), unless: i. such value falls within
an OID arc for which the Applicant demonstrates ownership, or ii. the
Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data in a public
context; or b. semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party
about the certificate information verified by the CA (such as including
extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to verify
that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware due to
remote issuance)."

 

In this case, the logotype extension would have a trademark included (or
link to a trademark). I think this allowed as:

1.  There is a reason for including the data in the Certificate (to
identify a verified trademark). Although you may disagree about the reason
for needing this information, there is a not small number of people
interested in figuring out how to better use identification information. No
browser would be required to use the information (of course), but it would
give organizations another way to manage certificates and identity
information - one that is better (imo) than org information.
2.  The cert applies in the context of the public Internet.
Trademarks/identity information is already included in the BRs. 
3.  The trademark does not falls within an OID arc for which the
Applicant demonstrates ownership (no OID included).
4.  The Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data
in a public context. If we vet ownership of the trademark with the
appropriate office, there's no conflict there.
5.  Semantics that, if included, will not mislead a Relying Party about
the certificate information verified by the CA (such as including
extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to verify
that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware due to
remote issuance). None of these examples are very close to the proposal.

 

What I'm looking for is not a discussion on whether this is a good idea, but
rather  is it currently permitted under the BRs per Mozilla's
interpretation. I'd like to have the "is this a good idea" discussion, but
in a separate thread to avoid conflating permitted action compared to ideal
action.

 

Jeremy

 



smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
___
dev-security-policy mailing list
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy