Certificates in Mozilla system preferences under "Authorities" HELP please

2021-01-17 Thread Michelle via dev-security-policy
HI there, so Im new here, so please go easy on me :) But Ive been doing some 
research on what I should and should not be seeing in my firefox preferences 
certificates and well, it has me a bit worried, Im hoping someone might be able 
to shed a bit of light for me and let me know if what Im seeing is of concern 
or not.   Everything is either " Built in object token" or "software security 
device"but  under Certificate name I have things such as Actalis 
S.p.A./03358520967 Athentication Root CA from Milan with the Purposes:
Certificate Signing, CRL Signing.  or 
Organization
Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I)
Organizational Unit
Serveis Publics de Certificacio
Organizational Unit
Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verarrel (c)03
Organizational Unit
Jerarquia Entitats de Certificacio Catalanes
Common Name
EC-ACC
from Country- ES
Public Key Info: RSA
also Purposes
Certificate Signing, CRL Signing
and:
Organizational Unit
ePKI Root Certification Authority
Organization
Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.
Algorithm
RSA
Key Size
4096
Exponent
65537
Signature Algorithm
SHA-1 with RSA Encryption


Organization
China Financial Certification Authority
Common Name
CFCA EV ROOT

country IN
Organizational Unit
emSign PKI
Organization
eMudhra Technologies Limited
Common Name
emSign Root CA - G1

Organizational Unit
AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM
Signature Algorithm
SHA-256 with RSA Encryption
Purposes
Certificate Signing, CRL Signing

I haVE 3 OF THESE

Organization
Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority
Common Name
Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011
Signature Algorithm
SHA-1 with RSA Encryption
Serial Number 00
Purposes
Certificate Signing, CRL Signing

Organization
Japan Certification Services, Inc.
Common Name
SecureSign RootCA11
Public Key Info
Algorithm
RSA
Key Size
2048
Exponent
65537
Modulus
FD:77:AA:A5:1C:90:05:3B:CB:4C:9B:33:8B:5A:14:45:A4:E7:90:16:D1:DF:57:

Serial Number
01
Signature Algorithm
SHA-1 with RSA Encryption
Version 3
 Fingerprints
SHA-256
BF:0F:EE:FB:9E:3A:58:1A:D5:F9:E9:DB:75:89:98:57:43:D2:61:08:5C:4D:31:4
SHA-1
3B:C4:9F:48:F8:F3:73:A0:9C:1E:BD:F8:5B:B1:C3:65:C7:D8:11:B3
Certificate Authority
Yes
Key Usages
Purposes
Certificate Signing, CRL Signing
Subject Key ID
Key ID
5B:F8:4D:4F:B2:A5:86:D4:3A:D2:F1:63:9A:A0:BE:09:F6:57:B7:DE

Few other names: Common Name
SSL.com Root Certification Authority RSA
Common Name
Staat der Nederlanden EV Root CA
Common Name
Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA
Common Name
TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifikasi - Surum 1
Organization
TAIWAN-CA
Organizational Unit
Tanúsítványkiadók (Certification Services)
Common Name
NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanúsítvány


These just dont seem right.  ?  theres MANY more. can anyone help ? or 
point me in the right direction as to where I might get help.  Just FYI my Mac 
Keychain has some pretty oddball items in it as well.  A lot of Public and 
Private keys, for items with names simply "key"  ( for instance in the Log in 
keychain) Kind: Public Key, RSA,2,048-bit, usage - encrypt, derive, verify. no 
effective date no expiry date. and you can not see a password or key. its blank 
where it should be. 

Id appreciatte any help. 


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Re: Summary of Camerfirma's Compliance Issues

2021-01-17 Thread Ramiro Muñoz via dev-security-policy
El domingo, 10 de enero de 2021 a las 17:27:01 UTC+1, Ryan Sleevi escribió:
> On Sat, Jan 9, 2021 at 1:44 PM Ramiro Muñoz via dev-security-policy < 
> dev-secur...@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: 
> 
> > > That Camerfirma does not understand or express appreciation for this 
> > risk 
> > > is, to the extent, of great cause for concern. 
> >
> > Dear Ryan, 
> > 
> > We are looking at the same data but we’re reading two completely different 
> > stories. 
> > 
> > We are reading a story of a small CA that had its own graduation journey, 
> > struggled but eventually managed to emerge stronger from such journey. 
> > 
> > You are reading a story of deceitful and unreliable CA that represents the 
> > worst danger to the entire community (your even wrote: “Camerfirma is as 
> > bad or worse than WoSign and DigiNotar”!), even if you yourself recognised 
> > that was your subjective opinion on the matter.
> I am concerned about the attempts to so significantly dismiss the concerns 
> as merely subjective. 
> 
> I’m saddened that Camerfirma does not recognize the seriousness of these 
> issues, despite this thread, as evidenced by this latest response. 
> Camerfirma continues to suggest “risk” as if this is some absolute that 
> should the the guiding pole. 
> 
> The analogy, in the hopes that it helps Camerfirma understand, is a bit 
> like saying to a bank “I know we borrowed $100, and defaulted on that loan 
> and never paid it back, but we were a small CA, we’ve grown, and now we 
> would like to borrow $1 million. We cannot demonstrate our financials, nor 
> can we offer collateral, but we believe we are low risk, because it was 
> only $100”. 
> 
> More concretely, Camerfirma is viewing this through the lens of what did go 
> wrong, and continuing to be blind to how that signals, from a risk 
> perspective, of what can go wrong. They are asking to be judged based on 
> the direct harm to users by their (many, more than any CA I can think of) 
> failures, while similarly asking the community to disregard the 
> significance of that pattern of failures, and what it says about the 
> overall operations of the CA. 
> 
> In short, Camerfirma is asking to be trusted implicitly and explicitly for 
> the future, and asking that their $100 default not hold back their $1m 
> loan. In banking, as in trust, this is simply unreasonable. 
> 
> Some have suggested that “trust” is the ability to use pst actions to 
> predict future outcomes. If you say you do X, and as long as I’ve known 
> you, you’ve done X, then when I say I “trust” you to do X, it’s an 
> indicator I believe your future actions will be consistent with those past 
> actions. 
> 
> Camerfirma has, undisputed, shown a multi-year pattern that continues, 
> which demonstrates both a failure to correctly implement requirements, but 
> also a failure to reasonably and appropriately respond to and prevent 
> future incidents. The incident responses, which Camerfirma would like to 
> assert are signs of maturity, instead show a CA that has continued to 
> operate below the baseline expectations for years. 
> 
> Camerfirma would like the community to believe that they now meet the bare 
> minimum, as if that alone should be considered, and all of these past 
> actions disregarded because of this. 
> 
> Yet the risk is real: that Camerfirma has not met the bare minimum at 
> present, and that Camerfirma is not prepared to continue to meet that 
> minimum as the requirements are improved over time. We have exhaustive 
> evidence of this being the case in the past, and the only assurances we 
> have that things are different now is Camerfirma’s management believing 
> that, this time, they have finally got it right. However, the responses on 
> even the most recent incidents continue to show that Camerfirma is 
> continuing to pursue the same strategy for remediation it has for years: a 
> strategy that has demonstrably failed to keep up with industry 
> requirements, and failed to address the systemic issues. 
> 
> These are objective statements, demonstrated by the evidence presented, but 
> Camerfirma would like to present them as subjective, because they take 
> consideration of the full picture, and not merely the rosy, but misleading, 
> image that Camerfirma would like to present. 
> 
> That these are persistent, sustained issues, without systemic change, is 
> something demonstrably worse than DigiNotar. Further, when considering the 
> capability for harm, and the sustained pattern of failure, it would be 
> foolish to somehow dismiss the risk, pretending as if Chekhov’s gun of 
> failure is not destined to go off in the next act. 
> 
> At the core, Camerfirma is treating this as if any response from the 
> community should be directly proportional to the *individual* failures, as 
> many as they are, and is asking the community to ignore both the systemic 
> patterns and what it says about the future. This is abundantly clear when 
> they speak of risk: they