Re: [dmarc-ietf] Cataloging MLM manipulations of messages

2014-09-23 Thread Dave Crocker
On 9/23/2014 10:09 AM, Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
 I suspect such a thing will quickly become obsolete. 


I'm sure it will.  The point is that I think it can have utility to get
folks thinking in terms of a potentially wide /range/ of choice, with
the document giving a snapshot in time of choices that have been made.

d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] yet more From rewriting,

2014-09-23 Thread Stephen J. Turnbull
Steven M Jones writes:
  On 09/22/2014 03:17 PM, Josh Aberant wrote:

Who uses X-Original-From ?  This is a real question, I'm not
aware of anyone who does.
  
   At Twitter we use the X-Original-From to route our security
   tickets with users within our ticketing system Salesforce. Users
   can open and reply to tickets by emailing what is a Google Groups
   alias. Google Groups (takes ownership of the From per our
   #RejectPolicy) and then

I don't understand our #RejectPolicy.  What are you talking about?
Surely not DMARC?  That reject policy would be related to the From
Domain of the user, not anything about Twitter.  Or do users use an
@twitter address for email they send?

   forwards those emails to Salesforce where they are automatically
   turned into support tix where we key off of the user's email
   address in the X-Original-From header.
  
  Interesting use case. Presumably the messages are flowing from Google
  Groups to Salesforce over the Internet.

So what we have is

  SMTP SMTP
Customer (Author) --- Google Group (Mediator) --- Twitter (Destination)

right?

  However I would consider everything that happens after Salesforce
  receives the messages as an application workflow.

Indeed.  But as long as these message don't leave the Twitter
workflow, I'd consider all of this a private protocol that isn't
really any of the IETF's business.

  Messages the customer sees would be in-scope;

Not if they don't go back through the Google Group.  Nothing so far
suggests that they do, and the word security suggests that they do
not, to me anyway.

  I'm not so sure about things happening between Google Groups and
  Salesforce,

In scope.

  or within Salesforce.

Not.

  If we consider all the ways email messages are spindled, folded and
  mutilated when they become part of an application workflow, I
  expect we'd see an absolute explosion of additional weirdness...

Not our business, though.  Some of the specific mutilations may be,
but the whole collection surely is not.  We would consider specific
instances case-by-case.

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] yet more From rewriting,

2014-09-23 Thread Steven M Jones
On 09/23/2014 10:26 AM, Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
  On 09/22/2014 03:17 PM, Josh Aberant wrote:
  
alias. Google Groups (takes ownership of the From per our
#RejectPolicy) and then

 I don't understand our #RejectPolicy.  What are you talking about?
 Surely not DMARC?  That reject policy would be related to the From
 Domain of the user, not anything about Twitter.

My reading was that this was some kind of configuration item within
Google Groups. Therefore it's interesting if it is a normally available
feature that any Google Group might use to alter the RFC5322.From or add
an X-Original-From: header.

Josh, anybody, feel free to correct/amplify...

--S.

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] yet more From rewriting,

2014-09-23 Thread Stephen J. Turnbull
Brandon Long writes:

  In any case, support folks, especially when dealing with paying
  customers, tend to want to get all of the email, they don't want
  their nicely paying customers to not get support just because of
  spam false positives or the mail routing breaking dkim.

Sure, but this isn't a problem if the support site ignores p=reject or
treats it as p=quarantine.  I think this is a twitter-side problem,
not a Google-side problem or IETF problem.

The recipient MUST reject aspect of DMARC is broken as far as I'm
concerned.  I personally consider p=reject to be informational, with
preferred recipient semantics of as far as we're concerned you can
black-hole this message, and for your own good you probably should if
you don't have *very* good reason to do otherwise *and* your own
strong defenses against inauthentic mail.

Support staff also can be trained not to get phished (is that really
even necessary?)

Presumably the remaining problem here would be the amount of
inauthentic mail that gets through.  Yahoo! admins speak of millions
of messages per minute, which I find entirely plausible, and it
certainly would knock down not just my tiny host, but probably my
employer's whole network.

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Additional List-foo Header Field To Help Mitigate Mailing List Damage

2014-09-23 Thread Scott Kitterman
On September 23, 2014 8:22:41 PM EDT, Stephen J. Turnbull 
step...@xemacs.org wrote:
Brandon Long writes:

  Sorry, they often term the messages as notifications instead of
  posts, when they actually contain the full post and author
  information/etc.

I guess I'd need to see one to decide how I would classify them and
how they fit into this WG as use cases.  Examples?

The only thing I can think of that fits that description is a bug
tracker, and there the message is usually only one component of the
information conveyed, and often is missing.  In that case I would
consider the actual message to be encapsulated in the outer message as
delivered by the service, similar to the way I quoted you above --
this message is *from* me, *quoting* you.  (Note that some
authors/MUAs using a quoting style that looks much like RFC 822
headers, increasing the similarity.)

I would consider that mode of operation to be deficient in a
discussion list.  I don't recall commercial service Groups using
that mode, though -- they always have the author in From IIRC.

Except at the very least Google Groups.

Scott K

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Additional List-foo Header Field To Help Mitigate Mailing List Damage

2014-09-23 Thread Stephen J. Turnbull
Scott Kitterman writes:
  On September 23, 2014 8:22:41 PM EDT, Stephen J. Turnbull 
  step...@xemacs.org wrote:

  I don't recall commercial service Groups using that mode, though
  -- they always have the author in From IIRC.
  
  Except at the very least Google Groups.

If you are talking about their workaround for DMARC p=reject From
Domains, that's irrelevant to my point.  This subthread was discussing
how modern lists/bbses/forums have evolved over time.  What I am
saying is that in the absence of DMARC p=reject at public mailbox
providers, as far as I know Google Groups and Yahoo Groups normally
put the poster's name and address in the From field.  This is 100%
confirmed by a sample of nearly 100 of my personal archives of GG and
YG mailing lists.[1]

If you have a counterexample, I'd love to hear about it, in enough
detail to determine whether the From-munging was done with at least
implicit authorization by the posters.

Eg, subscribing to an anonymous mailing list described as such on its
information page constitutes implicit authorization.  Posting to a
list which changed to from-munging as a DMARC mitigation, without an
explicit announcement of this ToS change, is not.

Footnotes: 
[1]  As it turns out, my GG lists have *zero* Yahoo and AOL posters,
and my YG lists most recent post was 2008/8/12, so mostly irrelevant
to recent policy.

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