Re: [EM] RE : Re: A few concluding points about SFC, CC, method choice, etc.
On Feb 15, 2007, at 23:29 , Kevin Venzke wrote: --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Thus, we conclude, the Condorcet Criterion *must* be violated in some elections by an optimal method, and thus this theoretical optimum method must fail the criterion and others similar to it, such as the Majority Criterion and SFC. I agree with this, although I don't think this theoretical optimum method exists. If it does exist I suppose it's pretty complicated. I'm not ambitious enough to try to define a method that would give optimum results in all cases. Even proving this for one case is too difficult. I however think that it is a good practice to choose one utility function that the society agrees to approximate the real world needs accurately enough. There need not be one such function. Different targets may apply in different situations (one could seek best median utility or minimize worst utility to one individual, width of opposition, take into account strength of opposing opinions, strong first preference support to the winner etc.). And sometimes one the society may be satisfied with some other than the theoretically best utility function to make the system better in some other aspects (e.g. simplicity, strategy resistance). Too often, when we consider methods by election criteria, we assume that a criterion is desirable, entirely apart from whether or not it chooses the optimum winner. I would guess that most of our criteria *do* coincide with higher utility. All things being equal you couldn't expect that a method that fails majority favorite would produce higher utility. There are other issues besides utility of course... There's the question of what the public will accept and understand how to use, and there's all the questions of how to give the voter incentive to vote sincerely. Yes, all such criteria need to be considered. Abd ul-Rahman Lomax mentioned that also the majority rule could be violated. I agree that with some excellent utility functions that gives the best overall utility (e.g. Range style). One reason why the majority rule is popular is that it is hard to develop voting methods that would not respect it and still be strategy resistant. Or maybe majority rule is in some cases in line with the targeted utility function (e.g. to avoid a mutiny of the majority). (There are also other reasons, like simply the tradition.) One reason why I think it would be good to always mention the target utility function is that then it is easier to compare the impact of the strategy resistance related modifications to some voting method against the basic utility function. It is typical that when strong anti-strategy measures are applied they make the achieved utility a bit worse. These two aspects, strategy resistance and good performance with sincere votes, need to be balanced. (I have often used the example of winning votes and ballots 49:A, 49:BC, 1:CA.) Juho Laatu ___ To help you stay safe and secure online, we've developed the all new Yahoo! Security Centre. http://uk.security.yahoo.com election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] I want to apologize for the cordialilty-lapse.
Anyone offering criteria should welcome criticism of them, without anger, just as Ive been doing. But sometimes something that you werent expecting takes you by surprise, and you lose your temper. BC is a criterion, more than its Schulzes method dressed-up as a criterion. Thats because, if Schulzes method were a criterion, it would be met only by one method. A narrow criterion indeed. BC, on the other hand, is met by a set of methods (including, but certainly not limited to, Schulzes method. But, though BC, even in its name, is called a criterion, I dont use it as a criterion, in the sense of offering it as something that I claim that you should want methods to comply with. Thats what FBC, SFC, GSFC, WDSC, and SDSC are. Theyre worded so as to tell why youd want their guarantee. BC is for my own use. I dont offer it as a criterion. Thats why Benham caught me off-guard when he told me that BC, which Id been using, isnt useful. I hadnt recommended that Chris use it. Though I was ready for criticism of my criteria, I wasnt ready for criticism of how I, personally, determine compliances. It would be different if Chris had raised a validity-point about the compliance-determination. Thats why, as I said, Chris caught me off-guard, and I lost my temper. Before that, there hadnt been anger when I replied to objections and criticisms about my criteria. So I apologize that something hitting me from a different direction caught me off-guard and caused me to lose my temper. Mike Ossipoff election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Easy voting handcount. Approval vs RV.
I applaud this statement, though not agreeing with all of its details. While we can learn by participating in polls, we need to remember that our proper goal is assisting average voters in elections. By participating in this group we become something other than average voters. On Fri, 16 Feb 2007 13:55:10 + Michael Ossipoff wrote: Before saying more, I want to say that, in spite of anything that I say below here, SSD is what I want for public elections. If you've ever participated in an EM poll, the ones where we use all sorts of balloting, then you know that ranking is _lots_ easier than rating. And you know that, especially when there are lots of candidates, Approval is easier than ranking. In fact, Approval's very easy voting and handcount, in EM polls, will give you a new appreciation for Approval. In general, I much prefer Approval to RV (in its versions other than Approval). Approval has a simple elegance and beauty that RV doesn't even come close to. In Approval, a sincere vote is essentially the same as a strategic vote. And, though Approval doesn’t give you the kind of expressiveness that Condorcet does, it gives you another kind of expressiveness that rank-balloting can’t give: Expressiveness about _how_ good or bad a candidate is. You express that when you vote for him/her or not. You can rank all the candidates in order of preference, but that doesn’t tell which ones are disgusting. With Approval you say something that you don’t say in a ranking. Perhaps we need to debate need for ranking all the candidates with Condorcet. There is no such need, and demanding more ranking than might be useful can even end up with false ranking if voters are forced to pretend to decide value of candidates that do not interest them positively. Those voters who find they can fully express their desires in a race with Approval, should be allowed to express EXACTLY the same desires with Condorcet with the same effort. But Condorcet provides the ability for voters to say something more for any race for which they feel need - to rank as 1 those candidates they like best, as 2 those candidates they want considered if none of the ones win, etc. Having 1/2/blank is the minimum to be Condorcet; 1..9/blank means so little extra election effort as to be the obvious next step; even more ranks are possible if anyone can justify the effort. Yes, I’d rather have SSD, but if it’s to be a handcount, or there are lots of candidates, and you might not want to ask people to rank that many candidates, then the much easier Approval offers a very good substitute for Condorcet’s expressiveness, Approval’s own kind of expressiveness. Approval would be my 2nd choice then. To me, depends on what kind of expressiveness I wish for in a particular race, after I have informally ranked the candidates: There is one candidate at the top of my list, and I offer nothing for the possibility that that candidate may lose: Plurality would FULLY satisfy my desires. Other methods that let me express my desires, such as Condorcet or Approval, would be fine PROVIDED they gave me as much control without additional effort, for I realize I could desire their expressiveness in other races. There is more than one candidate at the top of my list, and I care not which of them may win. I offer nothing for the possibility that all of them may lose: Plurality cannot do this but Approval would FULLY satisfy my desires for expressiveness. Other methods that let me express my desires, such as Condorcet, would be fine PROVIDED they gave me as much control without additional effort, for I realize I could desire their expressiveness in other races. There is more than one candidate at the top of my list. I care among them which I most desire and wish to express these differences. I offer nothing for the possibility that all of them may lose: Plurality or Approval cannot do this but Condorcet would FULLY satisfy my desires. Other methods that let me express my desires, such as RV may, would be fine PROVIDED they gave me as much control without additional effort. Agreed handcounts are difficult for Condorcet with many candidates, which makes me desire better quality than too many DREs offer. RV lets you express fine gradation of preference? Illusory. RV’s strategy problem stifles expressiveness more than it provides it. Now, having said all that about Approval vs. RV, I have to also say that, due to the special situation in our elections, RV would probably give a better result than Approval in our public elections, in spite of Approval’s general superiority to RV, and in spite of Approval’s great aesthetic superiority to RV. I’ve also talked about RV’s much greater familiarity and popularity, and people’s widespread misunderstanding about Approval and “1-person-1-vote”. So RV is probably a good public proposal, if SSD turned out to be
[EM] Are apportionment academics as incompetent as voting system academics?
Are apportionment academics related to voting-system academics? You have probably noticed a certain cluelessness about voting-system academics. Ive been checking out some apportionment writing on the Internet, and apparently academics who write about apportionment share that cluelessness. The emphasis seems to be on two-state transfer properties. Youre not going to believe this, but it never seems to occur to academic authors that maybe equal representation expectation could be a good thing, or that theres anything wrong with systematically giving more s/q to states at one end of the population-size spectrum. Alright, I admit that that conclusion is based on a limited look at their writing. But if academic interest in equal representation expectation is difficult to find, surely that says something unflattering. Sure, the pair transfer properties sound plausible enough, if, by whatever standard, no two states could be closer. But what would you say about someone who scrutinizes transfer properties, seemingly ignoring the fact that its theoretically and empirically obvious that Hills method systematically gives more seats per quota to the smaller states? I mean, what kind of a person must that academic be? A bumbling comic character like Jerry Lewiss Nutty Professor? Again, the term head-up-the-ass suggests itself. The Constitution says that seats should be given according to population, and this is interpreted to mean proportional to population. Systematically giving more s/q to smaller states (or bigger states) is obviously the most unfair violation of that proportionality requirement. As you know from single-winner methods, all criteria sound plausible. But are the transfer properties so plausible as to justify systematic s/q disparity with respect to population? Someone has seriously lost track of the point of proportional apportionment. Webster is the divisor method that gives equal representation expectation for everyone, disregarding the effects of a non-uniform state-size probability distribution. Webster is the intrinsically unbiased divisor method, even if something extrinsic like the probability distribution could cause measured bias. That can be shown as I described earlier. When I found out about my Bias-Free fallacy, I set out to find the intrinsically unbiased divisor method. Write expressions for the total number of quotas possessed, and the total number of seats received, by the states in a some particular cycle, between two whole numbers of Hare quotas, such as the set of states possessing between 4 and 5 Hare quotas. Set those two expressions equal, and solve for the rounding point between those integers. When I did that, I got (a+b)/2, which is a + .5 Thats Webster s method. Why doesnt it occur to the bumbling, comic, clueless, head-up-the-ass nutty professors that it might be desirable for everyone to have equal representation expectation? And that theres something seriously wrong when residents of smaller states systematically receive more representation than residents of large states? Ive suggested that measured bias caused by the distribution isnt unfair in the sense that measured bias caused by the method is unfair. If thats correct, then Webster could be all we need. But it could be desirable to actually get rid of measured bias, whatever its cause, and thats why I, and then Warren, have been looking at ways of doing that. Ive proposed three such methods, and have named them Weighted Webster, Cycle-Webster, and Adjusted-Rounding. Getting back to transfer properties, of course Webster has one. Mike Ossipoff election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
