Re: [EM] EM] Simmons' solution of voting system design puzzle is inadequate
Warren Smith wrote:
Benham: By this definition Range fails ICC because voters can only express
preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of
them, thus making it
possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the
clones lose.
--no. The definition in the problem statement said slight preferences among
clones.
By slight, I meant, to be formal, infinitesimal.
Right. And how does a voter express an infinitesimal preference in
the Range 0-99 that you advocate?
499: A99
251: B99C98
250: C99B98
Range average scores: A49.401,B49.349, C49.348
A wins, but if the {B,C} clone set is coalesced into a single candidate
X, X wins. This is an FPP-like failure of
Clone-Winner, and BTW also of course a failure of Majority for
Solid Coalitions (and Condorcet).
499: A99
501: X99
Range average scores: X49.599,A49.401
Apart from that, I gather that Range with fewer available ratings
slots also qualifies as Range Voting, so
of course in that case it is even more difficult for the voter to
express infinitesimal preferences.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] EM] Simmons' solution of voting system design puzzle is inadequate
At 05:47 AM 1/21/2007, Chris Benham wrote: Warren Smith wrote: --no. The definition in the problem statement said slight preferences among clones. By slight, I meant, to be formal, infinitesimal. Right. And how does a voter express an infinitesimal preference in the Range 0-99 that you advocate? They don't. Benham is so fixated on ranked voting that he consistently overlooks the implications of what is written about Range. Slight preference would properly refer to preference strength below the resolution of the Range method. This makes sense when Range is expressive to a degree that the expressable preference strengths are probably beyond what people can sensibly discriminate. As I've written, as have others, 0-9 or 10 is actually pushing it. 0-99 or 100 is pretty clearly beyond necessity. Slight preference would thus mean preference that exists, perhaps, but which is less than the resolution on the ballot. And then the question becomes, How much resolution should the ballot provide? There is a cost to increased resolution, and it would appear that beyond a certain point, there is little or no return in value. If we assume that voters will rank Clones identically, then Range satisfies ICC. As we examined in a previous post, the technical definition of clone is based on an assumption of ranks, i.e., a clone is a candidate whom no voter ranks differently than another candidate or other candidates. The definition clearly wasn't written to apply to Range, it was written in the context of comparing ranked methods. The point is that Range does not provide a benefit to parties to introduce clones, unlike some methods, nor does the introduction of clones have any anticipable effect in causing members of a clone set to lose. Theoretically, clones under Range would tie. But generally noise would prevent that. *We don't care which clone is elected, if we did, they would not be clones.* election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] EM] Simmons' solution of voting system design puzzle is inadequate
Benham: By this definition Range fails ICC because voters can only express preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of them, thus making it possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the clones lose. --no. The definition in the problem statement said slight preferences among clones. By slight, I meant, to be formal, infinitesimal. Benham: Note: Many voting systems are known (beyond just variants of range voting) which satisfy AFB Many? There is MCA, ER-Bucklin(Whole), one or two Kevin Venzke methods and what else? --the puzzle page I was citing, http://rangevoting.org/Puzzlepage.html gives a hyperlink to a page explaining many. That page is http://rangevoting.org/FBCsurvey.html There are in fact an infinite set of such methods mentioned there, albeit most are variants of range voting. Warren D Smith http://rangevoting.org election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
