Re: [Election-Methods] Proposing a Delegable Proxy poll: best
On 8/2/07, AllAbout Voting <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >[Jan Kok] Let's try a DP poll! > >... > >This is the proposed poll topic and title: > >*** What is the best place to host the US-Iraq Conflict forum? > Jan, > > Can you give us more information about what features the forum will need? Good question! I'm not sure what features might turn out to be important. These are some guesses: - The forum should have a familiar look and feel, so new users can join in the discussions quickly and with minimum effort. The learning curve should be as easy as possible. - Note that some potential participants are _very_ computer un-savvy. Some refuse to get an email account. Others (myself included) prefer to interact as much as possible via email. - I anticipate that there may be a lot of "discussion" (I would rather not call it "debate" :-) among people with different viewpoints. It would be nice to have some way to keep track of the issues that are discussed, the pros and cons, and whether people have reached any consensus on the issues. The only "solutions" to that summarizing problem that I can think of that are available now are 1) Grouping posts by "threads", i.e. by email subject lines, 2) searching through archived discussions, 3) Someone edits and summarizes the posts (labor intensive, and hard to do impartially) 4) Create polls to track the level of consensus on various issues. - We need way(s) to conduct polls. This could be a whole topic by itself! Anyway, I would prefer that most polls be open, where everyone can see everyone else's vote, and people can even record brief notes about why they voted as they did. See the Bylaws poll at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/database for an example. But there should also be a way to do secret ballot polls, as a way of confirming that the public votes weren't bought or coerced. - I personally would like to be able to vote by email, rather than having to log in at a web site. When a new poll opens, send me an email ballot. I can hit Reply, fill in my votes, and hit Send. I would get a reply that confirms how I voted and (optionally) shows the results of the polling so far. Does anyone else like this idea of polling by email? - Yes, tools to manage the Proxy Assignments and Proxy Descriptions tables and to count DP polls might be nice. But I don't think they will be needed until we get 50 members in an FA/DP and we do frequent polling. Until then, I think spreadsheets and manual counting will be tolerable. > > In particular, does it itself need to support DP polls? > (If yes, then I am not aware of any site that is suitable. I don't > share Abd ul-Rahman Lomax's view that the idea is central and the > tools don't matter. Having a site with good DP tools will help the > idea function and propagate!!) Ha! I'm not yet at the point of worrying about how to get other people to create FA/DPs. Right now I'm struggling and begging people to join a couple FA/DPs that I created. I'm willing to do a fair amount of admin and count the votes myself by hand for now. > > Does the forum currently exist? At what URL? The US-Iraq Conflict forum is at http://metaparty.beyondpolitics.org/tiki-view_forum.php?forumId=3 The home page that tries to sell people on joining the any of several forums is metaparty.beyondpolitics.org That page says how to join the Metaparty FA and how to get email from the forums. To get hooked into the proxy structure for that forum, edit the wiki page at http://metaparty.beyondpolitics.org/tiki-index.php?page=US-Iraq+Conflict+proxy+list (The other FA/DP I would like people to join is the Range Voting FA, whose Proxy Assignment and other data is at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/database ) > Are there other forums on the same topic that already exist? There are forums with a strong bias, such as http://antiwar.com/blog/ and http://www.firesociety.com/forum/5/Global-Fires/ There might also be forums where people from different sides of the issue go to battle with each other. > If so, why do you want to create a new one? Every forum has its own culture and way of doing things. It seems very hard to change an existing culture or to get it to adopt new practices. For example, the RangeVoting yahoo group has 68 members, but only 4 have added their names to the Proxy Assignments table, which is what it takes to indicate interest in participating in the FA. And, I haven't looked very hard, but I doubt there are any active forums about the Iraq war that are focussed on looking for common ground and trying to find a solution that would be satisfactory to most people (Americans, Iraqis...). Most forums, I expect, are focussed on preaching to their own choir about their own rightness, and doing battle with those people who have different viewpoints. By creating a new forum from scratch, I hope to shape the forum's culture, including the things that go with FA/DP, treating people with other viewpoints respectfully, focusing on look
[Election-Methods] response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting >W.Schudy: >Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote strategically >(approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters >have the most black and white, polarized view of the world. --WDS replies: This criticism of range voting has been heard several times before, but Schudy perhaps has a nicer way to phrase and view it than the previous critics, which makes his attack overcome more of range voting's defenses. (For some of those defenses, see, e.g. http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html http://rangevoting.org/ShExpRes.html .) *1. with range voting, it is "recommended" (this could be, by law, printed on ballots) but not "required" that voters rate their favorite with the top score (say 99 for 0-99 range) and their most-hated with the least score (0). With such a recommendation, it is likely that almost all range voters will actually do that. If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot of honesty concerning other candidates. *2. So for example, if 49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and 49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and 2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0 then Nader would win. This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts the assertion RV "gives power to the candidate whose supporters have the most black and white, polarized view of the world." In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized Nader supporters. (See also http://rangevoting.org/TidemanRespB.html .) Indeed by forcing voters to vote approval-style, you would *force* artificial "polarization" and thus distort the results by causing Nader to have an artificially high or low score (probably the latter; it depends on the shape of the distribution whose average was 53). This is totally contrary to Schudy's claimed desire. *3. If we also add, say, Badnarik with scores not of 53 like for Nader, but rather, say, 20, then Badnarik would not win, but still would get a total range-voting score in the same ballpark as Bush, Gore, and Nader, thus permitting him to claim he has a lot of popular support, and thus allowing his party to try to get money and support for future elections. *4. However, if forced to vote approval-style, the latter possibility is precluded, causing Badnarik and his party forever to get very low scores (below 1%) and never be able to attract either money or serious candidates. As a result, the country would have fewer choices since small parties would be artificially prevented from growing to a deservedly-large size and strength. That's very bad. Furthermore, with continued 2-party domination, "polarization" is kind of inherent! Thus Schudy, by supporting approval over range, in fact could be CAUSING huge polarization, FORCING all Nader-like candidates to lose, and fossilizing it forever, preventing third parties from ever becoming significant - exactly the opposite of what Schudy says he wants! Note, it was an "immediate" bad effect that (above) Approval caused Nader to lose when Range vould have caused him to win. But what we here are talking about is a "secondary" - not-immediate but rather prolonged over historical time - effect somewhat resembling "Duverger's law" that certain voting systems engender 2-party domination. *5. That scenario (the "nursery effect" http://rangevoting.org/NurseryEffect.html ) is quite plausible. See http://rangevoting.org/PsEl04.html to see that Badnarik indeed got hugely less with approval than with range voting. This is a systematic effect that hurts all third-party candidates with approval, and hurts them hugely. *6. We have to base our arguments on reality. In our study of the 2004 US election, we were not able to find any evidence that Bush voters were either more or less "polarized" and "strategically exaggerating" than Gore voters. (Perhaps they were, but if so the effect was too small for our statistics to see.) This is only one election of course, so it does not mean a lot, but still, the fact is, Schudy apparently has no evidence that any nonuniform polarization ever exists, and what little evidence we do have, suggests it does not. The point is, it is hard to make such a conspiracy work. You have to get your suppoters to all agree to be strategic, AND keep this conspiracy secret so the other side does not find out about it and try to compensate. Realistic? Or a fantasy? *7. Might it be somebody could have a legitimate reason to score some preferences more strongly than others, and this is not because they are "polarized"? *8. Another interesting and good - kind of more philosophical - response to this kind of criticism, is by Lomax: http://rangevoting.org/TidemanRespA.html . Warren D. Smith http://rangevoting.org Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Proposing a Delegable Proxy poll: best
>[Jan Kok] Let's try a DP poll! >... >This is the proposed poll topic and title: >*** What is the best place to host the US-Iraq Conflict forum? Jan, Can you give us more information about what features the forum will need? In particular, does it itself need to support DP polls? (If yes, then I am not aware of any site that is suitable. I don't share Abd ul-Rahman Lomax's view that the idea is central and the tools don't matter. Having a site with good DP tools will help the idea function and propagate!!) Does the forum currently exist? At what URL? Are there other forums on the same topic that already exist? If so, why do you want to create a new one? -- Follow my blog at http://AllAboutVoting.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] Proposing a Delegable Proxy poll: best place to host forum?
(To those not familiar with Delegable Proxy (DP), FA/DP, etc., please check out metaparty.beyondpolitics.org , beyondpolitics.org and the FAQs at http://www.beyondpolitics.org/wiki/tiki-index.php?page=BeyondPolitics .) Let's try a DP poll! Several reasons: - I really am interested in the results of the poll, which I will take as advisory. - Practice. Let's see what really is involved in doing a DP poll. - A demonstration. I hope this exercise will be of interest to some people on this list, and will get more people to become interested in FA/DP organizational technology. Abd has suggested that polls be discussed first before being voted. That makes sense to me. It can avoid stupid poll questions, stupid, incomplete, etc. allowed choices, stupid polling technique, etc. I propose that - The discussion of the poll take place on the RangeVoting yahoo group (reason: we have some FA/DP infrastructure set up here). - The votes be recorded in a new table (similar to the Bylaws poll table) at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/database - The polling method be 0-10 Range with Delegable Proxy. - The votes be expanded according to the Proxy Assignments table at the aforementioned URL. That means that if you want to participate in the DP poll, you will have to join the RangeVoting yahoo group, and you will have to record your vote directly in the new poll table, or you will have to ask someone to be your proxy, and if they agree, get that recorded in the Proxy Assignments table. Your proxy will vote for you in all future polls, as long as the proxy relationship exists, but you can always vote for yourself directly, which overrides your proxy's vote for you. This is the proposed poll topic and title: *** What is the best place to host the US-Iraq Conflict forum? *** To explain a bit more the purpose of this poll, i.e. why I'm asking this particular question, I suspect that the present location of the forum may be discouraging participation. It's presently a forum on a tiki-wiki. That is probably unfamiliar to most potential participants (political activists, not necessarily computer-savvy people); it may hard to learn and use. So, before the discussion on that forum gets very far, I'm wondering whether to leave the forum where it is, or create a forum somewhere else for discussing the US-Iraq Conflict topic. Before I go on and discuss some alternative places for hosting the US-Iraq Conflict discussion, let me pause and see if there is interest in continuing this discussion about the DP poll here. I suggest that if you are interested in continuing, suggest one or more alternative places for hosting the US-Iraq Conflict forum. Or, if you object to holding a DP poll, or you object to the poll topic, suggest an alternative. Cheers, - Jan Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
>W.Schudy: >Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote strategically >(approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters >have the most black and white, polarized view of the world. --WDS replies: This criticism of range voting has been heard several times before, but Schudy perhaps has a nicer way to phrase and view it than the previous critics, which makes his attack overcome more of range voting's defenses. (For some of those defenses, see, e.g. http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html http://rangevoting.org/ShExpRes.html .) *1. with range voting, it is "recommended" (this could be, by law, printed on ballots) but not "required" that voters rate their favorite with the top score (say 99 for 0-99 range) and their most-hated with the least score (0). With such a recommendation, it is likely that almost all range voters will actually do that. If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot of honesty concerning other candidates. *2. So for example, if 49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and 49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and 2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0 then Nader would win. This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts the assertion RV "gives power to the candidate whose supporters have the most black and white, polarized view of the world." In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized Nader supporters. (See also http://rangevoting.org/TidemanRespB.html .) Indeed by forcing voters to vote approval-style, you would *force* artificial "polarization" and thus distort the results by causing Nader to have an artificially high or low score (probably the latter; it depends on the shape of the distribution whose average was 53). This is totally contrary to Schudy's claimed desire. *3. If we also add, say, Badnarik with scores not of 53 like for Nader, but rather, say, 20, then Badnarik would not win, but still would get a total range-voting score in the same ballpark as Bush, Gore, and Nader, thus permitting him to claim he has a lot of popular support, and thus allowing his party to try to get money and support for future elections. *4. However, if forced to vote approval-style, the latter possibility is precluded, causing Badnarik and his party forever to get very low scores (below 1%) and never be able to attract either money or serious candidates. As a result, the country would have fewer choices since small parties would be artificially prevented from growing to a deservedly-large size and strength. That's very bad. Furthermore, with continued 2-party domination, "polarization" is kind of inherent! Thus Schudy, by supporting approval over range, in fact could be CAUSING huge polarization, FORCING all Nader-like candidates to lose, and fossilizing it forever, preventing third parties from ever becoming significant - exactly the opposite of what Schudy says he wants! Note, it was an "immediate" bad effect that (above) Approval caused Nader to lose when Range vould have caused him to win. But what we here are talking about is a "secondary" - not-immediate but rather prolonged over historical time - effect somewhat resembling "Duverger's law" that certain voting systems engender 2-party domination. *5. That scenario (the "nursery effect" http://rangevoting.org/NurseryEffect.html ) is quite plausible. See http://rangevoting.org/PsEl04.html to see that Badnarik indeed got hugely less with approval than with range voting. This is a systematic effect that hurts all third-party candidates with approval, and hurts them hugely. *6. We have to base our arguments on reality. In our study of the 2004 US election, we were not able to find any evidence that Bush voters were either more or less "polarized" and "strategically exaggerating" than Gore voters. (Perhaps they were, but if so the effect was too small for our statistics to see.) This is only one election of course, so it does not mean a lot, but still, the fact is, Schudy apparently has no evidence that any nonuniform polarization ever exists, and what little evidence we do have, suggests it does not. The point is, it is hard to make such a conspiracy work. You have to get your suppoters to all agree to be strategic, AND keep this conspiracy secret so the other side does not find out about it and try to compensate. Realistic? Or a fantasy? *7. Might it be somebody could have a legitimate reason to score some preferences more strongly than others, and this is not because they are "polarized"? *8. Another interesting and good - kind of more philosophical - response to this kind of criticism, is by Lomax: http://rangevoting.org/TidemanRespA.html . Warren D. Smith http://rangevoting.org Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section
At 02:04 AM 8/2/2007, Juho wrote: >The votres' "stated preferences" are easy to collect but in a >competitive environment voters tend to exaggerate. I guess the basic >problem is the feeling you get when Bush wins Gore and you have voter >G=100, B=80 and your neighbour has voted B=100, G=0. But your neighbor cared more than you. Look, the kind of example you cited is very common. In this election, you actually have very little motive to vote (of those are the frontrunners). You cared very little, your neighbor cared enough to vote as the neighbor did. If there were two people making the decision, which one would be right? "I prefer Gore, but Bush is fine with me." "I prefer Bush, and Gore is awful." Which one is the choice that makes that neighborhood a nicer place to live? Do you trust democracy? If you cared about the outcome, why in the world did you vote such a weak vote? It only makes sense to me if you *didn't* care, and you'd be happy with Bush winning. Look, I *wish* I could get outcomes like that! They have been quite rare for me. The assumption is that voters don't vote their *true* preferences, and then are upset about the result. If you'd be upset, your true preference is not 100/80. Why in the world did you vote that way if Bush was not acceptable to you? Actually, we expect even sincere voters to vote as described very little. Most voters will max one and min one. The scenario is unrealistic and a narrow view of the election, rooted in ranked thinking. The only reason you don't like the outcome is that you mistrust the neighbor, you don't think the neighbor was "sincere." But people vote to get what they want, and only if it is easy for them will they vote weak votes. They vote weak votes if they actually don't care. Would you be upset if you voted that way? If so, you woudn't do it again, and, I suggest, you would be improving outcomes. Bad thinking. Get more precise. Consider the whole context. >Intermediate votes may not do harm in some cases but as a main rule >competitive voters are likely to use mins and maxes as efficiently as >they can. Approval votes do harm. To those who vote that way. The harm doesn't show in the individual strategies, it shows in the overall social utility *to the set of voters who vote that way.* Unless the way they are voting is sincere. In which case, what is the problem? > > But in two stages, you can have your Condorcet cake and optimize > > satisfaction as well. > >Some guidance for reading my comments. I tend to split the cases in >two categories. Sincere elections => Range ok. COmpetitive elections >=> better to go for Condorcet or Approval or some other strategy >resistant but more coarse methods. Said over and over and over with no evidence but rather "this is bad" without explaining *how* it is bad and *how much* it is bad. > Trying to put these (opinion >strength measurements and competitiveness) in one package causes me >confusion. If you can prove that some such system works I'll include >that method in my favourite methods list. Confusion for what? Easy. Vote sincerely, pretty much as you would in a Range without runoff, only it gets a little easier to simply vote a utility transfer, full scale, no stretching. The system will determine your preferences from your votes. The preference marker allows you to vote full scale for more than one and still indicate a favorite. It answers the number one objection to Range. You can equally empower and indicate your favorite too. Utterly easy for the voter to vote what may actually be an optimal strategy, or at least close to that. Let me say this, it does not make it more difficult. Have a problem figuring out which of two equally rated top candidates is your favorite? Fine. Leave it blank. You don't have to make a choice. Only mark Favorite if you feel that way! Why wouldn't it work? It's a range election! But with a preference analysis trigger to confirm that the Range winner is actually the best, where there is someone else who would win, in the initial election, a pairwise comparison. > > You get people to vote sincerely by trusting what they say and > > giving it to them! > >There is some truth in this. I'm however afraid than in many cases >the competitive instincts and fear of others using strategies will >take over. In a competitive environment, people have stronger preferences, so they will vote that way. What is the problem? > > You have an election between Al Gore, G W Bush, and Osama Bin > > Laden, I'll pick the current Bete Noir, he deserves the > > approbation in my opinion. If I thought that there was a real risk > > that Bin Laden would win the election, it wasn't just a joke, I > > would seriously consider, in Range, voting max for both Bush and > > Gore. And I think Bush is pretty bad! > >Note that Condorcet / ranked ballots would be good here. Ballot >Gore>Bush>Osama says Gore>Bush with maximum strength, Gore>Osama with >maximum s
