Re: [EM] Paper by Ron Rivest
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: The Rivest lottery is non-monotone, but here is a monotone, clone independent lottery that always selects from the uncovered set: 1. Let C1 be a candidate chosen by random ballot. If C1 is uncovered, then C1 wins. 2. Else use random ballot to find a candidte C2 that covers C1. If C2 is uncovered, then C2 wins. 3. Else use random ballot to find a candidte C3 that covers C2. If C3 is uncovered, then C3 wins. 4. Else use random ballot to find a candidte C4 that covers C3. If C4 is uncovered, then C4 wins. etc. Note that the clone independence has the nice character of the Condorcet Lottery and the Rivest method: the conditional probability that a member C of the clone set S is chosen given that the winner is in the clone set is equal to the probability that C would be chosen from S if the method were applied soley to S. I suppose this method can be used to enhance any base method so it elects from the uncovered set. Just let C1 be the winner of the base method. Whether or not that introduces more criteria failures is another question. One could also run the above lottery a billion times and elect the candidate that wins most often. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Idea Proposal: Listening Democracy
On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 9:42 PM, Duane Johnson duane.john...@gmail.com wrote: The voting process would go like this: 1. (By some process outside the scope of this proposal), it is determined that an issue needs to be voted on This could be an issue, as controlling what people get to vote on represents considerable power. 2. The issue is publicized and some citizens become aware of the issue 3. Of those who are aware, some citizens are concerned and want to vote on the issue. Each engages in the following process: a. The citizen registers as a voter and receives a voter ID b. The voter approaches a potential endorser (e.g. friend or relative) and asks to hear their point of view for the vote c. The endorser tells their point of view d. The voter summarizes their point of view in writing e. The endorser agrees that the summary is a correct representation, endorses the writ, and registers the endorsement f. The voter repeats steps (b) through (e) for a SECOND endorser g. The voter is now qualified to vote, and votes. This seems pretty open to abuse. You just need to get 2 people to sign that you listened to them. The Listening Democracy system emphasizes, formalizes, and rewards listening in the decision-making process. The system is an improvement over direct voting because it ensures that each voter synthesizes information external to them. It assumes that decisions reached through discourse are generally better than those reached by merely counting isolated opionions. One of the reasons representative democracy is used is because people don't have the time to consider the issue. Well organised groups (often called special interests) have a big advantage over dispersed interests (the general interest). The point of democracy is to give the general interest a voice. Ofc, with current systems, special interests (as always) still have an advantage. However, with your proposal, these groups could enhance their voting power further by ensuring that their members have a much higher percentage registered to vote. Also, if you make it harder to vote, less people will bother. Crucially, however, it does not exclude people who do not reach that bar from significantly influencing the system. Huh? If they don't reach the bar, they don't get to vote. I guess they could just refuse to endorse anyone who they disagree with. An important element of a Listening Democracy is the ranked ballot (and subsequent pairwise tally, see Condorcet Method on Wikipedia). The voting method used is separate from the voting rights component. As mentioned earlier, the system is viral in the sense that it systematically involves more and more of the population. Well, viral normally means choice. It would be more accurately described as excluding everyone from voting and then re-grant the right back in a viral way. Also, viral means starting small and getting bigger. It is like how a spark can create a fire. By evenly (i.e. without discrimination) applying a restriction on the number of people who can vote, the value of a vote increases, just like currency. Individual votes are effectively (almost) worthless now, but people vote for social reasons. When endorsements are hard to find, more discussion will be required across tribe-like boundaries. I think tribes would be well advised to conserve their endorsements. Each person outside the tribe who is endorsed is half an additional vote for the tribe's enemies and half a vote lost for the tribe. What about vote buying or endorsement buying? Vote buying would actually be much harder in a system of Listening Democracy. Consider first of all that an unscrupulous citizen would have to buy out 3 people to get 1 vote: a voter and his or her two endorsers. An unscrupulous citizen might try to buy the voter after he or she has achieved endorsement, but then a voter would feel doubly guilty for using or possibly even backstabbing close friends or relatives. It seems that Listening Democracry would promote honesty in society better than any law could enforce it. Vote buying is already illegal. However, since the endorsement system is public, you do run the risk of voter intimidation, so there is more risk of it. If a mob-boss recommends that you endorse members of his party, then it would be public if you did it. The problem is that the people who are elected then are the ones who enforce the law. This was the purpose of the secret ballot. Btw, you should look into the delegable proxy system. This is also designed to allow effective communication without overloading the voters. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Paper by Ron Rivest
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: The Rivest lottery is non-monotone, but here is a monotone, clone independent lottery that always selects from the uncovered set: 1. Let C1 be a candidate chosen by random ballot. If C1 is uncovered, then C1 wins. 2. Else use random ballot to find a candidte C2 that covers C1. If C2 is uncovered, then C2 wins. 3. Else use random ballot to find a candidte C3 that covers C2. If C3 is uncovered, then C3 wins. 4. Else use random ballot to find a candidte C4 that covers C3. If C4 is uncovered, then C4 wins. etc. Note that the clone independence has the nice character of the Condorcet Lottery and the Rivest method: the conditional probability that a member C of the clone set S is chosen given that the winner is in the clone set is equal to the probability that C would be chosen from S if the method were applied solely to S. I suppose this method can be used to enhance any base method so it elects from the uncovered set. Just let C1 be the winner of the base method. This enhancement will preserve individually each of the following possible compliances of the base method: clone independence, monotonicity, Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives, and Independence from non-Smith alternatives. So Random Ballot Smith would be a great base method for somebody that likes all of these compliances DMC would be a great base method for the same reason.. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Uncovered set methods (Re: How close can we get to the IIAC)
- Original Message - From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm ... That's UncAAO, right? I've considered adding it to my simulator, but I'm unsure of where the simulated voters should put the approval cutoff. Yes. I'm glad someone remembers UncAAO. I suggest using truncation as the approval cutoff, and using the same truncations that you do for Schulze wv. By the way, (contrary to Marcus' confusion) UncAAO does satisfy Monotonicity, Clone Independence, IDPA, and Independence from Non-Smith Alternatives, as well as the following: 1. It elects the same member of a clone set as the method would when restricted to the clone set. 2. If a candidate that beats the winner is removed, the winner is unchanged. 3. If an added candidate covers the winner, the new candidate becomes the new winner. 4. If the old winner covers an added candidate, the old winner still wins. 5. It always chooses from the uncovered set. 6. It is easy to describe: Initialize L to be an empty list. While there exists some alternative that covers every member of L, add to L the one (from among those) ranked on the greatest number of ballots. Elect the last candidate added to L. What other deterministic method (based on ranked ballots with truncations allowed) satisfies all of these criteria? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Uncovered set methods (Re: How close can we get to the IIAC)
Dear Forest, you wrote (20 April 2010): 1. It elects the same member of a clone set as the method would when restricted to the clone set. Well, how do you define clones? In the approval voting paradigm, the term clones implies that all candidates have the same approval score. So when you apply UncAAO to a clone set, then all candidates of its uncovered set are tied. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Uncovered set methods (Re: How close can we get to the IIAC)
Markus wrote ...
'..how do you define clones? In the approval
voting paradigm, the term clones implies that
all candidates have the same approval score.
So when you apply UncAAO to a clone set, then
all candidates of its uncovered set are tied.'
Your suggested interpretation of clones (always being tied in approval) would
satisfy my claim, breaking ties with random ballot, for example. But that's not
what I had in mind.
Here's what I had in mind:
Since Approval and Cardinal Ratings are strategically equivalent, if the
standard high resolution Cardinal Ratings methods satisfy clone independence,
then at a strategic level, so must Approval.
Beyond that consideration, in the context of many voters we can assume that each
candidate's average approval will be approximately equal to each candidate's
average cardinal rating even with non-strategic voting. For similar reasons
(except in rare borderline cases) it doesn't matter (to their grade) if I give
my students partial credit or not when grading hundreds of problems over a term.
(It does matter psychologically to the students.)
It may be that X, Y, and Z are always ranked solid on the cardinal ratings
ballots of some election, but unless they are usually rated near each other, and
frequently approved or disapproved together in strategic voting, we would have
to judge the clone relationship to be quite loose. In other words, we could
call them pseudo-clones. It takes Cardinal Ratings or Approval to distinguish
pseudo-clones from true clones. Visually compare in one dimension
original:
A*C*B**
Tight clone set {X, Y, Z} replaces C:
AX**Y**ZB***
Loose clone set:
*A*X*YZ***B**
Since rankings do not distinguish between pseudo and true clones, MinMax
Condorcet based on rankings fails clone dependence. But if we base MinMax on
ratings ballots (or ranked ballots with approval information) and use James
Green-Armytage's weighted pairwise (whether CWP or AWP) measure of strength of
defeat, the method acquires clone independence. And because of its simplicity,
together with the other advantages of using weighted pairwise measures of
strength (see James' discussion at
http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/vm/antistratsum.htm), MinMax(CWP or
AWP) is an obvious public proposal.
In summary the stronger the clone relationship, the stronger the tendency to
approve or disapprove all of the members of the clone family together. The
looser the relationship, the greater the number of ballots that split them up in
approval/disapproval. So they are more or less split up in the approval totals
depending on how strong or weak the clone relationship.
Forest
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