[EM] Election method simulator code
Quite some time ago, I rewrote and expanded the singlewinner part of my election method analysis program, mainly to add a cache to make X,,Y and X//Y methods very fast if results for base methods and sets X and Y had been calculated earlier -- and to only calculate the pairwise matrix one instead of 200 times if I were to find the results of 200 Condorcet methods. The last week or so, I've been cleaning up that code, and a version is up on Google Code at http://preview.tinyurl.com/5rd5krp . It's only tested on Linux, has some known bugs, and the actual structure isn't documented apart from comments, but there it is. I'll probably continue working on it now that I know how versioning works :-) If anyone has any questions or want to add to it, go ahead and reply! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Arrow's Theorem
robert bristow-johnson wrote: likewise, when the IRV method chooses the same candidate as Condorcet would (which is what would happen if the Condorcet winner makes it into the IRV final round), we can say Hey, IRV did pretty good! but if IRV fails to elect the Condorcet winner, it doesn't make IRV appear more legitimate to the electorate. so, in both cases; Electoral College and IRV, i would ask Why bother? if the measure of goodness of the election result is how congruent it is with the Popular vote or Condorcet, respectively, why not just use the Popular vote and Condorcet instead of something that tries to approximate either? Well, Fairvote would like to make us believe that some cases, if the Condorcet winner had won, we'd all be saying but wait! He didn't have enough core support! Boo!. (Presumably we should also be saying, if the Plurality winner won, but wait! Lots of people second-ranked someone else! Boo!. One might wonder how much core support is enough.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Election method simulator code
I recommend you put it up on GitHub. Git handles versioning and source control for you, and github is a good place for people who want to suggest code changes to do it directly, so it's easy for you to just accept or reject those suggestions. If you don't want to have to learn Git's command-line interface, there are a few gui tools: you can use git-cola for making checkins, and giggle or gitg for looking at the history of checkins. 2011/5/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com Quite some time ago, I rewrote and expanded the singlewinner part of my election method analysis program, mainly to add a cache to make X,,Y and X//Y methods very fast if results for base methods and sets X and Y had been calculated earlier -- and to only calculate the pairwise matrix one instead of 200 times if I were to find the results of 200 Condorcet methods. The last week or so, I've been cleaning up that code, and a version is up on Google Code at http://preview.tinyurl.com/5rd5krp . It's only tested on Linux, has some known bugs, and the actual structure isn't documented apart from comments, but there it is. I'll probably continue working on it now that I know how versioning works :-) If anyone has any questions or want to add to it, go ahead and reply! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Arrow's Theorem
On May 6, 2011, at 3:05 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: robert bristow-johnson wrote: likewise, when the IRV method chooses the same candidate as Condorcet would (which is what would happen if the Condorcet winner makes it into the IRV final round), we can say Hey, IRV did pretty good! but if IRV fails to elect the Condorcet winner, it doesn't make IRV appear more legitimate to the electorate. so, in both cases; Electoral College and IRV, i would ask Why bother? if the measure of goodness of the election result is how congruent it is with the Popular vote or Condorcet, respectively, why not just use the Popular vote and Condorcet instead of something that tries to approximate either? Seems like Robert meant or rather than and. Well, Fairvote would like to make us believe that some cases, if the Condorcet winner had won, we'd all be saying but wait! He didn't have enough core support! Boo!. But, we chose ranking rather than Approval to let voters approve, but with unequal liking. Bush haters could want to vote both Gore and Nader as better, but not as equally liked - with whoever they ranked second still seen as better than Bush. (Presumably we should also be saying, if the Plurality winner won, but wait! Lots of people second-ranked someone else! Boo!. One might wonder how much core support is enough.) But, if the Plurality winner won without a runoff, all three methods would agree as to winner. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Arrow's Theorem
Dave Ketchum wrote: Well, Fairvote would like to make us believe that some cases, if the Condorcet winner had won, we'd all be saying but wait! He didn't have enough core support! Boo!. But, we chose ranking rather than Approval to let voters approve, but with unequal liking. Bush haters could want to vote both Gore and Nader as better, but not as equally liked - with whoever they ranked second still seen as better than Bush. True. If you have a binary level, Approval is the obvious method to use. If you have rank, then Approval will be problematic because you can't designate relative strength within those you do approve. Condorcet still respects relative rank, but it seems they argue it doesn't respect relative rank *enough*, particularly when the rank is relative to first place. (Presumably we should also be saying, if the Plurality winner won, but wait! Lots of people second-ranked someone else! Boo!. One might wonder how much core support is enough.) But, if the Plurality winner won without a runoff, all three methods would agree as to winner. I was a bit unclear here. What I meant was that if the method had been Ranked Plurality (everybody submits rank-ballots and whoever is listed first on most ballots win), then they would say that this is bad because it doesn't take lesser preferences into account. So this shoehorning of Plurality is too bad in one direction, and Approval is too bad in the other. Why, then, is Condorcet also too bad in the other? How much core support is too much, and why? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Election method simulator code
I counter-recommend git. I don't like it. If you like the new 'distributed version control' system style, I recommend Mercurial. code.google.com also supports mercurial. My own election simulator is also up on google code, also with subversion. It's kinda hidden inside my project for multi-language (C/Java/perl) election method implementation library. http://code.google.com/p/voteutil/ http://code.google.com/p/voteutil/source/browse/#svn%2Fsim_one_seat On May 6, 2011, at 8:29 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I recommend you put it up on GitHub. Git handles versioning and source control for you, and github is a good place for people who want to suggest code changes to do it directly, so it's easy for you to just accept or reject those suggestions. If you don't want to have to learn Git's command-line interface, there are a few gui tools: you can use git-cola for making checkins, and giggle or gitg for looking at the history of checkins. 2011/5/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com Quite some time ago, I rewrote and expanded the singlewinner part of my election method analysis program, mainly to add a cache to make X,,Y and X//Y methods very fast if results for base methods and sets X and Y had been calculated earlier -- and to only calculate the pairwise matrix one instead of 200 times if I were to find the results of 200 Condorcet methods. The last week or so, I've been cleaning up that code, and a version is up on Google Code at http://preview.tinyurl.com/5rd5krp . It's only tested on Linux, has some known bugs, and the actual structure isn't documented apart from comments, but there it is. I'll probably continue working on it now that I know how versioning works :-) If anyone has any questions or want to add to it, go ahead and reply! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Election method simulator code
Git and GitHub has the largest mindshare among open source developers that I am aware of (I come from the open source dev community, not academia). If you want to be discovered or collaborate, I recommend that route. Duane On May 6, 2011, at 1:19 PM, Brian Olson b...@bolson.org wrote: I counter-recommend git. I don't like it. If you like the new 'distributed version control' system style, I recommend Mercurial. code.google.com also supports mercurial. My own election simulator is also up on google code, also with subversion. It's kinda hidden inside my project for multi-language (C/Java/perl) election method implementation library. http://code.google.com/p/voteutil/ http://code.google.com/p/voteutil/source/browse/#svn%2Fsim_one_seathttp://code.google.com/p/voteutil/source/browse/#svn/sim_one_seat On May 6, 2011, at 8:29 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I recommend you put it up on GitHub. Git handles versioning and source control for you, and github is a good place for people who want to suggest code changes to do it directly, so it's easy for you to just accept or reject those suggestions. If you don't want to have to learn Git's command-line interface, there are a few gui tools: you can use git-cola for making checkins, and giggle or gitg for looking at the history of checkins. 2011/5/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com Quite some time ago, I rewrote and expanded the singlewinner part of my election method analysis program, mainly to add a cache to make X,,Y and X//Y methods very fast if results for base methods and sets X and Y had been calculated earlier -- and to only calculate the pairwise matrix one instead of 200 times if I were to find the results of 200 Condorcet methods. The last week or so, I've been cleaning up that code, and a version is up on Google Code at http://preview.tinyurl.com/5rd5krp . It's only tested on Linux, has some known bugs, and the actual structure isn't documented apart from comments, but there it is. I'll probably continue working on it now that I know how versioning works :-) If anyone has any questions or want to add to it, go ahead and reply! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Antifraudmeasures
¡Hello! ¿How fare you? Some took me to task for combining voting procedures with antifraudmeasures. I contend that the 2 are not separable. I shall abstract the 2 as much as possible: We need to start at printing and go to archiving: The candidates and other should be randomized. Each precinct has the candidates in a different random order. The precinct number should be printed on the ballots. Each ballot should be consecutively numbered. I shall explain the reason for this later. Here is an example: P # 002 391 B # 001 528 Precinct # 002,391 Ballot # 001,528 The each ballot and its privacyenvelope goes into an opaque envelope, thus forming a complete voting kit. Voting kits go into sleeves. Sleeves go into boxes. Boxes go into crates. Crates go onto pallets. Pallets go into trucks. ¿Anyone else ever work shipping? When the kits reach the precincts, they are put locked away under a live webcam. When it is time to vote, the voting kits are put into a transparent drum. The transparent locked cast ballotbox and the locked transparent locked spoiled ballotbox are brought out. All of this happens under live webcams and in front of anyone who wants to witness it. Before the first voter takes a kit, someone tumbles the transparent drum a triple digit number of times. The first voter grabs a random kit. Someone tumbles the transparent drum a double-digit number of times between voters. Someone must design the voting method from the ground up so that one cannot alter a cast ballot. Voting methods and antifraudmeasures are inseparable. Before a ballot can be put into a privacyenvelope and then plced into the locked transparent cast ballotbox, it must pass a ballotvalidater (optical scanner). Ballots which cannot make it through the ballotvalidator go into pricayenvelopes and then into the locked transpartent spoiled ballotbox. keeping spoiled ballots out of the cast locked transparent ballotbox means that any spoiled ballots in the locked cast transparent ballotbox must have been altered after casting. When the polls close, pollworksers open the cast transparent ballotbox and count the votes immediately in front of live webcams and anyone who wants to watch using both humans and optical scanners. Any spoiled ballots in the cast ballotbox means that someone manipulated ballots after casting. The total number of cast ballots must equal the exact number of voters. One counts the total number of ballots (cast, spoiled, and blank). All ballots must have the same precintnumber of the precinct. One must have no missing or duplicated numbers. All numbers must be consecutive and in the range ordered: Let us suppose that Precinct # 002 543 expected only thousands of voters so ordered only ten thousand ballots. The ballots in cast, spoiled and blank must have numbers between: P # 002 583 B # 000 000 P # 002 583 B # 009 999 With no missing or duplicated numbers. Any irregularities should lead to an immediate fraudinvestigation. The cast, spoiled, and blank ballots cast well as the video from the webcams should be archived. Katherine Harris and Walden “The Electionfixer” O’Dell would have a hard time fixing these elections. I welcome any criticisms. Please be brutal. I welcome all suggestions. Please feel free to chime into this thread. ¡Peace! -- “⸘Ŭalabio‽” wala...@macosx.com Skype: Walabio The first Intactivistic wiki on Earth devoted to Peaceful Beginnings: * - HTTP://Intact.Wikia.Com/ “You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts.” —— Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
