Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
This was a good overall description of party list proportional representation. I wrote few (actually quite many) minor comments below. On 4.7.2011, at 2.06, James Gilmour wrote: First we have to recognise that there is no one voting system called party list proportional representation. There are probably as many variants of party-list PR as there are countries and jurisdictions using such a system for their public elections. However, these party-list PR voting systems fall into two broad categories: closed-list party-list PR and open-list party-list PR. In both closed and open versions of party-list systems the order of the candidates in each party's list is determined by the relevant political party. Why do all say this? It is possible that in all used systems parties determine the order. But it could be of no importance from the election result point of view. It could be just e.g. a random or alphabetical order, possibly determined by the election officials. In closed lists the order is essential but not necessarily in open lists. Different countries have different rules about how that is to be done and different parties have different procedures within those rules for ordering the lists. Some parties exercise very strong centralised control; other parties are much more democratic and give every member a vote. In closed-list systems the voters can vote only for a party. Seats are allocated to parties by an arithmetic formula, usually d'Hondt (favours parties with more votes) or Sainte-Laguë (favours parties with fewer votes). I think Sainte-Laguë could be said to be neutral with respect to party size. It is at least less biased than D'Hondt. (D'Hondt is also not grossly biased. It clearly favours large parties in the allocation of the remaining fractional seats. Full seats will be allocated accurately.) Candidates take the seats allocated to their respective parties strictly in the order in which they are named on their parties' lists. In open-list systems the voters can also mark a vote for a candidate but usually only for one candidate. Votes for a candidate are counted as votes for that candidate's party and seats are allocated to the parties by an arithmetic formula, usually d'Hondt or Sainte-Laguë as in closed-list party-list systems. When candidates are allocated to the seats won by each party, the votes for each candidate within the relevant party are taken into account (in different ways in the various implementations). Sometimes the candidates' votes can change the order in which they are allocated to the party's seats. The main objection to party-list voting systems is that they are centred on the registered political parties and not on the voters. I think they are very much centered on the voters, just like most other voting systems. They just assume that the political field is organized and can be divided into parties or other maybe more election specific lists of candidates. (In addition many but not all list based methods allow also parties to determine to order in which candidates are elected.) (Of course, such systems cannot be used in non-partisan elections.) The prime objective of all party-list voting systems is to deliver PR of the registered political parties. ... and other (non-registered) groupings of candidates and candidates running alone. Party-list voting systems entrench the political power of the political parties (especially the central party machine) at the expense of the voters. Maybe in the form of the party determined order in the closed lists. Otherwise maybe not more than in any other party based political system. I however note that methods that provide proportionality also within parties may reduce the power of the central party machine since then the opinions of the voters become more visible. Party lists don't exclude such proportionality although they usually do not provide any party internal proportionality. One more thing is that methods where candidates run as independent citizens and join together as parties or other groupings only after the election put at least psychologically more weight on the party independent role of the representatives. Also voters' ability to vote across party border lines (as e.g. in STV) may have some similar psychological effects. This is most certainly true of closed-list party-list voting systems where the voters have no say in which candidates are elected. Open-list systems do allow the voters some say in which of the parties' candidates should be elected Not some say but possibly also all say. In the beginning of the mail you said that there are two categories, closed-list party-list PR and open-list party-list PR. It s a matter of taste in which of those categories one puts those methods where voters have some say on which candidates will be elected (could depend on e.g. if voters vote for parties/lists or
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
On 4.7.2011, at 4.08, Kathy Dopp wrote: Thanks for the responses. In response to the party leaders having too much control, I believe it is possible to make party-lists on the fly from voters' own rank choice ballots in a way that the most voters would naturally support -- which would put the control into voters' hands and treat all voters fairly and the same (unlike IRV and STV). As soon as I have time, I'll write it up. Yes. One could use primaries to determine the order of candidates in the closed lists. One could enhance open lists by using STV (or e.g. some Condorcet based proportional method) to build a hybrid method that provides proportionality also within parties. One could also use tree like lists to implement more accurate proportionality within parties. There are many tricks to reduce the possible problems of fixed order in the closed lists and to improve party INTERNAL proportionality in both open and closed lists. I appreciate the comments and agree with the problem of too much control given to party leaders -- but think that it is solvable, and that the Condorcet method can be used to resolve any ties with this method. It seems a little more complex than I like, but perhaps it can be simply described and counted? Not sure yet. One reason why Condorcet based proportional methods have not gained popularity is that they are even computationally complex (in addition to being quite difficult to understand to regular politicians) (when compared to basic single winner Condorcet methods that are simpler but do not provide proportionality). Juho On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 2:06 PM, padraigdelg...@yahoo.co.uk wrote: Hi Kathy, I can't speak for the person who said it on this list but the primary reason for most people is that it gives control to party elites - those who select the party candidates and decide order on which they come on said list. Personally I think there are many ways to overcome that problem, and it can be a good method. What, for instance? Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts. Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation
On 3.7.2011, at 20.34, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 2:33 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
I do not like this system and believe it is improper to call it
Condorcet. It seems to have all the same flaws as IRV - hiding the
lower choice votes of voters, except if the voter voted for some of
the less popular candidates. Thus, I can see there may be lots of
cases when it eliminates the Condorcet winner.
Do you mean that it fails to elect the Condorcet winner in some singlewinner
elections, or in multiwinner ones? If it's the latter, then there's a
perfectly good reason for that.
Let me pull an old example again:
45: Left Center Right
45: Right Center Left
10: Center Right Left
If there's one seat, Center is the CW; but if you want to elect two, it
seems most fair to elect Left and Right. If Center is elected, the wing
corresponding to the other winning candidate will have greater power.
I disagree. In your example, clearly 55 prefer right to left, but only
45 prefer left to right. And center is the clear winner overall.
Thus, if only two will be elected, it should be center and right.
That's incompatible with the Droop proportionality criterion. The DPC says
that if there are k seats, and a fraction greater than 1/(k+1) of the
electorate all prefer a certain set of candidates to all others, then someone
in that set should be elected.
(Actually, the more general sense is that if more than p/(k+1) of the
electorate all prefer a set of q candidates to all others, then min(p, q) of
these candidates should win.)
You could also consider a single-candidate variant of the majority criterion:
If, in a single-winner case, more than 50% vote a certain candidate top, he
should win. If, in a two-winner case, more than 33% vote a certain candidate
top, he should win. If in an n-winner case, more than 1/(n+1) vote a certain
candidate top, he should win. Such a criterion would mean that Left and Right
have to be elected, because each is supported by more than 33%.
Here's one more example that I have used to point out the difference between
proportionality oriented and majority oriented elections. Party A has 55%
support and two candidates, party B has 45% support and only one candidate.
55: A1A2B
45: BA1A2
A1 is the clear Condorcet winner in single winner elections.
Any proportional multi winner election that elects two representatives would
elect A1 and B.
If we elect two most popular candidates, then we elect A1 and A2.
If we allow voters to elect any pair of candidates (using a single winner
Condorcet method), then the candidate sets are {A1, A2}, {A1, B} and {A2, B}.
Out of these three alternatives {A1, A2} would be a Condorcet winner (since the
55 A party supporters have a majority and can therefore always decide).
As Kristofer Munsterhjelm points out, proportional methods may and should
sometimes not elect the (single winner) Condorcet winner. The Condorcet
criterion can be applied in groups (extended) so that the best group of n
candidates is does not always contain all candidates of best group of size m,
where mn (in the single winner Condorcet case m=1). In more general terms my
point is also that dIfferent elections may have different needs and targets and
rules.
- We could also have single winner methods that do not always elect the
Condorcet winner. We could for example have a method that would elect A1 with
55% probability and B with 45% probability, and that would this way provide
statistical proportionality in time.
- A Republican government in the U.S.A. could elect only republican candidates
as ambassadors and judges, maybe in the Condorcet preference order. The voters
could be Republicans only, or alternatively both Republicans and Democrats, but
the point is that majority would rule in both cases, until next time when the
majority could be the other party.
- Also if you elect employees from a group of candidates there is maybe no need
to be proportional. Just pick the best ones.
((I also note that in principle Condorcet methods need not define a full
preference order of the candidates. Picking one winner is all that single
winner methods need to do.))
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 1:34 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com wrote: Let me pull an old example again: 45: Left Center Right 45: Right Center Left 10: Center Right Left If there's one seat, Center is the CW; but if you want to elect two, it seems most fair to elect Left and Right. If Center is elected, the wing corresponding to the other winning candidate will have greater power. I disagree. In your example, clearly 55 prefer right to left, but only 45 prefer left to right. And center is the clear winner overall. Thus, if only two will be elected, it should be center and right. That's incompatible with the Droop proportionality criterion. The DPC says that if there are k seats, and a fraction greater than 1/(k+1) of the electorate all prefer a certain set of candidates to all others, then someone in that set should be elected. In your example: 55: prefer Center to (Left or Right) 55: prefer Right to Left 45: prefer Left to Right and you say that the Droop criteria says that Right and Left must be elected! But by the rule you cite, then all three candidates must be elected, and thus the Droop quota requires electing k+1 candidates, which contradicts the statement of its own rule. Thus, QED, the Droop criteria doesn't elect k seats, and so must be abandoned, unless you are insisting on burying the 2nd choice candidates of all voters - like STV and IRV do to some voters, while considering the 2nd choice candidates of others. Thus, it seems logical, that only an IRV proponent, who insists on not looking at the 2nd choice votes of some voters would insist on using the Droop quota. I dare say, that to apply the Droop quota in many instances requires the unfair treatment of voters' votes (looking at only some voters 2nd and later choices, but not others) in most cases, or it would tend to elect more or less than the required number of seats otherwise. Hence, the Droop quota, not in this example, but in many others with the same number of voters and candidates, would require the unfair treatment of voters' rank choice votes or if not, it would elect the wrong number of seats. (Actually, the more general sense is that if more than p/(k+1) of the electorate all prefer a set of q candidates to all others, then min(p, q) of these candidates should win.) Throwing p in the expression, seems to make little sense. You mean if only p= 6/(k+1) = 2 voters prefers a set of 3 candidates to all others, in the case of k=2, then min(2,3) = 2 of these candidates should win! That's a funny rule. A more common sense rule IMO would be for k seats, elect the k candidates who are preferred above the rest of the candidates by more voters. -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts. Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Subject: Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system? On 4.7.2011, at 4.08, Kathy Dopp wrote: Thanks for the responses. In response to the party leaders having too much control, I believe it is possible to make party-lists on the fly from voters' own rank choice ballots in a way that the most voters would naturally support -- which would put the control into voters' hands and treat all voters fairly and the same (unlike IRV and STV). As soon as I have time, I'll write it up. Yes. One could use primaries to determine the order of candidates in the closed lists. One could enhance open lists by using STV (or e.g. some Condorcet based proportional method) to build a hybrid method that provides proportionality also within parties. One could also use tree like lists to implement more accurate proportionality within parties. There are many tricks to reduce the possible problems of fixed order in the closed lists and to improve party INTERNAL proportionality in both open and closed lists. I was *not* referring to using primaries or STV. I am proposing using a combination of Condorcet and voters' own rank choice ballots, i.e. all the unique permutations of rank choice ballots cast by voters to determine an on-the-fly list ordering of candidates to elect winners. However, although it is precinct-summable, it would require (n-1)! sums per precinct to count, and be at least tediously time-consuming to manually calculate. I haven't given thought yet to how to manually audit the results. That seems complex too. So, even though this method is simpler than IRV/STV methods to manually count, and at least does not require centralized counting only after all ballots are cast, and treats all voters votes equally, it may be too complex - regardless of how fair and individualized. I will write it up when I have time. Perhaps it is an all-new PR electoral method proposal, or perhaps not, or will be equivalent to some other. I appreciate the comments and agree with the problem of too much control given to party leaders -- but think that it is solvable, and that the Condorcet method can be used to resolve any ties with this method. It seems a little more complex than I like, but perhaps it can be simply described and counted? Not sure yet. One reason why Condorcet based proportional methods have not gained popularity is that they are even computationally complex (in addition to being quite difficult to understand to regular politicians) (when compared to basic single winner Condorcet methods that are simpler but do not provide proportionality). This method I am thinking of is, I believe, fairly easy for computers to count (once I go through all the cases that may crop up to see what rule(s) fits best), and probably fairly easy, but tedious and time-consuming, for people to count manually. Condorcet comes in as the secondary condition, not the first, in this method. Even after I work through it, folks on this list may think of other special cases that may crop up and need some resolution. It may not be the best choice in terms of complexity of counting. I like the open party list system, and agree that as long as anyone could form an on-the-fly party by running and putting his/her own list together, it does not necessarily give parties any more of an upper hand than already exists today. I suppose the name could be abbreviated to be simply the list method. However, I do like the idea of allowing voters to simply rank any of the candidates from any list and put together the lists on-the-fly from their rank choices - but may not be worth the extra effort in counting difficulty, since the lion's share of voters would not have time or ability to investigate the individual positions of a large number of candidates. Most voters use political party as an identifier for quick decision-making. Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts. Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 1:34 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Let me pull an old example again:
45: Left Center Right
45: Right Center Left
10: Center Right Left
If there's one seat, Center is the CW; but if you want to elect two, it
seems most fair to elect Left and Right. If Center is elected, the wing
corresponding to the other winning candidate will have greater power.
I disagree. In your example, clearly 55 prefer right to left, but only
45 prefer left to right. And center is the clear winner overall.
Thus, if only two will be elected, it should be center and right.
That's incompatible with the Droop proportionality criterion. The DPC says
that if there are k seats, and a fraction greater than 1/(k+1) of the
electorate all prefer a certain set of candidates to all others, then
someone in that set should be elected.
In your example:
55: prefer Center to (Left or Right)
55: prefer Right to Left
45: prefer Left to Right
and you say that the Droop criteria says that Right and Left must be elected!
But by the rule you cite, then all three candidates must be elected,
and thus the Droop quota requires electing k+1 candidates, which
contradicts the statement of its own rule.
That's not what it says. The DPC says that:
if there are k seats, and a fraction greater than 1/(k+1) of the
electorate all prefer a certain set of candidates
*to all others*,
then someone in that set should be elected.
In other words, if more than a 1/(k+1) fraction voted A, B, and C, above
all the other candidates, but not necessarily in the same order, then
one of A, B, and C should win. Center is not preferred *to all others*
by more than a Droop quota - only the 10 Center voters prefer Center to
all others.
If you want to be exhaustive, the count for all sets are:
100 voters prefer the set {Left, Center, Right} to all others
45 voters prefer the set {Left, Center} to all others
0 voters prefer the set {Left, Right} to all others
55 voters prefer the set {Right, Center} to all others
45 voters prefer the set {Left} to all others
45 voters prefer the set {Right} to all others
10 voters prefer the set {Center} to all others.
A Droop quota is 1/(k+1), in this case, 100/3 = 33 + 1/3. That means
that the DPC says:
Elect at least one from {Left, Center} (since 45 33.3)
Elect at least one from {Right, Center} (since 55 33.3)
Elect at least one from {Left} (since 45 33.3)
Elect at least one from {Right} (since 45 33.3)
and the only way to make that work is to elect Left and Right.
The Droop proportionality criterion is thus a generalization of the
mutual majority criterion, which says that if a majority prefers a
certain set of candidates to everybody else, then someone from that set
should win.
(If the candidates in that set had agreed to run only one of the
candidates, that candidate would, after all, have won by a straight
majority.)
(Actually, the more general sense is that if more than p/(k+1) of the
electorate all prefer a set of q candidates to all others, then min(p, q) of
these candidates should win.)
Throwing p in the expression, seems to make little sense. You mean if
only p= 6/(k+1) = 2 voters prefers a set of 3 candidates to all
others, in the case of k=2, then min(2,3) = 2 of these candidates
should win! That's a funny rule.
I forgot to say fraction. If a fraction of more than p/(k+1) of the
electorate all prefer a set of q candidates to everybody else, then
min(p, q) should win. In the example above, with two winners, this works
out as:
if more than 100 * 1/3 = 33 + 1/3 voters prefer a set to everybody
else, at least one candidate from that set should win,
if more than 100 * 2/3 = 66 + 2/3 voters prefer a set to everybody
else, at least two candidates from that set should win, unless the set
has only one candidate in it (in which case it's impossible).
For three winners:
if more than 100 * 1/4 = 25 voters prefer a set to everybody else, at
least one should be elected from that set,
if more than 100 * 2/4 = 50 voters..., at least two candidates should
be elected from that set (if possible),
if more than 100 * 3/4 = 75 voters..., at least three candidates,
and so on.
A more common sense rule IMO would be for k seats, elect the k
candidates who are preferred above the rest of the candidates by more
voters.
If you mean the k individual candidates, then consider an election of
the form:
51: A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4
49: B1 B2 B3 B4 A1 A2 A3 A4
four seats.
The first candidate preferred by more voters is A1. The second is A2.
The third is A3, and the fourth is A4. So the assembly turns out to have
only A-candidates, even though only slightly more than half of the
electorate ranked the A-candidates above the B-candidates. That's not
very proportional.
If you mean k candidates taken as a whole, then that's what the
Condorcet-like
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
Kathy Dopp wrote: Thanks for the responses. In response to the party leaders having too much control, I believe it is possible to make party-lists on the fly from voters' own rank choice ballots in a way that the most voters would naturally support -- which would put the control into voters' hands and treat all voters fairly and the same (unlike IRV and STV). As soon as I have time, I'll write it up. You could make a party list system that would arrange the list after the election, yes. This would have a ballot where you first pick a party and then order the party's candidates. However, either the election method used within each party to determine the list orders would be majoritarian (in which case the system isn't proportional beyond the party level), or it would be PR (in which case you could just as easily remove the party constraint and just use the PR method directly). I suppose a party list with Condorcet for each party method would both be summable and inter-party proportional[1]. If the largest party fields n candidates and there are k parties, then you would have an upper bound of k * n^2 numbers, which is polynomial in the summability sense. You would in essence do k mini-elections, one for each party. [1] that is, proportional between parties, if not inside each. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation
Thanks Kristofer. I ignored the all* in all others.
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters
overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times. The Droop
quota seems to go hand in hand with IRV and STV methods.
The Droop proportionality criterion is thus a generalization of the mutual
majority criterion, which says that if a majority prefers a certain set of
candidates to everybody else, then someone from that set should win.
Yes. Even in the case that a greater majority prefers a different set
of candidates over the ones elected by Droop.
Interesting.
Kathy
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 9:22 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 1:34 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Let me pull an old example again:
45: Left Center Right
45: Right Center Left
10: Center Right Left
If there's one seat, Center is the CW; but if you want to elect two, it
seems most fair to elect Left and Right. If Center is elected, the wing
corresponding to the other winning candidate will have greater power.
I disagree. In your example, clearly 55 prefer right to left, but only
45 prefer left to right. And center is the clear winner overall.
Thus, if only two will be elected, it should be center and right.
That's incompatible with the Droop proportionality criterion. The DPC
says
that if there are k seats, and a fraction greater than 1/(k+1) of the
electorate all prefer a certain set of candidates to all others, then
someone in that set should be elected.
In your example:
55: prefer Center to (Left or Right)
55: prefer Right to Left
45: prefer Left to Right
and you say that the Droop criteria says that Right and Left must be
elected!
But by the rule you cite, then all three candidates must be elected,
and thus the Droop quota requires electing k+1 candidates, which
contradicts the statement of its own rule.
That's not what it says. The DPC says that:
if there are k seats, and a fraction greater than 1/(k+1) of the electorate
all prefer a certain set of candidates
*to all others*,
then someone in that set should be elected.
In other words, if more than a 1/(k+1) fraction voted A, B, and C, above all
the other candidates, but not necessarily in the same order, then one of A,
B, and C should win. Center is not preferred *to all others* by more than a
Droop quota - only the 10 Center voters prefer Center to all others.
If you want to be exhaustive, the count for all sets are:
100 voters prefer the set {Left, Center, Right} to all others
45 voters prefer the set {Left, Center} to all others
0 voters prefer the set {Left, Right} to all others
55 voters prefer the set {Right, Center} to all others
45 voters prefer the set {Left} to all others
45 voters prefer the set {Right} to all others
10 voters prefer the set {Center} to all others.
A Droop quota is 1/(k+1), in this case, 100/3 = 33 + 1/3. That means that
the DPC says:
Elect at least one from {Left, Center} (since 45 33.3)
Elect at least one from {Right, Center} (since 55 33.3)
Elect at least one from {Left} (since 45 33.3)
Elect at least one from {Right} (since 45 33.3)
and the only way to make that work is to elect Left and Right.
The Droop proportionality criterion is thus a generalization of the mutual
majority criterion, which says that if a majority prefers a certain set of
candidates to everybody else, then someone from that set should win.
(If the candidates in that set had agreed to run only one of the candidates,
that candidate would, after all, have won by a straight majority.)
(Actually, the more general sense is that if more than p/(k+1) of the
electorate all prefer a set of q candidates to all others, then min(p, q)
of
these candidates should win.)
Throwing p in the expression, seems to make little sense. You mean if
only p= 6/(k+1) = 2 voters prefers a set of 3 candidates to all
others, in the case of k=2, then min(2,3) = 2 of these candidates
should win! That's a funny rule.
I forgot to say fraction. If a fraction of more than p/(k+1) of the
electorate all prefer a set of q candidates to everybody else, then min(p,
q) should win. In the example above, with two winners, this works out as:
if more than 100 * 1/3 = 33 + 1/3 voters prefer a set to everybody else, at
least one candidate from that set should win,
if more than 100 * 2/3 = 66 + 2/3 voters prefer a set to everybody else, at
least two candidates from that set should win, unless the set has only one
candidate in it (in which case it's impossible).
For three winners:
if more than 100 * 1/4 = 25 voters prefer a set to everybody else, at least
one should be elected from that set,
if more than 100 * 2/4 = 50 voters..., at least two candidates should be
elected from that set (if
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 9:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com wrote: You could make a party list system that would arrange the list after the election, yes. This would have a ballot where you first pick a party and then order the party's candidates. Yes, the open party list system already exists in nations and Juho has discussed it nicely on this list. I think most open party list systems today allow voters to vote for the party and simply one candidate from that party. However, either the election method used within each party to determine the list orders would be majoritarian (in which case the system isn't proportional beyond the party level), Plurality is how it is done I believe. To have PR within the party would require some sort of party primary system I suppose to determine which candidates are on each list in the general election for each party. or it would be PR (in which case you could just as easily remove the party constraint and just use the PR method directly). Then you don't have a party list system - Do you mean use STV again? I suppose a party list with Condorcet for each party method would both be summable and inter-party proportional[1]. If the largest party fields n candidates and there are k parties, then you would have an upper bound of k * n^2 numbers, which is polynomial in the summability sense. You would in essence do k mini-elections, one for each party. [1] that is, proportional between parties, if not inside each. That is an interesting idea that would require a different ballot type than in existing party list systems whereby one could rank all the candidates within a particular party one votes for. In that case, we might want to return to the days where people cast a party ballot - but that brings up privacy concerns for some people -- but no more than registering for a political party and voting in a political party primary IMO. The nice feature of existing party list methods is that it allows the election of a large number of candidates to a large national body of legislators without requiring voters to rank individually a huge number of candidates. This makes the job for voters and election administrators much easier than asking voters to rank from among a huge number of candidates. (which makes me less inclined to even work on the on-the-fly party list system I have in mind - which would be probably only administratively and voter practical for electing smaller, more local bodies of representatives.) -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts. Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
The nice feature of existing party list methods is that it allows the election of a large number of candidates to a large national body of legislators without requiring voters to rank individually a huge number of candidates. Yes, this is the main reason for people who favor party list systems. Note that this same advantage can be given, without giving any centralized power to party structures, by using Asset or Asset/STV blends. These can include ballots of any complexity - from vote-for-one to full ratings ballots - and many different proportional vote assignment/transfer rules. They can even do things similar to mixed member systems, in which all votes are local but vote transfers can be regional/national. And parties can voluntarily recreate the effects of either open or closed lists within such systems. The only downside to asset-like PR systems is that they require the candidates to be somewhat more sophisticated. Thus, in general, I prefer such systems to party lists. Also, with my house in Guatemala, I've seen close-up how extremely dysfunctional closed party list systems can get. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation
On 4.7.2011, at 16.33, Kathy Dopp wrote: I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times. If you want the most popular single candidates to be elected (e.g. Condorcet winner), and you do not require 100% best proportionality, then maybe you like methods that are based on proportional ordering. Also your interest in organizing the party lists in some preference order points out in this direction. Proportional order based methods thus do not provide the best possible proportionality but they are close. Typical proportional order methods follow philosophy where you fist pick the winner if there is only one representative. That would be the Condorcet winner. The next candidate is the one that makes a two seat representative body most proportional, but with the condition that the first candidate will not be changed. And so on for the rest of the seats. Proportional ordering methods are also algorithmically simpler than methods that seek best possible proportionality. (Methods that seek ideal proportionality do not respect the condition/limitation of creating an ordering that increases the number of representatives one by one.) If you want to put emphasis on always electing the most popular ones of the candidates, but keep good proportionality at the same time, and not allow majority to take all the seats, then maybe proportional ordering methods are close to what you want. They may also not always elect the next most popular candidate, if e.g. some wing has already had its fair share of candidates, but maybe they offer a good approximation of what you want. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
Kathy Dopp Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 2:53 PM However, either the election method used within each party to determine the list orders would be majoritarian (in which case the system isn't proportional beyond the party level), Plurality is how it is done I believe. To have PR within the party would require some sort of party primary system I suppose to determine which candidates are on each list in the general election for each party. This suggestion misses the point. For any voting system to give full effect to proportional representation of the voters, the selection of the candidates to take the seats won by a party must be decided by those who vote in the actual public election - not decided by any kind of party primary. After all, the party primary (before the public election) has already decided who should be on the party's list and has ordered that list. The nice feature of existing party list methods is that it allows the election of a large number of candidates to a large national body of legislators without requiring voters to rank individually a huge number of candidates. This makes the job for voters and election administrators much easier than asking voters to rank from among a huge number of candidates. But it is precisely this nice feature of most open-list party-list systems that causes the failure of such systems to produce proportionality WITHIN parties. If you are going to do this properly, to produce a within-party PR result, the voters for each party would have to mark preferences against the candidates in their chosen party's list (not necessarily all candidates, depending on the system you choose). And then you would need to use STV-PR (or something like it as you don't like STV) to determine which candidates should take the seats allocated to each party. No such system could be precinct-summable, but that is not a priority for everyone. And as has already been said, if you are prepared to go the bother of counting what is in effect a separate PR election WITHIN each party, why not go all the way and apply your chosen PR system to all candidates across all parties? That would give the voters real choice and would also avoid completely the problem of entrenching the political power of the parties' machines. James Gilmour Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation
Kathy Dopp wrote: Thanks Kristofer. I ignored the all* in all others. I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times. The Droop quota seems to go hand in hand with IRV and STV methods. Then the question you should ask is where you want to balance proportionality and majoritarianism. When dealing with multiwinner elections, there are two objectives that work against each other. On the one hand, you'd want proportionality, so that variation in the electorate is reflected by variation in the assembly or council. That is, you'd like it to have members that some people like a lot. On the other, you'd want quality across the board, i.e. candidates that every voter can like to some extent. This, as my simulations show, gives a tradeoff scale (on the Pareto frontier). At one end, the only thing that matters is that proportionality is accurately reproduced (consider an assembly that's elected by lot, and that it's large enough to be representative). At the other, the only thing that matters is what the electorate as a whole thinks of the council (which would give a majority party, even a 51% one, every single seat; or even a well-liked minority party every single seat, Range style). The Droop criterion pulls in the direction of proportionality. Like the mutual majority criterion says that a majority can control the single outcome in a singlewinner method, the Droop proportionality criterion says that, if you consider each seat to have a majority, each majority (Droop fraction) should be able to control the winner of that seat. In doing so, it can go against the wishes of a larger group: it satisfies a proportion of the electorate to a greater extent at the cost of satisfying the whole electorate less on average. (As someone who thinks proportional representation is important, I think the people may actually get a better result, on the whole, by PR. However, that kind of additional benefit arises from the dynamics, such as minor parties or independents checking major parties. That is quite hard to model, so when I mentioned satisfying the whole electorate above, I was referring to according to the preferences the voters gave in the election.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
On 4.7.2011, at 16.53, Kathy Dopp wrote: That is an interesting idea that would require a different ballot type than in existing party list systems whereby one could rank all the candidates within a particular party one votes for. I just note that if we combine party lists and candidate ranking within those lists, then we can have actually quite simple ballots. In a flat STV election with many candidates voters may need to rank high number of candidates in order to be sure that their vote will be counted fully for their own party and it will not exhaust in the calculation process before that is done. In a list election with STV (or some other ranked method) within the parties it is enough to rank just one candidate to be sure that the vote will go fully to one's own party. That makes voting simple for those who are in a hurry or who don't want to study the background and opinions of all the candidates (to be able to rank them). For the same reason one could live with quite simple ballots without losing much and still be able to provide much better party internal proportionality than with one single vote (that is the traditional approach in list elections). One could e.g have a white ballot paper with three boxes. Voters would mark the numbers of their three favourite candidates in those three boxes. From ballot complexity and ballot filling effort point of view that would be about as simple as it gets (assuming that writing the numbers of the candidates in the ballot is not considered to be much more complex than ticking some ordered boxes next to the candidates, or giving and ordering number to each candidate). And this would work reasonably well also with very high number of candidates and elected representatives. (Of course the idea of having proportionally ordered candidate lists in a closer list election would make voting in the actual election even simpler. But then one would need to have a primary to find the ordering for each party.) Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
Juho Laatu Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 4:30 PM (Of course the idea of having proportionally ordered candidate lists in a closer list election would make voting in the actual election even simpler. But then one would need to have a primary to find the ordering for each party.) But that would not give proportional representation of the voters, i.e. those who voted in the public election. Any ordering of a party's list by a primary election can, at best, reflect only the views of those entitled to vote in that primary. That is a private, internal matter for each party. For real proportional representation of the VOTERS, the voters must be free to express their opinions among the parties and among the candidates within the parties. That can be done only in the actual public election, i.e. all at one time, when all the voters know which parties are contesting the election and can see all the candidates of all the parties. James Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
Jameson Quinn Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 5:03 PM As I said in my last message, asset-like systems can let you have your cake and eat it, if you trust your favorite candidate to agree with you in ranking other candidates. This is fundamentally different from trusting your party, because your favorite candidate in asset-like systems could, in principle, be arbitrarily close to you - even BE you, if you're willing to give up vote anonymity, and if the system allows this extreme. Most systems will put some limits on this, but still, they are far closer to this extreme than any party list system. Also, there is no need to stay within the arbitrary bounds of any party; a candidate can have affinities based on ideology, so candidates at the fringes of their party (including the centrist fringes) have full freedom. I am a campaigner for practical reform of voting systems and I do not think an asset system or asset-like system will be acceptable for partisan public elections - certainly not here in the UK. And I see nothing in US or Canadian politics to make me think such a system might be any more acceptable there. I disagree about the no such system statement. I myself have worked out an unpublished system which is not perfectly droop-PR, but is a ~99% approximation thereof; and which is complicated, but still 2n² summable. It's not worth sharing the details here, but, having gone through the exercise, I believe that it should be possible to do better than I did. If you have done this I would encourage you to write it up for publication in the (somewhat informal) technical journal Voting matters. In the UK we do not sum or count the ballot papers from any public elections in the precincts, but it would be very interesting to see how this could be done in a practical way for STV-PR or a system that would deliver comparable PR results. James Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
2011/7/4 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk Jameson Quinn Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 5:03 PM As I said in my last message, asset-like systems can let you have your cake and eat it, if you trust your favorite candidate to agree with you in ranking other candidates. This is fundamentally different from trusting your party, because your favorite candidate in asset-like systems could, in principle, be arbitrarily close to you - even BE you, if you're willing to give up vote anonymity, and if the system allows this extreme. Most systems will put some limits on this, but still, they are far closer to this extreme than any party list system. Also, there is no need to stay within the arbitrary bounds of any party; a candidate can have affinities based on ideology, so candidates at the fringes of their party (including the centrist fringes) have full freedom. I am a campaigner for practical reform of voting systems and I do not think an asset system or asset-like system will be acceptable for partisan public elections - certainly not here in the UK. And I see nothing in US or Canadian politics to make me think such a system might be any more acceptable there. I disagree, if the asset-like transfers were pre-announced and optional to the voter. That is, no smoke-filled room after the election; everything is there on the ballot. This still leaves a broad array of possible ballot formats/complexities and transfer/assignment rules. JQ I disagree about the no such system statement. I myself have worked out an unpublished system which is not perfectly droop-PR, but is a ~99% approximation thereof; and which is complicated, but still 2n² summable. It's not worth sharing the details here, but, having gone through the exercise, I believe that it should be possible to do better than I did. If you have done this I would encourage you to write it up for publication in the (somewhat informal) technical journal Voting matters. In the UK we do not sum or count the ballot papers from any public elections in the precincts, but it would be very interesting to see how this could be done in a practical way for STV-PR or a system that would deliver comparable PR results. I thank you for your suggestion, and I'll consider it. Just to give you an idea, my system is bucklin-like (rated ballot considered as a falling-threshold series of approval ballots); and the summable matrices for my system, for each approval threshold, are the candidateXcandidate correlations (co-occurences) and the candidateX(number of ballots with each number of approvals) matrix. With reasonable assumptions about the homogeneity of the higher-order candidate correlations, this system gives a proportional result. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
On Jul 4, 2011, at 12:28 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/7/4 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk Jameson Quinn Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 5:03 PM As I said in my last message, asset-like systems can let you have your cake and eat it, if you trust your favorite candidate to agree with you in ranking other candidates. This is fundamentally different from trusting your party, because your favorite candidate in asset-like systems could, in principle, be arbitrarily close to you - even BE you, if you're willing to give up vote anonymity, and if the system allows this extreme. Most systems will put some limits on this, but still, they are far closer to this extreme than any party list system. Also, there is no need to stay within the arbitrary bounds of any party; a candidate can have affinities based on ideology, so candidates at the fringes of their party (including the centrist fringes) have full freedom. I am a campaigner for practical reform of voting systems and I do not think an asset system or asset-like system will be acceptable for partisan public elections - certainly not here in the UK. And I see nothing in US or Canadian politics to make me think such a system might be any more acceptable there. I disagree, if the asset-like transfers were pre-announced and optional to the voter. That is, no smoke-filled room after the election; everything is there on the ballot. This still leaves a broad array of possible ballot formats/complexities and transfer/ assignment rules. being that we, in the US, are still struggling with institutions like the Electoral College (a term not found in the code that instituted it), plurality (a.k.a. simple majority), and the occasional delayed runoff, even if i saw asset voting as a reform, i cannot see it getting anywhere in the US. only a handful of jurisdictions have a ranked ballot (and these elections are all decided by IRV rules, no government yet uses Condorcet for any public election) and, unfortunately from my POV, the ranked ballot is declining in use. we can't even get simple reforms enacted in law, how could we get something as completely different as asset voting. i believe that asset voting will never catch on, first because it's at least as complex as IRV which is oft rejected because of complexity, and second, at least with IRV (as well as in delayed runoffs), the voter directly controls their contingency vote, whereas in asset, they do not have independent control of it. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Has this idea been considered?
Hello, I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years ago. How is everyone doing? I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her preference list. The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles IRV, but note that this method is summable -- a major advantage over IRV, eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV. What do you think? Thanks. Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, SODAhttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA, is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here. With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as spoiled (the centrist would have won pairwise) and nonmonotonic (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. Cheers, Jameson 2011/7/4 Russ Paielli russ.paie...@gmail.com Hello, I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years ago. How is everyone doing? I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her preference list. The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles IRV, but note that this method is summable -- a major advantage over IRV, eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV. What do you think? Thanks. Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
Jameson Quinn wrote: With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as spoiled (the centrist would have won pairwise) and nonmonotonic (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. I wonder if it would be possible to mitigate the order-of-elimination problem by devising a constraint program of some sort. Something like: A candidate has links to it from other candidates according to the voters who voted the other candidate above him. A candidate has links away from it to other candidates according to the voters who voted him above the other candidates. Each candidate can hold a Droop quota's worth of voting power. Any excess is distributed to the candidates that candidate links to, proportional for each candidate to the strength of each link. Start by giving the candidates power equal to how many people voted them in first place. Then: evolve the system until some candidate gets a Droop quota through the mutual distribution. Perhaps this isn't always possible. I'm being a bit quick around the edges here. The general idea is to consider equilibria of some vote-distribution system so that the order in which the actual transfers are done matters less. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
On 4.7.2011, at 18.59, James Gilmour wrote: Juho Laatu Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 4:30 PM (Of course the idea of having proportionally ordered candidate lists in a closer list election would make voting in the actual election even simpler. But then one would need to have a primary to find the ordering for each party.) But that would not give proportional representation of the voters, i.e. those who voted in the public election. Any ordering of a party's list by a primary election can, at best, reflect only the views of those entitled to vote in that primary. Yes, that is not exact proportionality based on the voters of the actual election. But this proportionality is quite good still. It may be ok to determine some things also in the primary. There are also options like allowing only the party members to vote or allowing everyone to vote. Their results offer two different approaches to the philosophy of proportionality. The latter case is interesting since it can be used also as a strategy. Allowing non-party members to say which candidates are interesting makes the party list more interesting / better from the non-regular party voters' point of view, and may lead to getting more votes in the actual election. That is a private, internal matter for each party. For real proportional representation of the VOTERS, the voters must be free to express their opinions among the parties and among the candidates within the parties. That can be done only in the actual public election, i.e. all at one time, when all the voters know which parties are contesting the election and can see all the candidates of all the parties. I could accept even arrangements where each party has different rules in their primary, or arrangements where the votes of different parties will be counted in different ways in the actual election. It is true that one would get cleanest proportionality if everything would be decided in one go in one big election with same rules for all. But if votes can be distributed to the parties in some nice and proportional way, they could also have their own (democratically chosen) ways to decide who will get seats within that party. Or maybe the country would set some minimum requirements for nomination and seat allocation within each party. Nomination is anyway usually under the control of the parties nowadays, so they can play tricks there (not to nominate certain candidates, to nominate candidates so that some of them will have good probability of becoming elected). But I guess I agree with you roughly on which approaches are the cleanest. Juho James Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation
To be clearer: In your scenario 55% of people hate 50% of the winners and 45% hate (ranked last) 50% of the winners. If the Center and Right win, only 45% of the voters hate 50% of the winners and everyone else is happy. In summation: In your example, applying the Droop quota criteria, 100% of the voters hate (rank dead last) 50% of the winners. Looking at all voters' 2nd choices equally, only 45% of voters hate (rank dead last) 50% of the winners -- a much more palatable outcome for more voters. Clearly a larger proportion of people will be more satisfied with the results of government in your example, without the use of the Droop quota criteria. -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts. Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
One possible unwanted feature in Asset like methods is that they make it possible for the candidates to trade with the votes. The voters may trust their candidate, but they should not trust them too much, since in extreme cases they might even sell their valuable vote assets to someone. One straight forward fix to this problem is that the candidates would declare their preferences already before the election. In that case the voters would vote for these predeclared preference orders, and the used method could be STV or some other ranking based method. This approach could allow also voters to provide full rankings themselves, or it could allow short voter given preference orders to be completed to longer rankings e.g. so that the preference order of their first favourite will be used to continue the given preference order. Since it may be too tedious to study the preference orders of all potential candidates one could simplify the structure. That could lead to a tree based election where the votes to some candidate will be inherited in a tree so that a vote to a candidate would support the smallest branch in the tree that contains this candidate. Then to the next smallest branch etc. The tree could be ordered also so that not only the leaves but also the branches of the tree would contain candidates. Branch candidates would be elected first, leading to a preference order among the candidates of that branch. The basic idea of the tree is that it os easy to understand and politicians must declare their true preferences. Trees are not anymore far from basic lists. They just give a better structure to the political space. My point was to show how the problems of Asset could be fixed and that there is a continuum of methods between Asset and basic list methods. Juho On 4.7.2011, at 17.33, Jameson Quinn wrote: The nice feature of existing party list methods is that it allows the election of a large number of candidates to a large national body of legislators without requiring voters to rank individually a huge number of candidates. Yes, this is the main reason for people who favor party list systems. Note that this same advantage can be given, without giving any centralized power to party structures, by using Asset or Asset/STV blends. These can include ballots of any complexity - from vote-for-one to full ratings ballots - and many different proportional vote assignment/transfer rules. They can even do things similar to mixed member systems, in which all votes are local but vote transfers can be regional/national. And parties can voluntarily recreate the effects of either open or closed lists within such systems. The only downside to asset-like PR systems is that they require the candidates to be somewhat more sophisticated. Thus, in general, I prefer such systems to party lists. Also, with my house in Guatemala, I've seen close-up how extremely dysfunctional closed party list systems can get. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
Kathy Dopp Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 10:40 PM James, As someone on this list already pointed out, such a system as you suggest does *nothing* to ensure proportionality *within* the party list because the list of candidates could all have been chosen by either the leaders or the majority of the political party prior to the election and thus represent the same group within the party. Therefore, I said that a party primary allowing all party members to vote in a PR way would be needed *before* the election in order to ensure proportionality. Unless, you are suggesting a rule about how parties can operate requiring that anyone can get on any party's ballot who wants to, or has some number of signatures, without having permission of the political party, I suppose. Not sure what effects that might have. Thus, the suggestion for a party primary to ensure proportionality among voting party members in the primary, at least. Kathy, your comments illustrate the fundamental problems with all party list voting systems: 1. you must have registered political parties; 2. each party must produce a list of candidates ordered in some way; 3. voters are restricted (to a greater or lesser degree) in how they can respond to the choices of representative offered to them. All of these impose unnecessary limitations on the PR of the voters that could be obtained by a less constrained voting system. I would also say that these restrictions are undesirable, but that view reflects my political culture. I do, however, recognise that these restrictions are accepted by many in continental Europe who happily use party-list PR voting systems without any clamour for change. Your comments also confuse what are essentially private matters with public matters. The candidates who can stand in the name of a registered political party must be decided by that party. Some parties may decide that by centralised control; other may do it by very democratic (PR) elections (primaries) of all party members. All parties are coalitions, some broad, some narrow. It is in a party's interest to ensure that its list of candidates will appeal to the widest range of its potential supporters among the electorate. Thus all significant factions within a party are likely to be represented on its list. If some faction within a party finds it candidates consistently excluded, that faction will almost certainly go off and form a new party. If some faction within a party finds its candidates on the list, but always at the bottom (and so with little chance of election), that faction may well split off and form a separate party, when its candidates will automatically be at the top of its list. That does happen, especially with closed-list party-list systems. It is open for any group that can meet the requirements to be a registered political party to present a list. In some jurisdictions, that can include individuals standing as independent candidate. But these are all private matters (within-party), determined by the respective parties before the public election. At the public election a voter can choose one party from among the various parties, and in open-list systems make one choice (or a restricted choice) from among the candidates of that one party. The counting rules provide good proportionality among the parties (subject to various arbitrary thresholds). But with the commonly used open-list systems, the counting rules do not provide PR within the parties. Significant groups of voters who support a particular party can be seriously under-represented in terms of the within-party balance, either through piling up massive votes for some particularly popular candidates or through spreading their votes across too many candidates. To overcome this defect, the votes must be transferable in some way. And to ensure PR of the voters, those transfers must be determined by the voters, not by some party-list rule in the legislation. What you then end up with is a series of STV-PR elections within each party list (or with something comparable for those who don't like STV). The most complex open-list party-list systems go some way towards this. But I have to say again, if you are going to go to all that bother, why not go the whole way and fully open up the voters' choice by removing all the restrictions of 'voting for a party' and of 'voting within one party list'? James Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
My point was to show how the problems of Asset could be fixed and that there is a continuum of methods between Asset and basic list methods. Exactly. And the common advantage is that they simplify the task for at least some voters, without requiring artificial party divisions. Divisions and ideologies would still exist, but candidates who didn't fit neatly into predefined categories would not be frozen out. Asset-like aspects can also simplify the rules by setting up the right incentives for the candidates and then getting out of the way. After all, pure asset is a radically-simple system which is perfectly proportional. Not that I think that's a realistic reform proposal, but it is a good demonstration of principle. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I consider a major defect. OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in Approval Voting. How does that stack up? By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't consider it a practical reform proposal. It's way too complicated to ever be adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA. Regards, Russ P. On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote: A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, SODAhttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA, is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here. With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as spoiled (the centrist would have won pairwise) and nonmonotonic (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. Cheers, Jameson 2011/7/4 Russ Paielli russ.paie...@gmail.com Hello, I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years ago. How is everyone doing? I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her preference list. The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles IRV, but note that this method is summable -- a major advantage over IRV, eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV. What do you think? Thanks. Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On 5.7.2011, at 3.09, Russ Paielli wrote: Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I consider a major defect. I agree that if IRV is interesting then also this method is. Some IRV related problems remain but you will get summability, clear declarations of candidate preferences, very simple voting and ability to handle easily large number of candidates. You could say that this method is also an improvement of TTR (similar voting, but has ability to pick the winner in one round only, maybe smaller spoiler problem). If people don't like the preference list given by their favourite candidate, one could nominate additional fake candidates to offer additional preference lists. If the preference list of candidate A is ABC, then thee could be an additional (weaker) candidate A1 whose preference order would be A1ACB. One possible extension would be to allow candidates that are afraid that they would be spoilers (that reduce the votes of a stronger favourite candidate too much so that he will be eliminated too early) to transfer their votes right away. The preference list could have a cutoff. Preference list ABCDE (of candidate A) would be interpreted so that votes to A would be added right away also to the score of B and C (but not D and E). If A gets transferred votes from some other candidates, they will be transferred further (to candidates not mentioned above cutoff in the original transfer list) only after A has been eliminated. (One could use this trick also in regular IRV.) If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end up using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail I send:). In that approach there is no risk of having loops in the candidate transfer order. Votes would be counted right away for each branch, and the candidate of the largest brach of the largest branch of the ... would win. OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in Approval Voting. How does that stack up? You should define that method a bit more in detail. I started wondering if it would allow candidate X to win if he asked also 100 of his friends to take part in the election and transfer their votes to him. Juho By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't consider it a practical reform proposal. It's way too complicated to ever be adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA. Regards, Russ P. On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote: A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, SODA, is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here. With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as spoiled (the centrist would have won pairwise) and nonmonotonic (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. Cheers, Jameson 2011/7/4 Russ Paielli russ.paie...@gmail.com Hello, I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years ago. How is everyone doing? I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as follows. Weeks before
