Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
Several thoughts (not a thorough critique) after one straight-through
reading:
1. Length: I agree that for the reasons Richard described, the length of
his proposed declaration (less than 2300 words) is appropriate and that
trying to shorten it very much would be a mistake. It's long compared to
previously proposed versions, but it's still very short compared to,
say, a small pamphlet or even a fairly short magazine article, and it's
only two to three times the length of a typical US newspaper op-ed
article. At the same time, I think it is long enough (or nearly so --
see #5 below) to convey clearly, to a broad non-expert audience, at
least the minimum necessary information and explanation.
2. Readability: When opening the email Richard's post was in (I got it
along 4 other posts in an issue of Election-Methods Digest), I didn't
expect to want to take the time to read it carefully all the way
through, but after I started reading, I found it well-written and
compelling enough to want to do so -- almost like a "page turner" novel.
3. Language: I'm guessing most readers will find the language clear with
just a few exceptions. One exception, for example, may be "pairwise".
This is a word most non-expert readers will be unfamiliar with and many
may find puzzling and jargon-like. To find other exceptions, a variety
of non-expert readers should be asked to read the statement (or later
drafts of it) and note any words, phrases, or explanations they find
unclear.
4. When describing Condorcet methods: I suggest briefly describing
Condorcet himself and his role in developing such methods. I would also
explain that the main point of Condorcet methods is to use the
preference information voters provide to determine how each candidate
would fare against every other candidate in a series of one-to-one
contests, just as in a round-robin athletic tournament in which each
contestant competes one-to-one against every other contestant. In
addition, I suggest mentioning that for this reason, an alternative name
sometimes used to describe Condorcet methods is Instant Round Robin
methods, which can be abbreviated as IRR methods to distinguish them
from Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), a more widely known and promoted
method that makes use of the same kinds of ballots IRR methods do. (By
the way, "1-2-3 ballots" may not be much better than "preferential
ballots"; there may better names than either, such as rank voting
ballots, rank order ballots, or just ranking or ranked ballots. This may
be worth asking non-expert readers about.)
5. Finally, I think the statement could be greatly improved and made
more interesting, relevant, and compelling to a wider range of readers
by explaining that alternative voting and representation methods can
also be beneficially used for a large variety of purposes other than
general political elections and that different methods are often more
suitable for some kinds of purposes than for other purposes. Some
example of other purposes are: US-style primary elections; party
convention votes; decisions in legislative bodies and committees;
decisions by informal groups; decisions in meetings of different kinds
and sizes; uncritical or relatively minor decisions vs. major,
critically important decisions; opinion polling; TV/radio audience
voting; provisional ("straw") voting; and choosing organizational board
members and conference attendees. Furthermore, because alternative
voting and representation methods have the potential to greatly improve
collective decisionmaking in a large variety of situations other than
general political elections and because abstract analyses of different
methods need to be supplemented with well-designed experimentation and
social scientific research, there is a great need and justification for
support for such experimentation and research, possibly in the form of a
new well-funded non-partisan research institute.
Explaining these things would require lengthening the statement, though
I think not by a lot. An objection may be that this would make the
statement less focused and therefore less compelling and influential. My
reply would be that while election laws are generally very difficult to
change, it is often much easier (as I know from some personal
experience) to change how decisions are made for purposes other than
public elections. If such changes became increasingly frequent and
widespread, people would increasingly become more familiar with
alternative voting and representation methods and with the idea that
alternative methods are often far superior to ones currently used, and
it should also become increasingly easy to persuade people to support
major changes in public election laws.
-RS
PS: I'm actually not an election-methods expert and haven't read
messages on this list at all regularly for several years. At most, I'm a
fairly well-informed amateur, and even that may be overstating it. M
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
On Aug 23, 2011, at 9:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - ** Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than two candidates. The mention of "two choices" confuses. The kind of ballot to be used must be decided, in at least most cases, before one can be certain how many candidates will be chosen from. If nothing else, write-in candidates can mean the possibility of more choices. Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference information to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order: * Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who are not acceptable * Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels * Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an academically recognized name, but the term "single-mark ballot" can be used to refer to this primitive ballot type. Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known? Single- mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the actual preferences of voters in elections that have three or more reasonably popular candidates. This lack of full preference information makes it nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear proof, or even evidence, of unfair election results. The Approval ballot allows selecting one or more, but does not allow indicating preference among them. When this same ballot was used in plurality it worked because the voter was only allowed to select one. Perhaps the target of this discussion is desire to indicate more than one AND which are more or less desired. ** In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also support some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of the Condorcet method to identify a "Condorcet winner" (who is pairwise-preferred over all the other candidates) and then, if there is no Condorcet winner, we support using either instant-runoff voting (IRV) or approval voting to resolve the ambiguity and identify a single winner. Most, if not all, Condorcet methods use the same way to find the CW and, if found, declare that to be the winner. If not found, different methods have their own way to find a winner. I question involving IRV here. Seems like, unless defending against such, that it would have its home problem of wrong choices. Note that each member of the cycle would be the CW if all other cycle members were excluded.
[EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world, unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in which there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we offer ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results. We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact, we believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce many political and economic benefits. Some of the benefits we expect include reduced voter frustration, reduced government costs (that arise from excessive political influence from self-serving special interests), wiser use of tax dollars (based on electing problem-solving leaders who solve underlying problems that waste money), dramatically increased voter turnout because of having meaningful choices, increased compliance with laws including taxation laws, and likely increases in widespread economic prosperity (arising from increased fairness in the business world). We use the term "plurality" voting to refer to the commonly used counting method in which each voter marks only a single choice on the ballot, and the number of marks for each candidate are counted, and the candidate with the highest number is regarded as the winner. In some nations this method is called "First Past The Post" (and abbreviated FPTP). Although this election method produces fair results when there are only two candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when this approach is used in elections with three or more candidates. In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is predominantly used in most elections in most democratic nations around the world, with Australia and New Zealand being notable exceptions. It is also the preferred election method in nations that pretend to be democracies, yet lack the freedoms and economic benefits of democracy. Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than two candidates. Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference information to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order: * Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who are not acceptable * Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels * Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an academically recognized name,
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 23, 2011, at 4:07 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: > It seems to me that Arrow must want a unique generic meaning that people can > relate to independent of > the voting system. Perhaps he is right that ordinal information fits that > criterion slightly better than > cardinal information, but as Warren says, what really matters is the > operational meaning. > > But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you > think that candidate X would > vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could > give candidate X a score that > is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. > > Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. So would a score that reflects the difference in height between each candidate and the voter, but neither one is a plausible utility measure. And that's assuming that a voter actually knew not only what the candidate would be voting on, but in each case how he would vote. That in itself is a judgement that each voter (even voters with the same preferences) would make differently. Worse, each projected vote would have to be weighted by some (incommensurable) sense of how important each vote is to the voter (the utility of each vote). So now we've exploded the problem is coming up with a candidate utility to adding up a bunch of utilities of votes that we're guessing about years into the future. That seems worse than circular. And *that's* assuming that the list of votes is the utility measure we want. But that's not really plausible, either. Consider as an extreme case voting for US President, though something similar obtains for legislative candidates with respect to leadership, initiative, ability to persuade others, &c. But set that aside, and return to my first point. You don't help the problem of candidate utility by converting it to a sum of vote utilities. > > Furthermore, with regard to commensurability of range scores, think of the > example that Warren gave in > which the optimum strategy is sincere range strategy; in that example it > makes no difference (except for > ease of counting) whether or not each voter uses a different range; some > could use zero to 100, some > negative 64 to positive 64, etc. A ballot will distinguish among the two > finalist lotteries in the same way > after any affine transformation of the scores. > > A few years ago Jobst gave a rather definitive discussion of this issue. His > investigation led to the result > that ideally the scores should allow infinitesimals of various orders along > with the standard real values > that we are used to. Jobst is skeptical about generic objective meaning for > "utilities," but in the context > of voting, especially "lottery" methods, he can give you a precise objective > meaning of the scores. > > For example, if you have a choice between alternative X or a coin toss to > decide between Y and Z, and > you don't care one whit whether or not X is chosen or the the coin toss > decides between Y and Z, then > (for you)objectively X has a utility value half way between Y and Z. > > A sequence of questions of this nature can help you rationally assign scores > to a set of alternatives. > > I'll see if I can locate Jobst's results in the archives. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
It seems to me that Arrow must want a unique generic meaning that people can relate to independent of the voting system. Perhaps he is right that ordinal information fits that criterion slightly better than cardinal information, but as Warren says, what really matters is the operational meaning. But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you think that candidate X would vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could give candidate X a score that is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. Furthermore, with regard to commensurability of range scores, think of the example that Warren gave in which the optimum strategy is sincere range strategy; in that example it makes no difference (except for ease of counting) whether or not each voter uses a different range; some could use zero to 100, some negative 64 to positive 64, etc. A ballot will distinguish among the two finalist lotteries in the same way after any affine transformation of the scores. A few years ago Jobst gave a rather definitive discussion of this issue. His investigation led to the result that ideally the scores should allow infinitesimals of various orders along with the standard real values that we are used to. Jobst is skeptical about generic objective meaning for "utilities," but in the context of voting, especially "lottery" methods, he can give you a precise objective meaning of the scores. For example, if you have a choice between alternative X or a coin toss to decide between Y and Z, and you don't care one whit whether or not X is chosen or the the coin toss decides between Y and Z, then (for you)objectively X has a utility value half way between Y and Z. A sequence of questions of this nature can help you rationally assign scores to a set of alternatives. I'll see if I can locate Jobst's results in the archives. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 21, 2011, at 5:06 PM, Warren Smith wrote: > Kenneth Arrow has worried that range-voting-type "score" votes might have no > or > unclear-to-Arrow "meaning." In contrast, he considers rank-ordering-style > votes to have a clear meaning. > Nic Tideman has also expressed similar worries in email, but now about > the "lack of meaning" of an approval-style vote. > In contrast, I think Tideman regards a plurality-style "name one > candidate then shut up" > vote as having a clear meaning. > > E.g. "what does a score of 6.5 mean, as opposed to a score of 6.1, on > some ballot?" > > But the Bayesian view is: whether or not Arrow or Tideman or somebody > has a more-or-less muddled mental notion of the "meaning" of a ballot, > is irrelevant. The only genuinely meaningful thing is "who won the > election?" > All meaning of any ballot therefore derives purely from the rules > for mathematically obtaining the election-winner from the ballots. Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in determining a winner. But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. > > For a simple example of how ballots have no inherent meaning without > voting system rules, consider plurality and AntiPlurality voting in which > the meanings of a "name one candidate" ballot are pretty much opposite > (plurality: most-named candidate wins; > AntiPlurality: least-named candidate wins). > > Let us now enquire more deeply about ballot "meaning." In a non-monotone > voting > system like Instant Runoff, your vote A>B>C can cause A to lose, whereas > your vote B>C>A would have caused A to win. Would Arrow be right if > he said IRV is wonderful > because "A>B>C" has a "clear meaning"? Or would a Bayesian be right > in saying this > example indicates the "meaning" Arrow had in mind, was not valid? Indeed the > Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem > http://rangevoting.org/GibbSat.html > shows that in essentially ANY rank-order ballot system and also in the > plurality and > AntiPlurality systems with "name one candidate" ballots -- i.e. exactly > the systems Arrow & Tideman thinks "have meaning" -- there ALWAYS > exist elections > in which some voter's vote of A>B>C will cause a worse election winner > (for the A>B>C > notion of "better" and "worse") than some different > dishonestly-ordered vote would > have caused. (And with Plurality and AntiPlurality, "dishonestly" ranking > your non-favorite candidate top or your really-not-worst candidate > bottom, can be the only way > for you to get an improved election result.) > In such an election, what is the "clear meaning" of an A>B>C rank-order vote? > > Gibbard identified/invented exactly two rank-order ballot systems in > which honest and strategic > voting were the same thing (this required him to employ > non-determinism), but stated > that both of his systems were not good enough for practical use since they > "leave too much to chance." > > In contrast, consider the "double range voting" system invented by > F.Simmons and Warren D. Smith > http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html > > This system (or others of the Simmons class) ARE good enough for > practical use if any > rank-order system is (since it leaves only an arbitrarily small amount > of the deciding to chance, > and deviates from your favorite system in an arbitrarily small way). > > In this voting system, each ballot contains a part on which the voter > is urged to > provide her honest scores (on, say, an 0-to-9 range) for each > candidate. In this system, > ONLY voting on this ballot portion in a unique honest manner is strategically > best. Any deviation from perfect honesty (or omision of information) > is a strictly worse voting strategy. > That is, if your expected utility if A wins is 6.5 and your > expected utility for B > winning is 6.1 on an 0-to-9 scale (defining the utility scale so > you've rated the > best available candidate 9 and the worst 0) > then you MUST score A=6.5 and B=6.1 EXACTLY, otherwise you are guaranteed > to get in expectation a worse-utility election result. > > So contrary to assertions by the likes of Arrow that utility is "unmeasurable" > or that range votes "lack meaning" it seems to me that we have a very > clear, totally unique, > not changeable by one iota, meaning for the scores 6.5 and 6.1 deriving > wholy from the procedure the voting system uses to determine the > winner from the votes. > This is wholy unlike EVERY allegedly-practical rank-order voting system. > > So Arrow, and Tideman (and anybody else) are simply wrong if they > assert scoring-style votes > are inherently less-meaningful than rank-ordering-style or > name-one-candiate-style votes. > > So now Arrow might perhaps riposte that to HIM, dee
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
>Michael Allan: The effect however of a single ballot is exactly zero. It cannot change the outcome of the election, or anything else in the objective world. --no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes. Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. Also, even in elections which can only be changed by changing a set of (more than one) ballot, ballots still derive meaning from that. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
