Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

[Juho Laatu]

On 2.2.2012, at 6.28, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> Dave gives good reasons for Condorcet. I'd like to present the other side.
> 
> Condorcet systems have many advantages. So what's wrong with Condorcet?
> 
> It comes in a bewildering array of forms, thus reducing the unity of its 
> supporters. But that's not the real problem.
> 
> It admits both betrayal and burial strategy, thus encouraging dangerous, 
> negative-sum strategizing from its voters. And that could be significant. But 
> I think that voters will realize that they will almost never have the 
> information and unity to pull off a successful strategy, so that's not the 
> real problem.
> 
> It is complicated to understand, and impossible to easily visualize, how it 
> works. But that's not the real problem.

Visualization is not really a problem if the method is simple and straight 
forward enough. If the method measures the number of required additional votes 
to beat all others, then a simple histogram can be used to show how far each 
canidate is from that position (or how far ahead the CW is).

Juho


P.S. If you want more information, maybe multiple columns to show distance of 
one candidate to all other candidates could be useful somewhere.

P.P.S. Debian visualizes their Condorcet results in a more complex way that may 
be cryptic to people who don't understand the method fully. But their figures 
at least have lots of information and they are visually interesting. There is 
also some interesting additional information in the form of a "None Of The 
Above" box. The Debian approach is a bit complicated, but at least interesting. 
http://www.debian.org/vote/2010/vote_001



> 
> As a ranked system, it is hopelessly caught in the contradictions of Arrow's 
> theorem. But that's not the real problem.
> 
> Some voters will mistakenly imagine that it's Borda. But that's not the real 
> problem. (They'll imagine that MJ is Range, too. I don't see how they'd 
> significantly misapprehend SODA, though.)
> 
> The real problem is that I think that people just don't want to do that much 
> work to vote. Yes, I know, you can just vote approval-style if you want to, 
> but most people would feel guilty about not really doing the whole job then.
> 
> I honestly think that honest rating is easier than honest ranking. (How's 
> that for honesty per square word?) MJ is the only system which allows honest 
> rating to be full-strength in practice; and SODA is the only good system 
> which allows anything easier. (And no, approval is not easier than MJ, 
> because approval forces some amount of strategizing.)
> 
> Most voters are lazy. And they'll resent any system which rubs their nose in 
> that fact. Which Condorcet does.
> 
> (SODA, on the other hand, brings lazy voters together, and gives their 
> representative as much negotiating power as possible without diluting the 
> winner's leadership mandate.)
> 
> Jameson
> 
> 2012/2/1 Dave Ketchum 
> Mike offers serious thinking about Approval.  I step up to Condorcet as being 
> better and nearly as simple for the voter.
> 
> Voter can vote as in:
> . FPTP, ranking the single candidate liked best, and treating all others 
> as equally liked less or disliked.
> . Approval, ranking those equally liked best, and treating all others as 
> equally liked less or disliked.
> . IRV, giving each voted for a different rank, with higher ranks for 
> those liked best, and realizing that IRV vote counters would read only as 
> many of the higher rankings as needed to make their decisions.
> . Condorcet, ranking the one or more liked, using higher ranks for those 
> liked best, and ranking equally when more than one are liked equally.
> 
> Condorcet is little, if any, more difficult for voters than FPTP and Approval.
> . For many elections, voting as with them is good and as easy.
> .. When a voter likes A and B but prefers A - Approval cannot say this, 
> but it is trivial to vote with Condorcet's ranking.
> 
> In Condorcet the counters consider each pair of candidates as competing with 
> each other.  Usually one candidate, being best liked, proves this by winning 
> in every one of its pairs.  Unlike IRV (which requires going back to the 
> ballots as part of the counting), counting here can be done in multiple 
> batches of votes, and the data from the batches summed into one summary batch 
> for analysis.
> 
> There can be cycles in Condorcet, such as A>B, B>C, and C>A, with these 
> winning against all others.  This requires a closer look to decide on the 
> true winner, normally one of the cycle members.
> . Here the counters see the cycle, rather than a CW - and how to pick a 
> winner from a cycle is a reason for the dispute as to what is best.
> 
> Range/score ratings have their own way of showing more/less desire.  Truly 
> more power than Condorcet ranking - AND more difficult to decide on rating 
> values to best interact with what other voters may do.
> 
> Write-ins?  Some would do aw

[EM] STV+AV

[Bryan Mills]

>
> Date: Wed, 01 Feb 2012 23:26:47 -0600
> From: Ken & Karla 
> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] STV+AV
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For a start, please configure your mail client to send plain-text or
plain-text + HTML; HTML-only doesn't show up in the digest and then I have
to post-process it to quote it.

> given that US law requires single-winner FPTP

> elections for federal representation and the major parties (who

> control the legislature and benefit greatly from FPTP) have no

> incentive to change that law.


> [Ken B.]  That is incorrect; I know of no such law.  Each state
> can specify its own method of electing its federal
> representatives.
> (If there is such a federal law, please cite it.)


Single-winner is required by 2 USC Sec. 2c:

> [...] there shall be established by law a number of
> districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such
> State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only
> from districts so established, no district to elect more than one
> Representative [...]


I can't find a proper citation for requiring FPTP in the source where I saw
it; that part may be mistaken.  So that might might admit the possibility
of using an alternative single-winner method within districts, but it's not
at all clear to me that that would help significantly given the
susceptibility of single-winner districts to gerrymandering.

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Sortition and the Delegable Proxy system

[Bryan Mills]

On Wed, Feb 1, 2012 at 9:41 AM, <
election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote:

> On 01/31/2012 07:05 AM, Bryan Mills wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 25, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> >   wrote:
> >> I think it is strategy-proof, but I wonder if people would irrationally
> >> reason something like this:
> >>
> >> "My chance of winning is very low, so I shouldn't keep my hopes up.
> Instead,
> >> I should delegate my vote so that I can feel I expressed myself if
> [popular
> >> candidate] wins."
> >>
> >> Now, that makes no sense, but if people were game-theoretically
> rational,
> >> turnout would be very low (and it isn't). So I'm wondering if the people
> >> would irrationally be more mass-like than you'd want of a
> sortition-based
> >> system.
> >
> > Moderate clustering of votes is desirable, and leads to lower-variance
> outcomes
> > (because the count proceeds further on average before hitting the
> > max-seats limit).
> >
> > That's among several reasons why you would want a large number of
> > seats; probably on the order of 400-500 for a practical legislature.
> > Voters could hopefully find a fairly close match among the
> > several-hundred front-runners -- much closer than would be possible
> > in a single-winner or even a typical STV election, especially since
> > they wouldn't have to spend time figuring out a rank-ordering of
> > less-preferred candidates.
>
> Alright, I misunderstood a bit what you were trying to do. I thought
> that you wanted sortition with its essential features (representative
> sample of the population, incorruptability) but with a fix to keep those
> who themselves did not want to serve from being unrepresented. I
> envisioned that voters who did not want to serve would (ideally) name a
> friend or relative or something like that, so any given candidate would
> have less than ten votes.
>
> By what you're saying, since you mention Droop quotas and analogies to
> STV, as well as "representative sample of preferences for
> representation", it seems you're coming at it from an election method
> angle - i.e. you want something like STV but without the hassle of
> filling in a 400-candidate ballot, and with no incentive for strategy
> whatsoever.
>
> Is that right?
>

Pretty much.  Ideally I'd like a legislature that produces the same results
as an enlightened direct democracy.  But we don't all have time to research
every issue, so we delegate to representatives -- ideally knowledgeable
ones who share most of our views.  And we don't have the infrastructure to
re-delegate for every bill, so we need a standing legislature (unless we
want to build the infrastructure).

I see STV and Sortition as two extremes of the possible solutions for
legislatures: sortition is strategy-free and maximally-representative,
while STV is solidly deterministic but still fairly proportional and with
fairly minimal party influences.  I started out by trying to figure out an
STV method that would produce results closer to direct democracy, and
decided that meant scaling it way up (to make it easier for minorities to
collect a Droop quota).  So I looked at various schemes for pre-filtering
the candidates without distorting proportionality too much, and stumbled
across Delegated Sortition as a possible filtering system.

When I looked at DS in more depth I realized that it has some really
interesting properties as a stand-alone system, including solving the
ballot-size problem quite handily.  (I'm still not sure whether DS+STV is
worth pursuing; I got kind of sidetracked.  For what it's worth, I'm now
deeply skeptical of the general concept of filtering+STV -- it's very
difficult to filter down to a fixed number of candidates without
introducing some really nefarious strategies )


> In general, I don't think one can solve the "elected candidates
> > ignore their constituency" problem completely with any long-period
> > election system. If you want to solve that problem you'd need voters
> > to be able to change their delegations midway through a term, and
> > while I think that's a very interesting line of investigation it
> > doesn't satisfy my initial objective of "conventional
> > infrastructure". (That is, any system that completely solves the
> > ignored-constituency problem presents more substantial technical
> > barriers to adoption than does DS.)
>
> You could mitigate it by having staggered elections. You could have an
> election for 1/kth of the assembly 1/kth of the term, kind of like the
> interleaving of US executive and legislative elections. Beyond that,
> you're probably right.
>
> > It may be fairly unlikely that your vote would "pull the candidate
> > in your direction", but that's kind of the point of using a
> > proportional system instead of a single-winner district system.
> > Rather than attempting to move the position of a consensus
> > candidate, voters can instead seek a candidate whose views are
> > already suitably close to their own.
>
> You could move th

Re: [EM] STV+AV

[Ken & Karla]

  
  
On 2/1/2012 10:54 PM, Bryan Mills wrote:

  given that US law requires single-winner FPTP
elections for federal representation and the major parties (who
control the legislature and benefit greatly from FPTP) have no
incentive to change that law.

= = = = =
  [Ken B.]  That is incorrect; I know of no such law.  Each state
  can specify its own method of electing its federal
  representatives.
  
  Each state is allocated seats in the House according to its
  population after each census and each state elects two Senators.  The eligibility requirements for candidates are in the U.S. Constitution,
  Article I, sections 2 and 3, respectively.
  
  (If there is such a federal law, please cite it.)
    - Ken Bearman, Minneapolis MN USA
  


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

[robert bristow-johnson]

On 2/1/12 11:28 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Dave gives good reasons for Condorcet. I'd like to present the other 
side.


Condorcet systems have many advantages. So what's wrong with Condorcet?

It comes in a bewildering array of forms, thus reducing the unity of 
its supporters. But that's not the real problem.


It admits both betrayal and burial strategy, thus encouraging 
dangerous, negative-sum strategizing from its voters. And that could 
be significant. But I think that voters will realize that they will 
almost never have the information and unity to pull off a successful 
strategy, so that's not the real problem.


It is complicated to understand, and impossible to easily visualize, 
how it works.
i disagree with that.  i spelled that out (how you would spell it out to 
the average voter) in my just previous post.


Condorcet is *simple* to understand.  unless there is a cycle, no one 
should be disputing the CW outcome.  the weak-CW with few 1st-choice 
votes is not a strong case.


you elect the CW, because of the inverse consideration.  if you elect 
someone other than the CW (as we did in Burlington 2009), you are 
electing a candidate when *more* of us voters marked explicitly on our 
ballots that we preferred someone else.  *not* merely someone else in 
general (the "anybody but Jack" vote), but we voter said specifically we 
want Jill instead.  how can it be a democratic decision when more of us 
choose Jill elected to office over Jack than those who choose Jack over 
Jill, yet Jack is elected despite the mandate from the voters?  i have 
never seen an adequate answer to that.  in a simple 2-person race, even 
if the vote margin is close, even if by *one* vote, if more of us want 
Jill than those of us who want Jack, then Jill is elected.  would you 
have it any other way?


if you would not have it any other way, you cannot make a consistent 
argument against electing the CW if there is one.  but we can argue 
about what to do about cycles.



But that's not the real problem.

As a ranked system, it is hopelessly caught in the contradictions of 
Arrow's theorem.


sure, and that's the case for any system.  but it's less of a problem 
than the demonstrated problems (not mere theoretical issues with Arrow) 
of either IRV (as demonstrated in Burlington 2009) or FPTP (myriad times 
when there are spoiler candidates, which might happen in Burlington in 1 
month).


the *only* problem (a la Arrow) that i see with Condorcet is the 
potential of a cycle.  but it won't happen often and only when the three 
top candidate all have roughly equal support.  it's the same kind of 
problem as a tie, and you create rules to deal with that difficult 
situation in some kind of sense that makes sense (and i'm not saying 
that there is a clear winner in which cycle-resolving method makes the 
most sense, but since a cycle is even less likely to involve more than 
three, it's really a moot question).



But that's not the real problem.

Some voters will mistakenly imagine that it's Borda. But that's not 
the real problem. (They'll imagine that MJ is Range, too. I don't see 
how they'd significantly misapprehend SODA, though.)


The real problem is that I think that people just don't want to do 
that much work to vote. Yes, I know, you can just vote approval-style 
if you want to, but most people would feel guilty about not really 
doing the whole job then.


what people don't want to do is to agonize over how to vote to serve 
their political interest when there are multiple outcomes, only one of 
which is the voter's hearts desire.  there often is another outcome 
which is tolerable and another that is intolerable.  what should the 
voter do to be counted among those against the intolerable outcome, yet 
still support his/her sincere favorite candidate?


that is the real problem, Jameson.  i don't think feeling guilty is a 
problem.  but voter regret is, especially after helping elect someone 
like George W Bush to office because one voted for Ralph Nader.  that, 
in a nutshell, is the problem.


I honestly think that honest rating is easier than honest ranking. 
(How's that for honesty per square word?) MJ is the only system which 
allows honest rating to be full-strength in practice; and SODA is the 
only good system which allows anything easier. (And no, approval is 
not easier than MJ, because approval forces some amount of strategizing.)


Most voters are lazy. And they'll resent any system which rubs their 
nose in that fact. Which Condorcet does.



i don't see that.  it's no worse than IRV, which is

  "as easy as 1-2-3!"  :-)

ranking is not hard.  Condorcet does not ask anything more from the 
voter, lazy or not, than does IRV.  all it requires is for the voters to 
make up their minds about the candidates by Election Day.  how is that 
an unreasonable expectation of voters?



(SODA, on the other hand, brings lazy voters together, and gives their 
representative as much negotiating power 

Re: [EM] STV+AV

[Bryan Mills]

>>> > Why STV? The original poster wanted elected representatives to have
>>> votes
>>> > proportional to their electoral support yes? There's no need for
>>> fractional
>>> > transfers from elected candidates then.
>>> > >
>>> >
>>> > IRV is a form of STV, but it's not my favorite.  Some of the other STV
>>> > methods (e.g. Schulze-STV and CPO-STV) tend to produce better
>>> eliminations.
>>> >
>>> > But the question of why not STV is a good one.  Several reasons.
>>> >
>>> > STV requires much more work on the part of the voter - ranking all the
>>> way
>>> > down to a candidate likely to be elected, instead of just one.  That
>>> > probably means a much larger ballot and/or an arbitrary cutoff between
>>> > ballot-candidates and write-in candidates.
>>> >
>>> dlw: If the number of possible rankings is the number of seats + 2 then
>>> it's not too bad.  And nobody would be forced to rank umpteen candidates,
>>> so the low-info voters could just vote for their favorite candidate.
>>>
>>
>> The number of possible rankings is quite a lot larger than S+2.  Even if
>> you don't transfer votes from elected candidates, there are still C-S
>> candidates eliminated -- so you'd have (C choose C-S-1)*(C-S-1)!
>> distinguishable rankings, and even more if you allow equal rankings.  The
>> only way out seems to be to pre-filter the set of candidates, so you
>> basically have to drop to approval voting at some point --
>> candidate-registration petitions and the like -- and then we're back to an
>> arbitrary cutoff.
>>
>
> dlw: You misunderstood me.  If voters are only permitted to rank S+2
> candidates then it's not as bad for voters.

I don't see how arbitrarily reducing voter options is "not as bad for
voters"; especially if S is small, only allowing one to rank S+2
candidates seems like it would result in either frequent undervotes or
an increase in the need for strategic compromise-ballots.


>> Partial rankings might be workable in a weighted-seat STV variant, though.
>>  If a vote only transfers in case of elimination (and not in case of
>> surplus), one would only need to rank candidates down to the first
>> candidate sufficiently likely to be elected, and you could split the ballot
>> into manageable chunks by party.  Determining a suitable cutoff candidate
>> still has a cognitive cost, but it probably wouldn't be that bad in
>> practice.
>>
>
> If there are 3-5 seats STV then the number of candidates won't proliferate
> too much and there'd be 5-7 places to vote.  This would keep things
> reasonable.

To get reasonable proportionality with only 3-5 seats per district
you'd probably need to go to an MMP system, with all its added
complexity.  Otherwise Droop proportionality doesn't buy you much over
FPTP; with 5 seats the Droop quota measures to a precision of ~17%,
and the remaining 17% in each district is still susceptible to
gerrymandering.

If you assume two major parties with ~40% of the electorate each, that
means that the 5th seat in each district is noisy -- but it's not
random noise, it's systematically biased by the parties' voting
strategies and the choice of district boundaries.  Larger districts
allow finer-grained Droop quotas and thereby reduce that noise.


>> But if we assume that partial rankings are effective, there's still the
>> strategy/computation tradeoff to deal with: allowing truncated ballots
>> still doesn't help with favorite-betrayal, and STV variants less
>> susceptible to favorite-betrayal are also less susceptible to efficient
>> counting.
>>
>
> dlw: Truncated ballots may not end favorite betrayal, but it'll help with
> it.

I don't see how; please elaborate.


>> > The STV variants that are less strategy-prone are computationally
>>> > inefficient, and even those are not strategy-free.
>>> >
>>> > And perhaps most importantly, the more resistant an STV method is to
>>> > strategy, the more complicated it is to explain and understand.
>>> >
>>> > As deterministic methods go, I do like STV methods; but DS fixes a lot
>>> of
>>> > the worries I have about them.
>>> >
>>> dlw: One could also apply the same sort of approach to simplifying STV
>>> with the
>>> initial treatment of all of the rankings as approval votes to get the
>>> number of candidates down to N+2, where N is the number of seats.
>>> As with IRV, it's easier to explain STV when there's relatively few
>>> candidates to eliminate.  And, it'll mitigate the strategy effects, which
>>> have to be examined more closely.
>>
>>
>> The initial treatment of rankings as approval votes introduces some other
>> problems, though.
>>
>> With an explicit "approval threshold" in the ranking, it induces a
>> substantial cognitive cost on the voter (determining the approval threshold
>> strategically).
>>
>
> dlw: Once again, if the no. of seats isn't that great then they'd not have
> to sweat it too much.  Do I rank 1, 2, 3 or 5 candidates?  Who can I live
> with?I'd say it's an empirical question whether such would be a reasonabl

Re: [EM] Looking at Condorcet

[robert bristow-johnson]

On 2/1/12 10:22 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Mike offers serious thinking about Approval.  I step up to Condorcet 
as being better and nearly as simple for the voter.


Voter can vote as in:
. FPTP, ranking the single candidate liked best, and treating all 
others as equally liked less or disliked.
. Approval, ranking those equally liked best, and treating all 
others as equally liked less or disliked.
. IRV, giving each voted for a different rank, with higher ranks 
for those liked best, and realizing that IRV vote counters would read 
only as many of the higher rankings as needed to make their decisions.
. Condorcet, ranking the one or more liked, using higher ranks for 
those liked best, and ranking equally when more than one are liked 
equally.


Condorcet is little, if any, more difficult for voters than FPTP and 
Approval.

. For many elections, voting as with them is good and as easy.
.. When a voter likes A and B but prefers A - Approval cannot say 
this, but it is trivial to vote with Condorcet's ranking.




Condorcet is *simpler* to define than IRV or Bucklin (maybe not simpler 
than Borda, but Borda sucks).  here it is:


"If a majority of voters agree that Candidate A is a better choice than 
Candidate B, then Candidate B is not elected."


translation:

"If Candidate Bob should be elected mayor, then Candidate Bob should be 
preferred by voters to Candidate Andy.  And Candidate Bob should be 
preferred by voters to Candidate Kurt.  And Candidate Bob should be 
preferred by voters to Candidate Dan.  And every other candidate."


THAT IT!  who can argue with that?  If any voters wonder what the 
meaning of their ballot is, it is simply that if they rank Andy above 
Bob above Kurt above Dan, all that means is that if the choice was 
between Andy and Bob, they pick Andy.  If the choice is between Bob and 
Kurt, they pick Bob.  And if the choice is between Andy and Kurt, they 
pick Andy.  (the same as with IRV or Bucklin or Borda.  that's all the 
ranked ballot means.  it means that we require the voters to make up 
their minds about the candidates by Election Day, and it's hard for me 
to understand why that is such a hardship.)


what else need there be to it?  there is nothing more to it.

it doesn't say anything about how much more they like Andy over Kurt 
than they like Andy over Bob, except it must be at least a little more 
because they prefer Bob to Kurt.  but it could be a lot more.  however 
it doesn't make any difference.  this voters vote counts *equally* as 
much in the contest between Bob and Kurt as it would in the contest 
between Andy and Kurt.  it's ONE-PERSON-ONE-VOTE in either case, and i 
do not see it quite so with Range/Score.  that is what is wrong with 
Range.  why i see it dead on the track right outa the blocks.



In Condorcet the counters consider each pair of candidates as 
competing with each other.  Usually one candidate, being best liked, 
proves this by winning in every one of its pairs.  Unlike IRV (which 
requires going back to the ballots as part of the counting), counting 
here can be done in multiple batches of votes, and the data from the 
batches summed into one summary batch for analysis.


There can be cycles in Condorcet, such as A>B, B>C, and C>A, with 
these winning against all others.  This requires a closer look to 
decide on the true winner, normally one of the cycle members.
. Here the counters see the cycle, rather than a CW - and how to 
pick a winner from a cycle is a reason for the dispute as to what is 
best.


i still have seen *no* convincing evidence that Condorcet cycles would 
be common.  but, just in case, there should be language in the law (if 
Condorcet is ever adopted) to deal with cycles, so that the election is 
decisive (and no delayed runoff with only a fraction of the voters 
showing up).


and it's even far less unlikely that if a Condorcet cycle *did* occur in 
a governmental election that there would be more than 3 candidates 
involved in the cycle.  then in that case, Schulze, Minmax, or Ranked 
Pairs (margins) all agree who the winner is.  sounds to me that the 
simplest language should be used, which, to me, appears to be Minmax or 
RP (sorry Markus).  i think i like RP better than Minmax, but i dunno.


Range/score ratings have their own way of showing more/less desire.  
Truly more power than Condorcet ranking


it's no more *power*.  it is more *expressivity* but also more of a 
burden.  how high do you score your 2nd choice so that all of your 
electoral muscle helps the 2nd choice beat lower choices but none of 
your effort helps the 2nd choice beat your 1st choice?  that's a tough 
question and places upon the voter a burden of tactical voting.


Approval has a similar problem.  do you Approve of your 2nd choice or 
not?  do you want to help your 1st choice beat your 2nd choice, or do 
you want to help your 2nd choice beat your lower choices.  you cannot do 
both in Approval voting and the vo

Re: [EM] [CES #4429] Looking at Condorcet

[Jameson Quinn]

Dave gives good reasons for Condorcet. I'd like to present the other side.

Condorcet systems have many advantages. So what's wrong with Condorcet?

It comes in a bewildering array of forms, thus reducing the unity of its
supporters. But that's not the real problem.

It admits both betrayal and burial strategy, thus encouraging dangerous,
negative-sum strategizing from its voters. And that could be significant.
But I think that voters will realize that they will almost never have the
information and unity to pull off a successful strategy, so that's not the
real problem.

It is complicated to understand, and impossible to easily visualize, how it
works. But that's not the real problem.

As a ranked system, it is hopelessly caught in the contradictions of
Arrow's theorem. But that's not the real problem.

Some voters will mistakenly imagine that it's Borda. But that's not the
real problem. (They'll imagine that MJ is Range, too. I don't see how
they'd significantly misapprehend SODA, though.)

The real problem is that I think that people just don't want to do that
much work to vote. Yes, I know, you can just vote approval-style if you
want to, but most people would feel guilty about not really doing the whole
job then.

I honestly think that honest rating is easier than honest ranking. (How's
that for honesty per square word?) MJ is the only system which allows
honest rating to be full-strength in practice; and SODA is the only good
system which allows anything easier. (And no, approval is not easier than
MJ, because approval forces some amount of strategizing.)

Most voters are lazy. And they'll resent any system which rubs their nose
in that fact. Which Condorcet does.

(SODA, on the other hand, brings lazy voters together, and gives their
representative as much negotiating power as possible without diluting the
winner's leadership mandate.)

Jameson

2012/2/1 Dave Ketchum 

> Mike offers serious thinking about Approval.  I step up to Condorcet as
> being better and nearly as simple for the voter.
>
> Voter can vote as in:
> . FPTP, ranking the single candidate liked best, and treating all
> others as equally liked less or disliked.
> . Approval, ranking those equally liked best, and treating all others
> as equally liked less or disliked.
> . IRV, giving each voted for a different rank, with higher ranks for
> those liked best, and realizing that IRV vote counters would read only as
> many of the higher rankings as needed to make their decisions.
> . Condorcet, ranking the one or more liked, using higher ranks for
> those liked best, and ranking equally when more than one are liked equally.
>
> Condorcet is little, if any, more difficult for voters than FPTP and
> Approval.
> . For many elections, voting as with them is good and as easy.
> .. When a voter likes A and B but prefers A - Approval cannot say
> this, but it is trivial to vote with Condorcet's ranking.
>
> In Condorcet the counters consider each pair of candidates as competing
> with each other.  Usually one candidate, being best liked, proves this by
> winning in every one of its pairs.  Unlike IRV (which requires going back
> to the ballots as part of the counting), counting here can be done in
> multiple batches of votes, and the data from the batches summed into one
> summary batch for analysis.
>
> There can be cycles in Condorcet, such as A>B, B>C, and C>A, with these
> winning against all others.  This requires a closer look to decide on the
> true winner, normally one of the cycle members.
> . Here the counters see the cycle, rather than a CW - and how to pick
> a winner from a cycle is a reason for the dispute as to what is best.
>
> Range/score ratings have their own way of showing more/less desire.  Truly
> more power than Condorcet ranking - AND more difficult to decide on rating
> values to best interact with what other voters may do.
>
> Write-ins?  Some would do away with such.  I say they should be allowed
> for the cases in which something needs doing too late to attend to with
> normal nominations.  True that voters may do some write-ins when there is
> no real need - and I have no sympathy for such voters - this needs thought.
>
> Dave Ketchum
>
> On Jan 28, 2012, at 3:13 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote
>  Re: [EM] Propose plain Approval first. Option enhancements can be later
> proposals.:
>
>>
>> The enhancement consisting of voting options in an Approval election
>> should only be mentioned when there’s plenty of time to talk, and when
>> talking
>> to someone who is patient or interested enough to hear that much. And the
>> enhancements should only be mentioned as possibilities, when speaking to
>> someone to whom the whole notion of voting-system reform is new.
>>
>>
>>
>> Maybe that goes for SODA as well. Don’t propose too much
>> change, when talking to someone new to the subject.
>>
>>
>>
>> So the method to propose first is ordinary Approval.
>>
>>
>>
>> If, in some particular community, there is

[EM] Looking at Condorcet

[Dave Ketchum]

Mike offers serious thinking about Approval.  I step up to Condorcet  
as being better and nearly as simple for the voter.


Voter can vote as in:
. FPTP, ranking the single candidate liked best, and treating all  
others as equally liked less or disliked.
. Approval, ranking those equally liked best, and treating all  
others as equally liked less or disliked.
. IRV, giving each voted for a different rank, with higher ranks  
for those liked best, and realizing that IRV vote counters would read  
only as many of the higher rankings as needed to make their decisions.
. Condorcet, ranking the one or more liked, using higher ranks for  
those liked best, and ranking equally when more than one are liked  
equally.


Condorcet is little, if any, more difficult for voters than FPTP and  
Approval.

. For many elections, voting as with them is good and as easy.
.. When a voter likes A and B but prefers A - Approval cannot say  
this, but it is trivial to vote with Condorcet's ranking.


In Condorcet the counters consider each pair of candidates as  
competing with each other.  Usually one candidate, being best liked,  
proves this by winning in every one of its pairs.  Unlike IRV (which  
requires going back to the ballots as part of the counting), counting  
here can be done in multiple batches of votes, and the data from the  
batches summed into one summary batch for analysis.


There can be cycles in Condorcet, such as A>B, B>C, and C>A, with  
these winning against all others.  This requires a closer look to  
decide on the true winner, normally one of the cycle members.
. Here the counters see the cycle, rather than a CW - and how to  
pick a winner from a cycle is a reason for the dispute as to what is  
best.


Range/score ratings have their own way of showing more/less desire.   
Truly more power than Condorcet ranking - AND more difficult to decide  
on rating values to best interact with what other voters may do.


Write-ins?  Some would do away with such.  I say they should be  
allowed for the cases in which something needs doing too late to  
attend to with normal nominations.  True that voters may do some write- 
ins when there is no real need - and I have no sympathy for such  
voters - this needs thought.


Dave Ketchum

On Jan 28, 2012, at 3:13 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote
  Re: [EM] Propose plain Approval first. Option enhancements can be  
later proposals.:


The enhancement consisting of voting options in an Approval election
should only be mentioned when there’s plenty of time to talk, and  
when talking
to someone who is patient or interested enough to hear that much.  
And the
enhancements should only be mentioned as possibilities, when  
speaking to

someone to whom the whole notion of voting-system reform is new.



Maybe that goes for SODA as well. Don’t propose too much
change, when talking to someone new to the subject.



So the method to propose first is ordinary Approval.



If, in some particular community, there is a committee of
people interested in working on a voting-system reform proposal,  
then, though
the enhancements might be mentioned to that committee, the  
suggestion to
include them in a public proposal should come only from other  
members of the
committee, people new to voting systems. That’s a measure of their  
enactment-feasibility in that community.




For AOC, MTAOC, etc., I’ve spoken of two kinds of
conditionality :conditionality by mutuality, and conditionality by  
top-count.
In an Approval election in which the conditional methods are offered  
as
optional ways of voting, any particular voter could choose which of  
those two kinds
of conditionality s/he intends to use for any particular conditional  
vote for
any particular candidate. There’s no reason why a voter couldn’t  
specify

different kinds of conditionality for conditional votes for different
candidates.



In the count, the conditionality by top-count should be done
first, and then, when those conditional votes are established, the  
calculation
for conditionality by mutuality, as described in the MTAOC  
pseudocode, should

be done.



Of course, if SODA’s delegation is also an option in the
same election, then after the entire count is completed (including  
AERLO’s 2nd
count if AERLO is offered), then the work of the delegates would  
begin, just as
it would if SODA’s delegation were the only option enhancement in  
the election.




Of course, for SODA to work as needed, mutual approval
agreements among candidate-delegates, whether made before or after the
pre-delegate-work count(s), should be public, officially-recorded,  
and binding.
Of course, one would expect that there would be no need for  
delegates to make

agreements before the pre-delegate-work count(s).



Since the current poll’s voting period doesn’t end till zero
hours, one minute, on February 1st (Wednesday), GMT (UT), or, in
other-words, at a minute after midnight, Tuesday night,  GMT (UT),
which is 

Re: [EM] SODA criteria

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/2/1 Kevin Venzke 

> Hi Jameson,
>
>   *De :* Jameson Quinn 
> *À :* Kevin Venzke 
> *Cc :* em 
> *Envoyé le :* Mercredi 1 février 2012 11h12
> *Objet :* Re: [EM] SODA criteria
>
>   2012/2/1 Kevin Venzke 
>
>  Hi Jameson,
>
> I expect that unpredictability (whatever there may be) of candidates'
> decisions can only hurt criteria compliance.
> At least with criteria that are generally defined on votes, because with
> such criteria you usually have to assume
> the worst about any other influences incorporated into the method.
>
>
> This is true.  For most of the criteria, I was implicitly talking about a
> version of SODA where all candidates use optimum strategy according to
> their predeclared preferences. This is well-defined and unique, but is not
> necessarily polytime-calculable. Still, even without being able to
> calculate results, you can prove criteria compliances for this version by
> contradiction.
>
> For a polytime-calculable version which satisfies most of the same
> criteria, assume that each candidate, when it is their turn to assign
> delegated votes, looks at the two "distinct frontrunners"; that is:
> Candidate X, their most-preferred member of the current Smith set
> and candidate Y, the candidate, of those whom they prefer differently from
> X, who does best pairwise (again, using current assignments and unassigned
> preferences) against X
> They approve as many candidates as possible without approving both X and Y.
>
> This version does not satisfy participation (though again, it's damn
> close) or IIA, and I'm not 100% sure about its cloneproofness (though I
> think it is). Otherwise, it satisfies the criteria I said.
>
>
> So I wonder, can you suggest a deterministic version of SODA, where the
> "negotiations" of SODA are instead
> calculated directly from the pre-announced preferences of the candidates?
> And if so, does it satisfy the same
> criteria in your view?
>
> I can say I would be skeptical of how a criterion is being applied, or how
> clearly it is being defined, if the
> satisfaction of it *depends* on the fact that candidates have post-voting
> decisions to make.
>
>
> Are you still suspicious of participation and [delegated] IIA, given that
> satisfying them depends on assuming optimal strategy?
>
>
>
> Hmm, I think so, just because "optimal strategy" is hard to define in
> general. Do you think that it will be possible to produce
> convincing proofs when somebody asks for one? Pretty daunting task I would
> think.
>

The proofs for the condorcet-related properties using optimal strategy are
pretty simple and obvious.

The participation criterion only applies for delegated voters. The proof
for that is a bit harder, but not too tough. For approval ballots, it is
possible to fail the (voted) participation criterion only if the delegation
order changes, and there are at least 5 candidates (in a delicate balance,
and for voters whose ballots cannot make sense in a one-dimensional
ideology space).

I just discovered a hole in my proof for delegated IIA. It works if all
votes for the new candidate are and were approval-style. It can fail if
there are at least 4/5 candidates in a tricky balance and the 5th/extra
candidate pulls delegated votes in a way that changes the delegation order.
In that case, there is always still a rational strategy for those voters
which would still preserve IIA. (This proof is tricky.)

>
> I find myself trying to suggest that it may never be necessary to delegate
> any power to the candidates. That would make it
> easier to analyze. But in that case the method is basically Approval and
> doesn't even satisfy Majority Favorite. Right?
>

No. In my previous message, I suggested two versions which leave no freedom
for the candidates, automatically assigning delegated ballots. The first –
optimal strategy – is not polytime computable that I know of (I strongly
suspect it's NP-complete in theory, though in practical cases it will be
easy to compute). The second – vote-one-frontrunner – is easy to compute,
but it causes violations of IIA and participation.


>  In
> your criteria list you had "Majority" but for that you must actually be
> assuming the opposite of what I am trying, namely that
> *everyone* is delegating, is that right?
>

Everyone who votes for the majority candidate is either delegating to them,
or voting them above all other alternatives - that is, approving only them
but checking "do not delegate". This is the standard meaning of the
majority criterion. For instance, by this meaning, approval meets the
majority criterion.

For MMC, everyone in the mutual majority is either delegating to one of the
candidates, or approving all of them and nobody else.



> Kevin
>
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] SODA criteria

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Jameson,


De : Jameson Quinn 
À : Kevin Venzke  
Cc : em  
Envoyé le : Mercredi 1 février 2012 11h12
Objet : Re: [EM] SODA criteria


2012/2/1 Kevin Venzke 
>>
>>Hi Jameson,
>>> 
>>>I expect that unpredictability (whatever there may be) of candidates' 
>>>decisions can only hurt criteria compliance.
>>>At least with criteria that are generally defined on votes, because with 
>>>such criteria you usually have to assume
>>>the worst about any other influences incorporated into the method.
>>
>>
>>This is true.  For most of the criteria, I was implicitly talking about a 
>>version of SODA where all candidates use optimum strategy according to their 
>>predeclared preferences. This is well-defined and unique, but is not 
>>necessarily polytime-calculable. Still, even without being able to calculate 
>>results, you can prove criteria compliances for this version by 
>>contradiction. 
>>
>>
>>For a polytime-calculable version which satisfies most of the same criteria, 
>>assume that each candidate, when it is their turn to assign delegated votes, 
>>looks at the two "distinct frontrunners"; that is:
>>Candidate X, their most-preferred member of the current Smith set
>>and candidate Y, the candidate, of those whom they prefer differently from X, 
>>who does best pairwise (again, using current assignments and unassigned 
>>preferences) against X
>>They approve as many candidates as possible without approving both X and Y.
>>
>>
>>This version does not satisfy participation (though again, it's damn close) 
>>or IIA, and I'm not 100% sure about its cloneproofness (though I think it 
>>is). Otherwise, it satisfies the criteria I said.
>> 
>>>So I wonder, can you suggest a deterministic version of SODA, where the 
>>>"negotiations" of SODA are instead
>>>calculated directly from the pre-announced preferences of the candidates? 
>>>And if so, does it satisfy the same
>>>criteria in your view?
>>> 
>>>I can say I would be skeptical of how a criterion is being applied, or how 
>>>clearly it is being defined, if the 
>>>satisfaction of it *depends* on the fact that candidates have post-voting 
>>>decisions to make.
>>
>>
>>Are you still suspicious of participation and [delegated] IIA, given that 
>>satisfying them depends on assuming optimal strategy?


Hmm, I think so, just because "optimal strategy" is hard to define in general. 
Do you think that it will be possible to produce
convincing proofs when somebody asks for one? Pretty daunting task I would 
think.

I find myself trying to suggest that it may never be necessary to delegate any 
power to the candidates. That would make it
easier to analyze. But in that case the method is basically Approval and 
doesn't even satisfy Majority Favorite. Right? In 
your criteria list you had "Majority" but for that you must actually be 
assuming the opposite of what I am trying, namely that
*everyone* is delegating, is that right?

Kevin
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Majority Judgement

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 02/01/2012 06:15 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:


On 2012 1 31 01:45, "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com>> wrote:
 >
 > On 01/30/2012 10:09 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
 >>
 >>
 >> Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what
 >> valid strategic claims can be made for it? How would one maximize one’s
 >> utility in an election with acceptable and completely unacceptable
 >> candidates who could win? How about in an election without completely
 >> unacceptable candidates who could win?
 >>
 >> And no, I don't mean refer to a website. The question is do YOU, as an
 >> MJ advocate, know what MJ's strategy is?
 >
 >
 > A maximally strategic MJ ballot (assuming certainty of all other
ballots) would be an Approval ballot with a strategic Approval
threshold, something like "approve of everybody you prefer to the
frontrunner you like most, then approve of him if he's got lower support
than the other frontrunner".

Actually, if "maximally strategic" means "favorably changes the margin
of victory" (the minimum number of ballots that would haved to change to
change the utility of the outcome), then it only requires voting the two
distinct frontrunners on opposite sides of the winning median.


I meant maximally strategic in the sense of "most favorably changes the 
outcome in your direction". Voting Approval style should do that because 
it works no matter what the honest median is.


The argument would go something like: say the probability of changing 
the election in a way you prefer, if you vote Approval style, is p_ms 
(for max strategy). Then if you're Homo Economicus, you know that if you 
don't exaggerate maximally, the probability of the change after you 
submit your somewhat-exaggerated ballot is p_ps and p_ps < p_ms. The 
margin here may be really small, but if you're Homo Economicus, you take 
it no matter how small.


I don't think people are Homo Economicus-es, so I agree with you on 
strategy. MJ does degrade more gracefully in this way, too, in that 
those who feel they have to employ some sort of strategy (but don't like 
it) don't have to go all the way, and so don't have to distort as much 
the data MJ uses to find the outcome. I'm just clarifying that (I think) 
Approval-style is the biggest bang for the buck, even if it's not 
realistic.



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Majority Judgement

[Jameson Quinn]

On 2012 1 31 01:45, "Kristofer Munsterhjelm"  wrote:
>
> On 01/30/2012 10:09 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>>
>>
>> Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what
>> valid strategic claims can be made for it? How would one maximize one’s
>> utility in an election with acceptable and completely unacceptable
>> candidates who could win? How about in an election without completely
>> unacceptable candidates who could win?
>>
>> And no, I don't mean refer to a website. The question is do YOU, as an
>> MJ advocate, know what MJ's strategy is?
>
>
> A maximally strategic MJ ballot (assuming certainty of all other ballots)
would be an Approval ballot with a strategic Approval threshold, something
like "approve of everybody you prefer to the frontrunner you like most,
then approve of him if he's got lower support than the other frontrunner".

Actually, if "maximally strategic" means "favorably changes the margin of
victory" (the minimum number of ballots that would haved to change to
change the utility of the outcome), then it only requires voting the two
distinct frontrunners on opposite sides of the winning median. If those
frontrunners are ideological opponents, chances are high that an honest
ballot accomplishes this. If the two frontrunners are ideological
near-clones from an opposing ideology, it is likely that their utility is
about the same, so that the next frontrunner whose utility is distinct is
ideologically opposed, and we're back to the previous case. So probably the
only time strategy is an issue is in the chicken dilemma case, where the
frontrunners are near-clones from a favored ideology. And in this case, the
unswerving strategy is not meta-strategic; an ideological group which tends
to be unswervingly strategic against its allies will tend to lose to its
opponents. So basically, in all common cases there is at least a reasonable
presumption that honesty is justifiable.

I should also talk a bit about zero-knowledge strategy. Even if you don't
know anything about the popularities of the particular candidates involved,
you still have robust statistical and historical reasons to believe that
the winning median will be something around the middle score or slightly
above. So even if you are relentlessly strategic, you can be almost sure
that you are using the correct zero-knowlege strategy without maximally
exaggerating. For instance, on the 6-level ballot that Balinsky and Laraki
suggest, you could just avoid the middle two ratings (and perhaps once we
have better statistics on historical elections, that might shrink to 1 or
even 0 ratings to avoid). This has important psychological effects; since
you still have expressive room to make a distinction between your favorite
and an acceptable compromise, there is less of an impulse to
unstrategically bullet vote than there would be under approval.

>
> In other words, Range strategy.
>
> The thing about MJ is that it's based on a robust estimator - the median
- and therefore, unlike Range, it's much less likely that your maximal
ballot will have a different effect than if you just voted honestly. So if
your default is to vote honestly (because you feel you should keep some
standard of fairness, for instance) - or the great majoriy prefers to vote
honestly - then you'll be much less tempted to vote strategically.
>

Well said.

> MJ doesn't actually punish strategists, however. It just ignores strategy
if not too many people are doing it. Warren used that fact to claim that if
you're rational, you should strategize in MJ too because you lose nothing.
In the worst case, his reasoning goes, you don't hurt your candidate/s; in
the best, you make him win.
>
> That's why I say "if your default is to vote honestly", and I think
people would default to vote honestly if the temptation for strategy wasn't
too large. I have no proof of that, of course.
>
> You could also use a feedback argument. Range strategy is really obvious,
so everybody knows how to do it, so a lot of people does it, and the
equilibrium then consists of a great deal of strategy. MJ, on the other
hand, robustly handles the case with a small minority of strategists, so
the strategists don't see their reward, so they revert to honesty, making
it harder to strategize for some other minority. Again, that's a heuristic
argument and I have no proof, but it seems sensible.
>

I agree.

>
>> But of course MJ differs from RV in the following way: In RV, if you
>> rate x higher than y, you’re reliably, unquestionably, helping x against
>> y. In MJ, of course that isn’t so. In fact, if you like x and y highly,
>> and at all similarly, and rate sincerely, then you’re unlikely to help
>> one against the other, at all.
>>
>> Another difference is that, in MJ, even if you correctly guess that
>> you’re raising a candidate’s median, you can’t know by how much.
>>
>> Suppose x is your favorite. y is almost as good. Say the rating range is
>> 0-100. You sincerely give 100 to x, and 90 to y.
>>

Re: [EM] SODA criteria

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/2/1 Kevin Venzke 

> Hi Jameson,
>
> I expect that unpredictability (whatever there may be) of candidates'
> decisions can only hurt criteria compliance.
> At least with criteria that are generally defined on votes, because with
> such criteria you usually have to assume
> the worst about any other influences incorporated into the method.
>

This is true.  For most of the criteria, I was implicitly talking about a
version of SODA where all candidates use optimum strategy according to
their predeclared preferences. This is well-defined and unique, but is not
necessarily polytime-calculable. Still, even without being able to
calculate results, you can prove criteria compliances for this version by
contradiction.

For a polytime-calculable version which satisfies most of the same
criteria, assume that each candidate, when it is their turn to assign
delegated votes, looks at the two "distinct frontrunners"; that is:
Candidate X, their most-preferred member of the current Smith set
and candidate Y, the candidate, of those whom they prefer differently from
X, who does best pairwise (again, using current assignments and unassigned
preferences) against X
They approve as many candidates as possible without approving both X and Y.

This version does not satisfy participation (though again, it's damn close)
or IIA, and I'm not 100% sure about its cloneproofness (though I think it
is). Otherwise, it satisfies the criteria I said.

>
> So I wonder, can you suggest a deterministic version of SODA, where the
> "negotiations" of SODA are instead
> calculated directly from the pre-announced preferences of the candidates?
> And if so, does it satisfy the same
> criteria in your view?
>
> I can say I would be skeptical of how a criterion is being applied, or how
> clearly it is being defined, if the
> satisfaction of it *depends* on the fact that candidates have post-voting
> decisions to make.
>

Are you still suspicious of participation and [delegated] IIA, given that
satisfying them depends on assuming optimal strategy?

Jameson

>
> Kevin
>
>
>
>   *De :* Jameson Quinn 
> *À :* EM 
> *Envoyé le :* Mardi 31 janvier 2012 20h50
> *Objet :* [EM] SODA criteria
>
> SODA passes:
>
> Majority
> MMC (as voted)
> Condorcet (as voted, and in a strong Nash equilibrium as honest)
> Condorcet loser (ditto)
> Monotone
> Participation (with the fix that delegation can be any fraction)
> IIA (delegated version - that is, if a new candidate is added, the winner
> is either the same, or someone higher on the new candidate's delegation
> order.)
> Cloneproof
> Polytime (there is no guarantee that optimal delegated assignment strategy
> is polytime calculable, but it will be in any real case, and anyway,
> candidates can just choose some near-optimal strategy.)
> Resolvable
> Summable
> Allows equal rankings
> FBC
>
> So, of the criteria in the wikipedia voting systems 
> table,
> the only ones it out-and-out fails are:
> Consistency (though it comes damn close)
> Later-no-harm and later-no-help (though it does satisfy LNHarm for the one
> (two) candidate(s?) with the most voted approvals, and for other
> candidates, adding later preferences is probably strategically forced; so
> I'd say it fulfills the spirit of both of these. Similarly, it satisfies
> LNHelp for the last-to-delegate candidate, and nearly so for other
> late-delegating candidates, and the point of LNHelp is to prevent a weak
> candidate from winning through clever bottom filling, so again it satisfies
> the spirit.)
> Allows later preferences (though delegation substitutes for this
> affordance in some cases.)
>
> If we could just get some wikipedia-notable mention of SODA, we could put
> it in the table, and I think it would graphically stand out as the most
> criteria-compliant method there.
>
> I'm working on an academic article on SODA, which would not be focused on
> these criteria or even on SODA, but would quickly state the above. But if
> anyone can make an article happen in a wikipedia "reliable source", that
> would be great.
>
> Jameson
>
>
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>

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Re: [EM] Re STV+AV

[David L Wetzell]

On Wed, Feb 1, 2012 at 9:40 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> I just can't quit you...
>

I won't quit you...

>
> 2012/2/1 David L Wetzell 
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 11:03 PM, <
>> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>>>election-methods@lists.electorama.com
>>>
>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>>
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>>>
>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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>>>
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>>>election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com
>>>
>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>>>
>>>
>>> dlw: In the FPTP case, it trims the ability of dissenters to move the de
 facto center towards the true center.  In the IRV case, it does the
 opposite, it penalizes the major parties when they do not move enough
 towards the true center.

>>> RBJ: again, that was not the case in Burlington.  the center party was
>>> "squeezed" (as Jameson would say).  the candidate in the center received
>>> nearly all of the 2nd-choice votes from voters who ranked one of either the
>>> left or right wing candidates 1st.  it was relatively rare that the
>>> left-wing voter ranked the right-wing candidate as their 2nd choice and
>>> also vise versa.  but the center candidate did not benefit from that
>>> because IRV is opaque to your 2nd choice if your 1st choice has not been
>>> eliminated.  but, under Condorcet-compliant rules, the center candidate
>>> would have benefited greatly (and would be elected), so it can be said that
>>> Condorcet tends to favor the center candidate more (than either IRV or
>>> FPTP) whereas IRV tends to favor the largest subgroup (i.e. the Progs, in
>>> Burlington in 2009) of the majority group (liberals).  and, we know, that
>>> FPTP gives the minority candidate the best chance they have of winning
>>> (they need a 3rd-party or 3rd independent candidate to draw votes away from
>>> what would be their majority opponent if the spoiler was not there).
>>>
>>
>> dlw: But it is the case when you consider the incentives to vote
>> strategically.  If in FPTP, dissenters are under pressure not to spoil, in
>> the IRV case, it's the supporters of the R party who are under pressure not
>> to spoil.
>>
>
> Replace "IRV" with the plurality in the following two sentences. The
> argument remains just as valid. Since it demonstrably doesn't work for
> plurality, it won't work for IRV (and the same goes for IRV3).
>
>
>> IRV favors the "major party" (herein defined as one of the top two for an
>> area) that is closest to the true center.  It thereby goads the two major
>> parties to move towards the center, where it is easier for minority groups
>> to play them off of each other to get attention to their reasonable
>> demands.
>>
>
Yes, it sort of is true for FPP and this is the only reason we're able to
get electoral reform, but that doesn't mean it won't work better for IRV.
 The number of voters whose votes count is increased so that there's less
rope between the true center and the de facto center.  And when both major
parties are tending to position around the true center, as influenced by
everyone, it is easier for minorities to play them off of each other.

>
>
>
>>> dlw: Most rational choice models implicit here take as fixed the
 position of candidates/parties on the spectrum, when in real life, this can
 be changed somewhat.  This reduces the "badness" of strategic voting.  It
 becomes less important thereby to devise an election rule that doesn't give
 any incentive to anyone to vote strategically.

>>>
>>> the reason why i have never agreed with that is because people *resent*
>>> being saddled with the burden of voting tactically and particularly resent
>>> finding out ex-post facto that their sincere vote served their political
>>> interests more poorly than the tactical vote (the most common tactic is
>>> "compromising").  that resentment has consequences, one of which is a cloud
>>> hanging over the elected candidate as not being entirely "legitimate", not
>>> being the "true" choice of the electorate.  but the worse consequence is
>>> that of holding back what would otherwise be viable independent or 3rd
>>> party candidates, sometimes leaving the voters with a choice between Dumb
>>> and Dumber.  that is the *main* evil we're trying to avoid with voting
>>> system and ballot reform.
>>>
>>
>> dlw: I think the main evil is the way the de facto center can get so
>> detached from the true center.  If a major party refuses to adapt, it's
>> voters are not going to be happy.  But regardless of whether they vote
>> strategically or not, the momentum will be for the de facto center to
>> approach the true cent

Re: [EM] SODA criteria

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Jameson,
 
I expect that unpredictability (whatever there may be) of candidates' decisions 
can only hurt criteria compliance.
At least with criteria that are generally defined on votes, because with such 
criteria you usually have to assume
the worst about any other influences incorporated into the method.
 
So I wonder, can you suggest a deterministic version of SODA, where the 
"negotiations" of SODA are instead
calculated directly from the pre-announced preferences of the candidates? And 
if so, does it satisfy the same
criteria in your view?
 
I can say I would be skeptical of how a criterion is being applied, or how 
clearly it is being defined, if the 
satisfaction of it *depends* on the fact that candidates have post-voting 
decisions to make.
 
Kevin
 
 

De : Jameson Quinn 
À : EM  
Envoyé le : Mardi 31 janvier 2012 20h50
Objet : [EM] SODA criteria


SODA passes: 

Majority
MMC (as voted)
Condorcet (as voted, and in a strong Nash equilibrium as honest)
Condorcet loser (ditto)
Monotone
Participation (with the fix that delegation can be any fraction)
IIA (delegated version - that is, if a new candidate is added, the winner is 
either the same, or someone higher on the new candidate's delegation order.)
Cloneproof
Polytime (there is no guarantee that optimal delegated assignment strategy is 
polytime calculable, but it will be in any real case, and anyway, candidates 
can just choose some near-optimal strategy.)
Resolvable
Summable
Allows equal rankings
FBC

So, of the criteria in the wikipedia voting systems table, the only ones it 
out-and-out fails are:
Consistency (though it comes damn close)
Later-no-harm and later-no-help (though it does satisfy LNHarm for the one 
(two) candidate(s?) with the most voted approvals, and for other 
candidates, adding later preferences is probably strategically forced; so I'd 
say it fulfills the spirit of both of these. Similarly, it satisfies LNHelp for 
the last-to-delegate candidate, and nearly so for other late-delegating 
candidates, and the point of LNHelp is to prevent a weak candidate from winning 
through clever bottom filling, so again it satisfies the spirit.)
Allows later preferences (though delegation substitutes for this affordance in 
some cases.)

If we could just get some wikipedia-notable mention of SODA, we could put it in 
the table, and I think it would graphically stand out as the most 
criteria-compliant method there.

I'm working on an academic article on SODA, which would not be focused on these 
criteria or even on SODA, but would quickly state the above. But if anyone can 
make an article happen in a wikipedia "reliable source", that would be great.

Jameson


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Re: [EM] Re STV+AV

[Jameson Quinn]

I just can't quit you...

2012/2/1 David L Wetzell 

>
>
> On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 11:03 PM, <
> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>
>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>>election-methods@lists.electorama.com
>>
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>
>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>
>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>>election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com
>>
>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>>election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com
>>
>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>>
>>
>> dlw: In the FPTP case, it trims the ability of dissenters to move the de
>>> facto center towards the true center.  In the IRV case, it does the
>>> opposite, it penalizes the major parties when they do not move enough
>>> towards the true center.
>>>
>> RBJ: again, that was not the case in Burlington.  the center party was
>> "squeezed" (as Jameson would say).  the candidate in the center received
>> nearly all of the 2nd-choice votes from voters who ranked one of either the
>> left or right wing candidates 1st.  it was relatively rare that the
>> left-wing voter ranked the right-wing candidate as their 2nd choice and
>> also vise versa.  but the center candidate did not benefit from that
>> because IRV is opaque to your 2nd choice if your 1st choice has not been
>> eliminated.  but, under Condorcet-compliant rules, the center candidate
>> would have benefited greatly (and would be elected), so it can be said that
>> Condorcet tends to favor the center candidate more (than either IRV or
>> FPTP) whereas IRV tends to favor the largest subgroup (i.e. the Progs, in
>> Burlington in 2009) of the majority group (liberals).  and, we know, that
>> FPTP gives the minority candidate the best chance they have of winning
>> (they need a 3rd-party or 3rd independent candidate to draw votes away from
>> what would be their majority opponent if the spoiler was not there).
>>
>
> dlw: But it is the case when you consider the incentives to vote
> strategically.  If in FPTP, dissenters are under pressure not to spoil, in
> the IRV case, it's the supporters of the R party who are under pressure not
> to spoil.
>

Replace "IRV" with the plurality in the following two sentences. The
argument remains just as valid. Since it demonstrably doesn't work for
plurality, it won't work for IRV (and the same goes for IRV3).


> IRV favors the "major party" (herein defined as one of the top two for an
> area) that is closest to the true center.  It thereby goads the two major
> parties to move towards the center, where it is easier for minority groups
> to play them off of each other to get attention to their reasonable
> demands.
>

(end replace)


>> dlw: Most rational choice models implicit here take as fixed the position
>>> of candidates/parties on the spectrum, when in real life, this can be
>>> changed somewhat.  This reduces the "badness" of strategic voting.  It
>>> becomes less important thereby to devise an election rule that doesn't give
>>> any incentive to anyone to vote strategically.
>>>
>>
>> the reason why i have never agreed with that is because people *resent*
>> being saddled with the burden of voting tactically and particularly resent
>> finding out ex-post facto that their sincere vote served their political
>> interests more poorly than the tactical vote (the most common tactic is
>> "compromising").  that resentment has consequences, one of which is a cloud
>> hanging over the elected candidate as not being entirely "legitimate", not
>> being the "true" choice of the electorate.  but the worse consequence is
>> that of holding back what would otherwise be viable independent or 3rd
>> party candidates, sometimes leaving the voters with a choice between Dumb
>> and Dumber.  that is the *main* evil we're trying to avoid with voting
>> system and ballot reform.
>>
>
> dlw: I think the main evil is the way the de facto center can get so
> detached from the true center.  If a major party refuses to adapt, it's
> voters are not going to be happy.  But regardless of whether they vote
> strategically or not, the momentum will be for the de facto center to
> approach the true center.  At the end of the day, what matters is who gets
> elected(how close they are to the center) and the momentum caused by the
> election, not whether everyone votes sincerely and is happy with the
> outcome.
>
> Single-winner elections will always tend not to elect 3rd party
> candidates.  That's why we need a mix of single and multi-winner elections
> to sustain 3rd parties that give more exit threat to minorities and check
> the influence of $peech on both the major parties.
>
> But as shown by Burlington, with IRV there can be turnover wrt who are the
> major parties and that is a significant 

[EM] Re STV+AV

[David L Wetzell]

On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 11:03 PM, <
election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote:

> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>election-methods@lists.electorama.com
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>
> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>
>
> dlw: In the FPTP case, it trims the ability of dissenters to move the de
>> facto center towards the true center.  In the IRV case, it does the
>> opposite, it penalizes the major parties when they do not move enough
>> towards the true center.
>>
> RBJ: again, that was not the case in Burlington.  the center party was
> "squeezed" (as Jameson would say).  the candidate in the center received
> nearly all of the 2nd-choice votes from voters who ranked one of either the
> left or right wing candidates 1st.  it was relatively rare that the
> left-wing voter ranked the right-wing candidate as their 2nd choice and
> also vise versa.  but the center candidate did not benefit from that
> because IRV is opaque to your 2nd choice if your 1st choice has not been
> eliminated.  but, under Condorcet-compliant rules, the center candidate
> would have benefited greatly (and would be elected), so it can be said that
> Condorcet tends to favor the center candidate more (than either IRV or
> FPTP) whereas IRV tends to favor the largest subgroup (i.e. the Progs, in
> Burlington in 2009) of the majority group (liberals).  and, we know, that
> FPTP gives the minority candidate the best chance they have of winning
> (they need a 3rd-party or 3rd independent candidate to draw votes away from
> what would be their majority opponent if the spoiler was not there).
>

dlw: But it is the case when you consider the incentives to vote
strategically.  If in FPTP, dissenters are under pressure not to spoil, in
the IRV case, it's the supporters of the R party who are under pressure not
to spoil.  IRV favors the "major party" (herein defined as one of the top
two for an area) that is closest to the true center.  It thereby goads the
two major parties to move towards the center, where it is easier for
minority groups to play them off of each other to get attention to their
reasonable demands.

>
> dlw: Most rational choice models implicit here take as fixed the position
>> of candidates/parties on the spectrum, when in real life, this can be
>> changed somewhat.  This reduces the "badness" of strategic voting.  It
>> becomes less important thereby to devise an election rule that doesn't give
>> any incentive to anyone to vote strategically.
>>
>
> the reason why i have never agreed with that is because people *resent*
> being saddled with the burden of voting tactically and particularly resent
> finding out ex-post facto that their sincere vote served their political
> interests more poorly than the tactical vote (the most common tactic is
> "compromising").  that resentment has consequences, one of which is a cloud
> hanging over the elected candidate as not being entirely "legitimate", not
> being the "true" choice of the electorate.  but the worse consequence is
> that of holding back what would otherwise be viable independent or 3rd
> party candidates, sometimes leaving the voters with a choice between Dumb
> and Dumber.  that is the *main* evil we're trying to avoid with voting
> system and ballot reform.
>

dlw: I think the main evil is the way the de facto center can get so
detached from the true center.  If a major party refuses to adapt, it's
voters are not going to be happy.  But regardless of whether they vote
strategically or not, the momentum will be for the de facto center to
approach the true center.  At the end of the day, what matters is who gets
elected(how close they are to the center) and the momentum caused by the
election, not whether everyone votes sincerely and is happy with the
outcome.

Single-winner elections will always tend not to elect 3rd party candidates.
 That's why we need a mix of single and multi-winner elections to sustain
3rd parties that give more exit threat to minorities and check the
influence of $peech on both the major parties.

But as shown by Burlington, with IRV there can be turnover wrt who are the
major parties and that is a significant improvement.

>
> we are *now* experiencing some of these consequences in Burlington.  the
> Progs have decided not to run a candidate (the current mayor is or was a
> Prog and is not running for re-election).  it looked for a while that there
> would be only two (Dem and GOP), but recently an independent candidate
> emerged and her political appeal is a lot like a Prog candidate (the Prog

Re: [EM] Sortition and the Delegable Proxy system

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 01/31/2012 07:05 AM, Bryan Mills wrote:

On Wed, Jan 25, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
  wrote:



I think it is strategy-proof, but I wonder if people would irrationally
reason something like this:

"My chance of winning is very low, so I shouldn't keep my hopes up. Instead,
I should delegate my vote so that I can feel I expressed myself if [popular
candidate] wins."

Now, that makes no sense, but if people were game-theoretically rational,
turnout would be very low (and it isn't). So I'm wondering if the people
would irrationally be more mass-like than you'd want of a sortition-based
system.


Moderate clustering of votes is desirable, and leads to lower-variance outcomes
(because the count proceeds further on average before hitting the
max-seats limit).

That's among several reasons why you would want a large number of
seats; probably on the order of 400-500 for a practical legislature.
Voters could hopefully find a fairly close match among the
several-hundred front-runners -- much closer than would be possible
in a single-winner or even a typical STV election, especially since
they wouldn't have to spend time figuring out a rank-ordering of
less-preferred candidates.


Alright, I misunderstood a bit what you were trying to do. I thought 
that you wanted sortition with its essential features (representative 
sample of the population, incorruptability) but with a fix to keep those 
who themselves did not want to serve from being unrepresented. I 
envisioned that voters who did not want to serve would (ideally) name a 
friend or relative or something like that, so any given candidate would 
have less than ten votes.


By what you're saying, since you mention Droop quotas and analogies to 
STV, as well as "representative sample of preferences for 
representation", it seems you're coming at it from an election method 
angle - i.e. you want something like STV but without the hassle of 
filling in a 400-candidate ballot, and with no incentive for strategy 
whatsoever.


Is that right?


In general, I don't think one can solve the "elected candidates
ignore their constituency" problem completely with any long-period
election system. If you want to solve that problem you'd need voters
to be able to change their delegations midway through a term, and
while I think that's a very interesting line of investigation it
doesn't satisfy my initial objective of "conventional
infrastructure". (That is, any system that completely solves the
ignored-constituency problem presents more substantial technical
barriers to adoption than does DS.)


You could mitigate it by having staggered elections. You could have an 
election for 1/kth of the assembly 1/kth of the term, kind of like the 
interleaving of US executive and legislative elections. Beyond that, 
you're probably right.



It may be fairly unlikely that your vote would "pull the candidate
in your direction", but that's kind of the point of using a
proportional system instead of a single-winner district system.
Rather than attempting to move the position of a consensus
candidate, voters can instead seek a candidate whose views are
already suitably close to their own.


You could move the position of your candidate, I think. In, say, STV, if 
you're a socialist and prefer the socialist party, you may still prefer 
the leftmost SP candidate - and if the other SP candidates know that, 
they may move further to the left. The feedback is not as strong, 
granted, but I think that's an advantage STV (and other multiwinner 
party-neutral methods) have over party list.



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