Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
One more observation about the strategy and long term promotion of candidates. In the polls before the election the voters may mark all the candidates but in the actual election they may leave out some favourites with no chances to win in order to make sure that their vote will not harm their favourite candidates with chances to win. Some votes may use the strategy when it is needed. Some voters may use it always (safely). Some voters may never use it. In the presented example such a mixture of voting behaviour would guarantee that the radical candidates will be eliminated early enough not to spoil the election from their supporters' point of view. Some information is lost in the actual election but if there are good polls that information may be readable there (and new candidates will get publicity that way and their viability will be considered before voters decide whether to rank them in the actual election. Long term promotion of candidates may thus still work and new entrants may grow even if the strategy is actively followed. If one wants to get full rankings also in the actual election one could use such IRV variants where this problem is not too bad. I sometimes proposed forcing voters to approve more and more candidates when their first candidates are too weak. No candidates are eliminated from the race, so they may "come back" if they have lots of secondary support (like the moderate candidates in the example). The described strategy may not materialize very strongly in real life since voters often are quite eager to support their first preference candidates. But as already noted in some scenarios (like in the example) it would be better to apply the strategy since using the wrong strategy (sincerity) may lead to a bad outcome that may be clearly visible (especially if the votes will be published). (Alternatively some variants of IRV could be used.) Juho --- On Thu, 9/4/09, Juho Laatu wrote: > Sorry, fifth line was wrong, should be: > > 25: Dr>Dm>Rm>Rr > 20: Dm>Dr>Rm>Rr > 05: Dm>Rm>Dr>Rr > 05: Rm>Dm>Rr>Dr > 20: Rm>Rr>Dm>Dr > 25: Rr>Rm>Dm>Dr > > Juho > > > --- On Thu, 9/4/09, Juho Laatu > wrote: > > > From: Juho Laatu > > Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood > > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > > Date: Thursday, 9 April, 2009, 7:39 PM > > > > --- On Thu, 9/4/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm > > wrote: > > > > > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > > > > > Actually it may be a quite good strategy in > > > > IRV not to rank those favourite candidates > > > > that do not have a chance but to rank only > > > > those candidates that have a chance. This > > > > increases the probability that one's most > > > > favoured candidates with chances of winning > > > > the election are not eliminated too early > > > > (assuming that they might win if they could > > > > stay in the race until the end). > > > > > > That's also the strategy in Plurality - don't > vote > > for > > > those candidates that don't have a chance. But > if > > everybody > > > thinks like this, you end up with the "lesser of > n > > evils". > > > > Yes, it is true that if people do not rank > > the lesser candidates they will never grow > > and become major candidates. It may be more > > important for many to try to influence the > > future elections than to try to eliminate > > some small risks in this election. And of > > course in many cases one can vote also for > > the lesser candidates without problems. The > > described strategy is just a safe bet that > > eliminates risks in these elections. > > > > (Psychological factors are an important > > topic that should be covered too.) > > > > > One of the points of ranked voting is that you > don't > > have to > > > do that - you can vote X > Y > Z so you say > "I > > like X, > > > but if I can't have X, I'd have Y before Z". > > > > It seems that in IRV it is the safest > > strategy not to rank the weak candidates > > (if one only aims at winning this election > > in question), but not a necessary strategy > > for all situations to guarantee an optimal > > vote. > > > > >If this ability > > > is compromised by that voting for unpopular > > candidates > > > dilutes the vote so much one should rather not, > then > > why > > > have ranked voting in the first place? > > > > Words "so much" are impor
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Sorry, fifth line was wrong, should be: 25: Dr>Dm>Rm>Rr 20: Dm>Dr>Rm>Rr 05: Dm>Rm>Dr>Rr 05: Rm>Dm>Rr>Dr 20: Rm>Rr>Dm>Dr 25: Rr>Rm>Dm>Dr Juho --- On Thu, 9/4/09, Juho Laatu wrote: > From: Juho Laatu > Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Date: Thursday, 9 April, 2009, 7:39 PM > > --- On Thu, 9/4/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm > wrote: > > > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > > > Actually it may be a quite good strategy in > > > IRV not to rank those favourite candidates > > > that do not have a chance but to rank only > > > those candidates that have a chance. This > > > increases the probability that one's most > > > favoured candidates with chances of winning > > > the election are not eliminated too early > > > (assuming that they might win if they could > > > stay in the race until the end). > > > > That's also the strategy in Plurality - don't vote > for > > those candidates that don't have a chance. But if > everybody > > thinks like this, you end up with the "lesser of n > evils". > > Yes, it is true that if people do not rank > the lesser candidates they will never grow > and become major candidates. It may be more > important for many to try to influence the > future elections than to try to eliminate > some small risks in this election. And of > course in many cases one can vote also for > the lesser candidates without problems. The > described strategy is just a safe bet that > eliminates risks in these elections. > > (Psychological factors are an important > topic that should be covered too.) > > > One of the points of ranked voting is that you don't > have to > > do that - you can vote X > Y > Z so you say "I > like X, > > but if I can't have X, I'd have Y before Z". > > It seems that in IRV it is the safest > strategy not to rank the weak candidates > (if one only aims at winning this election > in question), but not a necessary strategy > for all situations to guarantee an optimal > vote. > > > If this ability > > is compromised by that voting for unpopular > candidates > > dilutes the vote so much one should rather not, then > why > > have ranked voting in the first place? > > Words "so much" are important. Polls are > inaccurate, people do believe in the > chances of their favourites, there will be > changes in support, there is a need to > show support to the "so far unpopular" > candidates, and the risks involved in this > strategy may be small. As a result I don't > think people should and people will apply > this strategy generally in IRV elections. > > There are however cases where the risks > are very real. The original example was > one. Here is another with moderate and > radical Democrats and Republicans. > > Approximate support: > 25: Dr>Dm>Rm>Rr > 20: Dm>Dr>Rm>Rr > 05: Dm>Rm>Dr>Rr > 05: Rm>Dm>Rr>Dr > 05: Rm>Rr>Dm>Dr > 25: Rr>Rm>Dm>Dr > > In this example all four candidates have > the risk of being eliminated early. If Dm > or Rm will be eliminated first then the > other party is likely to win. It makes > sense to the Dr and Rr supporters not to > rank their favourite first (although they > are about as popular within the party as > the other moderate candidate). > > (From this point of view Condorcet methods > allow the voters to use more sincere > rankings than IRV.) > > Juho > > > > > > > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
--- On Thu, 9/4/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > Actually it may be a quite good strategy in > > IRV not to rank those favourite candidates > > that do not have a chance but to rank only > > those candidates that have a chance. This > > increases the probability that one's most > > favoured candidates with chances of winning > > the election are not eliminated too early > > (assuming that they might win if they could > > stay in the race until the end). > > That's also the strategy in Plurality - don't vote for > those candidates that don't have a chance. But if everybody > thinks like this, you end up with the "lesser of n evils". Yes, it is true that if people do not rank the lesser candidates they will never grow and become major candidates. It may be more important for many to try to influence the future elections than to try to eliminate some small risks in this election. And of course in many cases one can vote also for the lesser candidates without problems. The described strategy is just a safe bet that eliminates risks in these elections. (Psychological factors are an important topic that should be covered too.) > One of the points of ranked voting is that you don't have to > do that - you can vote X > Y > Z so you say "I like X, > but if I can't have X, I'd have Y before Z". It seems that in IRV it is the safest strategy not to rank the weak candidates (if one only aims at winning this election in question), but not a necessary strategy for all situations to guarantee an optimal vote. >If this ability > is compromised by that voting for unpopular candidates > dilutes the vote so much one should rather not, then why > have ranked voting in the first place? Words "so much" are important. Polls are inaccurate, people do believe in the chances of their favourites, there will be changes in support, there is a need to show support to the "so far unpopular" candidates, and the risks involved in this strategy may be small. As a result I don't think people should and people will apply this strategy generally in IRV elections. There are however cases where the risks are very real. The original example was one. Here is another with moderate and radical Democrats and Republicans. Approximate support: 25: Dr>Dm>Rm>Rr 20: Dm>Dr>Rm>Rr 05: Dm>Rm>Dr>Rr 05: Rm>Dm>Rr>Dr 05: Rm>Rr>Dm>Dr 25: Rr>Rm>Dm>Dr In this example all four candidates have the risk of being eliminated early. If Dm or Rm will be eliminated first then the other party is likely to win. It makes sense to the Dr and Rr supporters not to rank their favourite first (although they are about as popular within the party as the other moderate candidate). (From this point of view Condorcet methods allow the voters to use more sincere rankings than IRV.) Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Juho Laatu wrote: Actually it may be a quite good strategy in IRV not to rank those favourite candidates that do not have a chance but to rank only those candidates that have a chance. This increases the probability that one's most favoured candidates with chances of winning the election are not eliminated too early (assuming that they might win if they could stay in the race until the end). That's also the strategy in Plurality - don't vote for those candidates that don't have a chance. But if everybody thinks like this, you end up with the "lesser of n evils". One of the points of ranked voting is that you don't have to do that - you can vote X > Y > Z so you say "I like X, but if I can't have X, I'd have Y before Z". If this ability is compromised by that voting for unpopular candidates dilutes the vote so much one should rather not, then why have ranked voting in the first place? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Thanks Ralph for pointing out my oversite. >> The primary may be non-monotonic as well as the general election but >> together they are monotonic. >You presumably meant that the other way around. Plurality is >monotonic for both elections, but the 2 taken together result in >strategy and a non-monotonic effect? >Monotonic = voting for (or raising the preference of) a candidate >cannot result in that candidate losing SORRY, GOT IT BACKWARDS, MY FALUT. Let's Look at the example in wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion Number of votes 1st Preference 2nd Preference 39 Andrea, Belinda 35 Belinda, Cynthia 26 Cynthia, Andrea Using IRV "Cynthia is eliminated, thus transferring votes to Andrea, who is elected with a majority." In a primary Andrea and Belinda would be the top-two and would go to the general election. The Cynthia voters would now vote for Andrea in the general election (based on their preference). And the result would be the same as IRV. Let us now assume Cynthia voters manage to "...persuades ten of Belinda's supporters to change their votes to her at the next election." (or in this election) This election would look like this: Number of votes 1st Preference 2nd Preference 49 Andrea Belinda 25 Belinda Cynthia 26 Cynthia Andrea "Because of the votes Belinda loses, she is eliminated first this time, and her second preferences are transferred to Cynthia, who now wins 51 to 49." "In this case Andrea's preferential ranking increased between elections - more electors put her first - but this increase in support appears to have caused her to lose." "Counterintuitively, it was the increase in support for Andrea (along with the properties of IRV) that hurt her." They could use the same strategy in a primary. Belinda would be eliminated in the primary. Andrea and Cynthia would advance to the general election. Assuming that the Belinda voters preferences remain the same then Cynthia would win in the general election (51 to 49). The strategy worked in a IRV election and in a top-two election. It is clear that both voting SYSTEMS are non-monotonic. In actual voting (IRV or Top-two) there is very little chance that Belinda voters could be persuaded to vote for their third choice. In order for this strategy to work you would have to have a precise knowledge of all of the voters preferences (first and second). In this example if you missed the 2nd preference by 2 (say it was really - 23 Belinda Cynthia and 2 Belinda Andrea) Andrea would win (51 to 49). The 10 Belinda voters who switched would be very upset at the Cynthia voters who convinced them to switch, now they have to settle for their third choice, Andrea. The argument some people are making is that IRV has a potential flaw. Which I have pointed out, the top-two voting system has the same flaw. I also pointed out that the top-two has more of a chance of voter manipulation than IRV. It would seem that those opposed to strategic voting and voter manipulation are backing the wrong horse. All of this is not relevant. The only way it would be relevant is if an election method that is "non-monotonic" is unconstitutional. Which would rule out IRV and top-two. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that the top-two is constitutional (see case below). It is the responsibility of the legislature (or the voters in this case) to decide on their election method, and it is the responsibility of the Supreme Court to decide if it is Constitutional. If you think that a voting method is flawed you need to take that issue to the legislature (or voters) who make the laws. If the law (a voting method passed by the people) is full of flaws and it passes the Equal Protection Clause (and other Constitutional issues) then the "will of the people" shall prevail. See Washington State Grange. v. Washington State Republican Party (2007) "...they threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented consistent with the Constitution." Don Hoffard Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
--- On Wed, 8/4/09, Don & Cathy Hoffard wrote: > Thanks Peter for your comments > > >Suppose that by my estimation about the electorate is > about > > >400: Smith, Jones, Johnson > >300: Jones, Smith, Johnson > >600: Johnson, Jones, Smith > > Johnson loses regardless as to whether Smith or Jones is > eliminated > Normal IRV with no strategy: > Jones is eliminated in the first round and Smith wins in > the second round. > > IRV with a strategy, of 101 vote switch, from Johnson > voters to Jones > Smith is eliminated in the first round and Jones wins in > the second round. > The Johnson voters would have to except Jones as their > second best choice. Here's another way to describe this strategy. If there is a Condorcet winner that will be eliminated before the last round, then some of the IRV voters have an interest to compromise and vote for the Condorcet winner. This group is large enough to make the Condorcet winner win. This strategy is also quite free of risks. In the example above, if the Johnson supporters are certain that Johnson will not win, then they could all vote for Jones. If the last round will be between Jones and Smith, Jones will win anyway. Actually it may be a quite good strategy in IRV not to rank those favourite candidates that do not have a chance but to rank only those candidates that have a chance. This increases the probability that one's most favoured candidates with chances of winning the election are not eliminated too early (assuming that they might win if they could stay in the race until the end). Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
On Wed, Apr 8, 2009 at 7:54 AM, Don & Cathy Hoffard wrote: > The primary may be non-monotonic as well as the general election but > together they are monotonic. You presumably meant that the other way around. Plurality is monotonic for both elections, but the 2 taken together result in strategy and a non-monotonic effect? Monotonic = voting for (or raising the preference of) a candidate cannot result in that candidate losing Ofc, voting for a candidate in stage 1 cannot result in him ending up losing. What happens is that by voting for a candidate, you can cause your 2nd choice to lose. Looking only at the votes, the process is monotonic. OTOH, shifting your vote in stage one from one candidate to another is non-monotonic. By taking your vote away from one candidate and giving it another, you can cause the the first candidate to win. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Don & Cathy Hoffard wrote: IRV elections are LESS subject of strategic voting than a primary and a top-two run-off. Both voting systems are clearly monotonic. Are you saying that both top-two runoff and IRV is monotonic? There are lots of examples as to how IRV is nonmonotonic - Yee diagrams also show that it's not a rare occurence. As for top-two runoff, I suppose that depends on how you interpret it. If you say that TTR is equal to a system where the voters first vote for whoever they placed first (in the first round), then for which of the two remaining that they ranked highest (in the second round), then with three candidates, TTR is equal to IRV and so is nonmonotonic. However, this is probably not what voters do, since they move their votes around, but since monotonicity is a property of single-ballot systems, that muddles the picture. Why is Monotonicity an issue, if they are both systems are monotonic and monotonic is not ever a constitution requirement. Monotonicity is an issue because it degrades the result. Now, you might say that many problems degrade the result (Consistency, Participation, etc), but many of those are very hard to satisfy; monotonicity is not, unless you want both LNHelp and LNHarm (like IRV). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Thanks Peter for your comments >Suppose that by my estimation about the electorate is about >400: Smith, Jones, Johnson >300: Jones, Smith, Johnson >600: Johnson, Jones, Smith Johnson loses regardless as to whether Smith or Jones is eliminated Normal IRV with no strategy: Jones is eliminated in the first round and Smith wins in the second round. IRV with a strategy, of 101 vote switch, from Johnson voters to Jones Smith is eliminated in the first round and Jones wins in the second round. The Johnson voters would have to except Jones as their second best choice. A more realistic example is the following: 340: Smith, Jones, Johnson 40 Smith, Johnson, Jones 280: Jones, Smith, Johnson 20: Jones, Johnson, Smith 620: Johnson, Jones, Smith First let's look at a primary with a top two general election: Smith (380) and Johnson (620) advance and Jones is eliminated (with 300) Assume the Jones voters vote their same preference in the general election. Smith wins (660) and Johnson loses (640) Assume that 100 of the Johnson voters vote for Jones in the primary Jones (400) and Johnson (520) advance to the general election, and Smith is eliminate (380) Assume the Smith voters vote the same preference in the general election. Also assume the 100 who voted for Jones in the primary switch back to Johnson in the general election. Johnson wins (with 660) and Jones loses (with 640). The Strategy worked. It is clear that a primary (a plurality election) and a top two run-off general election taken together is subject to Strategic voting. The primary may be non-monotonic as well as the general election but together they are monotonic. Next let's look at an IRV election: In the first round Smith (380) and Johnson (620) and Jones is eliminated (with 300) Assume the Jones voters vote the same preference in the general election. Then in the second round Smith wins (660) and Johnson loses (640) Assume that 100 of the 620 Johnson voters change their preference to the following 100: Jones, Johnson, Smith 520: Johnson, Jones, Smith Jones (400) and Johnson (520) advance to the second round, and Smith is eliminate (380) Now under IRV rules the 100 who voted for Jones continue to vote for Jones. Jones wins (with 740) and Johnson loses (with 560). The Strategy did not get Johnson elected but Johnson votes would be happier it Jones than Smith. IRV elections are LESS subject of strategic voting than a primary and a top-two run-off. Both voting systems are clearly monotonic. Why is Monotonicity an issue, if they are both systems are monotonic and monotonic is not ever a constitution requirement. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
> Yet me give you an example > Vote for mayor: > We have three candidate running for mayor > Vote for one: > [ ] Smith > [ ] Jones > [ ] Johnson > > If Smith has the least number of votes and is eliminated then who > would you vote for. > [ ] Jones > [ ] Johnson > > If Jones has the least number of votes and is eliminated then who > would you vote for. > [ ] Smith > [ ] Johnson > > If Johnson has the least number of votes and is eliminated then who > would you vote for. > [ ] Smith > [ ] Jones > > This is clearly consistent with one-person one-vote. > Every voter votes once and all voters are treated equal. > You could say that each voter is voting twice once in the first part > and a contingency vote in the second part depending on who is > eliminated. This is conceptually the same as IRV method, with one > exception. IRV assumes voters are rational and that the votes are > independent. > In this example a voter could vote for Jones on the first part and > if Smith is eliminated then vote for Johnson in the second part. > It is hard to understand the rationality of this kind of vote. For punctuality's sake: I think this kind of vote would be rare, but sometimes rational. Suppose that by my estimation about the electorate is about 400: Smith, Jones, Johnson 300: Jones, Smith, Johnson 600: Johnson, Jones, Smith and I happen to belong to the latest, estimatedly 600 strong group. I am afraid to vote first for my favourite Johnson, because Jones is likely to drop first, and then the hated Smith is almost sure to win. So I make a compromise and vote for Jones, sacrificing my favourite Johnson. Suppose that my estimation proves to be wrong - it can happen even to a rational person - and Smith drops first. Then I would happily vote for Johnson. The thing can happen even without wrong estimation. If we Johnsonists are smart enough then 150 of us vote for Jones and 450 vote for Johnson, so we _make_ Smith drop first. Of course, we don't have much hope to win in the second round but no reason for not to try. Still I don't think IRV violates the one person one vote principle. This principle is not to apply in a what-would- happen-if-using-not-this-but-another-method style. The question is what a vote is. If a vote is a paper which can be filled, then of course IRV is one person one vote. If a vote is a checkmark on a paper then of course IRV is one person one vote. The principle doesn't say a person have one vote in her entire life! Of course, a paper can contain one first vote, one second vote, one third vote and so on, as long as these possibilities are for everyone. The voter has the right not to use all thiese votes - in the US, voting is not compulsory (yes, I know there are countries where it is). Peter Barath PUMA termékek akár 70%-kal olcsóbban CSAK MOST, rendkívüli akció. Katt ide >> http://www.brands.hu/origo Hetente a legnagyobb márkák akciói webáruházunkban! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Thanks Kathy for your comments >Is it also "reasonable" when IRV elects a winner who the majority of >voters oppose in an "instant"? >Don, your conception of "equality" is surely different than my own. The relative question is "Does IRV violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution"? If it does not them the state or city has a right to adopt IRV. It is not the responsibility of the U.S. Supreme Court to say "the voters in a city cannot adopt IRV, because there are better methods available or that it fails some criteria". Plurality voting (first passed the poll) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Equal Protection does not require an election to yield a majority. The Supreme Court has said that, in effect, voters in a city (or State) are free to adopt (by a vote of the people) any voting method they what (even some really bad ones) as long as it provides Equal Protection to all (and does not violate other parts of the Constitution). See Washington State Grange. v. Washington State Republican Party (2007). In the opinion, the Court said "Finally, facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution." This case relates to the "top two primary". The primary selects two candidates by plurality (the first round) to be on the general election ballot (the second round). The primary itself has only one round, and all candidates who have less votes than the top two are eliminated. This type of primary system has some major problems including "cloning", and monotonicity. The "Top-two primary" as well as any Run-off election are conceptually the same problems as IRV (although not instant). It would seem that these election types have already passed the "Equal Protection Clause" standard (see the courts' opinion). INSTANT: Let us assume that a run-off election is held a month later. Well with addition time and information a voter may decide to vote for a different candidate. Let us now assume that a run-off election is held a day later. With very little new information the odds are you would vote for the same candidates as the original vote. With some addition thought some voters, but perhaps very few, may decide to vote for a different candidate. I don't know how may would change their vote a day later. But I will speculate it could be less than 0.5 percent (only a wild guess). Let us now assume that a run-off election is held 1/1000th (or less) of a second later. It is theoretically impossible for a voter to change their mind in an "instant". The "instant" you drop your ballot in the box you are voting (or had the right to vote) in every single round of the election. That is why they call it "instant" run-off voting. I believe this is the definition of "Instant run-off voting" REASONALBLE: When I used the term, I as only referring to a what the U.S. Supreme Court would determine as the "reasonable intent of the voters". If a voter votes A>B>C or A>C>B I believe it is reasonable to assume that the intent of the voter is, if C is eliminated, then the voter would vote for A over B in a second round. The U.S. Supreme court has used the "Reasonability" standard many times. My opinion is not important, what is important is what would the Court assume is the intent of the voter (under the reasonable standard). >Is it also "reasonable" to assume that all voters whose candidates are >eliminated before the final counting round would chose not to vote in >the final round in an "instant"? Assume that A and B are the only candidates in the final round, and that C is eliminated. If I voted C>B>A, then if you look closely at the final vote tally (under IRV) you will see my vote for B. All voters whose candidates are eliminated before the final counting round votes (C>B>A and C>A>B) DID vote in the final round. >And is it also "reasonable" to assume that all voters whose first >choice loses and whose second choice is never considered are OK with >never having their second choice counted in an "instant"? This sounds the same as your statement above. Maybe I don't understand your point. The only thing I would say is that all votes are counted in the second round. Except for a C>blank>blank vote. The question is, what is the intent of this voter? The voters' intent seems quite clear, the voter wants to vote for C in the first round and if C is eliminated then the voter did not wish to vote in the second round. Assume that the voter votes blank>blank>blank. The voters' intent also seems clear, the voter did not wish to vote in the first or the second round. If a voter does not vote in the first round (blank>blank>blank) their vote is not counted, if they don't vote in the second round (C>blank>blank) their vote is not counted in the second round. >And is it also "reasonable" to assume that all voters whose 2nd and >3rd choices are only considered after it is too
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
> Message: 2 > Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2009 18:53:47 -0700 > From: "Don & Cathy Hoffard" > > Kathy Dopp Said: >>Let's hope that the Minnesota Supremes have more sense and more >>concern for the principles of the US constitution, than the IRV >>promoters at "Fair" Vote. > > IRV is, instant voting, and it is reasonable to assume that a voter could > not change their mind in an "instant". Is it also "reasonable" to assume that all voters whose candidates are eliminated before the final counting round would chose not to vote in the final round in an "instant"? And is it also "reasonable" to assume that all voters whose first choice loses and whose second choice is never considered are OK with never having their second choice counted in an "instant"? And is it also "reasonable" to assume that all voters whose 2nd and 3rd choices are only considered after it is too late to help their 2nd and 3rd choices avoid elimination are OK with never having their 2nd or 3rd choices considered in a timely fashion? And ETC and on and on? Is it also "reasonable" when IRV elects a winner who the majority of voters oppose in an "instant"? Don, your conception of "equality" is surely different than my own. Kathy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Kathy Dopp Said: >Let's hope that the Minnesota Supremes have more sense and more >concern for the principles of the US constitution, than the IRV >promoters at "Fair" Vote. I relevant part of the U.S. Constitution is the 14th amendment, and in particular the Equal Protection Clause. Under GRAY v. SANDERS (1963) the Supreme Court decided: "a)The Equal Protection Clause requires that ...all who participate in the election must have an equal vote" "d) The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing - one person, one vote." One-person one-vote is the foundation of democracy. The question is "does IRV satisfy this principle" Let us look first at a proposed city. The vote could go like this. Do you wish to incorporate this city. [ ] Yes [ ] No If the electorate votes yes on incorporation then what is you vote for mayor. [ ] Smith [ ] Jones This type of election (contingency voting) is done at times. You only count the votes for mayor if the city is incorporated. Everyone voter votes once (or twice) and all voters are treated equally. It assumes that voters are rational, and that the two votes are independent. For example a voter could say I thought that the incorporation would fail so I vote for my best friend Smith. Since it did pass I want to change my vote to Jones, because he is clearly the better qualified. To avoid this problem the State would have to have two separate elections. The U.S. Supreme court has allowed State laws to be subject to a reasonability standard as long as it did not create a severe burden on the right to vote. I doubt that the Supreme Court would see this as violation of one person-one vote concept. A more normal example would be: Vote for one for governor. [ ] Smith [ ] Jones Vote for one for Treasurer. [ ] Johnson [ ] Roberts For example a voter could say at if Smith wins I want to change my vote from Johnson to Roberts. Smith is a Republican and I want to have a Democrat (Roberts) as Treasurer for balance. It also assumes that voters are rational, and that each office is independent. In effect we (the state) do not allowing you to change your vote for Treasurer contingent who is elected Governor. You could solve this problem by having "sequential voting", they first vote for governor then find out the results, and then have another election later for Treasurer. It would be very costly for the state to conduct "sequential elections". The Supreme Court has stated that this is not a violation of the one person-one vote concept. You could also solve the sequential voting problem with a vote as follows: If Smith is elected Governor then what is your vote for Treasurer. [ ] Johnson [ ] Roberts If Jones is elected Governor then what is your vote for Treasurer. [ ] Johnson [ ] Roberts The State can make a reasonable assumption of rationality and independents and should not be obligated to cover all the possibilities that would burden the voter and the state. Some people may say that IRV only allows those who voted for a eliminated candidate to vote twice and the other voters only vote once. If this were true it would violate the one-person one-vote principle. Yet me give you an example Vote for mayor: We have three candidate running for mayor Vote for one: [ ] Smith [ ] Jones [ ] Johnson If Smith has the least number of votes and is eliminated then who would you vote for. [ ] Jones [ ] Johnson If Jones has the least number of votes and is eliminated then who would you vote for. [ ] Smith [ ] Johnson If Johnson has the least number of votes and is eliminated then who would you vote for. [ ] Smith [ ] Jones This is clearly consistent with one-person one-vote. Every voter votes once and all voters are treated equal. You could say that each voter is voting twice once in the first part and a contingency vote in the second part depending on who is eliminated. This is conceptually the same as IVR method, with one exception. IVR assumes voters are rational and that the votes are independent. In this example a voter could vote for Jones on the first part and if Smith is eliminated then vote for Johnson in the second part. It is hard to understand the rationality of this kind of vote. In an actual IRV vote there is the assumption that voters who voted for Jones (or Johnson) would continue to vote for Jones (or Johnson) if Smith is eliminated. IRV is, instant voting, and it is reasonable to assume that a voter could not change their mind in an "instant". In the second round (runoff) those who voted for Jones vote for Jones, those who vote for Johnson vote for Johnson and those who voted for Smith vote for Jones or Johnson. So EVERYONE votes in the first round and EVERYONE votes in the second round (after a candidate is eliminated). IRV is really a type of contingency voting and does not violate the one-per
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Kathy Dopp wrote: That anyone would suggest that anyone should use such an inane voting method as IRV/STV is beyond my understanding - except if they are trying to help voting machine vendors profit by selling an all-new round of high-tech voting machines or if they are trying to implement a voting method that makes it much more difficult to detect vote fraud when it occurs. I guess that it's a combination of many things. Some may know only of IRV, others think monotonicity is unimportant (and a "technical" flaw similar to those used by opponents who prefer Plurality); and the leaders have committed to IRV and are thus "stuck" with it. STV is much simpler than CPO-STV also, so the "IRV then STV" strategy may explain some part of it. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
At 10:17 PM 1/18/2009, Terry Bouricius wrote: Markus, The source you cite is a Minnesota League of Women Voters report that refers to an article with legal analysis in the Minnesota Bar Association's journal, dealing with the Minnesota statutes and Minnesota constitution. "Municipal Voting System Reform: Overcoming the Legal Obstacles." Bench and Bar of Minnesota. Vol. 59, No. 9, October 2002 FairVote is not responsible for reports by the League of Women Voters or lawyers writing scholarly articles. Perhaps that's technically true. However, that article has been cited many times by FairVote, and one of the coauthors was with FairVote: "TONY ANDERSON SOLGARD is chair of the board of FairVote Minnesota, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization educating the public about voting systems and their effect on the quality of democracy." The interpretation of Brown v. Smallwood, many times argued by FairVote, including as an intervenor in the present case, has been one which would indeed render any Condorcet method unconstitutional in Minnesota. Not anywhere else, because the Brown decision was idiosyncratic and the arguments in it not accepted elsewhere. However, the Later-No-Harm argument isn't what the Brown court actually decided upon, and they repetitively expressed dissatisfaction with any kind of alternative vote, where a candidate preferred by one voter faces many other candidates preferred by another voter. In this argument, that the other candidates are presented together or one at a time doesn't seem to be relevant. As you know, it's a bizarre decision, because on the one hand, they quoted with obvious approval that what mattered was the number of voters supporting a candidate, not the number of marks on the ballot, but then they complained about the marks on the ballot, with Bucklin, exceeding the number of voters. On an IRV ballot, generally, the number of marks on the ballot exceeds the number of voters! In the end, with Bucklin, the winner is the candidate who was found to have been voted for by the most voters. How the method gets there is something else. IRV sequentially assigns votes, Bucklin considers them in ranks and ultimately all of them at the same time if a majority hasn't been found before that, a Condorcet method considers them all simultaneously as well (though you can think of it as a series of round-robin elections). The problem with IRV is that some votes are counted and some are not. I agree that there is a problem with this, but disagree that it makes IRV unconstitutional. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
> From: Markus Schulze > Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood > > Tony Solgard was president of FairVote Minnesota > when he wrote the quoted article in which he claims > that Condorcet was unconstitutional in Minnesota. > > Also the report by the League of Women Voters of > Minnesota refers to him as "Tony Solgard, President > of Board of FairVote Minnesota". Markus, I decided to read the LWV, MN report and it is rife with mistatements of fact and almost seems like it was written by Tony Solgard himself. Apparently the LWV, MN did not try out any different examples themselves that would have tested the false statements that were being fed to them by Fair Vote, MN and so merely repeated the lies and included the limited examples that backed up the lies about IRV/STV. Sad that the LWV, MN did not think to try out diverse examples so that they can see that in examples that correspond more closely to real-life elections, that IRV/STV does *not* find majority winners or solve the spoiler problem and causes a host of new problems. Fair Vote is truly one the most-skilled organizations at misleading the public that exists today. IRV/STV is essentially a sequence of plurality elections where ballots are treated arbitrarily unequally where voters are involuntarily excluded from participating in subsequent rounds even if they fully fill out the ballot whenever the number of candidates exceeds the number of ballot positions plus the number of positions to be filled. The unequal treatment of ballots in IRV/STV causes non-monotonicity, and a host of other undesirable, unfair outcomes. And if all that is not bad enough, IRV/STV eviscerates the public oversight and transparency of elections due to its being not precinct-summable and of exponential difficulty to hand count or to audit. That anyone would suggest that anyone should use such an inane voting method as IRV/STV is beyond my understanding - except if they are trying to help voting machine vendors profit by selling an all-new round of high-tech voting machines or if they are trying to implement a voting method that makes it much more difficult to detect vote fraud when it occurs. Cheers, Kathy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
FYI, "FairVote Minnesota" does not and never has had any legal connection to the national organization known as "FairVote" (though they obviously communicate and are collegial). The views of Tony Solgard are his, and not FairVote's. FairVote does not argue that Condorcet methods would violate the federal constitution, and would likely defend their constitutionality. I don't believe Tony Solgard has argued there is any problem with Condorcet methods with regards to the federal constitution either. Terry Bouricius - Original Message - From: "Markus Schulze" To: Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2009 11:52 PM Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood Dear Terry Bouricius, you wrote (18 Jan 2009): > FairVote is not responsible for reports by > the League of Women Voters or lawyers writing > scholarly articles. Tony Solgard was president of FairVote Minnesota when he wrote the quoted article in which he claims that Condorcet was unconstitutional in Minnesota. Also the report by the League of Women Voters of Minnesota refers to him as "Tony Solgard, President of Board of FairVote Minnesota". Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Dear Terry Bouricius, you wrote (18 Jan 2009): > FairVote is not responsible for reports by > the League of Women Voters or lawyers writing > scholarly articles. Tony Solgard was president of FairVote Minnesota when he wrote the quoted article in which he claims that Condorcet was unconstitutional in Minnesota. Also the report by the League of Women Voters of Minnesota refers to him as "Tony Solgard, President of Board of FairVote Minnesota". Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Markus, The source you cite is a Minnesota League of Women Voters report that refers to an article with legal analysis in the Minnesota Bar Association's journal, dealing with the Minnesota statutes and Minnesota constitution. "Municipal Voting System Reform: Overcoming the Legal Obstacles." Bench and Bar of Minnesota. Vol. 59, No. 9, October 2002 FairVote is not responsible for reports by the League of Women Voters or lawyers writing scholarly articles. Again, I do not think FairVote has any position on the constitutionality of Condorcet Voting, and would probably defend its constitutionality. Terry Bouricius - Original Message - From: "Markus Schulze" To: Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2009 2:44 PM Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood Dear Terry Bouricius, you wrote (18 Jan 2009): > Do you have any example of FairVote suggesting Condorcet > methods might be unconstitutional? See appendices 3 and 4 of this study: http://www.lwvmn.org/LWVMNAlternativeVotingStudyReport.pdf Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Dear Terry Bouricius, you wrote (18 Jan 2009): > Do you have any example of FairVote suggesting Condorcet > methods might be unconstitutional? See appendices 3 and 4 of this study: http://www.lwvmn.org/LWVMNAlternativeVotingStudyReport.pdf Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Markus, Do you have any example of FairVote suggesting Condorcet methods might be unconstitutional? I have worked with FairVote for many years, and I don't think they ever made that argument, or that Later-No-Harm failure makes any method unconstitutional (the widely used block plurality method fails L-N-H). I would certainly support a referendum for adopting Condorcet Voting compared to plurality. A nutshell summary of FairVote's position, I believe, would be that PR is the most significant reform, but that for single-seat elections, Condorcet is a theoretically much better method than Plurality, Bucklin or Approval, but like Range Voting, Condorcet has characteristics that make it unappealing to most Americans, and it probably has no chance of being adopted for governmental elections in the U.S., and that the best single-seat reform that has any realistic chance of adoption is IRV. Terry Bouricius - Original Message - From: "Markus Schulze" To: Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2009 9:47 PM Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood Hallo, FairVote always argued that Brown vs. Smallwood declared Bucklin unconstitutional because of its violation of later-no-harm. FairVote always claimed that, therefore, also Condorcet methods were unconstitutional. However, the memorandum of the district court doesn't agree to this interpretation of Brown vs. Smallwood. This means that this memorandum is a progress at least in so far as FairVote cannot use Brown vs. Smallwood anymore as an argument against Condorcet methods. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Hallo, FairVote always argued that Brown vs. Smallwood declared Bucklin unconstitutional because of its violation of later-no-harm. FairVote always claimed that, therefore, also Condorcet methods were unconstitutional. However, the memorandum of the district court doesn't agree to this interpretation of Brown vs. Smallwood. This means that this memorandum is a progress at least in so far as FairVote cannot use Brown vs. Smallwood anymore as an argument against Condorcet methods. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
At 07:59 PM 1/15/2009, Markus Schulze wrote:
in 1915, the Supreme Court of Minnesota declared
the "preferential system" unconstitutional. The
decision ("Brown vs. Smallwood") is here:
http://rangevoting.org/BrownVsmallwood.pdf
The crucial sentence is (page 508):
> We do right in upholding the right of the
> citizen to cast a vote for the candidate of
> his choice unimpaired by second or additional
> choice votes by other voters.
Now, a county judge had to decide whether
Brown vs. Smallwood also applies to IRV.
The judge came to the conclusion that
Brown vs. Smallwood doesn't apply to IRV.
The decision is here:
http://www.fairvotemn.org/sites/fairvotemn.org/files/IRV%20Lawsuit_Hennepin%20Cnty%20Crt%20Opinion%20011309_1.PDF
In my opinion, the decision is very problematic.
The judge judged the methods not by their
properties, but by IRV's underlying heuristic.
It's complicated. This was, however, more or less the result I
feared, though I'm pretty sure it will be appealed. The problem is
that this court didn't read Brown v. Smallwood completely, nor did
they read it accurately. Brown v. Smallwood, very clearly, prohibited
all forms of preferential voting, but FairVote successfully diverted
the court's attention to one passage which reads like a concern for
Later No Harm.
We can see the classic smokescreen here. The Court begins with a
statement describing the quorum for a single-seat election, "the
majority of the voters." The description does correctly insert, in
one place, "for continuing candidates," but doesn't excplicitly take
note that the threshold is a shifting one, an incautious reader would
assume otherwise, since the description talks about continuing rounds
until a "candidate reaches the threshold number of votes."
However, IRV is, in my opinion, constitutional. But so was Bucklin.
What's unfortunately here is that the decision appears to uphold
Brown while also allowing IRV. That doesn't bode well for better
election reform in Minnesota.
IRV is a plurality method; it has a peculiar way of finding
plurality. That peculiarity isn't unconstitutional, and I would agree
that an IRV winner is usually better than a plurality winner, where
they differ. However, there are still problems, of course. It is
quite possible for a candidate to win under IRV, when more voters
voted against this candidate than for this candidate, and
specifically, that more voters voted for another candidate over this
candidate. The Court did not adequately address this, it directly
flies in the face of the "majority of the votes" concept. The
majority of the voters voted against the IRV winner, but because of
how they voted, their votes did not count.
IRV counts many more votes than the number of voters, there are a
whole series of ultimately preposterous statements made by the court.
It just doesn't count them *simultaneously*. Bucklin counted them
simultaneously, which ensured that all of them would be counted. But
a candidate still faces, with IRV, one candidate after another, from
a particular voter, instead of just one. The result is pretty much the same.
The plaintiffs did not pursue the mostly likely avenue of success.
Note that had the plaintiffs been successful, pretty much all voting
reform would have remained impossible in Minnesota, except for LNH
compatible methods, which is the worst of preferential voting methods.
I would have hoped that Friend of the Court briefs would have been
filed seeking overturning of Brown; I suppose that will be
appropriate when it gets to a higher court, if it does. The Brown
ruling was out of synch with the rest of the courts in the U.S.,
which didn't have a problem with Bucklin, nor with IRV.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Hallo,
in 1915, the Supreme Court of Minnesota declared
the "preferential system" unconstitutional. The
decision ("Brown vs. Smallwood") is here:
http://rangevoting.org/BrownVsmallwood.pdf
The crucial sentence is (page 508):
> We do right in upholding the right of the
> citizen to cast a vote for the candidate of
> his choice unimpaired by second or additional
> choice votes by other voters.
Now, a county judge had to decide whether
Brown vs. Smallwood also applies to IRV.
The judge came to the conclusion that
Brown vs. Smallwood doesn't apply to IRV.
The decision is here:
http://www.fairvotemn.org/sites/fairvotemn.org/files/IRV%20Lawsuit_Hennepin%20Cnty%20Crt%20Opinion%20011309_1.PDF
In my opinion, the decision is very problematic.
The judge judged the methods not by their
properties, but by IRV's underlying heuristic.
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
