Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
Juho Laatu Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 5:12 PM On 4.8.2011, at 14.21, James Gilmour wrote: There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the voters. If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A and 49% for B, we have a major problem in representation. Ok, 49% of the voters without representation. This throws the problem into its sharpest perspective. There are related, difficult problems when there are three, four or more candidates for the one seat. If one uses single-member districts to elect multiple representatives, then this means also some randomness in the results. This is not really a problem of single-winner methods themselves but a problem in how they are used (as multi-winner methods). I agree. It is fundamentally wrong to use any single-winner, single-member district voting system to elect the members of a representative assembly (e.g. city council, state legislature). But if the voters vote in the same way (51% to 49%) in a two-member election, any sensible voting system will give one seat to A and one seat to B. Compared to that difference in providing representation of the voters, all the other differences between single-winner and multi-winner elections are trivial. From this point of view single-winner methods are more problematic than multi-winner methods (at least when used to elect multiple representatives from single-member districts). No - not just when (improperly) used to elect the members of a representative assembly. THE problem is inherent in the single-winner election. As you go on to say in your next comment. This problem of single-winner methods is quite impossible to fix (most single-winner methods respect the will of the majority). The extreme problem (51% to 49%) is impossible to fix and so it is the greatest challenge in electoral science to obtain the most representative outcome. In the two-candidate election, the best we can do is to guarantee representation to the majority. The 51% vs. 49% problem is present also in accurately proportional representative bodies since also those bodies may make majority decisions. One way to alleviate this kind of narrow majority related problems is to seek compromise decisions. I have to part company with you here. It should NOT, in my view, be part of the function of the voting system to manipulate the votes to obtain any outcome other than representation of the voters. It is not part of the function of a voting system to seek consensus. If the voters want to vote for candidates who will seek consensus, that's fine - but that is very different for making seek consensus an objective of the voting system. The function of the voting system should simply be to return the most representative result in terms of representing the voters, as expressed by the voters' responses to the candidates who have offered themselves for election. Seeking consensus and not seeking consensus are aspects of how the elected members will behave within the elected assembly. And of course, the voters may rightly take such views into account in their assessments of the candidates before they cast their votes. But that is just part of candidate appraisal. Given a sensitive voting system, the outcome (seats won) will reflect the views of the voters, which may include views on seeking consensus. James That is what in principle happens e.g. in coalition governments. Coalition governments may represent well over 50% of the voters. Let's assume that this is the case. The program of the government may contain multiple topics that would be 51% vs. 49% questions in the representative body or among the voters, but probably all coalition members will get more than they lose. Let's assume that the coalition is heterogeneous so that it does not agree on all the 51% vs. 49% decisions that is has to make. Maybe there are two 51% vs. 49% topics that go the right way against every one such topic that goes wrong. In that way we don't have a narrow majority that always makes 51% decisions but a supermajority that has considerably higher support behind everything it does (although all parties of the coalition do not like all the decisions). In two-party systems the balance is based more on two alternating policies. Often both parties have quite centrist policies since both try to meet the needs of the median voters. In some topics they may however have also clearly opposite positions. I guess the overall policy and results of two-party system governments are typically more 51% majority driven than in multi-party governments. (Coalition governments may however also have only narrow majority and the coalitions may be quite fixed, e.g. left vs. right, and as a result their decisions may follow the 51% majority style.) My point is just that in addition to multi-winner methods
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
I was also looking for pure proportional representation. The compromise decisions would take place after the election in a representative body or in a government. The election methods need not be tampered. My theory was just that in the case that the majority (of parties) that forms the government is considerably larger than 51% the decisions could have wider support than in the typical 51+% governments of a two-party system. The larger government would have to make compromises that are at least acceptable to all parties in the government. Juho On 6.8.2011, at 17.39, James Gilmour wrote: Juho Laatu Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 5:12 PM On 4.8.2011, at 14.21, James Gilmour wrote: There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the voters. If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A and 49% for B, we have a major problem in representation. Ok, 49% of the voters without representation. This throws the problem into its sharpest perspective. There are related, difficult problems when there are three, four or more candidates for the one seat. If one uses single-member districts to elect multiple representatives, then this means also some randomness in the results. This is not really a problem of single-winner methods themselves but a problem in how they are used (as multi-winner methods). I agree. It is fundamentally wrong to use any single-winner, single-member district voting system to elect the members of a representative assembly (e.g. city council, state legislature). But if the voters vote in the same way (51% to 49%) in a two-member election, any sensible voting system will give one seat to A and one seat to B. Compared to that difference in providing representation of the voters, all the other differences between single-winner and multi-winner elections are trivial. From this point of view single-winner methods are more problematic than multi-winner methods (at least when used to elect multiple representatives from single-member districts). No - not just when (improperly) used to elect the members of a representative assembly. THE problem is inherent in the single-winner election. As you go on to say in your next comment. This problem of single-winner methods is quite impossible to fix (most single-winner methods respect the will of the majority). The extreme problem (51% to 49%) is impossible to fix and so it is the greatest challenge in electoral science to obtain the most representative outcome. In the two-candidate election, the best we can do is to guarantee representation to the majority. The 51% vs. 49% problem is present also in accurately proportional representative bodies since also those bodies may make majority decisions. One way to alleviate this kind of narrow majority related problems is to seek compromise decisions. I have to part company with you here. It should NOT, in my view, be part of the function of the voting system to manipulate the votes to obtain any outcome other than representation of the voters. It is not part of the function of a voting system to seek consensus. If the voters want to vote for candidates who will seek consensus, that's fine - but that is very different for making seek consensus an objective of the voting system. The function of the voting system should simply be to return the most representative result in terms of representing the voters, as expressed by the voters' responses to the candidates who have offered themselves for election. Seeking consensus and not seeking consensus are aspects of how the elected members will behave within the elected assembly. And of course, the voters may rightly take such views into account in their assessments of the candidates before they cast their votes. But that is just part of candidate appraisal. Given a sensitive voting system, the outcome (seats won) will reflect the views of the voters, which may include views on seeking consensus. James That is what in principle happens e.g. in coalition governments. Coalition governments may represent well over 50% of the voters. Let's assume that this is the case. The program of the government may contain multiple topics that would be 51% vs. 49% questions in the representative body or among the voters, but probably all coalition members will get more than they lose. Let's assume that the coalition is heterogeneous so that it does not agree on all the 51% vs. 49% decisions that is has to make. Maybe there are two 51% vs. 49% topics that go the right way against every one such topic that goes wrong. In that way we don't have a narrow majority that always makes 51% decisions but a supermajority that has considerably higher support behind everything it does (although all parties of the coalition do not like all the decisions). In two-party systems the
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
You can also have minority government (usually single-party), where the majorities are by consensus, issue by issue, transcending the parties. Incidentally, what is pure proportional representation? It is a term I have come across quite frequently. James -Original Message- From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Juho Laatu Sent: Saturday, August 06, 2011 5:38 PM To: EM list Subject: Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list? I was also looking for pure proportional representation. The compromise decisions would take place after the election in a representative body or in a government. The election methods need not be tampered. My theory was just that in the case that the majority (of parties) that forms the government is considerably larger than 51% the decisions could have wider support than in the typical 51+% governments of a two-party system. The larger government would have to make compromises that are at least acceptable to all parties in the government. Juho On 6.8.2011, at 17.39, James Gilmour wrote: Juho Laatu Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 5:12 PM On 4.8.2011, at 14.21, James Gilmour wrote: There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the voters. If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A and 49% for B, we have a major problem in representation. Ok, 49% of the voters without representation. This throws the problem into its sharpest perspective. There are related, difficult problems when there are three, four or more candidates for the one seat. If one uses single-member districts to elect multiple representatives, then this means also some randomness in the results. This is not really a problem of single-winner methods themselves but a problem in how they are used (as multi-winner methods). I agree. It is fundamentally wrong to use any single-winner, single-member district voting system to elect the members of a representative assembly (e.g. city council, state legislature). But if the voters vote in the same way (51% to 49%) in a two-member election, any sensible voting system will give one seat to A and one seat to B. Compared to that difference in providing representation of the voters, all the other differences between single-winner and multi-winner elections are trivial. From this point of view single-winner methods are more problematic than multi-winner methods (at least when used to elect multiple representatives from single-member districts). No - not just when (improperly) used to elect the members of a representative assembly. THE problem is inherent in the single-winner election. As you go on to say in your next comment. This problem of single-winner methods is quite impossible to fix (most single-winner methods respect the will of the majority). The extreme problem (51% to 49%) is impossible to fix and so it is the greatest challenge in electoral science to obtain the most representative outcome. In the two-candidate election, the best we can do is to guarantee representation to the majority. The 51% vs. 49% problem is present also in accurately proportional representative bodies since also those bodies may make majority decisions. One way to alleviate this kind of narrow majority related problems is to seek compromise decisions. I have to part company with you here. It should NOT, in my view, be part of the function of the voting system to manipulate the votes to obtain any outcome other than representation of the voters. It is not part of the function of a voting system to seek consensus. If the voters want to vote for candidates who will seek consensus, that's fine - but that is very different for making seek consensus an objective of the voting system. The function of the voting system should simply be to return the most representative result in terms of representing the voters, as expressed by the voters' responses to the candidates who have offered themselves for election. Seeking consensus and not seeking consensus are aspects of how the elected members will behave within the elected assembly. And of course, the voters may rightly take such views into account in their assessments of the candidates before they cast their votes. But that is just part of candidate appraisal. Given a sensitive voting system, the outcome (seats won) will reflect the views of the voters, which may include views on seeking consensus. James That is what in principle happens e.g. in coalition governments. Coalition governments may represent well over 50% of the voters. Let's assume that this is the case. The program of the government may contain multiple
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
Term pure proportional representation was just an ad hoc invention that I used to refer to methods that aim at providing best possible proportional representation and nothing else (no thresholds, no bias, no consensus related stuff). Yes, minority governments need good support in the representative bodies. Since their life depends on having that support, hopefully wider than 51%, they probably make decisions that are intended to please (or at lest be acceptable to) as many parties as possible. Juho On 6.8.2011, at 19.52, James Gilmour wrote: You can also have minority government (usually single-party), where the majorities are by consensus, issue by issue, transcending the parties. Incidentally, what is pure proportional representation? It is a term I have come across quite frequently. James -Original Message- From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Juho Laatu Sent: Saturday, August 06, 2011 5:38 PM To: EM list Subject: Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list? I was also looking for pure proportional representation. The compromise decisions would take place after the election in a representative body or in a government. The election methods need not be tampered. My theory was just that in the case that the majority (of parties) that forms the government is considerably larger than 51% the decisions could have wider support than in the typical 51+% governments of a two-party system. The larger government would have to make compromises that are at least acceptable to all parties in the government. Juho On 6.8.2011, at 17.39, James Gilmour wrote: Juho Laatu Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 5:12 PM On 4.8.2011, at 14.21, James Gilmour wrote: There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the voters. If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A and 49% for B, we have a major problem in representation. Ok, 49% of the voters without representation. This throws the problem into its sharpest perspective. There are related, difficult problems when there are three, four or more candidates for the one seat. If one uses single-member districts to elect multiple representatives, then this means also some randomness in the results. This is not really a problem of single-winner methods themselves but a problem in how they are used (as multi-winner methods). I agree. It is fundamentally wrong to use any single-winner, single-member district voting system to elect the members of a representative assembly (e.g. city council, state legislature). But if the voters vote in the same way (51% to 49%) in a two-member election, any sensible voting system will give one seat to A and one seat to B. Compared to that difference in providing representation of the voters, all the other differences between single-winner and multi-winner elections are trivial. From this point of view single-winner methods are more problematic than multi-winner methods (at least when used to elect multiple representatives from single-member districts). No - not just when (improperly) used to elect the members of a representative assembly. THE problem is inherent in the single-winner election. As you go on to say in your next comment. This problem of single-winner methods is quite impossible to fix (most single-winner methods respect the will of the majority). The extreme problem (51% to 49%) is impossible to fix and so it is the greatest challenge in electoral science to obtain the most representative outcome. In the two-candidate election, the best we can do is to guarantee representation to the majority. The 51% vs. 49% problem is present also in accurately proportional representative bodies since also those bodies may make majority decisions. One way to alleviate this kind of narrow majority related problems is to seek compromise decisions. I have to part company with you here. It should NOT, in my view, be part of the function of the voting system to manipulate the votes to obtain any outcome other than representation of the voters. It is not part of the function of a voting system to seek consensus. If the voters want to vote for candidates who will seek consensus, that's fine - but that is very different for making seek consensus an objective of the voting system. The function of the voting system should simply be to return the most representative result in terms of representing the voters, as expressed by the voters' responses to the candidates who have offered themselves for election. Seeking consensus and not seeking consensus are aspects of how the elected members will behave within the elected assembly. And of course, the voters may rightly take such views into account in their assessments
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
Yes, there are areas where single-winner methods are more challenging. For example multi-winner STV works better than single-winner STV, and it is easier to collect sincere ratings in multi-winner methods than in single-winner methods. On the other hand the field of study may be wider in multi-winenr methods (a bit like N is more complicated than 1). In multi-winner methods we may have some additional aspects to study and solve like proportionality, geographical proportionality and the computational complexity related problems tend to cause problems. Individual problems may thus be more numerous in multi-winner methods although some individual problems may be more challenging in single-winner methods. Juho On 3.8.2011, at 19.35, James Gilmour wrote: Juho Laatu Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 6:04 AM Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated than single-winner methods. I disagree. It is much easier to obtain a satisfactory (representative, acceptable) outcome for a multi-winner election than it is to obtain a satisfactory (representative, acceptable) outcome for a single-winner election. Choosing a method to elect the candidate who best represents the voters in a single-winner election is the most difficult challenge in electoral science. As soon as you elect two or more candidates together, many of the problems disappear. James Gilmour Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the voters. If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A and 49% for B, we have a major problem in representation. But if the voters vote in the same way (51% to 49%) in a two-member election, any sensible voting system will give one seat to A and one seat to B. Compared to that difference in providing representation of the voters, all the other differences between single-winner and multi-winner elections are trivial. James -Original Message- From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Juho Laatu Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 7:07 AM To: EM list Subject: Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list? Yes, there are areas where single-winner methods are more challenging. For example multi-winner STV works better than single-winner STV, and it is easier to collect sincere ratings in multi-winner methods than in single-winner methods. On the other hand the field of study may be wider in multi-winenr methods (a bit like N is more complicated than 1). In multi-winner methods we may have some additional aspects to study and solve like proportionality, geographical proportionality and the computational complexity related problems tend to cause problems. Individual problems may thus be more numerous in multi-winner methods although some individual problems may be more challenging in single-winner methods. Juho On 3.8.2011, at 19.35, James Gilmour wrote: Juho Laatu Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 6:04 AM Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated than single-winner methods. I disagree. It is much easier to obtain a satisfactory (representative, acceptable) outcome for a multi-winner election than it is to obtain a satisfactory (representative, acceptable) outcome for a single-winner election. Choosing a method to elect the candidate who best represents the voters in a single-winner election is the most difficult challenge in electoral science. As soon as you elect two or more candidates together, many of the problems disappear. James Gilmour Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
2011/8/3 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk I noticed that there was a lot of activity on the multi-winner side. Earlier I have even complained about the lack of interest in multi-winner methods. Now there are still some interesting but unread mails in my inbox. Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated than single-winner methods. Maybe one reason behind the record is that there are still so many uncovered (in this word's regular non-EM English meaning) candidates to cover. Juho OK, on the theme of simple multi-winner systems I haven't seen described before, here's a simple Maximal (that is, non-sequential) Bucklin PR, MBPR. Now that the sequential bucklin PR methods have been described, it's the obvious next step: Collect ratings ballots. Allow anyone to nominate a slate. Choose the nominated slate which allows the highest cutoff to assign every candidate at least a Droop quota of approvals. Break the tie by finding the one which allows the highest quota of approvals per candidate (the slate whose members each satisfies the most separate voters). If there are still ties (basically, because you've reached the Hare quota, perfect representation, aside from bullet-vote write-ins) remove the approvals you've used, and find the maximum quota per candidate again (that is, look to for the slate whose members each double satisfies the most separate voters). Obviously, this needs to use the contest method to beat its NP-complete step. But all the rest of the steps are computationally tractable. Except for the NP-completeness, this or some minor variation thereof (diddling with the order of the tiebreakers between threshold, quota, and double-approved quota) seems like the optimal Bucklin method. I'd even go so far as to say that it seems so natural and right to me that, if it weren't NP-complete, I'd consider using it as a metric for other systems, graphing them on how well they do on average on the various tiebreakers. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
Hi Jameson, I like the slate-nominating feature it requires the nominators of the slates to think about the best composition of the council and not about their candidates. This encourages deliberation and discussion across partisan borders, I imagine, in order to find the perfect mix. Slate nomination is used in Sweden a lot, where a nomination committee gets the assignment to find the ideal slate. By allowing everyone to nominate slates, this nomination committee might not be needed, or would get some competition, I imagine. I like letting the voters do some deliberation and cross-partisan communication in order to ease the pain of the computer in evaluating zillions of slates. Peter On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 2:22 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote: 2011/8/3 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk I noticed that there was a lot of activity on the multi-winner side. Earlier I have even complained about the lack of interest in multi-winner methods. Now there are still some interesting but unread mails in my inbox. Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated than single-winner methods. Maybe one reason behind the record is that there are still so many uncovered (in this word's regular non-EM English meaning) candidates to cover. Juho OK, on the theme of simple multi-winner systems I haven't seen described before, here's a simple Maximal (that is, non-sequential) Bucklin PR, MBPR. Now that the sequential bucklin PR methods have been described, it's the obvious next step: Collect ratings ballots. Allow anyone to nominate a slate. Choose the nominated slate which allows the highest cutoff to assign every candidate at least a Droop quota of approvals. Break the tie by finding the one which allows the highest quota of approvals per candidate (the slate whose members each satisfies the most separate voters). If there are still ties (basically, because you've reached the Hare quota, perfect representation, aside from bullet-vote write-ins) remove the approvals you've used, and find the maximum quota per candidate again (that is, look to for the slate whose members each double satisfies the most separate voters). Obviously, this needs to use the contest method to beat its NP-complete step. But all the rest of the steps are computationally tractable. Except for the NP-completeness, this or some minor variation thereof (diddling with the order of the tiebreakers between threshold, quota, and double-approved quota) seems like the optimal Bucklin method. I'd even go so far as to say that it seems so natural and right to me that, if it weren't NP-complete, I'd consider using it as a metric for other systems, graphing them on how well they do on average on the various tiebreakers. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
2011/8/3 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com Hi Jameson, I like the slate-nominating feature it requires the nominators of the slates to think about the best composition of the council and not about their candidates. This encourages deliberation and discussion across partisan borders, I imagine, in order to find the perfect mix. Slate nomination is used in Sweden a lot, where a nomination committee gets the assignment to find the ideal slate. By allowing everyone to nominate slates, this nomination committee might not be needed, or would get some competition, I imagine. I like letting the voters do some deliberation and cross-partisan communication in order to ease the pain of the computer in evaluating zillions of slates. Peter Thanks for your positive comments. However, I have to admit that I anticipate that in most cases, the supposedly NP-complete problem would be an easy case which is resolvable using modern computation. So the winning slate would be often be proposed not by cross-partisan deliberation, but by someone who had a computer to evaluate zillions of slates. Note that another practical problem with this method is that it requires publishing full ballot data. With even a fair number of candidates and rating levels, that would be enough to make many individual ballots, opening up the possibility of vote-buying and such. So while I think this method is quite beautiful in theory, I don't propose it for real-world use. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
Juho Laatu Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 6:04 AM Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated than single-winner methods. I disagree. It is much easier to obtain a satisfactory (representative, acceptable) outcome for a multi-winner election than it is to obtain a satisfactory (representative, acceptable) outcome for a single-winner election. Choosing a method to elect the candidate who best represents the voters in a single-winner election is the most difficult challenge in electoral science. As soon as you elect two or more candidates together, many of the problems disappear. James Gilmour Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
This method looks like one pretty natural way of measuring who should be elected. The privacy concerns are a problem in some environments but not all. This method could thus well suit for some real-world use (if privacy in not a problem or if voting machines or vote counters can be trusted). Note that already e.g. basic rankings of typical Condorcet methods may violate privacy. If we want to be sure, we need large enough atomic voting areas and bullet votes, or not much more than that (e.g. short/truncated ballots and few discrete rating values only). The most efficient counting process could be one where you guess some cutoff level and then try to adjust it. One possible strategy could be that all parties (or wings) move towards exaggeration so that thy will give candidates of other parties 0 points. That way we could end up solving ties where the cutoff drops down to 0. Juho On 3.8.2011, at 19.05, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/3 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com Hi Jameson, I like the slate-nominating feature it requires the nominators of the slates to think about the best composition of the council and not about their candidates. This encourages deliberation and discussion across partisan borders, I imagine, in order to find the perfect mix. Slate nomination is used in Sweden a lot, where a nomination committee gets the assignment to find the ideal slate. By allowing everyone to nominate slates, this nomination committee might not be needed, or would get some competition, I imagine. I like letting the voters do some deliberation and cross-partisan communication in order to ease the pain of the computer in evaluating zillions of slates. Peter Thanks for your positive comments. However, I have to admit that I anticipate that in most cases, the supposedly NP-complete problem would be an easy case which is resolvable using modern computation. So the winning slate would be often be proposed not by cross-partisan deliberation, but by someone who had a computer to evaluate zillions of slates. Note that another practical problem with this method is that it requires publishing full ballot data. With even a fair number of candidates and rating levels, that would be enough to make many individual ballots, opening up the possibility of vote-buying and such. So while I think this method is quite beautiful in theory, I don't propose it for real-world use. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Record activity on the EM list?
Towards the end of July, I noticed that I had to scroll down a long ways in the archive to get to the most recent messages. I wonder if we set some kind of record. If we were approaching or receding from a major election, it would be more understandable. Maybe all of the feisty guys are getting too tame, so nothing gets censored. Maybe Rob is getting lax on filtering out the stuff that doesn't have Nobel prize potential :) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
On 8/2/11 8:48 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Towards the end of July, I noticed that I had to scroll down a long ways in the archive to get to the most recent messages. I wonder if we set some kind of record. If we were approaching or receding from a major election, it would be more understandable. Maybe all of the feisty guys are getting too tame, so nothing gets censored. i've been more peripheral because i ended up subscribing to the list because of and since a local political struggle regarding election methods and have been amazed by the contrast in the quality of argument regarding such between the local political scene (IRV violates one-person-one-vote... IRV disenfranchises certain voters... IRV favors progressive political interests violating equal protection of the law... or on the other hand IRV allows the voter to vote for their favorite candidate without worry of helping elect their least favorite candidate...) and this list (with a serious exception regarding two other subscribers that i eventually had to plonk). but, as a peripheral actor here, i haven't been participating too much in this SODA thing or any other asset voting systems. i have to admit that my attitude toward such is why bother?. i still don't get it. maybe in an election in an organization or corporation, but i just can't see such in a governmental election. people who complain about IRV or a ranked ballot as complicated will feel no different about an proxy-assignable contingency vote. toss in the option to not assign the contingency vote to a proxy (with an additional check box) and these people will all the more so say hunh?. but i'm watching. if i see something interesting, i'll pipe in, if that's okay with the other participants. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
I noticed that there was a lot of activity on the multi-winner side. Earlier I have even complained about the lack of interest in multi-winner methods. Now there are still some interesting but unread mails in my inbox. Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated than single-winner methods. Maybe one reason behind the record is that there are still so many uncovered (in this word's regular non-EM English meaning) candidates to cover. Juho On 3.8.2011, at 3.48, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Towards the end of July, I noticed that I had to scroll down a long ways in the archive to get to the most recent messages. I wonder if we set some kind of record. If we were approaching or receding from a major election, it would be more understandable. Maybe all of the feisty guys are getting too tame, so nothing gets censored. Maybe Rob is getting lax on filtering out the stuff that doesn't have Nobel prize potential :) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
