[EM] TACC (KM, CB)

2010-11-12 Thread C.Benham 


Chris wrote:

BTW, I also like the version of Smith//Approval that allows voters to indicate 
an
approval threshold so they can rank among unapproved candidates.


Kevin responded (10 Nov 2010):


I still don't. I don't understand why you should be allowed to vote
nonsense rankings and not have to stand by them when you succeed in
creating an artificial cycle. It means burial strategy only backfires when
the pawn candidate becomes the CW, which basically means burial is safe
as long as only one faction is doing it.




I think it's arguable that encouraging truncation goes against the 
spirit of the Condorcet criterion,
and I hate random-fill incentives. I just think that the winner of  
Smith//Approval (threshold) can

never be too bad  (SU-wise) or silly.

Arguing against results arising from "nonsense rankings" to me is almost 
an implicit criticism of

the Condorcet criterion itself.

Chris Benham

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Re: [EM] TACC (KM, CB)

2010-11-10 Thread Kevin Venzke 
Two quick comments:

--- En date de : Mer 10.11.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm  a 
écrit :

> De: Kristofer Munsterhjelm 
> Kathy Dopp wrote:
> > It is a little tricky to count, not very intuitive, so
> I wonder how to
> > explain it so most people could understand its
> logic?  The logic seems
> > solid.
> 
> You might do it by saying that the method admits stronger
> and stronger candidates into the set, according to the base
> method (Approval in this case), until it finds the strongest
> candidate that is also strong (beats the other members) in
> the pairwise sense.
> 
> The problem, however, would be to explain why having a
> candidate that is strong in both respects is desirable, and
> better than a candidate that is stronger in one respect but
> not strong at all in the other.

What is difficult for me to accept is that in the three-candidate case,
the pairwise strength is meaningless. Each of the three candidates will
have one win. So you're identifying the approval loser, and the guy who
happened to beat that candidate wins. He gets elected for beating a weak
candidate.

I think this oddness stems from always considering weak candidates 
(according to approval) before strong candidates, when the final candidate
considered is the winner.



Chris wrote:
>BTW, I also like the version of Smith//Approval that allows voters to
>indicate an
>approval threshold so they can rank among [un]approved candidates.

I still don't. I don't understand why you should be allowed to vote
nonsense rankings and not have to stand by them when you succeed in
creating an artificial cycle. It means burial strategy only backfires when
the pawn candidate becomes the CW, which basically means burial is safe
as long as only one faction is doing it.

Kevin


  

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