Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[raphfrk]

 From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>As I see it, without doing a rigorous analysis -- far from it! --
>the contribution to each fund by each voter would rationally be their 
>utility for that fund's candidate winning, should they wish to share
>the burden of their own caucus. The tragedy of the commons 
>could apply to this.

 
More specifically, their max contribution would be equal to the difference in 
utility
between the option in question and the expected outcome of the election.

There is however still a negotiation step:

A: 100, B: 80, C: 20
These people need the per voter payout to exceed $20 for them to shift from A 
to B

A: 0, B: 80, C: 20
Each of these people would be willing to contribute $80 to shift the winner to 
B from A

(Actually, since they get their share of the payout, they will actually be 
willing to pay $145
each.? If B wins, they lose $145 but then get a payout share of $65 meaning 
that a B win
costs them $80.? I will ignore this effect as it makes it more complex.? It is 
also a free
rider inducing effect though).

Assuming 100 voters, there is 80*45 = $3600 available for bids to shift the 
result to B.

The total effective payout to the first faction needs to be $20*55 = $1100. 

At what point should the first faction switch?? The second faction won't pay 
more than $80 each
but that represents more than 3 times as much as the minimum the first faction 
will accept.

This is where negotiation may be necessary.? Also, for negotiation, accurate 
knowledge of 
the potential outcomes are necessary.? Where there are more than 3 options, it 
may not 
be clear which options have a chance of winning and also how much they are 
valued by the
other factions.

>There is no possibility for betrayal in this -- except, of course, 
> that corrupt trustees could abscond with the funds, but ordinary 
>escrow could be used for the funds.

There are some free rider issues with the proposal.? It is in the interests of 
each of the
members of the first group not to bid and hope that enough others bid.? The 
question is if
the fa system could handle that.? On each level of the chain, people would be 
known and
it may be hard to pull out.? At the leaf levels, your proxy might ring you up 
to remind you
to bid (and point out that if he doesn't get 80% of his clients to bid, he will 
make his
proxy look bad).? 

Also, both sides suffer from free rider problems.? There will be members of the 
first faction 
who switch at $20 and members of the second faction who won't bid enough.? 
Perhaps,
?the 2 effects would cancel.

Tabarrok proposed what he called dominant insurance contracts.? This may have 
applications
here.? A betting market also achieves the above more directly.? Even without 
using the market
itself to select the winner, trading on the market should make every voter 
indifferent to the
outcome.




Raphfrk

Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"

www.wikocracy.com
 



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Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 10:33 PM 9/5/2007, Forest W Simmons wrote:
>As for the prisoner's dilemma problem, I wonder if the possibility of
>"defection" could be eliminated by having trading parties sit down and
>sign binding agreements during formal trading.

The concept that I was brought to by this discussion can be expressed in this:

The citizens of this community form an FA/DP organization; such 
organizations encourage universal membership by (1) making membership 
easy and of minimal burden, (2) not taking any controversial 
positions as an organization, and (3) facilitating coordination and 
cooperation between factions that can form over any issue, by 
utilizing the concentration of representation through chosen proxies, 
who do not issue binding orders, but only distribute advice to their 
clients (as well as receiving information about client ideas and preferences).

So, in the subject election, there are two factions, which can 
naturally be represented by two proxies, though more can certainly be 
at the table. These proxies negotiate a suggested compensation 
between the factions, and, in theory, it is possible, because this is 
a positive-sum game (i.e, there is an option which, if the ratings 
represent commensurable utilities, optimizes the overall gain, though 
it may not optimize the individual gain of each faction, unless there 
is some transfer of compensation) which makes the optimal choice a 
gain for all factions; it is possible but not necessary that this 
gain be evenly distributed.

*However,* the success of this negotiation will be measured by the 
election. What the negotiation does is to establish three funds, one 
for each of the outcomes. Thus there is the A fund, the B fund, and 
the C fund. Citizens contribute to the funds according to what 
outcome they prefer, they can contribute to more than one fund, 
should they choose, though it makes no sense to contribute to all of 
the funds. If the election is won by A, then the A fund is 
distributed to all citizens who voted. If by B, the B fund it 
distributed, and if by C, the C fund is distributed. The 
contributions to the other funds are returned to those who contributed.

Now the funds by themselves would be pretty chaotic. However, the key 
would be that FA/DP negotiation would set suggested contributions for 
each faction, and the FA structure would likewise monitor 
performance, and donors to any fund could change their contribution 
under certain rules, up until a certain deadline, perhaps the day 
before the election. Come election day, all voters would know what 
they would receive from each election outcome. There is no legal 
obligation to contribute to any fund. However, if the negotiation has 
been successful, all voters will have a motive to vote, probably, for 
the utility optimizer. Whatever other utilities there exist 
(non-financial) would, in theory, have been balanced by the 
compensation, and, if the distribution is even, the overall utility 
winner will be the one most advantageous to all voters. Rationally, 
it should be unanimous.

Such a system is not going to induce voters to vote for something 
they consider truly repugnant short of that, however, it will 
compensate them sufficiently, by definition. It's true that they may 
not get what they would personally deem enough to have induced them 
to vote for that option, but, remember, the initial conditions 
supposed uniform ratings within each of the two factions.

As I see it, without doing a rigorous analysis -- far from it! --, 
the contribution to each fund by each voter would rationally be their 
utility for that fund's candidate winning, should they wish to share 
the burden of their own caucus. The tragedy of the commons could apply to this.

However, if the B voters refuse to contribute to the C fund, they 
will have only themselves to blame for the victory of A, and this 
regret would be individual, and they would each know if they had made 
sufficient effort, on average. The members of the A faction, seeing 
the poor contribution level to the C fund, will likewise not make 
contributions to the A and C funds. They will know, from the FA/DP 
organization, that they are in the majority, and they can get what 
they want -- if the election rules allow the majority to prevail -- 
without resorting to compensation. If the election method is 
majoritarian, then, what would mostly happen is that B voters, 
understanding their situation, contribute to the C fund -- if the 
real commensurable utilities are the ones originally given as 
ratings. They only have to pay if C wins (more accurately, they get 
their contributions money back if C does not win.)

There is no possibility for betrayal in this -- except, of course, 
that corrupt trustees could abscond with the funds, but ordinary 
escrow could be used for the funds.

The proxies sitting down to negotiate on behalf of their factions 
would presumably have some idea of what their clients would actually 
be willing 

Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Forest!

Binding agreements will not solve the problem completely I think. Assume 
the situation is this, with 4 candidates A,B,C,D of which 3 (A,B,D) have 
each received 1/3 of the vote, and with the following preferences over 
lotteries:

A: A 100, C 80, BD 0
B: B 100, C 80, AB 0
D: D 100, C 80, AB 0
(The number 80 in the first row means A prefers getting C for certain to 
getting A with 80% and B or D with 20% probability.)

Now if one of the three bluffs by claiming not to consider C a good 
compromise, the other two still gain by signing an agreement to transfer 
their probability share to C. Hence each of the three has an incentive 
to bluff if she can hope the other two will probably sign the agreement 
anyway.

The only solution seems to be that at least one of them announces that 
she won't sign an agreement with only one other but only with both 
others. But such an announcement would only be credible if that 
candidate would at the same time represent her rating for the compromise 
as something between 34 and 49 instead of 80.

In any case, it seems that also with binding agreements it depends on 
what information the candidates have about the other's preferences...

Yours, Jobst


Forest W Simmons schrieb:
> Jobst,
>
> I'm not sure how to define "rational" in this context, either.
>
> As for the prisoner's dilemma problem, I wonder if the possibility of 
> "defection" could be eliminated by having trading parties sit down and 
> sign binding agreements during formal trading.
>
> My Best,
>
> Forest
>
>
> Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>
>
>   
>> Dear Forest,
>>
>> 
>>> Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots 
>>> before the election, and their "trading" of assets should be required 
>>> to be "rational" relative to these announced ratings?
>>>   
>>>   
>> I had this idea, too. But upon closer inspection, it is not quite easy 
>> to define what in this case "rational" means, since in this form of 
>> trading there easily arise situations similar to the prisoner's dilemma 
>> and situations in which "bluffing" could work...
>>
>> Yours, Jobst
>>
>> 
>>> Or perhaps, a randomly chose jury of candidate X supporters should 
>>>   
> have 
>   
>>> some say in the candidate X proxy decisions?
>>>
>>> Forest
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list 
>>>   
> info
>   
>>>   
>>>   
>>
>> 
>
>
>   



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Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[Forest W Simmons]

Jobst,

I'm not sure how to define "rational" in this context, either.

As for the prisoner's dilemma problem, I wonder if the possibility of 
"defection" could be eliminated by having trading parties sit down and 
sign binding agreements during formal trading.

My Best,

Forest


Jobst Heitzig wrote:


>Dear Forest,
>
>> Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots 
>> before the election, and their "trading" of assets should be required 
>> to be "rational" relative to these announced ratings?
>>   
>
>I had this idea, too. But upon closer inspection, it is not quite easy 
>to define what in this case "rational" means, since in this form of 
>trading there easily arise situations similar to the prisoner's dilemma 
>and situations in which "bluffing" could work...
>
>Yours, Jobst
>
>> Or perhaps, a randomly chose jury of candidate X supporters should 
have 
>> some say in the candidate X proxy decisions?
>>
>> Forest
>>
>>
>>
>> 
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list 
info
>>
>>
>>   
>
>
>

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Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 06:27 PM 9/2/2007, Forest W Simmons wrote:
>I'm not sure about the "most" but it does seem true that at least some
>of the more ego stricken candidates would be less willing to compromise
>than their supporters.  [However, in the challenge, if C voted for
>himself above A or B, it didn't register.]

Well, as stated, there is no C faction, if we name factions by their 
first choice. Yet, contrary to this, the universe of options is narrow.

Negotiationof compensation, as I've come to realize, could shift the 
utilities by essentially modifying the choices. I.e., instead of the 
choices being A, B, or C, they would become

A with compensation to the 45% faction of $X
B with compensation to the 55% faction of $Y.
C with compensation to the 45% faction of $M and the 55% faction of $N.

If the given ratings as given are commensurable utilities such that 
they can be meaningfully summed, we immediately recognize C as the 
efficient compromise, requiring the smallest total compensation. If 
we assume that whatever goes to one faction, net, must come from the 
other faction, then there is a net utility for each faction that is 
equalized, with the proper values of X, Y, M, and N.

Jobst looked at this in a restricted way, and wondered why the B 
voters should compensate the A voters, if the best compromise was 
being chosen. But the benefit of the "best compromise" -- or the loss 
of it, as could be the case -- is not equally distributed. Here the 
majority is losing and may, indeed, be able to force their outcome. 
However, justice is what I was considering, not power as such, even 
though being in the majority is power.

And justice would clearly indicate the most just outcome as the one 
which evenly distributes benefit or loss, other things being equal. 
(i.e., we might assert some distortion if one faction was wealthier 
than another, for example, but that would be noise in this study. 
Indeed, it could shift utilities, but we would have complicated the situation.)

What negotiation would do is to introduce a whole family of other 
options than the raw choices of A, B, or C. If it's a public facility 
being chosen, as the example I used, the proposal could be modified 
such that it was funded by a tax that was different on different 
districts. Or the whole thing could be done voluntarily, outside of 
government or tax funding of compensation. It all, ultimately, comes 
out of the same set of pockets, though.

If the negotiation is voluntary, it should, if done efficiently and 
the factions are well-represented in it (delegable proxy, anyone?), 
shift the utilities so that they are maximized for all, rationally, 
all voters would then support the outcome developed through 
negotiation. The proof of this, of course, would be the election 
results, but the negotiations could indeed set up preset compensation 
that depends on the election outcome.

Folks, this could be done *now*. It does not depend on changes in 
law. It does not buy votes, for the compensation is dependent, not on 
any individual vote, but on the outcome. "If this community passes 
this initiative, I will donate $X to a fund for community benefit," 
would be legal. "If the community center is built at C, I, as trustee 
for the B voters, will pay $X to every citizen who offered to pay $Y 
if A is elected." And the funds have been collected, or pledged on 
security, and then paid according to the outcome. Nobody is required 
to participate in this, and nobody is paid according to how they 
voted. You get paid, however, if you made a binding bid. (It's 
possible that the bids could be individual amounts, and thus even 
where utilities were not evenly distributed in a group, they could 
*all* be equalized. If you bid more for your option, you are implying 
an increased value to you of that option. "Which would you rather 
have, A, or $X?" If you bid inaccurately, you may get what your bid 
indicated! Some people, if they know how the bidding is gone, may 
exaggerate their bid if they are confident that the other option will 
be chosen, but they are running the risk that this will cause their 
bid to be accepted by the electorate. And the negotiators could 
specifically cap the compensation, if they suspected this was going 
on. With a travel distance utility underlying the process, 
exaggerated bids would be pretty visible.)

In any case, I find the idea of shifting preferences through 
compensation based on outcome to be quite interesting. If only a 
small number participate, it would improve election outcomes a small 
amount. If large numbers participate, it could make democracy 
function more efficiently and fairly without changes in law. Those 
kind of solutions truly interest me, because they bypass the 
entrenched interests which can often block changes in law that 
threaten their inequitable power.


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Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Forest,

> Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots 
> before the election, and their "trading" of assets should be required 
> to be "rational" relative to these announced ratings?
>   

I had this idea, too. But upon closer inspection, it is not quite easy 
to define what in this case "rational" means, since in this form of 
trading there easily arise situations similar to the prisoner's dilemma 
and situations in which "bluffing" could work...

Yours, Jobst

> Or perhaps, a randomly chose jury of candidate X supporters should have 
> some say in the candidate X proxy decisions?
>
> Forest
>
>
>
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>   



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Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[Forest W Simmons]

On August 29 raphfrk wrote ...

>Most candidates would prefer a 45% chance that they will win >over a 
100% chance that they won't.  Their own personal utlities
>will swamp any difference in factional utilities.

I'm not sure about the "most" but it does seem true that at least some 
of the more ego stricken candidates would be less willing to compromise 
than their supporters.  [However, in the challenge, if C voted for 
himself above A or B, it didn't register.]

So (in the challenge example) asset voting based on random ballot might 
do no better than plain random ballot, if A is one of those big ego 
types.

Is there a possibility of asset voting where the candidate proxies are 
more constrained by their supporters?

Even DYN, which delegates less power to the proxy than asset voting, 
might benefit from more good ideas along these lines.

Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots 
before the election, and their "trading" of assets should be required 
to be "rational" relative to these announced ratings?

Or perhaps, a randomly chose jury of candidate X supporters should have 
some say in the candidate X proxy decisions?

Forest




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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise (correction)

[Juho]

There are deterministic method related tracks that have not been  
discussed so far. It is possible to use the uncertainty involved in  
the polls. The votes need not be exactly 55% and 45% but there can be  
some uncertainty on which one of the two groups is bigger.


The A supporters may vote "A>C>>B" instead of "A>>C>B" to increase  
the probability of electing C in the case that the A group will not  
have majority. (The method could use e.g. approval cutoff, different  
preference strengths, ratings.)


I think this works also with the "near perfect information"  
assumption. Probabilities depend on the level of "nearness".


Juho


P.S. I assume the challenge is now to elect only "good" compromise  
candidates




On Aug 30, 2007, at 16:37 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:




Forest W Simmons wrote:

Below where I said "unlike Borda" I should have said "unlike D2MAC."
Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution  
requires

anything other than the ordinal preferences.

So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of  
vote

trading are insensitive to whether or not the voters are inclined to
approve C.

Perhaps we could refine the challenge to ask for methods that elect C
with near certainty when the two factions are

55 A 100 C 80 B 0
45 B 100 C 80 B 0

but almost surely do not elect C with when the two factions are

55 A 100 C 20 B 0
45 B 100 C 20 B 0

assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect
information.

It seems to me that vote trading and/or randomness are needed to  
solve

this challenge.



I am inclined to agree with you. however, I am not willing to give up
hope on a third type of method yet.

I would say that on a lower level you need"
  "A method that makes it optimal for an individual voter to vote with
true preference."

the 3 methods I have noticed identified so far are vote trading,
randomized ballots, and hiding information from the voter.

your assumption of "near perfect information" obviously eliminates the
last one. Both of the methods that are left reduce to giving the  
voters
good reason to vote the truth. I think it is a good idea to keep  
that in

mind when devising future systems.

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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 04:23 AM 8/30/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>The only thing I wish is that you try to be post shorter messages, 
>since I really have trouble to read that much!


Sorry, don't have time!





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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise (correction)

[Jobst Heitzig]

Hey folks,

it seems I got my numbers wrong when saying there was a group strategy 
equilibrium in Borda...
Because when the situation is
55 C>A>B
45 C>B>A
the 55 can still change the outcome to A by voting
55 A>B>C instead.
Only this is not an equilibrium either. Seems there is no equilibrium at 
all...

However, other scoring methods will work, e.g. the one proposed by Juho 
and the one Forest announced to me privately (in order to keep the fun): 
Vote against one.

Still, all of them have the cloning problem, so we should try to find a 
clone-proof scoring method that will do. I have the impression that the 
following comes near to it:
Ballots are complete rankings without equal rankings, scores are 
determined like this: Option X gets a point for each tuple (V,W) where V 
is any voter and W is any voter who ranked X above that option which was 
ranked last by V.

For example:
55 A>C>B
45 B>C>A
will give
A a score of (0+55)*55=3025,
B a score of (0+45)*45=2025, and
C a score of 55*55+45*45=5050.
Now the A voters could try
55 A>B>C
but this would change the scores to
A: (0+55)*55=3025,
B: 55*55+(0+45)*45=5050, and
C: 45*45=2025,
which is even worse for the A voters.
If they try
28 A>C>B and
27 A>B>C,
they will produce the scores
A: (27+28)*28+(28+27)*27=3025,
B: 27*27+(0+45)*45=729+2025=2754,
C: 28*28+45*45=784+2025=2809.
So this would produce A, but the B voters can easily react and vote
45 C>B>A
and thus change the result back to C.
However, this is still no equilibrium.

Let's see whether the following is an equilibrium:
55 C>A>B
45 C>B>A
Scores:
A: 55*55=3025
B: 45*45=2025
C: (55+45)*55+(45+55)*45=1
If now the A voters try
28 A>C>B and
27 A>B>C,
they will change the scores to
A: (27+28)*28+(28+27)*27=3025,
B: 27*27+45*45=729+2025=2754,
C: 28*28+28*45+45*45=784+1260+2025=4069,
so that won't work, and is seems also no other strategy will change the 
winner from C to A.
So it seems this is a group strategy equilibrium. Next, we will have to 
test whether there are other equilibria that elect A or B, and if not, 
whether this one is globally attractive. If not, I guess the scores have 
to be adjusted further...

Yours, Jobst


[EMAIL PROTECTED] schrieb:
> Forest W Simmons wrote:
> > Below where I said "unlike Borda" I should have said "unlike D2MAC."  
>
> > Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution requires 
>
> > anything other than the ordinal preferences.
>
> > 
>
> > So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of vote 
>
> > trading are insensitive to whether or not the voters are inclined to 
>
> > approve C.
>
> > 
>
> > Perhaps we could refine the challenge to ask for methods that elect C 
>
> > with near certainty when the two factions are
>
> > 
>
> > 55 A 100 C 80 B 0
>
> > 45 B 100 C 80 B 0
>
> > 
>
> > but almost surely do not elect C with when the two factions are
>
> > 
>
> > 55 A 100 C 20 B 0
>
> > 45 B 100 C 20 B 0
>
> > 
>
> > assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect 
>
> > information.
>
> > 
>
>
>
> What about using a clone elimination stage to allow Borda be used.
>
>
>
> For example, select 3 candidates using a PR method.   This is basically
>
> a clone elimination stage.
>
>
>
> The winner is then determined using Borda where all 3 candidates must be
>
> ranked.
>
>
>
> The problem is that A can still be cloned into A1 and A2 as the A faction has 
> a majority and
>
> so can ontain a majority under any reasonable PR method.  However, at least 
> there would be 
>
> a choice between A1 and A2.  The B faction would get to decide which of the 2 
> A's would 
>
> win.  The end result could easily be that C is A2 (i.e. the 2nd candidate 
> from the A faction 
>
> ... which isn't likely to be infinitely cohesive).  
>
>
>
> Also, the more candidates that are passed through the first stage the better. 
>  If 4 candidates
>
> were passed, then a faction with 40%+1 of the vote can get 2 candidates to 
> the 2nd stage.
>
>
>
> This would yield
>
>
>
> A: 2
>
> B: 2
>
>
>
> If A and B factions both ran clones, then the result is:
>
>
>
> 55:  A1>A2>B2>B1
>
> 45:  B1>B2>A2>A1
>
>
>
> A1 gets 3*55 = 165
>
> A2 gets 2*55 + 45 = 155
>
> B2 gets 55 + 2*45 = 145
>
> B1 gets 3*45 = 135
>
>
>
> This assumes perfect strategy.  The A faction is exactly countering
>
> each B faction vote.  However, it is unlikely that the B faction could
>
> coordinate all to vote the same way without the A faction winning.
>
>
>
> It still doesn't solve the problem, but at least it gives the voters more 
> choice and they 
>
> aren't likely to be party fanatics in general.  Also, if there are lots of 
> candidates
>
> through the first stage, maintaining party uniformity would be alot harder.
>
> 
> *Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail* 
>  
> -- Unlimited storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protecti

Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise (correction)

[raphfrk]

 Forest W Simmons wrote:

> Below where I said "unlike Borda" I should have said "unlike D2MAC."  
> Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution requires 
> anything other than the ordinal preferences.
> 
> So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of vote 
> trading are insensitive to whether or not the voters are inclined to 
> approve C.
> 
> Perhaps we could refine the challenge to ask for methods that elect C 
> with near certainty when the two factions are
> 
> 55 A 100 C 80 B 0
> 45 B 100 C 80 B 0
> 
> but almost surely do not elect C with when the two factions are
> 
> 55 A 100 C 20 B 0
> 45 B 100 C 20 B 0
> 
> assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect 
> information.
> 

What about using a clone elimination stage to allow Borda be used.

For example, select 3 candidates using a PR method.   This is basically
a clone elimination stage.

The winner is then determined using Borda where all 3 candidates must be
ranked.

The problem is that A can still be cloned into A1 and A2 as the A faction has a 
majority and
so can ontain a majority under any reasonable PR method.  However, at least 
there would be 
a choice between A1 and A2.  The B faction would get to decide which of the 2 
A's would 
win.  The end result could easily be that C is A2 (i.e. the 2nd candidate from 
the A faction 
... which isn't likely to be infinitely cohesive).  

Also, the more candidates that are passed through the first stage the better.  
If 4 candidates
were passed, then a faction with 40%+1 of the vote can get 2 candidates to the 
2nd stage.

This would yield

A: 2
B: 2

If A and B factions both ran clones, then the result is:

55:  A1>A2>B2>B1
45:  B1>B2>A2>A1

A1 gets 3*55 = 165
A2 gets 2*55 + 45 = 155
B2 gets 55 + 2*45 = 145
B1 gets 3*45 = 135

This assumes perfect strategy.  The A faction is exactly countering
each B faction vote.  However, it is unlikely that the B faction could
coordinate all to vote the same way without the A faction winning.

It still doesn't solve the problem, but at least it gives the voters more 
choice and they 
aren't likely to be party fanatics in general.  Also, if there are lots of 
candidates
through the first stage, maintaining party uniformity would be alot harder.






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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise (correction)

[Howard Swerdfeger]

Forest W Simmons wrote:
> Below where I said "unlike Borda" I should have said "unlike D2MAC."  
> Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution requires 
> anything other than the ordinal preferences.
> 
> So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of vote 
> trading are insensitive to whether or not the voters are inclined to 
> approve C.
> 
> Perhaps we could refine the challenge to ask for methods that elect C 
> with near certainty when the two factions are
> 
> 55 A 100 C 80 B 0
> 45 B 100 C 80 B 0
> 
> but almost surely do not elect C with when the two factions are
> 
> 55 A 100 C 20 B 0
> 45 B 100 C 20 B 0
> 
> assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect 
> information.
> 
> It seems to me that vote trading and/or randomness are needed to solve 
> this challenge.
> 

I am inclined to agree with you. however, I am not willing to give up 
hope on a third type of method yet.

I would say that on a lower level you need"
  "A method that makes it optimal for an individual voter to vote with 
true preference."

the 3 methods I have noticed identified so far are vote trading, 
randomized ballots, and hiding information from the voter.

your assumption of "near perfect information" obviously eliminates the 
last one. Both of the methods that are left reduce to giving the voters 
good reason to vote the truth. I think it is a good idea to keep that in 
mind when devising future systems.

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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Abd ul-Rahman,
>> > the ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction.
>>
>> You're doing it again -- please stop it.
>
> That was not an insult. It made the challenge more interesting. I'm 
> sorry that you thought it critical.

I don't think it was insulting. You just repeatedly attribute opinions 
or intentions to me which are not mine. I explained several times how 
the ratings are meant to have more meaning than just rankings.

I also don't think you were critical here, but I certainly invite you to 
be it!

The only thing I wish is that you try to be post shorter messages, since 
I really have trouble to read that much!

Yours, Jobst


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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 07:37 PM 8/29/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:

> > the ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction.
>
>You're doing it again -- please stop it.

That was not an insult. It made the challenge more interesting. I'm 
sorry that you thought it critical.


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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Juho]

On Aug 30, 2007, at 2:30 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:

> Dear Juho!
>
>> How about the weighted Borda that I described earlier? Square root
>> weights would give 0, 1 and 1.4 points instead of 0, 1 and 2.
>
> I'm totally sorry -- I just have forgotten that you proposed this. It
> will probably work, too, but I'm not sure whether those scores make it
> easier or more difficult...

Yes, same results, but with different style. At that point I didn't  
yet consider the equilibrium possibilities, just electing C already  
with the sincere votes, and therefore needing the square root  
modification (or something similar giving the compromise more points  
than just the average of min and max).

Juho

>> In line with what Forest wrote I'm not advocating these methods,
>> except as challenges on this list. The most obvious problem is
>> clones, e.g. one candidate from the Democrats and two from the
>> Republicans. From this point of view one could require that votes 55
>> A>>C>B 45 B>C>>A and 55 A>>C>B 45 C>B>>A will not elect C.
>
> Right. Neither am I advocating them. It was just an observation that
> Borda deals better in this particular situation. We should improve  
> upon
> that!
>
> Yours, Jobst



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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Abd ul-Rahman,

> The ratings, then, were a serious red
> herring. All that would matter is the ranking.

Not at all. I only stated that a certain method (classical Borda) has in the 
given situation no group strategy equilibria electing A or B but only some 
group strategy equilibria electing C.

> A 210, B 190, C 200. This does not elect C. So I've misunderstood
> something.

Yes. I did not say Borda elects C with *sincere* rankings. I said all *group 
strategy equilibria* elect C, for example the equilibrium

55 C>A>B
45 C>B>A

> the ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction. 

You're doing it again -- please stop it.

Jobst

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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Juho!

> How about the weighted Borda that I described earlier? Square root
> weights would give 0, 1 and 1.4 points instead of 0, 1 and 2.

I'm totally sorry -- I just have forgotten that you proposed this. It 
will probably work, too, but I'm not sure whether those scores make it 
easier or more difficult...
 
> In line with what Forest wrote I'm not advocating these methods,
> except as challenges on this list. The most obvious problem is
> clones, e.g. one candidate from the Democrats and two from the
> Republicans. From this point of view one could require that votes 55
> A>>C>B 45 B>C>>A and 55 A>>C>B 45 C>B>>A will not elect C.

Right. Neither am I advocating them. It was just an observation that 
Borda deals better in this particular situation. We should improve upon 
that!

Yours, Jobst


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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise (correction)

[Forest W Simmons]

Below where I said "unlike Borda" I should have said "unlike D2MAC."  
Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution requires 
anything other than the ordinal preferences.

So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of vote 
trading are insensitive to whether or not the voters are inclined to 
approve C.

Perhaps we could refine the challenge to ask for methods that elect C 
with near certainty when the two factions are

55 A 100 C 80 B 0
45 B 100 C 80 B 0

but almost surely do not elect C with when the two factions are

55 A 100 C 20 B 0
45 B 100 C 20 B 0

assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect 
information.

It seems to me that vote trading and/or randomness are needed to solve 
this challenge.


Forest W Simmons wrote:

>
>I was thinking of "vote against one," which could be called Reverse 
>Plurality, the base method for each step of the Coombs sequential 
>elimination method. Equivalently, it could be described as, "vote for 
>exactly two candidates."
>
>This method would elect C because the 45 in favor of B would have no 
>reason to vote against B or C, so they would all vote against A.  If 
>the other 55 voted more against C than B, then B would win, so they 
>will vote more against B than C, which allows C to win.
>
>Unlike Borda, this solution works even if the ratings for C are low:
>
>55 A>>C>B
>45 B>>C>A
>
>I'm not advocating Reverse Plurality, but it is perhaps the simplest 
>deterministic solution to the challenge.


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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

this discussion has developed, for me, a number of interesting ideas, 
it exposes certain aspects of election methods that have been 
otherwise obscured.

At 06:05 PM 8/28/2007, Forest W Simmons wrote:
>Jobst,
>
>so you were thinking of Borda where equal rankings are not allowed. Why
>didn't I think of that?

Now this is certainly interesting. I didn't see the post here where 
Jobst gave that answer, but maybe it was implied and I missed it, 
which could easily happen. The ratings, then, were a serious red 
herring. All that would matter is the ranking.

"Equal rankings are not allowed" requires some conditions that are 
problematic. First of all, this requires that all voters rank all 
candidates on pain of having their ballot tossed. Further, it is 
assumed, for this to work for the stated goal, that write-in 
candidates are also not allowed. This has implications beyond the 
functioning of the method itself, but reaches into how candidates 
make it onto the ballot.

And, of course, it's vulnerable to turkey-raising. I was assuming, in 
my consideration of the problem, what is often assumed in dealing 
with election methods, that the three candidates were merely the top 
three. For example, most studies of election methods, considering a 
candidate set, don't even think about write-ins; they are mostly 
irrelevant, they are only a little noise around the bottom. In 
bottom-elimination, they are gone quickly, leaving us with a smaller 
election set. Unless, of course, a lot of people write them in

I'd never before taken a close look at Borda Count. It is essentially 
Range with a restriction; in my view it is close to Range, the 
underlying machinery is more like Range than other ranked methods, 
but, of course, it is strictly a ranked method with ranks being 
defined as of equal preference strength.

Let me be explicit about how this could elect C. I will modify the 
way Borda count from how it is usually stated to make it equivalent 
to a Range 2 election (CR 3).

55: A>C>B
45: B>C>A

Counts: A, B, C

55: 3 1 2
45: 1 3 2

totals:

A 210, B 190, C 200. This does not elect C. So I've misunderstood something.

Now, *other things being equal,* C is clearly a good winner, indeed 
the optimal one. But that is actually a strong condition, other 
things may easily not be equal. I gave an example of the *meaning* of 
these rankings -- I was assigning meaning to the ratings, but 
obviously, that meaning was then simply a possible meaning for the 
ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction. The example was travel 
distance to a public site being chosen by the election, like the 
capital city distances used in Wikipedia election examples.

For 55% of voters, the distances are

A 0, B 100, C 20, thus the voter prefers A>C>B

while the B voter distances are

A 10, B 0, C 2, thus the voter prefers B>C>A

Which, now, is the "just" winner?

total travel distance for the community (assuming 100 voters):

A 450, B 5500, C 2000.

Which of these choices is more just?

The point that I have made, over and over, is that you cannot tell 
from rankings. Borda works, more or less, because *usually* there is 
some preference strength between candidates, and by assuming that 
this preference strength is an average value over the ranked 
candidate set, Borda approximates real preference strengths, and the 
differences will tend to average out.

However, the particular conditions of an election can easily make 
this fail. The travel distance example is one where we have an easily 
understandable, true utility basis for the preferences, the 
preference strengths as indicated in the original ratings (i.e, all 
voters had preferences of the kind 100, 80, 0, but reversed in 
sequence). Jobst claimed to not believe that utilities have any 
meaning, but this is reducing the meaning of elections to something 
quite arbitrary, pure, unexplained preference.

In the example I've given, if A is chosen, the A voters have minimum 
travel distance, 0 as stated, and they are in the majority. The B 
voters have maximum travel distance, but it is only 10 km more than 
the minimum.

If C is chosen, the A voters have a substantially increased travel 
distance, 20 km each, and that impacts a majority of voters, 55%, 
providing a smaller benefit to the B voters, a reduction in distance 
of 8 km over the A choice. In order to provide an 8 km benefit to the 
B voters, the choice of C would cost each A voter 20 km, and there 
are more A voters than B voters.

B, with the given distances, is a preposterous choice. It provides 
maximum benefit to the B voters, but the cost to the A voters is very large.

Jobst wanted to know why I considered the default to be A, when I 
suggested payment by the B voters if they wanted the election to 
choose C. Well, I didn't assign any special meaning to A, beyond the 
obvious one that the A voters were in the majority, so it made sense 
to consider the election from the point of view of the cost of 
shifting preferenc

Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Juho]

On Aug 27, 2007, at 23:15 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:

> Think about Borda using scores 0, 1, and 2, without equal rankings  
> allowed: The A voters can give A at most a score of 55*2=110 and  
> have to give either B or C at least a score of 28. Hence whatever  
> the A voters do, they cannot be sure to have A elected since the B  
> voters could advance B or C to at least a score of 118 by giving it  
> a score of 45*2=90. From this one can see easily that there is no  
> group strategy equilibrium electing A or B. All group strategy  
> equilibria elect C, for example the one in which everbody puts C  
> first and her favourite second. The drawback is only that these  
> equilibria are not globally attractive, since there are starting  
> points (e.g. sincere rankings) from which the process of repeatedly  
> replacing the strategies by optimal respond strategies to the  
> current strategies will not eventually lead to an equilibrium but  
> may get stuck in a cycle.

How about the weighted Borda that I described earlier? Square root  
weights would give 0, 1 and 1.4 points instead of 0, 1 and 2.

In line with what Forest wrote I'm not advocating these methods,  
except as challenges on this list. The most obvious problem is  
clones, e.g. one candidate from the Democrats and two from the  
Republicans. From this point of view one could require that votes 55  
A>>C>B 45 B>C>>A and 55 A>>C>B 45 C>B>>A will not elect C.

Juho




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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 02:32 AM 8/28/2007, rob brown wrote:
>On 8/27/07, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax 
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>At 01:07 AM 8/27/2007, rob brown wrote:
> >On 8/26/07, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> >Social animals and eusocial animals are totally different
> >things.  Worker bees, by virtue of their anatomical design and their
> >behavior, will give their own lives for the sake of the hive (they
> >sting and die).
>
>Whereas humans won't? What planet do you live on? It's *instinctive.*
>
>
>Uh, yeah.  Everyone here is motivated solely for the good of the collective.

I've now read Mr. Brown's little document on his web site, and I know 
understand better where he is coming from. He is not listening, he 
has an idea fixed in his head about what we are trying to say, 
already, before we say it, and it is not what we think or how we think.

Look at what I said above, and his response. What I did was to point 
to a very common and very human response. Not everyone will do it, 
but when an airliner crashed into the Potomac river, bystanders 
jumped into the freezing water to rescue people. They rescued many, 
and one of them himself died. This kind of action happens over and 
over again. Not always, not everybody, but many. Does this mean that 
the person who jumped into the river and died was "motivated solely 
for the good of the collective?" No. He probably didn't think about 
the "good of the collective." He saw people who needed help and he jumped in.

Does this mean that we can just sit back and trust that people will 
spontaneously act to prevent the tragedy of the commons (which is 
what his document is about, previously mentioned in this thread)? *Of 
course not.* People are complex, we are mixtures of self-interest and 
community connection. We have complex selves; we identify who we are 
and thus "us" in complex ways; in some situations, "us" is only our 
immediate family, in others, it is our co-workers, in others, it is 
our ethnic group, in others, it is our town, in others, it is the 
entire human community, and, occasionally, it is the entire community of life.

These allegiences conflict with one another, often. So which one 
predominates at any time is not something we can predict with ease. 
However, some general principles do seem easy to apply. People will 
not generally make a great sacrifice for the common welfare unless 
the action is clearly likely to succeed, and even there such actions 
would be spotty. However, people will routinely, most of them, make a 
small sacrifice for a larger net community good; this is even more 
likely if the beneficiary can actually be seen, it is less likely if 
the benefit is diffuse and abstract.

>   In fact, I think its lovely how here, on this planet, no one 
> tries to game the system or find loopholes or manipulate things to 
> their advantage.  If they did, people would, say, do things like 
> take advantage of the openness and cheapness of the email protocol 
> to send unsolicited commercial messages to people.  But luckily no 
> one does that...

Isn't sarcasm in the service of arrogance and ignorance wonderful?

People will try to seek advantage. Advantage for what? For 
themselves. But *what is the self?* It is not a fixed thing, we have 
overlapping concepts of self. At one moment it might be my, myself, 
and I. At another, my children. At another, my town. At another, the 
members of a mailing list. At another, every person on the planet. 
Not all people experience all of these, but healthy people experience 
most, at least occasionally.

*We want people to seek advantage for themselves through the election 
method.* We do not want them to act "altrustically," for the election 
methods that we promote are seeking to discover the common welfare, 
by amalgamating individual welfare as expressed by the voter. If the 
voter thinks that the voter benefits by some manner of voting, *this 
is what we want them to do.* They are providing the information we 
seek, which is what they think best for themselves.

Mr. Brown apparently has no understanding of this at all. It's not 
that he actually disagrees, for you can't actually disagree with 
something you do not understand. He *thinks* he understands, he has 
us pegged as "those naive, wide-eyed people who believe in innate 
human goodness and lah-te-dah everything will be rosy and we will all 
live happily ever after since we all love each other and always act 
for the common good."

No. We don't always act that way. A naive approach to the tragedy of 
the commons is not going to resolve it. The little story Mr. Brown 
tells, though, is quite warped. I would guess from it that he has 
never lived in a healthy small town where people have a sense of 
ownership of the place. I have, though only recently. It is not what 
I expected. Until last year, I lived for a few years in a small New 
England Town Meeting town, with what remains of direct democracy in 
the U.S. Quite simply, those roads wou

Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Forest W Simmons]

Jobst,

so you were thinking of Borda where equal rankings are not allowed. Why 
didn't I think of that?

I was thinking of "vote against one," which could be called Reverse 
Plurality, the base method for each step of the Coombs sequential 
elimination method. Equivalently, it could be described as, "vote for 
exactly two candidates."

This method would elect C because the 45 in favor of B would have no 
reason to vote against B or C, so they would all vote against A.  If 
the other 55 voted more against C than B, then B would win, so they 
will vote more against B than C, which allows C to win.

Unlike Borda, this solution works even if the ratings for C are low:

55 A>>C>B
45 B>>C>A

I'm not advocating Reverse Plurality, but it is perhaps the simplest 
deterministic solution to the challenge.

Forest

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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[rob brown]

On 8/27/07, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> At 01:07 AM 8/27/2007, rob brown wrote:
> >On 8/26/07, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> >Social animals and eusocial animals are totally different
> >things.  Worker bees, by virtue of their anatomical design and their
> >behavior, will give their own lives for the sake of the hive (they
> >sting and die).
>
> Whereas humans won't? What planet do you live on? It's *instinctive.*


Uh, yeah.  Everyone here is motivated solely for the good of the
collective.  In fact, I think its lovely how here, on this planet, no one
tries to game the system or find loopholes or manipulate things to their
advantage.  If they did, people would, say, do things like take advantage of
the openness and cheapness of the email protocol to send unsolicited
commercial messages to people.  But luckily no one does that...

Seriously, what planet are YOU posting from?

Yes, it's not exactly like honeybees. We have a far higher level of
> independence, but we are still social animals, with, *normally*,
> great concern for others.


The difference is that humans reproduce directly, hence fundamentally
different Darwinian pressures on humans vs. the non-reproducing worker
bees.

The whole conception is off. Adaptation is driven by survival of the
genes, not by survival of the individual

Yes I know all about Dawkins selfish gene model, which supports the concept
of eusociality quite well, thank you.

However, like Dawkins, I'm not big at all on group selection, as I think it
is an extremely weak force.  And everything you say seems to only make sense
from a group selection mindset.

Hey, if you are so selfish, what in the
world are you interested in election methods for? For personal gain?
There are much easier ways to find personal gain!

And I am not advocating selfishness, in any way.  If you misunderstand this
point, read the article I linked.  If you still don't understand it, read it
again.

I am advocating a system that does not give an unfair advantage to those who
DO behave more selfishly.  My assumption is not that all people act
selfishly, or even that most people will.  And I especially don't think
people SHOULD act selfishly.

But if you design a system that rewards those who are the most selfish by
giving them the most power, I think that is a very very bad thing.

And as best I can see, that is what range voting is.  It punishes people for
doing what feels like the most "moral" choice, which is to express their
preferences honestly.

Once again, I don't have time to read the rest of your lengthy post.  If you
are writing to others, or to yourself, fine, but I'm not going to read and
respond to each of your novels.  I found Jobst's challenge interesting and
thought provoking, but I get the impression he is getting frustrated as well
with your overly wordy illogic.

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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 01:07 AM 8/27/2007, rob brown wrote:
>On 8/26/07, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax 
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote:
> >Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so
> >elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.
>
>This is commonly assumed. But it probably is not true. First of all,
>the ballots don't have to be personally identified, all that is
>necessary is that the winner be known.
>
>
>Ok, so here you seem to be saying that, it is not necessary to keep 
>ballots secret to prevent buying an election

No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that one can buy an 
election with secret ballots, in fact. It can be done now, there are 
legal ways to do it. But what you can't do is to buy it *in a corrupt 
manner* with secret ballots. You have to do it openly. The vote 
trading mentioned would involve a payment or performance of whatever 
is agreed upon based on the *result* of the election, not on any 
specific vote. And, of course, this makes it fair.

If expensive. However, given the conditions we were working on, *this 
kind of fair vote trading or buying would be affordable." *By 
definition.* The value is there, there are large numbers of voters 
who presumably see that value -- that's what the ratings must mean if 
they are other than word salad -- and so it is merely a matter of 
organizing them to make the offer, and of letting the other side 
know. And of course, it would be best to *negotiate* the deal, so 
that you aren't just wasting your time.

This is why I'm so interested in Free Associations with Delegable 
Proxy. They could pull off this kind of trick. It could radically 
transform politics. And the kicker is that it would work with 
Plurality. You don't need Range do do it. But you would get Range 
results, or even better (i.e., the compensatory payments or 
agreements would more evenly distribute the benefit of social utility 
maximization).

>If I'm agreeing to pay $X if A
>wins, I'm paying for a result, not for a vote. Who do I pay it to?
>
>
>That's a good question, isn't it?  Well, the answer is simple...you 
>don't.  It doesn't work.  You've just shown why, counter to what you 
>suggested above, buying large elections is near impossible when the 
>ballots are secret.

No, it's not only not impossible, it is done all the time! But we 
don't think of it as vote buying. We think of it as convincing the 
public that something good will happen if they vote a certain way. 
Shall the Town approve the big shopping center? The developers not 
only promise jobs and the like, they also offer to fund certain town 
projects. It moves the voters to approve the project, perhaps. If the 
measure doesn't pass, they don't fund the project. Simple.

>Obviously, in a non-secret ballot election, you would pay 
>individuals to vote for your candidate, not pay all of the voters 
>for the final result.

*This* only works if your payments are secret. If they are public, it 
can quite easily backfire, and you end up paying out what you 
promised -- or defaulting -- and getting nothing.

Private payments are graft and corruption. The kind of payments I'm 
suggesting could be looked at -- and which are legal *now* without 
changes in law -- would be public, or at least not secret or hidden, 
nor would they be payments for a vote, as such, but for a result. 
(And I use "payments" as a convenient term, here, to cover any kind 
of compensation.)

Private payments in close elections can shift the result toward 
something desired by the payer, often utilizing the votes of people 
who would not even bother voting without the payment. The vast 
majority of voters get nothing.

But in this case, if we suppose the initial conditions described, the 
A voters could, for example, agree to accept a payment from the B 
voters, collectively. The B voters can afford it! (Unless they are 
collectively impoverished and not merely somewhat so, seriously so. 
They receive four times the benefit of the choice of C as do the A 
voters. There's a lot of room for disparity in ability to pay there. 
And, indeed, next time it might be other voters paying *them*. 
Generally, we would be talking about such large numbers of voters 
that single individuals with great wealth could make a dent, but not 
dominate. As the old saying goes, God must love the poor because he 
made so many of them. The "poor," collectively, are not all that 
poor. Consider some of the most impoverished third-world countries in 
the world, with corrupt leaders extracting great wealth from them. 
They have to have it for him to extract it! If they could pool their 
resources, if that were practical, they could outspend him. But  
they don't have the tools, so they are isolated and thus effectively 
powerless, except for unintelligent mass movements that are more like riots.)

>   It is up to you to calculate whether or not your payments to 
> individuals would be likely e

Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Rob,

> I AM against systems that create a conflict within people, between voting in 
> a way that is "most in their interest", and in a way that "feels honest".  
> Range voting blatantly creates this conflict (because voting at anything but 
> the extremes in range voting is not in your interest), while approval doesn't.

What do you think of D2MAC in this situation? It does not create the kind of 
conflict but rather makes it attractive for all voters to "approve also" of the 
compromise candidate C in addition to their "favourite" A or B, because in this 
way they keep the result from being randomly chosen from A and B and make sure 
it is C with certainty.

Yours, Jobst
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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Abd ul-Rahman!

> The B voters gain very substantial value from the election of C, 
> whereas the A voters lose only a little. 

Please make sure what what you compare the election of C with! It seems you 
only compare it with the election of A as a benchmark. But why? Why not with B? 
Or why not with the benchmark I proposed: 55% chance for A, 45% chance for B, 
as proportional to their share of the vote.

Yours, Jobst
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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Forest,

You answered to Rob:

> >Randomness is a weird oneit is great that it can get people to vote
> >honestly, but then it can just pick the "wrong" one.
> 
> But more often than other methods?

You are perfectly right here. Majoritarian methods will *always* elect the 
wrong one (A) in the example!

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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Rob!

> I tend to be in agreement with Forest that vote trading and randomness are 
> the only solutions.   I have no clue what you are thinking of, but I suspect 
> when I hear it I'm going to think its in the range of what I'd consider 
> "cheating". :)

Think about Borda using scores 0, 1, and 2, without equal rankings allowed: The 
A voters can give A at most a score of 55*2=110 and have to give either B or C 
at least a score of 28. Hence whatever the A voters do, they cannot be sure to 
have A elected since the B voters could advance B or C to at least a score of 
118 by giving it a score of 45*2=90. From this one can see easily that there is 
no group strategy equilibrium electing A or B. All group strategy equilibria 
elect C, for example the one in which everbody puts C first and her favourite 
second. The drawback is only that these equilibria are not globally attractive, 
since there are starting points (e.g. sincere rankings) from which the process 
of repeatedly replacing the strategies by optimal respond strategies to the 
current strategies will not eventually lead to an equilibrium but may get stuck 
in a cycle.

> Randomness is a weird oneit is great that it can get people to vote 
> honestly, but then it can just pick the "wrong" one.

Well... In D2MAC, when you assume people to be rational, all of them will 
approve of C and so C will be the certain outcome. I consider this evidence for 
the fact that a randomized method could be designed which will make rational 
voters elect a good compromise with certainty.
  
> Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so elections would 
> be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.  Not good.  

You are right. That was not the form of trading I was thinking of. Rather the 
used method can give the voters means to trade votes (or rather winning 
probabilities) automatically. D2MAC is such a method.

Yours, Jobst
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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[rob brown]

On 8/26/07, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote:
> >Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so
> >elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.
>
> This is commonly assumed. But it probably is not true. First of all,
> the ballots don't have to be personally identified, all that is
> necessary is that the winner be known.


Ok, so here you seem to be saying that, it is not necessary to keep ballots
secret to prevent buying an election

If I'm agreeing to pay $X if A
> wins, I'm paying for a result, not for a vote. Who do I pay it to?


That's a good question, isn't it?  Well, the answer is simple...you don't.
It doesn't work.  You've just shown why, counter to what you suggested
above, buying large elections is near impossible when the ballots are
secret.

Obviously, in a non-secret ballot election, you would pay individuals to
vote for your candidate, not pay all of the voters for the final result.  It
is up to you to calculate whether or not your payments to individuals would
be likely enough to get your candidate elected to make it worth your money.

>Obviously range voting would solve this problem perfectly, if only
> >humans were eusocial animals -- most of us being sterile
> >worker-people, whose only Darwinian interest was the good of the
> collective.
>
> We are far more that than seems to be realized. Not sterile, to be
> sure. But very much social animals. Most of us, most of the time.


Social animals and eusocial animals are totally different things.  Worker
bees, by virtue of their anatomical design and their behavior, will give
their own lives for the sake of the hive (they sting and die).  This sort of
thing is pretty much unheard of in non-eusocial animals, as it would quickly
be selected against.  Sure there have been kamakazi pilots and various
suicide bombers among people, but they are extreme exceptions, that only
seems to happen in the most desperate of situations (and we find it notable
and disturbing specifically because it seems so counter to human behavior).
The vast majority of humans and other non-eusocial animals act as an
evolutionary biologist would expect them to, which is to prioritize their
own interests, and that of very close kin, at the top.

Social animals tend to cooperate when it is in their individual best
interest to do so (even if very indirect, such as doing the "right thing"
when others are watching, possibly in hopes of reciprocity, or in hopes of
the indirect reciprocity that tends to come with increasing one's repuation
for trustworthiness).  Fundamentally different from eusocial animals.

It's ironic, really. Range Voting *to some degree, not completely,*
> collapses to Approval Voting, under certain conditions with allegedly
> "selfish" voters. This is a feature, not a bug! Approval Voting is
> quite a good method!


I'm not against approval voting, I agree it is a fairly good method
(although I think it can unfairly give an advantage to those who have the
best information about how others are likely to vote).

I AM against systems that create a conflict within people, between voting in
a way that is "most in their interest", and in a way that "feels honest".
Range voting blatantly creates this conflict (because voting at anything but
the extremes in range voting is not in your interest), while approval
doesn't.

I didn't have time to read the rest of your post, or much of your other
posts on this thread.  Too many words, and none of them I've read so far
(from any of the range voting people) has been compelling enough to make me
want to throw away the basic concepts of "rational self interest" that most
economics and game theory are based on.  Sorry.

(this is something I wrote some time ago that addresses the very logical
flaws I see in all of your posts:
http://karmatics.com/docs/groupmotivationfallacy.html . It's kind of wordy
itself, I suppose...).

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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote:
>Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so 
>elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.

This is commonly assumed. But it probably is not true. First of all, 
the ballots don't have to be personally identified, all that is 
necessary is that the winner be known. If I'm agreeing to pay $X if A 
wins, I'm paying for a result, not for a vote. Who do I pay it to?

Well, remember, I only have to pay if I get what I want. Do I really 
care? But how much moneh would it take to pay off all the voters who, 
perhaps, register for the payment prior to the election. (To collect, 
they would have to be on the list of those who actually voted.) 
Normally, a lot of money.

What is offensive about vote-buying is the secrecy of it, and that 
only some people get paid when all suffer the outcome.

In the situations where these payments make sense, though, it would 
not be a large amount of money *per voter*. In any case, I'll leave 
it to someone else to work out the details. Suffice it to say that it 
is *not* plutocracy.

Too much money is involved!

>   Not good.  And I wouldn't think it would be ok given your problem 
> description, which is for a single election.

It's okay if the voters accept it! And if they don't, they don't get 
paid! (Even if they accept the offer and the candidate doesn't win 
that someone was willing to compensate for, there is no payment. But 
probably no loss, either.)

Essentially, the given situation was one where all voters would agree 
that C was a good compromise. (I argued that we could not exactly 
tell this from the ratings, but, with certain assumptions, this would 
be the case.)

The B voters gain very substantial value from the election of C, 
whereas the A voters lose only a little. Thus it makes sense for the 
B voters to compensate the A voters, the majority, for giving up 
their majority rights, to accept a choice of lesser value to them. 
And it would make sense for the A voters to accept the compensation 
that shifted the *net* utility to them such that C becomes their 
optimum choice.

There are other forms of utility shift that could be employed. C 
could make certain promises, could agree to include, as an example, A 
in his government. A, as the representative of the A faction, could 
agree on their behalf to accept some compromise which not only 
improves overall social utility -- which ultimately benefits everyone 
if maximization is general policy -- but also at least preserves 
utility for the majority. (Asset Voting could have this kind of result).

>   ButI suppose if we were able to talk about mulitple 
> elections, where a voter can earn "credit" for compromising which 
> can be spent in later elections, you could build that into the 
> system in a way that doesn't require losing the secretness, and 
> would solve this problem nicely.

Perhaps. It could get very complicated very quickly, and it results 
in the past binding the present, a problem we already have in many 
ways. If the voter has "credit," by the way, how do we know to apply 
the credit? Talk about complicated!

>Obviously range voting would solve this problem perfectly, if only 
>humans were eusocial animals -- most of us being sterile 
>worker-people, whose only Darwinian interest was the good of the collective.

We are far more that than seems to be realized. Not sterile, to be 
sure. But very much social animals. Most of us, most of the time.

>   Sadly, we're not, so range voting is (in my opinion)  best left 
> to bees and the like. ( 
> http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html)

The argument here is that, because Range Voting is a perfect solution 
if people vote "sincerely," which is conveniently left undefined, it 
is therefore a bad solution if they vote "selfishly."

There is no basis for this claim. Simulations don't confirm it.

It's ironic, really. Range Voting *to some degree, not completely,* 
collapses to Approval Voting, under certain conditions with allegedly 
"selfish" voters. This is a feature, not a bug! Approval Voting is 
quite a good method!

And it is quite easy to improve Range in ways that should encourage 
more use of intermediate votes, which does, quite likely, improve 
performance. But even without these little touches, and with 
"strategic voting," which in Range only means what I call truncating 
the ratings, not preference reversal, Range still does very well. By 
the only real performance measures we have, so far: the simulations.

(Election Criteria are generally *not* performance measures, they 
don't generate "measures", rather each one is either satisfied or 
not. And evaluating methods by looking at a list of criteria and 
seeing how many are satisfied is obviously quite defective, for some 
criteria are, I think we would agree, more important than others. How 
do we know which ones are most important? It's quite subjective. 
However, t

Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Forest W Simmons]

>Date: Sat, 25 Aug 2007 23:59:26 -0700
>From: "rob brown" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
>To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
>Message-ID:
>   <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>On 8/25/07, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> > So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading
>> > and randomness.
>>
>> There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been
>> studied can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first 
see what
>> I mean :-)
>>
>
>I tend to be in agreement with Forest that vote trading and randomness 
are
>the only solutions.   I have no clue what you are thinking of, but I 
suspect
>when I hear it I'm going to think its in the range of what I'd consider
>"cheating". :)

Jobst is right.  There is a method.  I don't want to spoil the fun, so 
I won't tell yet.

>
>Randomness is a weird oneit is great that it can get people to vote
>honestly, but then it can just pick the "wrong" one.

But more often than other methods?

>
>Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so elections 
would
>be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.  Not good.

The proxy principle helps here. If vote trading is at the proxy stage, 
then it is good to have the proxy votes made public.  The proxies are 
representatives that must be accountable to the public they serve.

Forest

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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[rob brown]

On 8/25/07, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> > So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading
> > and randomness.
>
> There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been
> studied can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see what
> I mean :-)
>

I tend to be in agreement with Forest that vote trading and randomness are
the only solutions.   I have no clue what you are thinking of, but I suspect
when I hear it I'm going to think its in the range of what I'd consider
"cheating". :)

Randomness is a weird oneit is great that it can get people to vote
honestly, but then it can just pick the "wrong" one.

Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so elections would
be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.  Not good.  And I wouldn't
think it would be ok given your problem description, which is for a single
election.  ButI suppose if we were able to talk about mulitple
elections, where a voter can earn "credit" for compromising which can be
spent in later elections, you could build that into the system in a way that
doesn't require losing the secretness, and would solve this problem nicely.

Obviously range voting would solve this problem perfectly, if only humans
were eusocial animals -- most of us being sterile worker-people, whose only
Darwinian interest was the good of the collective.  Sadly, we're not, so
range voting is (in my opinion)  best left to bees and the like. (
http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html)

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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Kevin,

> Hi,
> 
> It seems to me there might be a use for something like the method that
> was proposed awhile ago that had to do with offering voters incentives
> to give sincere ratings. For example, the majority would give the 
> sincere score to their compromise in exchange for their vote having
> greater effect in reducing the win odds of their least favorite candidate.
> If they rate their compromise too high, the loss of win odds from
> favorite to compromise outweighs the value of the corresponding lessened
> odds of the worst candidate. And vice versa for rating the compromise
> too low.

Hmm, I don't think I understand how this works, either. It would have to be a 
non-majoritarian method in order to solve the problem, of course.

Yours, Jobst
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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Forest,

> The main thing I overlooked was vote trading.
> 
> So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading 
> and randomness.

There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been studied 
can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see what I mean :-)

> Jobst suggested a way of combining them: asset voting with random 
> ballot as the base method, so that probabilities are traded.

Right. That could solve the problem: With Random Ballot, A and B will win with 
55% and 45% probability, respectively. If Candidates A and B agree to "trade" 
their power by transferring their complete share of the probability to C, both 
factions will gain. 

There is only one problem left: If candidates are allowed to trade also parts 
of their power, C will not be elected with certainty since then A and B will 
only offer to transfer a part of their probability large enough so that the 
other faction will still gain somewhat (details to come).
 
> We could also combine them into a DYN version of D2MAC.
> 
> The basic ballots are DYN ballots.  Voters decide Yes/No for each 
> candidate that they feel sure about, and then Delegate the remaining 
> Y/N votes to one of the candidates, presumably their favorite.
> 
> After all of the Y/N votes have been completed by the proxies, two 
> ballots are drawn at random.  If there is a candidate that was (either 
> directly or by proxy) voted Yes on both ballots, then the common Yes 
> candidate with the greatest number of Y's (from the other voters or 
> their proxies) is elected.  Otherwise the favorite (i.e. proxy 
> candidate) of the first drawn ballot chooses the winner.
> 
> That's just an idea meant to stimulate exploration of further 
> possibilities.

A very nice idea in my view! One could even let the candidates know what the 
direct votes are and communicate with each other and let them sign contracts 
what candidates they will approve of. This would give them also some means of 
asset trading...

Yours, Jobst
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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

It seems to me there might be a use for something like the method that
was proposed awhile ago that had to do with offering voters incentives
to give sincere ratings. For example, the majority would give the 
sincere score to their compromise in exchange for their vote having
greater effect in reducing the win odds of their least favorite candidate.
If they rate their compromise too high, the loss of win odds from
favorite to compromise outweighs the value of the corresponding lessened
odds of the worst candidate. And vice versa for rating the compromise
too low.

I never really understood how this method worked, however.

Kevin Venzke


  
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Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

[Forest W Simmons]

I can see that I needn't have worried about taking the wind out of 
anybody sails.  Since my message was posted, the challenge has 
continued to generate a lot of lively discussion and clever ideas, 
including some that I completely overlooked.

The main thing I overlooked was vote trading.

So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading 
and randomness.

Jobst suggested a way of combining them: asset voting with random 
ballot as the base method, so that probabilities are traded.

We could also combine them into a DYN version of D2MAC.

The basic ballots are DYN ballots.  Voters decide Yes/No for each 
candidate that they feel sure about, and then Delegate the remaining 
Y/N votes to one of the candidates, presumably their favorite.

After all of the Y/N votes have been completed by the proxies, two 
ballots are drawn at random.  If there is a candidate that was (either 
directly or by proxy) voted Yes on both ballots, then the common Yes 
candidate with the greatest number of Y's (from the other voters or 
their proxies) is elected.  Otherwise the favorite (i.e. proxy 
candidate) of the first drawn ballot chooses the winner.

That's just an idea meant to stimulate exploration of further 
possibilities.

Forest

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