Re: [EM] IRNR question

2008-10-21 Thread Raph Frank
On Tue, Oct 21, 2008 at 8:47 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 To be more general, let's call ordinary loser-elimination methods
 0-elimination(X), where X is the base method. 1-elimination(X) successively
 eliminates the winners, according to X, then eliminates the last one
 eliminated. Presumably 2-elimination(X) would eliminate the losers,
 according to X, then the winners of that, then the losers of that; and so on
 for any n-elimination(X).

 It seems that no matter what X is (within reason), 1-elimination(X) is
 Condorcet. At least it is so for both X =  Borda and X = Plurality.

All 1-elimination(X) methods should be condorcet methods because the
only way to be eliminated is to lose pairwise against someone in the
last round.

In all ranked methods, the last round will just eliminate the pairwise
loser.  However, with range/score voting, the pairwise winner could be
eliminated, unless the ballots are rescaled.

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Re: [EM] IRNR question

2008-10-19 Thread Brian Olson
Hmm, only kick out the losingest loser. I kinda think there would  
still be discontinuities, but it might be better. Probably worth  
trying. Now I just need to code that up and run the diagram code.  
Dunno when I'll actually get around to that.


Has anyone checked what happens to regular IRV under such a system?

On Oct 19, 2008, at 2:35 AM, Greg Nisbet wrote:


Would Brian's IRNR benefit from an addditional level of recursion?

The current way to eject candidates is to compare range scores, what
if you modify that slightly?

Instead of kicking out the person with the lowest range score you
replace that with:

Kick out the person with the highest range score, shift the ratings
and do the same thing again. You are left with one candidate.

Kick this candidate out from the main system and repeat the above  
step.


Just as a broader question, do methods such as IRV, Nanson, Baldwin,
IRNR generally perform better or worse as additional levels of
recursion are added?

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Re: [EM] IRNR question

2008-10-19 Thread Raph Frank
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 2:14 PM, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Hmm, only kick out the losingest loser. I kinda think there would still be
 discontinuities, but it might be better. Probably worth trying. Now I just
 need to code that up and run the diagram code. Dunno when I'll actually get
 around to that.

 Has anyone checked what happens to regular IRV under such a system?

Hmm, it becomes a condorcet complaint method (and so would the IRNR
version).  To be eliminated, you must lose pairwise to someone at
least once (i.e. when there are only 2 candidates remaining in a
(super)-round).

It may suffer from the same problems as IRV-BTR ... which apparently
has lots of bad properties :p.

A disadvantage of the system is that it would take a large number of
rounds, with N candidates you are looking at on the order of N squared
rounds

Actually, a simpler method would be IRNR-BTR.  Rather than eliminating
the lowest candidate, the lowest 2 candidates are compared pairwise
against each other and the loser is eliminated.

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