Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote: Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to election-methods@lists.electorama.com To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com You can reach the person managing the list at election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest... Today's Topics: 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) -- Forwarded message -- From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com To: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100 Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma. Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two vote splitting factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000 doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the most self-consistent counts of Florida. Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property would remain in a singlewinner context. -- Forwarded message -- From: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600 Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and that both can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats a party wins could either be selected after the victory or specified before hand. So what do you think? I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having their
Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true. Jameson 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote: Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to election-methods@lists.electorama.com To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com You can reach the person managing the list at election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest... Today's Topics: 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) -- Forwarded message -- From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com To: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100 Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma. Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two vote splitting factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000 doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the most self-consistent counts of Florida. Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property would remain in a singlewinner context. -- Forwarded message -- From: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600 Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and that both can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats a party wins could either be selected after the victory or specified before hand. So what do you think? I'm keeping the seat numbers down
Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
It is because first-mover counts a lot that we've been stuck with FPTP in the US for such a long time in contrast with countries with younger democracies... I never said it was all that counts, but it counts a good deal, as I metaphorically allude to by emphing the diffs in Ps over the diffs in Xs for single-winner election rules. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:35 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote: If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true. Jameson 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote: Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to election-methods@lists.electorama.com To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com You can reach the person managing the list at election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest... Today's Topics: 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) -- Forwarded message -- From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com To: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100 Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma. Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two vote splitting factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000 doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the most self-consistent counts of Florida. Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property would remain in a singlewinner context. -- Forwarded message -- From: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600 Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? It seems to
Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
Hi David, De : David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 13h37 Objet : Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. You are supposed to get the EM list to agree first, before writing Soros directly. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates That doesn't make much sense to me. The election method is a part of the system and it has an obvious effect on how many candidates could run. and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw If I remember correctly your idea is to use approval to pick finalists. I don't think this is a good idea because it breaks clone independence, which is an IRV selling point. If your goal is to e.g. not elect Condorcet winners who place third, I think you should use the Approval-IRV hybrid that eliminates the least approved candidate until there is a majority favorite. I call it AER... I think Woodall called it Approval AV. Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
