Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Dear Greg, I will focus on the question of majoritarianism in this message. First my working definition of "majoritarian method": A method is majoritarian if for every option X and every group G consisting of more than half of the voters, there is a way of voting for G which makes sure X wins regardless of how the voters outside G vote. In other words: Any majority can overrule the rest if that majority votes in a certain way. Now for the discussion. I said: > That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other > majoritarian method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be > because every majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less > than 100% of the people (the "demos" in greek). Often, about 60% of > the people can consistently impose their will on the other 40% > without the latter being given any means at all by the majoritarian > method to influence the decision. Of course, this is a problem of > most popular election methods, but that does not mean the problem > cannot be solved. Democratic decisions are possible but not with > majoritarian methods. To which you replied: > Interesting point. I would argue that a compromise candidate is > better than a polarizing but barely passing candidate (like FPTP with > primaries tends to produce). I'd say this isn't a voting-issues > question, but a civil rights question. A nice constitution will help > protect you from tyranny of the majority. While of course civil rights are very important to make sure that no-one's basic *rights* are violated, they cannot make sure that everybody's *preferences* are have a fair chance of influencing decisions that are made *within* the limits the civil rights pose. > "Advocates of majoritarianism argue that majority decision making is > intrinsically democratic and that any restriction on majority > decision making is intrinsically undemocratic. I wonder how they do so. It's as simple as that: When any group of people, be it a single person (dictatorship) or a small group (oligarchy) or a large group (majoritarianism) can overrule the rest, that's not democratic since democracy in its main sense requires that *all* people must have a means to influence decisions. > If democracy is > restricted by a constitution which cannot be changed by a simple > majority decision then yesterday's majority is being given more > weight than today's; We may later discuss shifting majorities, but please let us first continue discussing a single decision since that is complicated enough. You continue to ask: > ... if not the majority, then who decides? Simple answer, contained in the definition of "democracy": It's not a subgroup of the voters which decides but its *all* voters who decide. I guess your real question is not who decides but how they do it. > If you > delegate the responsibility to some group (even yourself) to judge > what is best for society, then you are imposing your will on people. Right. That would be much worse. But essentially majoritarianism *does* delegate the decision to some group (the majority that finally overrules the rest). The only difference is that it does not prescribe who belongs to this group. Rather, any willing majority can establish itself as this deciding group. But this is not much better because some group overrules the rest anyway. The whole point of democracy is that *no* group can overrule the rest, neither a predefined group nor a group that establishes itself as a majority. > Arguments both for and against majoritarianism both tend to boil down > to rights. Do you have the right to non-interference from the > majority? Does the majority have the right to non-interference from > you? Please don't shift the focus. The question is not whether some group can intefere but whether some group can overrule. So, the right everyone should have is the right not to be overruled by a majority without my preferences having any chance to influence the result. Probably you still think, how on earth could this be achieved? But it is very easy to see that real democratic decisions are possible. Just imagine everyone marks their favourite option and then a ballot is drawn at random to decide the winner. Of course I don't suggest to use this method called Random Ballot. It is only to illustrate that the requirement of "democracy" can be met. The real task now is to find methods which are not only democratic but also satisfy other criteria (like anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, clone-proofness etc.) and are efficient in electing good compromise options. This is achieved by the methods D2MAC and FAWRB for example - you make look them up in the archives. Yours, Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Dear Raph, you replied to me: > > That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other majoritarian > > method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be because every > > majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less than 100% of the people > > (the "demos" in greek). > > They do have an equal vote. The move the median in their direction. First, what does an "equal vote" help when the other group (the majority) can elect whomever they want regardless of what you do? Nothing. And, the median claim is plain wrong: When you're already on one side of a median, moving further away from it does never change that median. Basic statistics. > However, you do get degenerate societies where there is a majority > that is a bloc. > > In Northern Ireland, for example, the Unionists have a majority. This > led to discrimination of the Nationalist minority. That's exactly my point. There are lots of such examples which all show clearly that majoritarianism is not democratic. > The problem with this majority is that it is solid and unchanging. > > Ideally, majority should just mean the group of more than 50% on a > particular issue. Every person should sometimes be part of the > majority and sometimes part of the minority. That doesn't help because then the majority on issue A will still overrule the rest in every single decision on that issue. So a compromise option for that issue will have no chance. > If a certain group of > people are always part of the minority, then this leads to a poorly > functioning society. A split society will only function poorly when a majoritarian method is used. When they use a method like FAWRB instead, they will function well because then they will care what the other faction wants, will try to devise good compromise options, and will vote in a way which makes sure the good compromises are elected instead of the random ballot result. This is possible *precisely* because with a non-majoritarian method the majority cannot simply ignore the minority but has to figure out how to get them to approve a compromise that is sufficiently near to their favourite. Non-majoritarian methods encourage discourse and cooperation. > Germany has 'eternal' provisions. Some amendment proposals can be > blocked by their Constitutional Court. This I think is undemocratic. > The eternal provisions relate to fundamental rights, which is their > reasoning. The reason why we have such should be obvious from history. It saves us for example from such restrictions of civil rights our American fellows experience since 9/11. > Someone wrote: > > Then let me challenge you right away: I don't understand at all what those > > numbers a range-ballot asks me for are supposed to mean. They are not > > explained but instead it is simply assumed naively that each voter will be > > able to assign meaningful numbers to options. That someone was me. Yours, Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
On Sun, Oct 12, 2008 at 1:42 AM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I was attempting to make a distinction between an active and a passive > majority. Any active majority (one unwilling to make any compromises > whatsoever, voting every non-them candidate the lowest possible score) will > win. A passive majority (clear majority opinion, but makes compromises) will > not necessarily win. I argue this isn't a fault because if a majority is > passive then they can arguably be considered to support another candidate > the percentage that they voted for him. E.g. their partial vote could be > used to form a majority per se. Also, they have agreed to give up their power. > That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other majoritarian > method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be because every > majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less than 100% of the people > (the "demos" in greek). They do have an equal vote. The move the median in their direction. However, you do get degenerate societies where there is a majority that is a bloc. In Northern Ireland, for example, the Unionists have a majority. This led to discrimination of the Nationalist minority. The problem with this majority is that it is solid and unchanging. Ideally, majority should just mean the group of more than 50% on a particular issue. Every person should sometimes be part of the majority and sometimes part of the minority. If a certain group of people are always part of the minority, then this leads to a poorly functioning society. Decisions are not made on the basis of what is best, but are made on the basis of who the proposer was. > "Advocates of majoritarianism argue that majority decision making is > intrinsically democratic and that any restriction on majority decision > making is intrinsically undemocratic. If democracy is restricted by a > constitution which cannot be changed by a simple majority decision then > yesterday's majority is being given more weight than today's; True, constitutions cannot defend themselves and it is paternalistic to not allow them to be changed. Ofc, in a federation, it is a little different. It consists of two levels of demos(es?). Should a majority of the federation be allowed to change the constitution. Perhaps, it would be allowed, but if there is a change, there would be a process for States to withdraw. In Ireland, the constitution can be changed by a majority. Calling the referendum requires a majority in the Dail (PR House). A majority in the Seanad (not proportional) speeds up the process but isn't technically required. Once the referendum is called a simple majority is sufficient for the amendment to pass. Germany has 'eternal' provisions. Some amendment proposals can be blocked by their Constitutional Court. This I think is undemocratic. The eternal provisions relate to fundamental rights, which is their reasoning. --- 'someone' wrote: > Then let me challenge you right away: I don't understand at all what those > numbers a range-ballot asks me for are supposed to mean. They are not > explained but instead it is simply assumed naively that each voter will be > able to assign meaningful numbers to options. This is true. I think after the first election people will get the message to approval vote at least the top 2. > Let's look to Australia and Ireland for evidence of the impact of IRV, > particularly Ireland. You might have seen pictures of campaign posters > advocating a certain person for spot #1 and others for #2 or #3. Or one > could observe the preference-swapping agreements in Australia. This is a > direct consequence of later no harm. The parties THEMSELVES share power with > each other. (In spite of this, both countries have two party systems). For the President (IRV), Ireland pretty much has a 1 party system. Labour won once, and FF won all the other times. Though the Dail (PR-STV) doesn't have a two party system. The seat totals are FF: 77 FG: 51 Lab: 20 Green: 6 SF: 4 PD: 2 Ind: 1 Ind: 1 Ind: 1 Ind: 1 Ind: 1 CC: 1 (chairman) The effective number of parties is: 3.06 Assuming that the independents are a single party give 3.05 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties > My best guess regarding Condorcet/Range's impact is this: the parties will > be campaigning in the same areas more and more, trying to improve their own > position in the same demographic. Campaigns will be less negative because > you have more than one opponent. Attacking that opponent will help your > rivals as well, so it's a waste of your effort. Explicit preference swapping > agreements will be rarer under Condorcet and nonexistent under Range, but > they will be campaigning in other parties' turf when they think they can > improve that group's opinion of them just a little. The same arguement can be applied to PR-STV as transfers are essential. However, you also need to 'lock-down' your personal supporters, so some attacking is ne
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 3:38 PM, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> However, you do get degenerate societies where there is a majority >> that is a bloc. > > That's exactly my point. There are lots of such examples which all show > clearly that majoritarianism is not democratic. The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'. It is two groups voting as one. > That doesn't help because then the majority on issue A will still overrule > the rest in every single decision on that issue. So a compromise option for > that issue will have no chance. You can still have compromises. In fact, it can be helpful if multiple issues are voted as a single unit. This allows negotiation between factions in order to make up the majority. A faction can make compromises on issues that it doesn't care about in order to get things that it does. This requires there is no solid bloc though. For example, assuming there are 3 parties and 2 issues 45) A(+20) B(+10) 10) A(+1), B(-100) 45) A(-20) B(+10) The middle group don't really care about policy A, but will be hurt alot by policy B. Policy A is supported by 55 to 45, so is passed. Policy B is supported by 90 to 10, so is passed The result is 45) +30 10) -99 45) -10 Total: -79 However, if the two policies are considered as one Option 1: "Pass A and B" 45: +30 10: -99 45: -10 Option 2:"Pass B, but not A" 45: +10 10: -100 45: +10 Option 3: "Pass A, but not B" 45: 20 10: +1 45: -20 Option 4: "Pass neither" 45: 0 10: 0 45: 0 The best case scenario for the the 10 group is option 3. They could say to the top 45 that they will support policy A in exchange for policy B being defeated. If the top 45 refuse, then they can go to the the bottom 45 and say they will vote against policy A in exchange for policy B being defeated. It is in the best interests of both to agree. It isn't entirely stable though. > A split society will only function poorly when a majoritarian method is used. > When they use a method like FAWRB instead, they will function well because > then they will care what the other faction wants, will try to devise good > compromise options, and will vote in a way which makes sure the good > compromises are elected instead of the random ballot result. This is possible > *precisely* because with a non-majoritarian method the majority cannot simply > ignore the minority but has to figure out how to get them to approve a > compromise that is sufficiently near to their favourite. Non-majoritarian > methods encourage discourse and cooperation. Sounds reasonable, the problem is that a) people don't like random methods b) it will result in certain outlier elements in society getting some power. Perhaps a threshold could be set before a candidate can participate. Each voter would be allowed to approve/disapprove the candidates and then also cast their main vote (for the random system). Any candidate below 1/3 approval would be eliminated. Alternatively, it might be a two stage system. The first round would reduce the candidate pool to those who have > 1/3 approval. > >> Germany has 'eternal' provisions. Some amendment proposals can be >> blocked by their Constitutional Court. This I think is undemocratic. >> The eternal provisions relate to fundamental rights, which is their >> reasoning. > > The reason why we have such should be obvious from history. It saves us for > example from such restrictions of civil rights our American fellows > experience since 9/11. It doesn't have to be easy to change, but it should be changable. For example, it might be required to pass 3 referenda with at least 5 years between any 2 and if any fail, it has to start from the beginning again. This means that it takes 10 years minimum to change. Also, the citizens of the US didn't get to vote on the restrictions of civil rights directly. It was handled by Congress. > That someone was me. Sorry, Greg didn't include your name in his post (or I couldn't find it). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Hi Terry, although FAWRB can be found in the lists archives, I use the opportunity to give the current definition of ... My favourite version of FAWRB (Favourite or Approval Winner Random Ballot) -- 1. Each voter rates each option as either "harmful", "not agreeable", "agreeable", "good compromise" or "favourite", the default being "agreeable". Only one option may be marked "favourite". 2. Those options which are rated "harmful" by more than, say, 90% of voters get excluded. (This security provision is only necessary when there is danger of really harmful options which are not already excluded by other mechanisms) 3. That options which is rated "agreeable" or better on the largest number of ballots is the "nominated" option. 4. A die is tossed. If it shows a six, 15 ballots are drawn at random, otherwise only 3 ballots. 5. If the "nominated" option is rated "good compromise" or better on all those ballots, it wins. Otherwise wins the option rated "favourite" on the first of the drawn ballots. (Some unimportant details for tie breaking need to be added) Although this seems pretty much randomness, my claim is that in practise, it will actually not be very random since opposing factions will cooperate in electing good compromise options with very high probability. In my 55/45-example of 55% of voters having A 100 > C 80 > B 0 and 45% of voters having B 100 > C 80 > A 0, the strategic equilibrium under FAWRB is when the first 55% vote A "favourite", C "good compromise", B "bad" and the other 45% vote B "favourite", C "good compromise", A "bad" in which case C is the sure winner without any randomness involved. This is because no voter gains anything in rating C lower. If you want to try FAWRB, you can use this demo which even adds a delegable proxy component to it: http://62.75.149.22/groucho_fawrb_dp.php Yours, Jobst Terry Bouricius schrieb: What does "FAWRB" stand for? Terry Bouricius - Original Message ----- From: "Jobst Heitzig" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Greg Nisbet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Raph Frank" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2008 10:38 AM Subject: Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet) Dear Raph, you replied to me: That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other majoritarian method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be because every majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less than 100% of the people (the "demos" in greek). They do have an equal vote. The move the median in their direction. First, what does an "equal vote" help when the other group (the majority) can elect whomever they want regardless of what you do? Nothing. And, the median claim is plain wrong: When you're already on one side of a median, moving further away from it does never change that median. Basic statistics. However, you do get degenerate societies where there is a majority that is a bloc. In Northern Ireland, for example, the Unionists have a majority. This led to discrimination of the Nationalist minority. That's exactly my point. There are lots of such examples which all show clearly that majoritarianism is not democratic. The problem with this majority is that it is solid and unchanging. Ideally, majority should just mean the group of more than 50% on a particular issue. Every person should sometimes be part of the majority and sometimes part of the minority. That doesn't help because then the majority on issue A will still overrule the rest in every single decision on that issue. So a compromise option for that issue will have no chance. If a certain group of people are always part of the minority, then this leads to a poorly functioning society. A split society will only function poorly when a majoritarian method is used. When they use a method like FAWRB instead, they will function well because then they will care what the other faction wants, will try to devise good compromise options, and will vote in a way which makes sure the good compromises are elected instead of the random ballot result. This is possible *precisely* because with a non-majoritarian method the majority cannot simply ignore the minority but has to figure out how to get them to approve a compromise that is sufficiently near to their favourite. Non-majoritarian methods encourage discourse and cooperation. Germany has 'eternal' provisions. Some amendment proposals can be blocked by their Constitutional Court. This I think is undemocratic. The eternal provisions relate to fundamental rights, which is their reasoning. The reason why
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Dear Raph, you wrote: The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'. It is two groups voting as one. Do you mean to say democracy is only for societies which are sufficiently homogeneous? That doesn't help because then the majority on issue A will still overrule the rest in every single decision on that issue. So a compromise option for that issue will have no chance. You can still have compromises. Only if the majority for some reason prefers to elect the compromise than their favourite. But in that it seems the "favourite" was just not the true favourite of the majority but the compromise was. So, still the minority has no influence on the decision but can only hope that the majority is nice enough to decide for the compromise. In fact, it can be helpful if multiple issues are voted as a single unit. This allows negotiation between factions in order to make up the majority. This common behavious is a pretty artificial construct to overcome the discussed drawbacks of majoritarian rules. A faction can make compromises on issues that it doesn't care about in order to get things that it does. This requires there is no solid bloc though. And when both factions care about both issues? A split society will only function poorly when a majoritarian method is used. When they use a method like FAWRB instead, they will function well because then they will care what the other faction wants, will try to devise good compromise options, and will vote in a way which makes sure the good compromises are elected instead of the random ballot result. This is possible *precisely* because with a non-majoritarian method the majority cannot simply ignore the minority but has to figure out how to get them to approve a compromise that is sufficiently near to their favourite. Non-majoritarian methods encourage discourse and cooperation. Sounds reasonable, the problem is that a) people don't like random methods b) it will result in certain outlier elements in society getting some power. a) FAWRB is not a random but a very specific and quite sophisticated method. It only uses a certain amount of chance, just as many things in our life do. Chance should not be mixed up with arbitrariness. Used in a rational way, FAWRB will usually elect good compromise options with near certainty, not leading to significant amounts of randomness. Perhaps a threshold could be set before a candidate can participate. Yes, I agree. The version I just proposed to Terry incorporates such a threshold. Also, the citizens of the US didn't get to vote on the restrictions of civil rights directly. It was handled by Congress. Using majority rule? That someone was me. Sorry, Greg didn't include your name in his post (or I couldn't find it). No need to be sorry. Yours, Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Jobst, 2008/10/16 Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Dear Raph, > > you wrote: > >> The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'. It is >> two groups voting as one. >> > > Do you mean to say democracy is only for societies which are > sufficiently homogeneous? > > >> That doesn't help because then the majority on issue A will still >>> overrule the rest in every single decision on that issue. So a >>> compromise option for that issue will have no chance. >>> >> >> You can still have compromises. >> > > Only if the majority for some reason prefers to elect the compromise > than their favourite. But in that it seems the "favourite" was just not > the true favourite of the majority but the compromise was. So, still the > minority has no influence on the decision but can only hope that the > majority is nice enough to decide for the compromise. > > In fact, it can be helpful if multiple issues are voted as a single unit. >> This allows negotiation between factions in order to make up the majority. >> > > This common behavious is a pretty artificial construct to overcome the > discussed drawbacks of majoritarian rules. > > A faction can make compromises on issues that it doesn't care about >> in order to get things that it does. This requires there is no solid >> bloc though. >> > > And when both factions care about both issues? > > A split society will only function poorly when a majoritarian >>> method is used. When they use a method like FAWRB instead, they >>> will function well because then they will care what the other >>> faction wants, will try to devise good compromise options, and will >>> vote in a way which makes sure the good compromises are elected >>> instead of the random ballot result. This is possible *precisely* >>> because with a non-majoritarian method the majority cannot simply >>> ignore the minority but has to figure out how to get them to >>> approve a compromise that is sufficiently near to their favourite. >>> Non-majoritarian methods encourage discourse and cooperation. >>> >> >> Sounds reasonable, the problem is that a) people don't like random methods >> b) it will result in certain outlier elements in society getting some power. >> > > a) FAWRB is not a random but a very specific and quite sophisticated > method. It only uses a certain amount of chance, just as many things in > our life do. Chance should not be mixed up with arbitrariness. Used in a > rational way, FAWRB will usually elect good compromise options with near > certainty, not leading to significant amounts of randomness. > But randomness of FAWRB can cause institutional conflicts, especially if the minority faction leader was the winner. My suggestion if your scenario exists is: 1. Perform simultaneously an approval election and a PR election for an electoral college 2. If the approval winner has approval higher than a threshold (e.g. 2/3), s(he) is elected. 3. Otherwise the electoral college performs a multi-round approval election until some candidate has a score higher than the threshold. Communication and cooperation are easier in a small electoral college than in a large electorate. > > Perhaps a threshold could be set before a candidate can participate. >> > > Yes, I agree. The version I just proposed to Terry incorporates such a > threshold. > > Also, the citizens of the US didn't get to vote on the restrictions >> of civil rights directly. It was handled by Congress. >> > > Using majority rule? > > That someone was me. >> >> Sorry, Greg didn't include your name in his post (or I couldn't find >> it). >> > > No need to be sorry. > > Yours, Jobst > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > -- Diego Renato dos Santos Mestrando em Ciência da Computação COPIN - UFCG Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Dear Diego, But randomness of FAWRB can cause institutional conflicts, especially if the minority faction leader was the winner. My focus has always been to decide issues, not to elect people. > My suggestion if your scenario exists is: 1. Perform simultaneously an approval election and a PR election for an electoral college 2. If the approval winner has approval higher than a threshold (e.g. 2/3), s(he) is elected. 3. Otherwise the electoral college performs a multi-round approval election until some candidate has a score higher than the threshold. OK, we need a game-theoretic analysis of this. My guess is that because of the multi-round provision there is the danger of not getting a decision in any predetermined fixed time. Also, there are probably a number of strategic equilibria and it so the impact of my vote will be difficult to foresee. And, what is most important: It does not solve the problem at all, it only shifts the threshold for overruling the minority from 1/2 to 2/3. That's still not nearly democratic. You may suggest a much higher threshold, but then I guess no decision will be made at all... Yours, Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Jobst, 2008/10/16 Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Dear Diego, > > But randomness of FAWRB can cause institutional conflicts, especially if >> the minority faction leader was the winner. >> > > My focus has always been to decide issues, not to elect people. The risk of minority will remains. How does FAWRB perform in binary issues? > > > > My suggestion if your > >> scenario exists is: >> >> 1. Perform simultaneously an approval election and a PR election for an >> electoral college >> 2. If the approval winner has approval higher than a threshold (e.g. 2/3), >> s(he) is elected. >> 3. Otherwise the electoral college performs a multi-round approval >> election until some candidate has a score higher than the threshold. >> > > OK, we need a game-theoretic analysis of this. My guess is that because of > the multi-round provision there is the danger of not getting a decision in > any predetermined fixed time. If a consensus exists between the factions, then this danger would be too rare. There`s no gain for any faction to leave the issue undecided. Also, there are probably a number of strategic equilibria and it so the > impact of my vote will be difficult to foresee. > > And, what is most important: It does not solve the problem at all, it only > shifts the threshold for overruling the minority from 1/2 to 2/3. That's > still not nearly democratic. You may suggest a much higher threshold, but > then I guess no decision will be made at all... Not always we can find an unanimity... -- Diego Renato dos Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Dear Jobst, > I will focus on the question of majoritarianism in this message. > > First my working definition of "majoritarian method": A method is > majoritarian if for every option X and every group G consisting of more than > half of the voters, there is a way of voting for G which makes sure X wins > regardless of how the voters outside G vote. In other words: Any majority > can overrule the rest if that majority votes in a certain way. Group membership is difficult to define. With ranked ballots it's simple, but in the majority criterion debate, I argue that a score of 60% represents 60% of a first preference, not the preference between 59% and 61%. Range is also majoritarian in the sense that a majority can impose its will on people. This is not true of, say, Borda. So in short, the majority criterion as most people define it is not even applicable to Range Voting, as we have not settled the issue of simultaneous majorities. This might seem overly technical and missing the point, but as long as we are arguing about whether it satisfies the nominal property and the value of that, such it will remain. > > > Now for the discussion. I said: > > That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other > > majoritarian method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be > > because every majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less > > than 100% of the people (the "demos" in greek). Often, about 60% of > > the people can consistently impose their will on the other 40% > > without the latter being given any means at all by the majoritarian > > method to influence the decision. Of course, this is a problem of > > most popular election methods, but that does not mean the problem > > cannot be solved. Democratic decisions are possible but not with > > majoritarian methods. > > To which you replied: > > Interesting point. I would argue that a compromise candidate is > > better than a polarizing but barely passing candidate (like FPTP with > > primaries tends to produce). I'd say this isn't a voting-issues > > question, but a civil rights question. A nice constitution will help > > protect you from tyranny of the majority. > > While of course civil rights are very important to make sure that no-one's > basic *rights* are violated, they cannot make sure that everybody's > *preferences* are have a fair chance of influencing decisions that are made > *within* the limits the civil rights pose. > > Let me explain my point. I set the bar fairly high for tyranny of majority i.e. it must constitute actually oppressing me and not merely annoying or inconveniencing me to be labelled tyranny. Belligerence of the majority is another issue entirely. You may say where do you draw the line, but just hear me out. You talk about the destruction of democracy. That democracy is an all-or-nothing type thing. I am arguing that a good constitution will prevent a majority from acting in such a way that democracy itself is subverted. If you argue instead that suboptimal results come about, yes I agree with you. I advocate Range Voting after all. I too find belligerence of the majority annoying and unhelpful. As for the fair shot argument, I have no idea what fair shot actually means. It is possible, with minimal computation, to determine a Range ballot that will achieve a specific purpose given necessary information. It is significantly more challenging/sometimes impossible for the same to be done with something like IRV (or other iterative methods). Again, you speak about actively preventing the majority from doing something that violates the rights of minority. Such cannot be prevented by any voting method! You speak of comparing utility in this case, voting methods at best can only simulate this. Preventing tyranny must include some immutable principles lest the principles that prevent tyranny be abolished. That isn't democratic. It's useful, very useful, but not democratic. Voting methods differ in their ability to elect winners best for society, but I guess you already know that. > > > "Advocates of majoritarianism argue that majority decision making is > > intrinsically democratic and that any restriction on majority > > decision making is intrinsically undemocratic. > > I wonder how they do so. It's as simple as that: When any group of people, > be it a single person (dictatorship) or a small group (oligarchy) or a large > group (majoritarianism) can overrule the rest, that's not democratic since > democracy in its main sense requires that *all* people must have a means to > influence decisions. This discussion of what democracy is and is not does not appear to be leading anywhere. I'll answer this claim by saying that the majority is not disenfranchising the rest of the people. It means that majority opinion is the most reliable barometer of utility. I disagree, but don't misunderstand the point. The current majority is the current optimal result is the point. > > > > If democracy is > > restricted by
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
These majorities, as described, seem close to identical twins, with little, if any, ability for individual thinking. Plurality promotes closeness for two major factions. Voters have painful decisions which can result in real, if painful, party strength - they cannot both back party choices and back other candidates. Condorcet is an example of providing flexibility. Voters can back whatever combination of home party/faction and other candidates they choose. Backing home party helps it continue its power. Backing others helps change, and how this is or is not progressing is partly reported in the N*N arrays from Condorcet elections. With Condorcet there is more opportunity for controlled change and parties/factions can see from the N*N reports what the voting suggests they had better change for continued success. What follows inspired my thoughts. DWK On Thu, 16 Oct 2008 20:58:10 +0200 Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Raph, you wrote: The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'. It is two groups voting as one. Do you mean to say democracy is only for societies which are sufficiently homogeneous? That doesn't help because then the majority on issue A will still overrule the rest in every single decision on that issue. So a compromise option for that issue will have no chance. You can still have compromises. Only if the majority for some reason prefers to elect the compromise than their favourite. But in that it seems the "favourite" was just not the true favourite of the majority but the compromise was. So, still the minority has no influence on the decision but can only hope that the majority is nice enough to decide for the compromise. In fact, it can be helpful if multiple issues are voted as a single unit. This allows negotiation between factions in order to make up the majority. This common behavious is a pretty artificial construct to overcome the discussed drawbacks of majoritarian rules. A faction can make compromises on issues that it doesn't care about in order to get things that it does. This requires there is no solid bloc though. And when both factions care about both issues? A split society will only function poorly when a majoritarian method is used. When they use a method like FAWRB instead, they will function well because then they will care what the other faction wants, will try to devise good compromise options, and will vote in a way which makes sure the good compromises are elected instead of the random ballot result. This is possible *precisely* because with a non-majoritarian method the majority cannot simply ignore the minority but has to figure out how to get them to approve a compromise that is sufficiently near to their favourite. Non-majoritarian methods encourage discourse and cooperation. Sounds reasonable, the problem is that a) people don't like random methods b) it will result in certain outlier elements in society getting some power. a) FAWRB is not a random but a very specific and quite sophisticated method. It only uses a certain amount of chance, just as many things in our life do. Chance should not be mixed up with arbitrariness. Used in a rational way, FAWRB will usually elect good compromise options with near certainty, not leading to significant amounts of randomness. Perhaps a threshold could be set before a candidate can participate. Yes, I agree. The version I just proposed to Terry incorporates such a threshold. Also, the citizens of the US didn't get to vote on the restrictions of civil rights directly. It was handled by Congress. Using majority rule? That someone was me. Sorry, Greg didn't include your name in his post (or I couldn't find it). No need to be sorry. Yours, Jobst -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Dear Diego, you wrote: The risk of minority will remains. How does FAWRB perform in binary issues? What you mean by "risk of minority"? That a minority favourite may win? Well, that is just the *feature* of FAWRB: It gives each part of the electorate full control over an equal share of the winning probability. This is the requirement of democracy. So, when 55% prefer A and 45% prefer B and both groups do not care to look for a good compromise C or do not cooperate in electing such a good compromise by using FAWRBs cooperation mechanism, then indeed A will win with 55% probability and B will win with 45% probability - which is just fair and what a democratically thinking person would expect. This also answers your question about the binary case. However, let me point out that in most real-world issues, there is a possibility to come up with a good compromise option. Sometimes, for example, this can be achieved by "side payments", that is, C is A plus some payments (or other forms of compensation) from the A supporting group to the B supporting group. Once a good compromise is found, using FAWRB makes it probable that this compromise is also elected. Majoritarian methods fail here since with them, the majority has no incentive at all not to bullet vote for A and thus overrule the rest. If a consensus exists between the factions, then this danger would be too rare. There`s no gain for any faction to leave the issue undecided. I don't think so. In my experience of politics it is often the case that one faction strongly wants to stick with the status quo, so they would have a strong incentive to refuse cooperation under your scheme. Not always we can find an unanimity... Yes, that's exactly the reason why sometimes we need to resort to a chance process in order to give every voter their fair right to influence the decision. Yours, Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 7:58 PM, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'. It is >> two groups voting as one. > > Do you mean to say democracy is only for societies which are > sufficiently homogeneous? To a certain extent, I would say it works reasonably if one faction is >75% or no faction is more than 1/3. In the first case, the majority should be sufficiently confident in its power that it doesn't have to be oppressive and in the second case, there is a requirement for negotiation. It also works if there is trust/good relations between the factions, no matter the distribution. Where is breaks down is when one group is a majority but not an unassailable one. If one group is 55-60%, then it needs to stay together or it risks losing control. This is made even worse if there is distrust/fear between the two groups. In Nothern Ireland, they have a substantial minority who don't want NI to exist. It also tends to move power to the leadership of the majority and away from their supporters. >> You can still have compromises. > > Only if the majority for some reason prefers to elect the compromise > than their favourite. But in that it seems the "favourite" was just not > the true favourite of the majority but the compromise was. So, still the > minority has no influence on the decision but can only hope that the > majority is nice enough to decide for the compromise. I was thinking of PR + negotiations in the legislature. If a party supports policy A in exchange for policy B being killed, and then the other party breaks its word, then that is bad for that party's reputation. This will make it more difficult for it to make deals in the future. >> In fact, it can be helpful if multiple issues are voted as a single unit. >> This allows negotiation between factions in order to make up the majority. > > This common behavious is a pretty artificial construct to overcome the > discussed drawbacks of majoritarian rules. This occurs in Ireland with our "Programme for Government". After the election, there is a negotiation between the parties to agree on what the policies/priorities for the government until the next election will be. If the coalition doesn't implement what was agreed, then it could find that one of its members leaves and the government falls. This could lead to a new general election or to a different coalition being formed. >> A faction can make compromises on issues that it doesn't care about >> in order to get things that it does. This requires there is no solid >> bloc though. > > And when both factions care about both issues? Well, they aren't likely to care equally about every issue. In any case, negotiations will start for the "Every decision decided by simple majority" and negotiations should improve the utility. It is possible that total utility would fall as a result of those negotiations, but that is (hopefully) unlikely. >> Sounds reasonable, the problem is that a) people don't like random methods >> b) it will result in certain outlier elements in society getting some power. > > a) FAWRB is not a random but a very specific and quite sophisticated > method. It only uses a certain amount of chance, just as many things in > our life do. Chance should not be mixed up with arbitrariness. Used in a > rational way, FAWRB will usually elect good compromise options with near > certainty, not leading to significant amounts of randomness. I know, but it does have randomness. Btw, could you create a web page that gives a description of the method, since it was still in the discussion stage the last time you posted here. > Yes, I agree. The version I just proposed to Terry incorporates such a > threshold. Great. > Using majority rule? Well, majority of the members of Congress. It may not have passed if voted directly by the people. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Dear Greg,
you wrote:
Group membership is difficult to define. With ranked ballots it's
simple, but in the majority criterion debate, I argue that a score of
60% represents 60% of a first preference, not the preference between 59%
and 61%.
Sorry, I don't get your meaning here.
However, it seems to me that there is a confusion about the usage of the
term "majority" in the context of our debate. In the majority criterion
and related criteria, we usually don't speak of *the* majority,
referring to one specific subset of the electorate, but we refer to *a*
majority, by which we mean *any* subgroup consisting of more than half
of the voters.
For example, consider the classical cycle of true preferences, where
voter X ranks A>B>C
voter Y ranks B>C>A
voter Z ranks C>A>B.
In this situation, there are three different majorities: {X,Y}, {Y,Z},
and {Z,X}. Of course these groups are not disjoint and it makes no sense
to speak of "the" majority. Rather, the majority criterion only requires
that each of these groups, should they decide to do so, can overrule the
third voter. That is, X and Y can cooperate in overruling Z and making
sure B wins. Likewise (but not at the same time of course), Y and Z
could agree to elect C. So, it usually makes no sense to speak of "the"
majority since most often there are lots of majorities - it all depends
on which of these groups happens to make the deal to overrule the rest.
> ... we have not settled the issue of simultaneous
majorities.
See above for clarification. There is no issue of "simultaneous"
majorities, the criterion simply requires that each subgroup of more
than half of the voters has a way of overruling the rest. It does not
require that two such subgroups can do so at the same time, which is
obviously impossible.
I continued:
While of course civil rights are very important to make sure that
no-one's basic *rights* are violated, they cannot make sure that
everybody's *preferences* are have a fair chance of influencing
decisions that are made *within* the limits the civil rights pose.
to which you replied:
Let me explain my point. I set the bar fairly high for tyranny of
majority i.e. it must constitute actually oppressing me and not merely
annoying or inconveniencing me to be labelled tyranny.
I don't care for the label "tyranny". My point is that when a majority
is able to overrule the rest with certainty, then that's not democratic.
You talk about the destruction of
democracy.
Did I? I don't think so. I don't think there has been any large-scale
truly democratic system yet. Only some families and small groups often
decide in an approximately democratic way when they make sure that each
member of the group makes a decision at some point in time, for example
by letting the members decide in turn.
That democracy is an all-or-nothing type thing. I am arguing
that a good constitution will prevent a majority from acting in such a
way that democracy itself is subverted.
Not when the constitution allows the majority to decide all issues
without having to be concerned about other peoples wishes.
If you argue instead that
suboptimal results come about, yes I agree with you.
My point is not the "optimality" of results, whatever that may mean. To
define and ensure optimality is a large but different task than to
ensure the democratic right to influence the decision.
For example, some philosophers argued that it would be optimal if some
highly intelligent, well-informed and impartial person (the
"philosopher-king") decided all issues. Though I tend to agree that this
might give "optimal" results, such a system would obviously be not a bit
democratic.
On the other hand, simply drawing a random ballot to decide is perfectly
democratic since it gives each voter exactly the same power regardless
of factions. However, that method would not give "optimal" results at
all since compromise options would get no chance at all. What is missing
here is an incentive to cooperate.
So, whether a method is democratic and whether it leads to "optimal"
results are just two questions which are in large part (but not totally)
independent. This is why we developed FAWRB, a method which gives each
voters the same power but gives them also strong incentives to cooperate
in finding and electing good compromise options.
Again, you speak about actively preventing the majority from doing
something that violates the rights of minority. Such cannot be prevented
by any voting method!
Excuse me! Of course it can. I have demonstrated this over and over.
With FAWRB, the worst a majority of, say, 55% of the electorate can do
to the minority is to bullet-vote for the option considered worst to the
other 45%, thus assigning 55% of the winning probability to that option.
But this is not violating the minorities rights since at the same time
those 45% of the voters can assign the remaining 45%
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Dear Raph, you answered to me: a) FAWRB is not a random but a very specific and quite sophisticated method. It only uses a certain amount of chance, just as many things in our life do. Chance should not be mixed up with arbitrariness. Used in a rational way, FAWRB will usually elect good compromise options with near certainty, not leading to significant amounts of randomness. I know, but it does have randomness. I includes a chance process just as many sophisticated things in our life do. It does not include arbitrariness. It will most often lead to a certain winner (one option getting 100% winning probability). Here's some evidence that the perceptions that chance processes are evil and that deterministic processes cannot lead to random results is wrong: 1. Some time ago I challenged you all by asking for a method which elects C with certainty in the 55/45-example. The only methods which achieved this seeminly simple goal included a chance process. 2. Every majoritarian method leads to a severe kind of randomness when there's no Condorcet Winner! This is because in all these situations there is no group strategy equilibrium, that is, whatever the winner is, there will be some majority having both the incentive and the means to change the winner to an option they like better. So, where the strategic process will end is mostly random since it cannot settle on an equilibrium. Yours, Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
On Fri, Oct 17, 2008 at 5:24 PM, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I know, but it does have randomness. > > I includes a chance process just as many sophisticated things in our life > do. It does not include arbitrariness. It will most often lead to a certain > winner (one option getting 100% winning probability). I am not sure it would in practice. It is likely that a few percent would bullet vote. I think having thresholds at both ends would be a good idea, i.e. eliminate all options with less than 1/3 support and automatically elect any option which achieves greater than 75% probability. > Here's some evidence that the perceptions that chance processes are evil and > that deterministic processes cannot lead to random results is wrong: I think it is that random methods have the potential to be easier to corrupt. If someone with 5% support wins the draw, there is likely to be many accusations of it being rigged. Also, it could have stability problems. > 1. Some time ago I challenged you all by asking for a method which elects C > with certainty in the 55/45-example. The only methods which achieved this > seeminly simple goal included a chance process. I actually do think that it is a reasonable idea, but having it implemented would be an uphill battle. I think that a system that results in a 100% winner would be a reasonable target unless, say more than 1/3 of the voters, refuse to compromise would be a reasonable target. Using it for something like a legislature where it is possible to repeat votes is also potentially a problem, as a losing majority can 'toss the coin' over and over. > 2. Every majoritarian method leads to a severe kind of randomness when > there's no Condorcet Winner! This is because in all these situations there > is no group strategy equilibrium, that is, whatever the winner is, there > will be some majority having both the incentive and the means to change the > winner to an option they like better. So, where the strategic process will > end is mostly random since it cannot settle on an equilibrium. I think it is likely that there would be an honest condorcet winners in most real cases. Also, the Smith set should contain candidates that are at least reasonably similar and anyway, condorcet completion methods are rarely random. Btw, again, can you put on the web a full description of the method. It would be helpful to be able to type "FAWRB" into google and see the current version. You have produced software that implements the method, so you should include a description of the method it implements. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
