Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
On Sat, 4 Oct 2008 01:56:01 -0400 Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: In simulation there is value, and sometimes excessive temptation, in tailoring test cases to favor a desired result. Maybe try an open simulator. Make the electorate engine pluggable so experimenters can try different voting behaviours. That should protect against bias. I was proposing a poll, so bias is expectable. Only whatever behavior he poll takers offer together. I was proposing multiple formulas for cycles, all to be done to let users compare formulas. In vivo, as I proposed, you get all kinds of test cases exposed to multiple formulas, but not necessarily a good variety of test cases. It's nice to go live, but the up front costs will be high. The many current polls imply costs can be tolerable. It's risky too because you have to follow the crowd. Sites will offer alternative voting methods and electors will vote with their feet. There's no telling where they'll be attracted, or whether it'll jive with the test plans. My plans are for them to see Condorcet as a desirable method, and back one of the best cycle formulas for use with it. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
Dave Ketchum wrote: I do not understand 'no resolution': By time N1 there have been 10 votes in the poll - to analyze as a complete Condorcet election. By time N2 there have been 2 more, for a total of 12 to analyze as if a complete election. Any such election may produce a CW. Those that do not produce a CW result in a cycle... Meaning indecision? Maybe it's best to leave it at that. To resolve it and report it as a decision is to report a fabrication. (I was taking your preference for a hands-off resolution to the extreme. When faced with cycles, meaning indecisions, nothing gets done to encourage or discourage their existence. Let the indecision be. Let be be finale of seem... Let the lamp affix its beam.) Or meaning the Condorcet count is unable to see the decision? Then: ... I suggest at least the ability to implement multiple cycle resolution formulas, to support comparison of the resolutions provided by various formulas. And maybe combine their resolving power? Where a telescope is unable to resolve a faint star, an array of telescopes can do better. Here I see Votorola offering a useful, though incomplete, service. What I see desirable for Condorcet is an external site using that service. I guess it depends on where you're aiming. You can test resolution mechanisms under simulation in vitro. Why test them in vivo? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 04:12:21 -0400 Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: I do not understand 'no resolution': By time N1 there have been 10 votes in the poll - to analyze as a complete Condorcet election. By time N2 there have been 2 more, for a total of 12 to analyze as if a complete election. Any such election may produce a CW. Those that do not produce a CW result in a cycle... Meaning indecision? Maybe it's best to leave it at that. To resolve it and report it as a decision is to report a fabrication. (I was taking your preference for a hands-off resolution to the extreme. When faced with cycles, meaning indecisions, nothing gets done to encourage or discourage their existence. Let the indecision be. Let be be finale of seem... Let the lamp affix its beam.) Or meaning the Condorcet count is unable to see the decision? Then: Condorcet CAN see - perhaps each formula can be described as representing view via different glasses. Perhaps three groups of voters have come to SOLID decisions as to their preferences, but their decisions conflict - AB, BC, and CA. ... I suggest at least the ability to implement multiple cycle resolution formulas, to support comparison of the resolutions provided by various formulas. And maybe combine their resolving power? Where a telescope is unable to resolve a faint star, an array of telescopes can do better. We want to see which telescope does best - we are far from the point where merging the conflicting results would help us toward truth. Here I see Votorola offering a useful, though incomplete, service. What I see desirable for Condorcet is an external site using that service. I guess it depends on where you're aiming. You can test resolution mechanisms under simulation in vitro. Why test them in vivo? Good question. Trying: In simulation there is value, and sometimes excessive temptation, in tailoring test cases to favor a desired result. In vivo, as I proposed, you get all kinds of test cases exposed to multiple formulas, but not necessarily a good variety of test cases. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
Dave Ketchum wrote: In simulation there is value, and sometimes excessive temptation, in tailoring test cases to favor a desired result. Maybe try an open simulator. Make the electorate engine pluggable so experimenters can try different voting behaviours. That should protect against bias. In vivo, as I proposed, you get all kinds of test cases exposed to multiple formulas, but not necessarily a good variety of test cases. It's nice to go live, but the up front costs will be high. It's risky too because you have to follow the crowd. Sites will offer alternative voting methods and electors will vote with their feet. There's no telling where they'll be attracted, or whether it'll jive with the test plans. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
On Thu, 2 Oct 2008 19:52:31 -0400 Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: Cycles happen, and perhaps should be reported, but are NOT a reason for he system to do anything special beyond normal analysis and reporting. Of course reporting should e based on total voting, thus updated as soon as practical after any vote. Big point is that cycles happen and nothing gets done to encourage or discourage their existence. Assume the ideal Condorcet resolution is no resolution at all. If reality intervenes and you would have a resolution, the closest to the ideal is a hands-off method. I do not understand 'no resolution': By time N1 there have been 10 votes in the poll - to analyze as a complete Condorcet election. By time N2 there have been 2 more, for a total of 12 to analyze as if a complete election. Any such election may produce a CW. Those that do not produce a CW result in a cycle. I suggest at least the ability to implement multiple cycle resolution formulas, to support comparison of the resolutions provided by various formulas. If it is a hands-off method, it ought to be transparent to other hands-off methods. No need to restrict to a single one. Allow multiple parallel resolutions and approach even closer to the ideal (Condorcet, phantom, and test bed or proving grounds) of no resolution at all. In terms of technical supports, Votorola's core is a continuous medium. It never reports a winner at all. So it meets the ideal. But the design allows for parallel analyses and massaging of the raw data stream. So external sites can report their own resolutions in more-or-less real time. (But this might not be implemented till the production release, depending on need.) Here I see Votorola offering a useful, though incomplete, service. What I see desirable for Condorcet is an external site using that service. In terms of my own interest, I want a rough understanding of how external signals will cross with other events in the real world, and influence the ideal (core, Condorcet, phantom). This discussion has me thinking that cascade decision rings are not a resolution mechanism after all, but some kind of defence formation (wagon circle) or protective response against (at least in part) external pressures. Possible values of such as wagon circles seem minimal to me for the current discussion. I do see external pressures possibly influencing later votes based on earlier results - all a human loop. These polls vary from real elections: Current content of polls can be analyzed while voting continues. Real elections do not get analyzed until after voting ends. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
Dave Ketchum wrote: I see the Condorcet phantom as going thru the same motions as a real primary or general election, but letting the real elections do the nominating and pay no official attention to results of the phantom. I see a phantom that will nevertheless have real effects (ghost in the machine). You see a test bed or proving grounds for an election method (machine in the ghost). Same ghost, different machines. (But I've interrupted your discussions.) That the phantom votes would be shiftable because current counts should be displayed during the voting/polling period does not make consensus exciting to me. I mentioned cycles because their resolution formulas are a hot topic and a variety of examples could help thinking. Maybe decision rings could help. The resolution is slow (depends on vote shifting), but maybe someone can improve that. (I needed a slow and thoughtful process to solve a real world problem, external to the counting mechanism.) Just to illustrate, here's a Condorcet resolution by a decision ring: 0. A clear Condorcet winner (null case). http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/decision-0-stable.png No need for a resolution with that result. All 58 voters are in agreement. 1. A Condorcet cycle. http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/decision-1-vacuum.png Call that a Condorcet cycle because it's (as you say) a near tie. Say the tie includes all those receiving 5+ votes apiece (but ignore the fiver on the bottom, pretend she's a four). Two problems with above i) it's not apparent to the voters that there's a cycle (tie), and ii) if we make it clear and turn up the decision heat (hurry up, we're picking the winner now) they may behave chaotically. They may pile up on the winner or something, so the end result is overly sensitive to initial vote shifts. 2. A decision ring. http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/decision-2-ring.png So rather than resolve by addition (pile up), we'll resolve by subtraction. The tied candidates form into a decision ring by voting for each other. For your purposes, the system automatically aligns their votes in this manner. The resulting whirlpool of assent (flow volume 52) is equally shared by all members of the ring. This formalizes their tie, and signals that it's time for a final decision. 3. The first vote shift. http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/decision-3-out.png Votes then shift to resolve the tie. In this case, the first move was made by a ring member. She shifts her vote to another member, and thus exits the ring. She's signalling that she's no longer a contender. This is only a resolution *framework*. It leaves much unspecified (not needed for my own problem). How do you force the timing? Maybe you eject the weakest members of the ring at regular intervals. What is the resolution criterion? It's not ring membership (that is only a signal). Raph Frank has suggested counting only the votes that are received from outside of the ring. In other words, factor out the cyclic flow that *equalizes* the ring members, and leave them with what *distinguishes* them. That's your resolution count. (All of this applies only to cascade voting. There are other methods, and I'm afraid I interrupted your discussion of them. Please resume...) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
Dave Ketchum wrote: When there is a cycle (3 or more in a near tie) there could be demos of whatever resolution procedures please someone. I was never concerned with a final decision. I doubt these are in your ballpark: a) Time. Votes are shiftable. If electorate wants to be decisive, they'll pull themselves into a consensus. b) Principal election as the Condorcet completion (but I think Raph or Kristofer has already suggested this) And, of course, the counting arrays must be correct and visible. They are visible in current alpha release of Votorola, but it's not easy to verify their correctness. The plan is to support verification in the beta, by disclosing raw electoral data and providing tools for recounting. Do need defense against one voter submitting multiple ballots - needs thought. Raph Frank wrote: You could try pre-registration. If you had enough money, you could send out invites to random people on the voting register... So think, and do what is practical. My thinking is that registrants can cross-authenticate using a trust network. The downside is disclosure of residential addresses in public. It'll be a slow grow, and biased at first. (Not sure it's practical. Doing preliminary tests in Toronto, over the next few months.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
On Tue, 30 Sep 2008 11:19:52 -0400 Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: When there is a cycle (3 or more in a near tie) there could be demos of whatever resolution procedures please someone. I was never concerned with a final decision. I doubt these are in your ballpark: I see the Condorcet phantom as going thru the same motions as a real primary or general election, but letting the real elections do the nominating and pay no official attention to results of the phantom. a) Time. Votes are shiftable. If electorate wants to be decisive, they'll pull themselves into a consensus. That the phantom votes would be shiftable because current counts should be displayed during the voting/polling period does not make consensus exciting to me. I mentioned cycles because their resolution formulas are a hot topic and a variety of examples could help thinking. b) Principal election as the Condorcet completion (but I think Raph or Kristofer has already suggested this) And, of course, the counting arrays must be correct and visible. They are visible in current alpha release of Votorola, but it's not easy to verify their correctness. The plan is to support verification in the beta, by disclosing raw electoral data and providing tools for recounting. Do need defense against one voter submitting multiple ballots - needs thought. Raph Frank wrote: You could try pre-registration. If you had enough money, you could send out invites to random people on the voting register... So think, and do what is practical. My thinking is that registrants can cross-authenticate using a trust network. The downside is disclosure of residential addresses in public. It'll be a slow grow, and biased at first. (Not sure it's practical. Doing preliminary tests in Toronto, over the next few months.) -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again, again
On Mon, 29 Sep 2008 19:45:14 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: For some reason, I didn't receive Dave Ketchum's reply to my post about the Condorcet party. So let's try this again, indeed. Dave Ketchum wrote: On Mon, 29 Sep 2008 00:05:28 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: My goal is using Condorcet, but recognizing that everything costs money, wo we need to be careful as to expenses. Thus I see: Condorcet as the election method. But then see no value in a condorcet party. Also then see no value in primaries, but know parties see value in such. The idea of having a Condorcet party is to gradually transform Plurality elections into Condorcet elections. Disturbing existing elections by marrying in something from Condorcet seems very destructive considering possible benefits, so how about: Run a phantom Condorcet election with current candidates before the existing voting. Candidates can drop out if they choose: Third party candidates have little to lose. Major party candidates risk static as to why they did not dare. Those who choose to, vote via internet. Thus we have ballots to count and report on as a sort of poll. I was demonstrating Condorcet so: Get NEAR a real election, as something to discus. Do REAL Condorcet, since that is what is being sold. But DO NOT marry into the real election, for that makes more headaches grab I expect to be worth the pain. Thus a poll, which is something to do fitting the above. Do not worry about biases - just admit they likely exist in the way the poll is done (though Condorcet actually used as a method would be concerned with such). If you're going to have a poll, you don't need the Plurality shell; that's true enough. But if you're a third party and you're seeing your rate go to close to zero, then uniting with other third parties under a Condorcet party could improve your chances, because at least the third parties aren't splitting the votes among themselves anymore. For polling, I would advocate ordinary polling, because internet polls would be colored by the effect that those who have good internet equipment would affect the results in a disproportionate manner. So could foreigners or hacked computers, although in reality those probably wouldn't be much of a problem. Ordinary? I picked internet because I thought I saw usability and value at affordable expense. Perhaps internet voting biases could be fixed by having a vote by party adjustment like real polling organizations do. That is, if 53% of the people are Democratic, then all Democrat-first voters count for 53% of the voting power in the poll, and so on. But that faces another problem, because many of those Yes, I like Democrats replies (that were used to derive the 53%) may be a result of the strategic vote nature that Plurality encourages. I duck adjustments because I do not want voters thinking of such unless they are into an election method where such actually need to be attended to. And no value in runoffs - Plurality needs runoffs because of the way voters cannot express their thoughts - but Condorcet has no similar problem. Runoffs are not perfection even in Plurality - look at the recent French election for which voters thought of rioting when neither runoff contender was popular. You're replying to yourself, but I'll agree with you here. Plurality plus runoff is not perfect, but it's much better than Plurality without runoff. To make a general observation, runoff weakens strategy, and Plurality is filled with strategy (least of two evils). Runoff doesn't eliminate the strategy, but then it can't, no matter what voting system it is paired with. With Condorcet they offer little possible value - every voter could rank AB, A=B, or BA at the same time as doing any other desired ranking. For public elections I think it's likely that candidates won't strategize enough to necessitate further hardening against strategy. Not everybody agrees, and I'm simply saying that I can see how someone would argue in the favor of having a runoff even with a Condorcet method. Also, if there is no CW there are at least three candidates in a near tie - want to put the N candidates in a runoff? I don't know - is that the case for Plurality ties with Plurality+runoff? Go back to the French election - because multiple good candidates divvied up the good votes, a couple oddballs graduated to the runoff. Here the voters can more completely express their desires, meaning we are closer to perfection without runoffs. Also, how many contenders permitted in the runoff? A cycle can describe three or more in a near tie. Condorcet runoffs may have value if the people decide to play dirty and always use strategy. Since the runoff must be honest (with only two candidates, the optimal strategy is honesty), it hedges the risk since the best of the two will always win. How much strategy need concern us with Condorcet?
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
On Mon, Sep 29, 2008 at 12:51 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The idea of having a Condorcet party is to gradually transform Plurality elections into Condorcet elections. Disturbing existing elections by marrying in something from Condorcet seems very destructive considering possible benefits, so how about: Run a phantom Condorcet election with current candidates before the existing voting. Right that is what I was thinking. It was that a party would hold a condorcet primary. Candidates can drop out if they choose: Third party candidates have little to lose. Major party candidates risk static as to why they did not dare. Also, I wonder if they could be put on the ballot anyway. Would that be legal? Those who choose to, vote via internet. This generates massive participation biases. You need some way to cancel them out. Thus we have ballots to count and report on as a sort of poll. The trick is to make it so that voters don't just see it as another poll. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
On Sat, Sep 27, 2008 at 4:57 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Certainly both party and non-party candidates would be permitted in Condorcet. If primaries were also used, parties would nominate only primary winners. This would not prevent primary losers from running as non-party candidates. Well the primary was that the condorcet party would hold a condorcet election. By calling it a primary, it might get State support. One of the strongest arguments I have heard against using Condorcet in the election and doing away with primaries, is a party desire to use primaries to decide who to back in the election. This is true, however, I don't see it as a major issue. They could either hold a primary anyway, or just pick a candidate. Following that kind of reasoning, it would appear that conventional parties have very little to lose by running Condorcet primaries instead of Plurality primaries, more so if there's an open primary. (So why don't they?) As to open, either: Party wants the primary to pick one if its members to be backed. Party wants its members to do the selecting of who to back. Well, they wouldn't need a primary if the leadership just picked a candidate. I guess the parties could still put up the 40 and 60 candidates. However, I wonder if they would prefer the other party to win rather than a compromise candidate. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
My goal is using Condorcet, but recognizing that everything costs money, wo we need to be careful as to expenses. Thus I see: Condorcet as the election method. But then see no value in a condorcet party. Also then see no value in primaries, but know parties see value in such. And no value in runoffs - Plurality needs runoffs because of the way voters cannot express their thoughts - but Condorcet has no similar problem. On Sun, 28 Sep 2008 02:28:55 +0100 Raph Frank wrote: On Sat, Sep 27, 2008 at 4:57 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Certainly both party and non-party candidates would be permitted in Condorcet. If primaries were also used, parties would nominate only primary winners. This would not prevent primary losers from running as non-party candidates. Well the primary was that the condorcet party would hold a condorcet election. By calling it a primary, it might get State support. What value might the state see as reason for paying for such? What value might voters see in this? One of the strongest arguments I have heard against using Condorcet in the election and doing away with primaries, is a party desire to use primaries to decide who to back in the election. This is true, however, I don't see it as a major issue. They could either hold a primary anyway, or just pick a candidate. Who does the just pick since voters can claim ownership of the right? Who justifies paying expense of a primary here? Following that kind of reasoning, it would appear that conventional parties have very little to lose by running Condorcet primaries instead of Plurality primaries, more so if there's an open primary. (So why don't they?) As to open, either: Party wants the primary to pick one if its members to be backed. Party wants its members to do the selecting of who to back. Well, they wouldn't need a primary if the leadership just picked a candidate. I guess the parties could still put up the 40 and 60 candidates. However, I wonder if they would prefer the other party to win rather than a compromise candidate. Now we are back to who decides. Part of all this is desire for a fair chance to win. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
Michael Allan wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: That is interesting. Perhaps one could have, for example, a Condorcet party that pledges to run the Condorcet winner of an earlier internal election for president. Then various small parties could nominally join up with the Condorcet party, and that party would hold an election (a primary of sorts). The effects predicted by game theory would be a problem, though. A losing party could think that hey, if I run independently, I may get a share, no matter how small, and that's better than the 0% chance I have if I stay under the Condorcet party umbrella. Or the parallel electoral system (Condorcet party) might undertake a hostile takeover of the other parties. It would appeal to their members and cherry-pick their candidates. (But I'm uncertain how this would play out in a PR context, unfamiliar to me.) It might attract candidates by the chance to be their own parties, or maybe just to be independent of any party. It might attract members (voters) by the ease of shifting votes across party lines, opening up a wider field of candidates to them. (So it would be like a market fair, with independent vendors.) It seems this system would be more stable than I originally thought. Third parties could run as parts of the Condorcet party without running much of a risk, since they would otherwise get no votes at all. The defection danger surfaces when the third parties have become sufficiently large from using that parallel electoral system. Then a party that would win a plurality vote but who isn't a Condorcet winner has an incentive to defect. Following that kind of reasoning, it would appear that conventional parties have very little to lose by running Condorcet primaries instead of Plurality primaries, more so if there's an open primary. (So why don't they?) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
On 9/26/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It seems this system would be more stable than I originally thought. Third parties could run as parts of the Condorcet party without running much of a risk, since they would otherwise get no votes at all. The defection danger surfaces when the third parties have become sufficiently large from using that parallel electoral system. Then a party that would win a plurality vote but who isn't a Condorcet winner has an incentive to defect. If the condorcet party winner can realistically claim to be one of the top-2, then it doesn't matter as he will defeat any challeger. Both the 2 main parties would have to defect. The question is at what level of support does this becomes self-reinforcing. Following that kind of reasoning, it would appear that conventional parties have very little to lose by running Condorcet primaries instead of Plurality primaries, more so if there's an open primary. (So why don't they?) The current parties don't want to elect a condorcet winner, they want to elect a winner that is biased towards them. The 2 candidates in a 2 party system have to balance support of their party with defeating the other candidate. In the single issue case with voters ranging from 0 to 100, the 2 parties pick at 25 and 75, but the condorcet winner is at 50. The final result might be 2 candidates at say 40 and 60 as they have to balance the 2 requirements. This can be seen as candidates switch the focus of their campaign once they have won nomination. Anyway, I would agree that an open primary would be key for the condorcet party. In states with a closed primary can a party allow non-party members to vote if it wishes? Would this block those voters from voting in their 'real' party? Another problem is actually getting the main candidates to participate. I assume it would be legal to add them to the ballot without their permission? Finally, turnout at the condorcet primary matters. If only a small number of people vote, then it is much less evidence that the winner is the real condorcet winner. One option would be to re-weight votes so that the result is representative. If the consequences of the result of the vote is not massive, then there is little point in bothering to vote. So, there needs to be some kind of boot-strap. Once the condorcet winner can credibilly claim to be one of the top-2, then the condorcet primary almost becomes the final election. Certainly, winning the condorcet primary would be a major boost to any candidate. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
Good Afternoon, Michael This is in response to your message to me on September 8th. You describe what you have in mind via at least one level of abstraction and, for me, that adds a degree of difficulty. For example, and please forgive me obtuseness, I don't understand your closing paragraph: The point of my post is that we can actually do this today. It opens up an interesting question. In your own words: Would the voters be deciding on the 'who' and the 'what' in the form of candidates for the ballot, and norms for action? Or would they really (as McLuhan might suggest) be deciding on the whole electoral system? I believe you are referring to the mechanism on your site, but, even so, I don't understand the question. I have suggested that voters select nominees by meeting in triads and selecting one of their number to represent them. I'm unclear about how, exactly, you suggest that should or will occur. It's possible you have described these details on other threads and I missed them. If so, I apologize. I lack the time to digest all the material on this site, but do try to be thorough in any discussions I join. re: The elections are themselves an evaluative medium. Can that be true? When voting is based on media-disseminated obfuscation, deception and hyperbole, and when public susceptibility to such distortions are so well understood that spin doctors control the flow of information to the public, how can the resulting elections be evaluative of aught but the propagandists? Are the circumstances in which we find ourselves (in the United States) not proof of the fallacy of that point of view? re: The same communication channels that traffic in information about ordinary elections are also available for open elections. So voters have access to mailing lists and chat networks, blogs and broadcast media. They can use these media to share information and arguments about the candidates. At the risk of belaboring the point, these are precisely the means that foisted Weapons of Mass Destruction upon us and gave us our present crop of politicians. I'm surprised so few people recognize how the principles laid down by Pavlov, B. F. Skinner and a host of other behavioral scientists are used by our leaders (political and commercial) to milk us like cows. Mass communications is their tool and they are expert in its use. If we are to improve our electoral systems, one of our first concerns must be to find a candidate evaluation mechanism that goes deeper than the emotion-inspiring fluff we're fed by the media. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: That is interesting. Perhaps one could have, for example, a Condorcet party that pledges to run the Condorcet winner of an earlier internal election for president. Then various small parties could nominally join up with the Condorcet party, and that party would hold an election (a primary of sorts). The effects predicted by game theory would be a problem, though. A losing party could think that hey, if I run independently, I may get a share, no matter how small, and that's better than the 0% chance I have if I stay under the Condorcet party umbrella. Or the parallel electoral system (Condorcet party) might undertake a hostile takeover of the other parties. It would appeal to their members and cherry-pick their candidates. (But I'm uncertain how this would play out in a PR context, unfamiliar to me.) It might attract candidates by the chance to be their own parties, or maybe just to be independent of any party. It might attract members (voters) by the ease of shifting votes across party lines, opening up a wider field of candidates to them. (So it would be like a market fair, with independent vendors.) Also, in a parliamentary context, the parallel system might vote nation-wide confidence in a candidate for Prime Minister. People would then expect Parliament to follow suit. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
Michael Allan wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: If you take the parallel system strategy to its extreme, you'd get a parallel organization where (as an example), a group elects a double mayor and support him over the real mayor, essentially building a state inside the state. I don't think that's very likely to happen, though; as hard it may be to alter the nation through voting, it's going to be even harder to make a duplicate state from nothing, and that duplicate state would still have to abide by the laws of the real state. Or the leading mayoral candidates of the parallel system might subsequently place themselves on the ballot of the City system. People would expect more-or-less equivalent results. They would expect the City system to reflect and ratify their prior choices. Then the two electoral systems would not be competitive (as I implied). They would be in synergy. The parallel system would be feeding candidates into the City system. Its function in that context would be indentical to that of the party electoral systems. It would occupy the same political niche. So the competition would be there, in that niche. Similar arguments can be applied to a parallel legislature. Popular parallel legislation would naturally find its way onto the legislative agenda of the state. Unpopular state legislation would naturally be voted down in the parallel legislature. Party discipline might be undermined. That is interesting. Perhaps one could have, for example, a Condorcet party that pledges to run the Condorcet winner of an earlier internal election for president. Then various small parties could nominally join up with the Condorcet party, and that party would hold an election (a primary of sorts). The effects predicted by game theory would be a problem, though. A losing party could think that hey, if I run independently, I may get a share, no matter how small, and that's better than the 0% chance I have if I stay under the Condorcet party umbrella. There would also be a duplication of effort since the Condorcet party would have to manage its own (secret ballot) elections. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: If you take the parallel system strategy to its extreme, you'd get a parallel organization where (as an example), a group elects a double mayor and support him over the real mayor, essentially building a state inside the state. I don't think that's very likely to happen, though; as hard it may be to alter the nation through voting, it's going to be even harder to make a duplicate state from nothing, and that duplicate state would still have to abide by the laws of the real state. Or the leading mayoral candidates of the parallel system might subsequently place themselves on the ballot of the City system. People would expect more-or-less equivalent results. They would expect the City system to reflect and ratify their prior choices. Then the two electoral systems would not be competitive (as I implied). They would be in synergy. The parallel system would be feeding candidates into the City system. Its function in that context would be indentical to that of the party electoral systems. It would occupy the same political niche. So the competition would be there, in that niche. Similar arguments can be applied to a parallel legislature. Popular parallel legislation would naturally find its way onto the legislative agenda of the state. Unpopular state legislation would naturally be voted down in the parallel legislature. Party discipline might be undermined. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
Michael Allan wrote: What about an alternative electoral system, in parallel? If voters really want to see change - if they really want to choose the 'who' and the 'what' - a parallel system would give them an opportunity to vote with their feet. If nothing else, they might be curious to learn how the results would differ (who would be Mayor, for example) if the selection wasn't restricted to party candidates. That's one way to do it. I think that if electoral reform is to work, the voters have to recognize that the new option (the better system) really is a better system, and also be interested in changing the system in the first place. One way of showing that the new method works better is to work from the local level up. Another is, as you state, to have a parallel instance where voters can see that it's better. The parallel instance doesn't have to be completely identical, it could be as simple as MTV's use of Selectricity (Schulze) for its elections, although in that example, it may be harder for voters to identify that it's the voting method that makes for better results (since the internals are hidden). If you take the parallel system strategy to its extreme, you'd get a parallel organization where (as an example), a group elects a double mayor and support him over the real mayor, essentially building a state inside the state. I don't think that's very likely to happen, though; as hard it may be to alter the nation through voting, it's going to be even harder to make a duplicate state from nothing, and that duplicate state would still have to abide by the laws of the real state. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
On 9/10/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you take the parallel system strategy to its extreme, you'd get a parallel organization where (as an example), a group elects a double mayor and support him over the real mayor, essentially building a state inside the state. I don't think that's very likely to happen, though; as hard it may be to alter the nation through voting, it's going to be even harder to make a duplicate state from nothing, and that duplicate state would still have to abide by the laws of the real state. This was similar to the route that was used in Ireland as part of the mechanism to obtain independance. The legislators that were elected refused to go to the London Parliament and instead setup their own local one. However, I think in most cases, setting up such a system would count as treason. This is especially true if it started getting powerful. I guess it depends on what is the official purpose. The founders of the Irish Free State refused to recognise the London Parliament's right to Ireland. It would be different if the alternative system recognised the power of the real state and was just organising and would only use powers held by its members. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
Good morning Fred, ... My immediate concern is how candidates are evaluated. Do voters decide based on candidates' stated positions or is there a mechanism for examining candidates to establish their bona fides? I guess there are two classes of evaluative mechanisms: a) Election results (internal to the system). b) Other mechanisms (external). (a). The elections are themselves an evaluative medium. The elections are continuous, and the results are reported at frequent intervals. Votes are expected to shift as new information is revealed to the voters. (b). But unless we take Marshall McLuhan at his word, a medium cannot be an ultimate source of information. The election results can only be meaningful if they are backed by external sources. (This is maybe the point of your Q.) External sources are: i) Dialogue and discourse in the public sphere. ii) Voting close to home, for somebody you know. iii) Voting for a norm, the text of which is visible. (i). The same communication channels that traffic in information about ordinary elections are also available for open elections. So voters have access to mailing lists and chat networks, blogs and broadcast media. They can use these media to share information and arguments about the candidates. (ii). The immediate recipient of the vote (voter's own delegate) can be evaluated by personal aquaintance. Because there are no formal candidates and no constraints on choice, a participant is free to vote for anyone. She can therefore cast her vote close to home, supporting someone she knows and trusts. Her vote will then cascade through a series of delegates, and ultimately reach an end candidate. None of these other people will be known to her personally. Only her own delegate will be known to her. But whenever she has a question or a concern, she can direct it to the delegate. She can use the delegate as a kind of 2-way communication channel into the election. If she does not get a satisfactory answer, she can consider shifting her vote. In this way, voters can evaluate both the delegates and the candidates. (iii). In a norm election (law, plan, policy), the voter can inspect the actual text of the candidate norm - the particular variant draft that she is voting for. (I'm calling this an external mechanism because the drafts are not actually stored in the system. Only the votes are stored in the system. The drafts are out there in the public sphere.) Norm elections are not supported yet, not till the beta release. The point of my post is that we can actually do this today. It opens up an interesting question. In your own words: Would the voters be deciding on the 'who' and the 'what' in the form of candidates for the ballot, and norms for action? Or would they really (as McLuhan might suggest) be deciding on the whole electoral system? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'
Good Morning, Michael Allan Thank you for your suggestion. I visited your site and must return to study it more carefully. My immediate concern is how candidates are evaluated. Do voters decide based on candidates' stated positions or is there a mechanism for examining candidates to establish their bona fides? Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
