Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 30, 2008, at 22:56 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "I see also some benefits in being "bound by manifesto and indebtedness" and having related 'cliques' already before the election." Then you must be happy with the status quo and all the deceit, obfuscation and corruption that dominate our present political process. I'm only saying that taking a system where all candidates represent just their personal views also loses something (a clear structure) and adds complexity (makes evaluation of the numerous candidates more difficult to the voters). I don't want status quo in most electoral systems of today. It is possible to have methods that allow groupings that could be more fine grained than today. It is also possible to have methods that allow voters to express opinions that deviate from the given party/subgroup structure. re: "If there are plenty of candidates it is very useful to know what each candidate stands for (and is morally bound to)." Thinking one knows "what each candidate stands for (and is morally bound to)." in a partisan system is the height of folly. To cite the most obvious case, those who 'knew' that the present President Bush was a fiscal conservative have learned, to their unending anguish, that they 'knew' nothing at all. The tragedy is that they attribute their error to the man rather than the system that produced him ... in spite of the fact that the same deception follows every election in every jurisdiction. The only way you can get any idea what a candidate really stands for is to examine him ... carefully. You won't always be right, but you'll be right more frequently than you will be when you form your judgment by listening to him (or her) tell you why you should vote for her (or him). I also want to avoid the situation where the candidate tells to each voter group different stories on what he/she represents. For poor people he/she would tell that he/she will promote their interests, and to riche people he/she would tell something else. This is where clear statements on groupings might help the poor voters to understand, and would make the candidates be more open on what they intend to do. One example. If both Republicans and Democrats would have clear internal factions "against war" and "pro war" then the results of the election could tell clearly what the voters want. If there is no such clear distinction the actual policy after the election could easily be anything. And the voters, even if they would have made detailed analysis of the individual candidates, would not know how much others agreed with their opinion. re: "(This need not mean a traditional flat party structure (and large parties) but can also be e.g. a tree like structure that makes it possible to identify the 'green republicans' and to support some of those candidates or that whole block.)" I'm unable to visualize such a tree-like structure, or how it would work. The political space could consist of "left wing" and "right wing". The right wing could consist of the conservative party and another more extreme right wing party. The conservative party could have a "against war" wing and/or a green wing. These groupings could still be divided in smaller fragments. Probably the system (multi-winner elections) would be based on multi seat districts (not single seat districts). It is easiest to think the tree based methods as extensions of the open list based methods. More to the point, and what those who choose their representatives by labels rather than substance I'd expect voters to vote based on substance and analysis of individuals. "Labels" / identified groups could help them in this task. re: "Maybe the key idea is to avoid situations where the parties start dominating the political life, candidate nominations, their opinions etc. more than what is ideal for the society (and thereby making the society more stagnant and causing citizens to lose trust and interest in governing the future of their own society). Is that not a precise description of our present political existence? How, exactly, can we avoid it. Who is to determine what is ideal for the society other than the society itself? I think it is included in the laws of nature that systems often tend to stagnate, leading persons tend to grab more power than what is beneficial for the society etc. We just need to work continuously to keep the system healthy and dynamic and responsive. I've outlined a method that lets the people select candidates from among themselves and, in the process, define the ideals of their society. It avoids the problems you describe. Would that I could make it attractive to you. Finding a good balance is not easy, different societies have different needs, it is easy to jump to new systems since grass often seems greener there. In short, lots of discussions and
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Afternoon, Juho re: "I see also some benefits in being "bound by manifesto and indebtedness" and having related 'cliques' already before the election." Then you must be happy with the status quo and all the deceit, obfuscation and corruption that dominate our present political process. If you prefer hearing your candidates' coached responses to posed questions rather than examining him yourself or being certain he is carefully examined by people with a vital interest in finding out what moves his soul; if you are willing to submit to the mindless, meaningless patter that passes for political campaigning in our era, you will be happy with the system in place. If you can aspire to nothing better than neverending witless confrontations on meaningless, 'made-up' issues, then support the system we have and continue to ignore its destructiveness. I think we're better than that. re: "If there are plenty of candidates it is very useful to know what each candidate stands for (and is morally bound to)." Thinking one knows "what each candidate stands for (and is morally bound to)." in a partisan system is the height of folly. To cite the most obvious case, those who 'knew' that the present President Bush was a fiscal conservative have learned, to their unending anguish, that they 'knew' nothing at all. The tragedy is that they attribute their error to the man rather than the system that produced him ... in spite of the fact that the same deception follows every election in every jurisdiction. The only way you can get any idea what a candidate really stands for is to examine him ... carefully. You won't always be right, but you'll be right more frequently than you will be when you form your judgment by listening to him (or her) tell you why you should vote for her (or him). re: "(This need not mean a traditional flat party structure (and large parties) but can also be e.g. a tree like structure that makes it possible to identify the 'green republicans' and to support some of those candidates or that whole block.)" I'm unable to visualize such a tree-like structure, or how it would work. More to the point, and what those who choose their representatives by labels rather than substance fail to grasp, is that whether or not a candidate espouses 'green republican' virtues is but an infinitesimal part of the qualities we want in those we elect to represent us in our government. What do we know of their inclinations and their decision-making capability in the areas of taxation, public works, bureaucracy, economic expansion, war and the multitude of other matters that concern us? re: "Maybe the key idea is to avoid situations where the parties start dominating the political life, candidate nominations, their opinions etc. more than what is ideal for the society (and thereby making the society more stagnant and causing citizens to lose trust and interest in governing the future of their own society). Is that not a precise description of our present political existence? How, exactly, can we avoid it. Who is to determine what is ideal for the society other than the society itself? I've outlined a method that lets the people select candidates from among themselves and, in the process, define the ideals of their society. It avoids the problems you describe. Would that I could make it attractive to you. Tangentially, my brother recently introduced me to some thoughts about a Dr. Alisdair MacIntyre at Notre Dame University. What I read astounded me. When I outlined an electoral method a few months ago, I was seeking to empower the people. Dr. MacIntyre has a more profound view. He suggests that, when the people ... all the people ... participate in the 'practice' of politics, they are enriched by their participation and the entire community benefits. (In my opinion, the method I outlined can be equated to Dr. MacIntyre's communities, but he never heard of me or my opinions, so you'll have to judge for yourself.) These two very brief excerpts from the piece may give you a little of the flavor of Dr. MacIntyre's view: 1) "When we have made the changes MacIntyre wants to see, politics will no longer be civil war by other means: 'the politics of such communities is not a politics of competing interests in the way in which the politics of the modern state is'. It is instead a shared project, and one that is shared by all adults, rather than being limited to a few elites who have gained power through manipulation and use that power to gain the goods of effectiveness for themselves." 2) "When the community deliberates collectively about its best way of life it is choosing a telos, or final end. And that final end will be one which reflects the needs of all the citizens, including the need to have and use the virtues, which are part of our nature as dependent rational animals." Perhaps you'll enjoy the piece as much as I di
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 12, 2008, at 21:01 , Fred Gohlke wrote: As a very good friend wrote me recently about what would happen if members of parliament in his country were selected by such a method ... "When people in parliament form cliques, they (would be) building majority opinions on specific issues. They (would not be) bound by manifesto or indebtedness to backers. I would expect different cliques (to) form, in response to each issue raised. ... Before election, cliques are formed to get power, not to solve problems." I see also some benefits in being "bound by manifesto and indebtedness" and having related "cliques" already before the election. The cliques certainly serve also as tools to get power but they may also clarify the political field to the voters. If there are plenty of candidates it is very useful to know what each candidate stands for (and is morally bound to). (This need not mean a traditional flat party structure (and large parties) but can also be e.g. a tree like structure that makes it possible to identify the "green republicans" and to support some of those candidates or that whole block.) Maybe the key idea is to avoid situations where the parties start dominating the political life, candidate nominations, their opinions etc. more than what is ideal for the society (and thereby making the society more stagnant and causing citizens to lose trust and interest in governing the future of their own society). Of course, as you pointed out, that implies a relatively high turnover of elected officials at each election. So, while that makes the system very dynamic and makes it difficult for rot to find a sticking place, it also makes it difficult for those who take time out of their lives to serve in public office, for they have no career guarantees. Such people must be afforded salary continuation and something similar to the G. I. Bill of Rights ... advanced education, career training, small business loans, and so forth ... to ease their transition back to private life. In many places high turnover would be good. There are also rules e.g. on how many terms a president can serve. Keeping half and changing half of the representatives may also work in many cases. Juho __ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + Candidate selection
Good Afternoon, Kevin When reading, did you see the "[Election-Methods] Selecting Leaders From The People" post from February 4th? A major impediment to selecting our leaders FROM the people is the role of political parties, and that led to the discussion on this thread. The cited post outlined a method of selecting candidates by sifting through the entire electorate. It is predicated on the fact that an individual's interest in politics waxes and wanes throughout their lives. It describes a method by which anyone, at any time in their life, may pursue an interest in politics to the full extent of their desire and ability. The method lets the people select representatives because of their individual qualities, rather than adherence to the dictates of a creed. It has the effect you suggest because candidates do not need party backing. They are elected on their merit. When I drafted the outline, I called it 'Active Democracy', but at the suggestion of a friend interested in improving the quality of those who speak for us in government, I plan to change that label to 'Practical Democracy'. He pointed out one of its great attributes is that it's a practical way to implement genuine democracy. I like his statement that ... "The only radical thing about Practical Democracy is that it is actually democratic." I hope you enjoy the ideas and can offer a thoughtful critique. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Hi, Juho re: "Yes, the new method has some properties that support this (i.e., replacing emotion with reason, flg). It is however not guaranteed that feelings, parties and other differentiating factors will not find their way in and play some role also in that method." You are correct. We can not guarantee the future. All we can do is use our best efforts (1) to insure there IS a future, and (2) accept the lessons of the past as we build toward that future. It is important to recognize that parties will not be dead. Once elected, representatives selected by the method I've outlined will form alliances to advance their ideas. That will happen because partisanship is natural for humans. We seek out and align ourselves with others who share our views. Through them, we hone our ideas and gain courage from the knowledge that we are not alone in our beliefs. Partisanship gives breadth, depth and volume to our voice. In and of itself, partisanship is not only inevitable, it is healthy. As a very good friend wrote me recently about what would happen if members of parliament in his country were selected by such a method ... "When people in parliament form cliques, they (would be) building majority opinions on specific issues. They (would not be) bound by manifesto or indebtedness to backers. I would expect different cliques (to) form, in response to each issue raised. ... Before election, cliques are formed to get power, not to solve problems." When considering the problems of society, honest people will differ. It is essential that they should. We advance our common interest by examining conceivable options. The important thing is to ensure that the consideration is done by 'honest people'. The best way to find 'honest people' is to subject candidates to rigorous examination by other candidates who seek the same positions. An important factor bearing on the matter of inhibiting adverse factors is the dynamism of the method. As you said back in March, "One interesting property of the proposed system is that current top level representatives, even if very popular, have a high risk of not being re-elected." That flows, not only from the filtering effect of the method, but from the fact that the concerns of the electorate can change considerably between elections. This method always reacts to current circumstances. Of course, as you pointed out, that implies a relatively high turnover of elected officials at each election. So, while that makes the system very dynamic and makes it difficult for rot to find a sticking place, it also makes it difficult for those who take time out of their lives to serve in public office, for they have no career guarantees. Such people must be afforded salary continuation and something similar to the G. I. Bill of Rights ... advanced education, career training, small business loans, and so forth ... to ease their transition back to private life. re: "... or if some single person simply dominates the process and makes the method reflect his/her personal visions (while expecting and reacting to comments from others)." That states my case pretty well. I'm not entirely happy with it, for I really don't want to 'dominate'. I'm much more interested in helping. No one person has the wit and wisdom to understand and accommodate the immense variety of human society. Building a solid political foundation must, necessarily, be the work of all of us. Even so, I've learned a great deal from the interaction on this site and hope to learn more. I will, I happily admit, express my views with all the force at my command, but I treasure those who can identify, point out and explain weaknesses in my reasoning. I use those events to expand my views. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + Candidate selection
Hi, I read your (Fred's) link and most of James'. The selection model rings true in my opinion. But it also suits me for it to ring true, since I prefer to imagine that the voter elects a representative perhaps not based on detailed policy stances, and then the elected representative does as he thinks is best with a great degreee of independence. --- Fred Gohlke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > I have, as is probably evident by now, a bias against partisan politics, > which I hold to be the central cause of society's political problems. I may have to read your past posts to see what you feel are promising directions in fixing this. For elections it seems to me you need to arrange things so that the party needs the winnable candidate, rather than the candidate needing the party's backing. There should be no special prize for the party who wins a majority of the seats (Congress in a system with a veto power is already an example, but also the fact that a minority in the Senate can hose things if they really want to, makes it less crucial to give your preferred party the majority). Barrier to entry should be somewhat less, so at least a third major candidate can have a chance to win when the two major parties select candidates who are out of touch with the voters. Just some ideas. Kevin Venzke _ Envoyez avec Yahoo! Mail. Une boite mail plus intelligente http://mail.yahoo.fr Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + Candidate selection
Good Afternoon, James Thank you, so very much, for the link to The Report of the Commission on Candidate Selection (which I'll refer to as "The Report"). It was well worth the reading. My version of Adobe Reader did not allow copying from The Report, but I did re-type several passages. I wish I could have re-typed more, for The Report is loaded with grist for our mill. I have, as is probably evident by now, a bias against partisan politics, which I hold to be the central cause of society's political problems. I was a bit surprised ... and delighted ... to learn my attitude is more common than I thought. This is shown by a passage in The Report: "The public's ideal of representation, if seldom articulated clearly, can differ from that of the parties and political professionals. Voters seem to prefer candidates who are prepared to adopt a consensual approach to political behaviour in Parliament, the council chamber and media studios while selectorates and party professionals are more attached to an adversarial approach." Of course they are. The party professionals, those who control our political existence, understand that the best way to control the people is to keep them fighting among themselves. That's how they maintain their power. It is the most fundamental strategy of warfare: "Divide and Conquer" We neither need nor want to be conquered. We seek to subject ourselves to the rule of reason. Reason is the antithesis of confrontation and reason is not served by an adversarial political system. The Report assumes there is no alternative to partisan politics. This is almost certainly a result of the fact that the Commission was headed by leaders of the (British) Liberal Democrat, Plaid Cymru, Scottish National, Labour and Conservative Parties and "held a number of seminars with people from all the main parties to discuss problems and possible ways forward." It also included a leading academic on the selection of candidates, the head of a major think tank and a leading opinion pollster. However, these latter members apparently filled advisory roles. They could not be expected to counter the Commission's central theme of helping the parties extend their reach. The Report contains a description of why "... parties remain a central feature of the political landscape, and vital for the functioning of representative democracy." The full description is too extensive for me to re-type here, but is a set of untested assumptions that are presented as being unchallengeable. Instead of blindly accepting these assumptions, we should analyze them critically. I hope an advocate of partisan politics will take the time to present the case for parties, one item at a time, so we can examine each one carefully. I stress these points because, in spite of being party-sponsored, The Report can be seen to be an indictment of Party Politics. Most of the following citations speak for themselves, although I may interject a segue between topics: After quoting statistics showing the 'underrepresentation' of various minorities, The Report says: * "These figures add up to a picture of a narrow group of representatives selected by a tiny proportion of the population belonging to parties, for which ever fewer members of the public vote and for whom even fewer people have any feelings of attachment." * "In most cases selection is in the hands of parties, and their relatively small groups of members. Voters themselves have to choose between candidates picked by these small groups, and, under the first-past-the-post system, the outcome in the vast majority of constituencies is a foregone conclusion." * "Party selectorates often expect candidates to have gone through traditional hoops (almost rites of passage) --- length of party service, door-to-door campaigning, service as a local councillor and fighting a "hopeless" seat. These are commonly seen as a prerequisite for selection as a candidate in a winnable seat. Such criteria --- and evidence of personal commitment and party loyalty --- are important. But they should not be the sole criteria, especially if they discourage people with local credentials and a background outside mainstream party politics from becoming candidates." * "The whole thrust of our report is against uniformity of candidates and in favour of diversity. Quality can take many different forms in a political context. If we wish candidates to be truly representative of the communities they are elected to serve, we must recognise that there will (and should) be all sorts of candidates with a wide variety of backgrounds." * "Many of the groups under-represented as candidates are also under-represented as party members. Broadening the appeal of parties is a pre-condition for broadening the range of candidates selected" * "The Commission has had to consider whether the ways in which candidates are selected
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + Candidate selection
At 01:49 PM 6/6/2008, James Gilmour wrote: You MAY find it interesting to see what was said about candidate selection in a different but similar political system. The Electoral Reform Society asked an independent Commission to look at this whole topic. You'll find the report (published 2003, PDF 222 KB) here: http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/downloads/Candidate%20Report.pdf James While that report is interesting, the approach is radically different, and "selection" for Mansbridge has a quite different meaning. She is writing about two different approaches to representation, a "selection model," where, in the image she uses, the voter notices someone else walking down the same road, apparently going to the same place, and asks this person to represent him or her. I.e., voters voting for someone whom they expect will naturally want to do the same things as the voter. The alternative model, the "sanctions model," is one where the elected official is viewed as seeking to maintain office and will, pursuing this goal, attempt to please as many voters as possible, with the voters monitoring performance and "sanctioning" failure to function in a pleasing manner. She notes the advantages and disadvantages of each model. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
At 10:55 AM 6/6/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
ou might be interested to know I just learned of a paper written by
Professor Jane Mansbridge of the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. It concerns candidate selection
and is the first work I've seen that provides an academic basis for
the electoral method I've outlined on this site. If you'd like to
read the paper, it can be downloaded without charge from:
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-010
Interesting. I want to thank Mr. Gohlke for drawing our attention to
this paper.
Indeed, Mansbridge explores the theory of representation,
distinguishing between the selection model and the sanctions model,
and covering much of the territory that I covered when inventing
FA/DP (but with her own specialization, I'm not claiming that I
covered what she covered, only that she covered much of what I covered).
Delegable Proxy is a pure selection model of representation, but it
also, through revocability, incorporates the sanctions model on an
immediate basis, because the principal (which I usually call the
"client") may at any time withdraw the proxy. That is not exactly a
"sanction," because it does not necessarily cause the loss of an
office (this depends on many other factors), but it has the same
effect; the principal may hold the representative responsible for his
or her actions, and may respond by either continuing to maintain the
representation, or by withdrawing it and, perhaps, assigning it to
someone else.
Mansbridge is writing mostly about the existing system and how some
representatives are selected for general compatibility with those who
vote with them ("selections") whereas others are considered to be
motivated by a desire to keep office, so they will act to please
their constituents who may otherwise "punish" them by removing them
from office ("sanctions"). However, she notes that selection works
best when a constituency is relatively homogeneous.
In Delegable Proxy, the constituency is defined as homogeneous by
being the set of all those who have chosen the same proxy, i.e., who
consider this person the best to represent them.
Mansbridge doesn't seem to be aware that representation (in a
proportional representation assembly) through chosen proxy was first
proposed by Lewis Carroll (Charles Dodgson) in 1884. He noted that,
in an STV election, instead of vote transfers being controlled only
by the voter's preferential ballot, voters who preferred to trust a
single candidate could do so, and vote transfers could then be under
the control of that candidate, "as if those votes were his own
property." This, of course, is the same metaphor that was used when
Warren Smith named his method, in 2004 (?) "Asset Voting." Mike
Ossipoff and Forest Simmons had earlier called it "Candidate Proxy."
And, unaware of all this at the time, I called it "Delegable Proxy,"
though I was considering representation only for the purpose of
measuring consensus on a large scale but the core idea is the
same in all of these: representation by chosen representatives, not
"elected" representatives, in the sense of an oppositional election,
with losers. Pure selection, and only the minimal sanction of
continued voluntary maintenance of the proxy assignment, or withdrawal.
I don't see Ms. Mansbridge's work as well-related to the complex
system of elections proposed by Mr. Gohlke, partly because his groups
are not self-selected and not homogeneous, generally. Mansbridge is
specifically likening selection to "Agency," which is precisely
equivalent to the institution of the proxy. Proxies are "elected,"
technically, but the election isn't a contested one. It's unanimous.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 6, 2008, at 17:53 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "I just pointed out that it does not guarantee full proportional representation." This point seems to center on what one considers proportional. You appear to believe minorities should have representation in proportion to their size. I do have some sympathies in that direction (but that is of course a separate topic from just pointing out the fact). I understand that you believe the mechanism I described will operate to the detriment of minorities while I believe it gives them a greater advantage than they have in a partisan political structure. I guess that depends on what kind of a political structure we are observing. In my view, the method replaces emotion with reason. As a result, minorities with a rational basis for their goals will achieve them more easily. Yes, the new method has some properties that support this. It is however not guaranteed that feelings, parties and other differentiating factors will not find their way in and play some role also in that method. Partisan politics is based on confrontation and rests, ultimately, on violence. We should avoid it. Yes, artificial division of people into such boxes indeed encourages confrontations. Party life may be more or less sophisticated, and the border lines more or less strict. Democracy is a majority rule concept. Those who would change society and its government must persuade the majority of the people to accept their views. Anything less than that is oligarchical in structure and offensive to reason. That is most typical. I hope also the minorities will be treated well and they will have their opinions heard. ... to be molded by the thoughtful minds on this site into a viable electoral method. The process was a bit confusing since I believe there are many viewpoints and ideas flying around in this mailing list. I think the process works better if there is either some clearly set target that narrows the search space and that everyone can follow, or if some single person simply dominates the process and makes the method reflect his/her personal visions (while expecting and reacting to comments from others). Juho Yahoo! Photos is now offering a quality print service from just 7p a photo. http://uk.photos.yahoo.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + Candidate selection
Fred, Juho I have changed the subject as this post (and my reply) appeared to address a specific subset of the problem. You MAY find it interesting to see what was said about candidate selection in a different but similar political system. The Electoral Reform Society asked an independent Commission to look at this whole topic. You'll find the report (published 2003, PDF 222 KB) here: http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/downloads/Candidate%20Report.pdf James -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Fred Gohlke Sent: Friday, June 06, 2008 3:57 PM To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal Good Morning, Juho I haven't been idle. As a result of my discussion with you and others, it occurred to me we should distinguish between the process of selecting candidates and the process of electing those candidates to office. That idea gradually took shape over the past couple of weeks, particularly when I tried to encourage building an electoral process from scratch. The comments on that effort illustrated the need for atomization; reducing the elements to their most basic form. Part of that would be to address the selection and election processes separately. When, this week, I read Professor Jane Mansbridge's treatise, A "Selection Model" of Political Representation, it jolted me. I was amazed to find there was academic interest in the selection process; a topic that has occupied my mind for many years. The method I have outlined on this site is primarily concerned with selecting the best of our people to serve in our government. It is exciting to know scholarly work is being done in this area. Jane Mansbridge is the Adams Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values; Radcliffe Fellow, Kennedy School of Government. If you'd like to read her paper, it can be downloaded without charge from: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-010 You may find it interesting. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG. Version: 7.5.524 / Virus Database: 269.24.6/1486 - Release Date: 05/06/2008 18:29 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Morning, Juho I haven't been idle. As a result of my discussion with you and others, it occurred to me we should distinguish between the process of selecting candidates and the process of electing those candidates to office. That idea gradually took shape over the past couple of weeks, particularly when I tried to encourage building an electoral process from scratch. The comments on that effort illustrated the need for atomization; reducing the elements to their most basic form. Part of that would be to address the selection and election processes separately. When, this week, I read Professor Jane Mansbridge's treatise, A "Selection Model" of Political Representation, it jolted me. I was amazed to find there was academic interest in the selection process; a topic that has occupied my mind for many years. The method I have outlined on this site is primarily concerned with selecting the best of our people to serve in our government. It is exciting to know scholarly work is being done in this area. Jane Mansbridge is the Adams Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values; Radcliffe Fellow, Kennedy School of Government. If you'd like to read her paper, it can be downloaded without charge from: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-010 You may find it interesting. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Morning, Dave I think I owe you an apology. Somehow, I failed to make myself clear. What I sought to do was put some marks on a board so you (and others) could tell me how those marks should be changed to create a sound electoral process. I anticipated differences of opinion and planned to seek the reasons behind the conflicting assertions. It was my hope that I could work out an appealing resolution. However naively, I believed we'd be able, among us, to devise a sound electoral process. I'd like to drop the whole thing. It was an unwisely ambitious plan. You might be interested to know I just learned of a paper written by Professor Jane Mansbridge of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. It concerns candidate selection and is the first work I've seen that provides an academic basis for the electoral method I've outlined on this site. If you'd like to read the paper, it can be downloaded without charge from: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-010 Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Morning, Juho Again, I must apologize for taking so long to respond. I assure you, it is not from lack of interest. re: "I just pointed out that it does not guarantee full proportional representation." This point seems to center on what one considers proportional. You appear to believe minorities should have representation in proportion to their size. I believe that, when the entire electorate participates in the electoral process, minorities are represented in proportion to their size. If 18% of the electorate holds a minority opinion and 100% of the electorate participates in the electoral process, precisely 18% of the electorate represents the minority view. Furthermore, it is vital to recognize that, as to any individual (and, hence, as to any collection of individuals), a minority condition ... whether an opinion, a fact of their life, or their race, creed or religion ... is a small part of the total person. No matter what one's minority condition, the need for food, clothing and shelter dominates our existence. Compared to that need, the gravity of a minority condition pales. It is wrong to magnify the significance of such a condition and equate it to the totality of the person. Whether one is a communist or an atheist or a caucasian is of much less importance than the fact that one is a human being. I understand that you believe the mechanism I described will operate to the detriment of minorities while I believe it gives them a greater advantage than they have in a partisan political structure. In my view, the method replaces emotion with reason. As a result, minorities with a rational basis for their goals will achieve them more easily. Partisan politics is based on confrontation and rests, ultimately, on violence. We should avoid it. Democracy is a majority rule concept. Those who would change society and its government must persuade the majority of the people to accept their views. Anything less than that is oligarchical in structure and offensive to reason. re: "The vote counting of the new proposed method used (conventional) summing of the votes. I was expecting something more radical from you ..." Alas, I failed you. Ohhh, my! How utterly human of me. Actually, I was just trying to insert some thoughts I'd picked up on this board. I wanted to put something there so others could change it. I was attempting to be clay ... to be molded by the thoughtful minds on this site into a viable electoral method. I'm a bit disillusioned. I was unable to express my intent with sufficient clarity and the concept does not appear to be working. It's a shame. It might have been fun. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 2, 2008, at 2:05 , Fred Gohlke wrote: I am concerned about the handling of divergent opinions, but will cross that bridge when I come to it. I have seen plenty of different opinions on various matters on this mailing list, so better to just try to propose methods that would appeal at least to some subgroup of the opinions here. Presenting a well justified proposal that need not be agreed by all is maybe a good approach. I suspect our best course would be to select one race (you've already mentioned 'governor') and build up a method around that. I don't believe there would be a method that would be a good proposal for all needs in all environments at all times. It is therefore important to identify the environment and the target. One could e.g. try to propose a realistic reform to the governor elections of the USA. The current methods in use and the traditions (e.g. use of write-ins in the USA) and the current opinions (is there an interest to make a reform, and how much or how little can be changed) are essential when trying to generate a proposal for such practical situation (defining theoretical ideal models would be another approach). It would also make sense to clearly lay out the basic requirements. In this case I expect that the method should be such that it would not be fully controlled by the current powerful parties but would allow also third parties and/or individuals to be active and influence the outcome. Further more it would help to set some technical targets on what one wants to achieve. Does one want to find a method that is based on small hierarchical groups or maybe a more flat structure method. Maybe one wants to base it on some well known existing methods like Condorcet or some style of ballots (rankings, ratings, bullet voting). The range of election methods is so wide that this kind of limitations are typically needed (to define the intended scope of search and expected range of comments and alternative proposals). - - - Maybe the scope is governor elections in the USA and the idea is to make a proposal that might have chances of success in a few years perspective. I note that e.g. write-ins could be included in the proposal due to the US traditions in this sector. Most other countries might not be interested. One could try to propose a method that is not bound to the current set-up of two leading parties competing about the seat. => This alone could mean that there is no easy to adopt proposals since the incumbents are likely to oppose. But one can try. If seeking for a good basic single-winner method (with no hierarchical groups) then one could consider e.g. the Condorcet methods. If one wants a method that is based on smallish hierarchical groups and discussions within them then we can not get that good help from the long tradition of election method studies but must improvise more. There are many alternatives. (Of course the degree of change when compared to the current system gets bigger and getting the reform accepted becomes trickier.) The nomination process could be an changed if one wants to open new possibilities there. (I don't know much about the current nomination practices so I don't propose anything here.) Some more observations: - requiring some level of education or other properties may not be appropriate in a governor race (I guess the trust of people is more important) - there may be a need to limit the number of candidates somehow => some limitations in the nomination process - - - I'm just trying to point out that if the target and requirements are clear enough then it is much easier to make and discuss concrete proposals and how they would meet the given requirements. (Otherwise the scope of alternative methods and opinions may be too wide to get any good grip of the topic.) Juho ___ Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Jun 2, 2008, at 1:58 , Fred Gohlke wrote: You apparently found aspects of my suggestion unacceptable. I think that the Active Democracy / "groups of three based method" is ok. I just pointed out that it does not guarantee full proportional representation. There are however many kind of elections and not all of them require strict proportionality. Therefore, it seemed worthwhile to encourage the development of a different approach. The vote counting of the new proposed method used (conventional) summing of the votes. I was expecting something more radical from you :-), maybe in line with your "groups of three" style or in line with the random ballot and other styles that I discussed. But the nomination process is anyway something that clearly differs from typical current methods and is very "bottom-up" as I'd expect from you. The method seems to be quite open for anyone to become a candidate. The rules still seem to contain many options (not as carefully thought yet as the Active Democracy method). They resemble Range voting in the way how the given preferences are summed up. The method also seems to have some elements of IRV in how the "order of preference" was handled in the votes (it was not quite clear from the explanation if this ordering was used to actually elect the candidates or just check which ones are electable). An aspect of Active Democracy that may have escaped notice is: "The process is inherently bi-directional. Because each elected official sits atop a pyramid of known electors, questions on specific issues can easily be transmitted directly to and from the electors for the guidance or instruction of the official." Yes, this relationship is strong. The length of the contact chain is relatively long because of the small size of the groups. Some members of the groups may also not consider the elected member to represent themselves. If the groups are formed geographically based on where people live then the method will obviously create strong "local representation". Juho ___ Copy addresses and emails from any email account to Yahoo! Mail - quick, easy and free. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/trueswitch2.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Sun, 01 Jun 2008 19:05:14 -0400 Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Dave I did a very poor job of describing my intentions when I started the outline based on Juho's comments. It struck me it would be a good idea to encourage a joint effort to create a sound electoral method. Several ideas are regularly discussed on [Election-Methods] and, although I'm not intimately familiar with most of them, they seem to favor fixed approaches. Since I don't think any have gained general approval, I thought it might be worthwhile to seek a more flexible approach in the hope of combining the best elements of all of them. The statements in the outline are not intended (or expected) to remain. They should be replaced by more definitive statements as various people challenge this or that assertion and help mold a clear, sound method of electing our public officials. My role in the process is that of a clerk. I fully intend to voice my opinion, but the outline must be what others want it to be, not my impression of what they want it to be. There is the obvious difficulty of properly expressing the views of others, so, my preference is that contributions be written to replace statements in the outline. I am concerned about the handling of divergent opinions, but will cross that bridge when I come to it. Ideally, the outline would be in a fixed location where it could be maintained, but I've no idea of the practicality of that notion. Unless and until we can made such an arrangement, I will append the outline, in it's then-current form, to some of my posts. I'm not certain I'll be available to continue the process, but feel confident that, if the idea has merit, someone will find a way to make it work. I'm writing all this explanation to you because I'm hoping you will restate some of your observations in a way I can copy into the outline. I'd much rather not try to restate your intent. Here are a couple of the comments you've made that I don't know how to handle in their current form: re: "Depends on race - even one such page would be overkill for some local races." I suspect our best course would be to select one race (you've already mentioned 'governor') and build up a method around that. Once the method for one race is clearly defined, it should be straightforward to modify it for other races. When I say "race" below it will be because requirements are stiffer for governor than for village trustee - and even for governor of a large state than for a small state. It varies based on importance of office, size of electorate, and even on experience with the electorate. Examples may be offered for starting thoughts such as for governor of a medium state. re: "Degrees are not always the best evidence of ability." How should the requirement be stated? race - degrees are sometimes important, but understanding of task is sometimes more important. re: "Internet web pages are, more and more, the best choice." Can you make this an assertion I can include? Idnhahr - I do not have a handy reference. re: "There are STRONG arguments against alphabetical order - particular list positions attract voters." The arguments should be presented in a way they can be examined. Idnhahr - but some claim different orders should be used on different ballots to even out benefits of being first. re: "Equal approval rating should be permitted (IRV chokes on such, but IRV should be rejected for other reasons)." This needs exposition, examination and, perhaps, challenge. When ranking candidates, voters can desire to express equal liking for two or more. Condorcet has no problem with honoring such ranking. If IRV is presented with equal rankings of which one is to be discarded as least liked, fair treatment of remaining such candidates is a challenge. re: "Ranking is appropriate, but do it more like the weighting described above." ... and ... "Anyway, while bullet voting should be permitted, there should not be more than one other method, such as ranking or weighting." These need itemization and exposition so they can be enhanced. Context was permitting voters to expresses thoughts fitting incompatible election methods. While a new method might be devised using some combinations of such, just letting voters express such without preparing for counting is destructive. For example, ranking for IRV is incompatible with rating for Range. I do believe bullet voting fits with most anything else - though some, such as IRV, may not permit it. re: "If IRV tempts, join me on Condorcet, which uses the same ballot but does not have the same failure. As an example A is popular below (and Condorcet would see A's popularity), but IRV would not elect A without more first-place votes: 28 B>A>C 25 D>A>E 24 F>A>G 23 A>B>C This may be profound but it can not stand without information to support the assertion. I lack the knowledge to flesh it out. IRV
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Afternoon, Dave I did a very poor job of describing my intentions when I started the outline based on Juho's comments. It struck me it would be a good idea to encourage a joint effort to create a sound electoral method. Several ideas are regularly discussed on [Election-Methods] and, although I'm not intimately familiar with most of them, they seem to favor fixed approaches. Since I don't think any have gained general approval, I thought it might be worthwhile to seek a more flexible approach in the hope of combining the best elements of all of them. The statements in the outline are not intended (or expected) to remain. They should be replaced by more definitive statements as various people challenge this or that assertion and help mold a clear, sound method of electing our public officials. My role in the process is that of a clerk. I fully intend to voice my opinion, but the outline must be what others want it to be, not my impression of what they want it to be. There is the obvious difficulty of properly expressing the views of others, so, my preference is that contributions be written to replace statements in the outline. I am concerned about the handling of divergent opinions, but will cross that bridge when I come to it. Ideally, the outline would be in a fixed location where it could be maintained, but I've no idea of the practicality of that notion. Unless and until we can made such an arrangement, I will append the outline, in it's then-current form, to some of my posts. I'm not certain I'll be available to continue the process, but feel confident that, if the idea has merit, someone will find a way to make it work. I'm writing all this explanation to you because I'm hoping you will restate some of your observations in a way I can copy into the outline. I'd much rather not try to restate your intent. Here are a couple of the comments you've made that I don't know how to handle in their current form: re: "Depends on race - even one such page would be overkill for some local races." I suspect our best course would be to select one race (you've already mentioned 'governor') and build up a method around that. Once the method for one race is clearly defined, it should be straightforward to modify it for other races. re: "Degrees are not always the best evidence of ability." How should the requirement be stated? re: "Internet web pages are, more and more, the best choice." Can you make this an assertion I can include? re: "There are STRONG arguments against alphabetical order - particular list positions attract voters." The arguments should be presented in a way they can be examined. re: "Equal approval rating should be permitted (IRV chokes on such, but IRV should be rejected for other reasons)." This needs exposition, examination and, perhaps, challenge. re: "Ranking is appropriate, but do it more like the weighting described above." ... and ... "Anyway, while bullet voting should be permitted, there should not be more than one other method, such as ranking or weighting." These need itemization and exposition so they can be enhanced. re: "If IRV tempts, join me on Condorcet, which uses the same ballot but does not have the same failure. As an example A is popular below (and Condorcet would see A's popularity), but IRV would not elect A without more first-place votes: 28 B>A>C 25 D>A>E 24 F>A>G 23 A>B>C This may be profound but it can not stand without information to support the assertion. I lack the knowledge to flesh it out. re: "You describe Range rating here. Ranking is a method worth mentioning." At the risk of showing my ignorance, I wasn't aware there is a difference ... or why it might be important. re: "... should there be a (length of) residency requirement? Sure." What should it be? re: "Yes, population counts. Experience also counts - if unreasonably few or many candidates happen often, adjust." How can this be presented so those reading the outline can agree or provide additional insights? re: "Candidate lists NEED establishment X days before election to allow planning and thinking." We need to say how many days so others can provide reasons why the number should be changed. re: "Then unplanned events can create need for changes (e.g., candidate dies)." To the maximum practical extent, we should identify the possible unplanned events and a manner of dealing with each. re: "My words about a write-in method were perhaps too detailed to bother with here." It is more likely the details need to be listed so they can be examined and challenged (if appropriate) re: "I want a set of nominators, which really attends to this problem, though whether the count should be over or under 100 is controlled by other needs." How would we create a set of nominators (for governor?)? re: "(a nominating mechanism or an election mechanism) Actually they can
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Afternoon, Juho re: "One more observation on the risks. Some people may feel participation in a triad to be more challenging than dropping a ballot n a box and therefore avoid taking part in such challenging activities where they are expected to perform and prove their viewpoint." Are we to leave our fate to those unable or unwilling to express their view on the circumstances that govern our lives? There is no requirement that they take part in any 'challenging activities'. At the lowest level, they probably don't even have to go to a polling place or fill out a ballot. All they have to do is discuss their views with two of their neighbors and select one of the two to represent their interest. The extent to which they engage in the process is their option. The point is that they ... and we ... have the option. re: "I haven't carefully thought what kind of method would be good for this purpose and I'm also not to familiar with the set-up." Insofar as the outline is concerned, you haven't had time to think carefully about the method and none of us know the form it will take. You apparently found aspects of my suggestion unacceptable. Therefore, it seemed worthwhile to encourage the development of a different approach. All I've done is take some of the points you mentioned and put them in a crude outline. At the moment, it can't be called a method. It will become one, if and when, we, by suggesting and challenging and justifying and discussing, gradually hone it into a semblance of a sound idea. To accomplish that, we must start by recognizing that there's no such thing as 'wrong'. Every idea is an embryo. Our job is to see to its nutrition. All we need contribute is good will, open-mindedness and a genuine desire to craft a sound electoral method. If we are able to do that, we will have realized the power and the promise of the internet. The greatest challenge we'll encounter is handling divergent opinions in a way that informs but does not detract from our joint effort. I'm not sure I have the wit or wisdom to arrange that gracefully, but, if we can make a good start, we can be sure others, more talented than I am, will come to the fore. re: "I tried to offer nomination practices that would be 'equal to all'." Ideas for nomination practices are in the outline. They should be challenged, justified, modified and honed until we have an acceptable set of practices. re: "There may be also other means to limit the ill effects of costly campaigning." Dave Ketchum has already made the outstanding suggestion that each candidate offer a resume of qualifications and aspirations. The idea deserves examination and enhancement. (I see you, too, approve Dave's approach. I need to include your comment in the outline.) re: "In a democracy a strong and persistent majority opinion of the citizens (if one exists) should overrule the opinions of the incumbent politicians." An aspect of Active Democracy that may have escaped notice is: "The process is inherently bi-directional. Because each elected official sits atop a pyramid of known electors, questions on specific issues can easily be transmitted directly to and from the electors for the guidance or instruction of the official." At the suggestion of my friend in the U. K., we are using this capability to improve the people's voice in their government. The change is so promising we may change the name of the process from Active Democracy to Inclusive Democracy; it includes the entire electorate in our government. Something has come up that may affect my availability to work on this project. I'll keep working as long as I can and will let you know if you'll need to find a replacement. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Fri, 30 May 2008 13:35:11 -0400 Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Morning, Dave Thank you for your comments on the outline I started for Juho. I will include it in this message, modified by adding the points you mentioned, striking some material (which can be reinstated, if appropriate), adding comments, and making a change suggested by one of Juho's comments. Perhaps we can flesh the material out. If so, I will maintain the list as well as time permits. Right now, the outline does not reflect my idea of a sound electoral method but many of the ideas are sketchy and vague. I would like to help hone them into robust form while gaining fresh insight into a complex problem. I hope, before we are done, we have an outline we can all be comfortable with. If you feel my efforts are intrusive or unwelcome, I shall, of course, desist. It is likely there will be alternate views on some items. I will show both sides of the issue until one or the other predominates. Some of the points may be divisive. If so, those who dissent may build a separate outline or maintain a separate branch of the discussion. Obviously, given the difficulty of communicating with clarity, there is a hazard in maintaining such an outline. If anyone notices an error, they should call it to my attention, preferably without rancor, so it can be corrected. At the moment, the outline is a bit of a jumble but it should improve in readability and understandability as we work on it. --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... * NOMINATIONS, NOMINATORS and NOMINEES - nominations are open to the entire electorate. - nominators may nominate anyone, including themselves. - nominations are incomplete until accepted by the nominee. - nominators may not nominate more than one nominee. - nominator and nominee must be part of the electorate. - nominees may provide a resume, not larger than the equivalent of [30?? flg] typewritten 8.5 x 11 pages. The resume may include references to additional source material describing the nominee's knowledge, experience and aspirations. Depends on race - even one such page would be overkill for some local races. As would apply THROUGHOUT, some of the rules for governor are unlike what is needed for village trustee. * RESTRICTIONS - an educational minimum [define the minimum. flg] - if expertise is required in the area for which the person is nominated, a degree symbolizing competence in that area. [this item needs expansion. It should list the offices that require a degree and the degree required. flg] Degrees are not always the best evidence of ability. * ELECTION COORDINATOR - lists of nominators and nominees are maintained by an election coordinator and may be accessed by any member of the electorate. [should the election coordinator publish the list? Where? flg] Internet web pages are, more and more, the best choice. - publishes the candidates' resumes and makes them available to the electorate. [how or where should the resumes be published flg] * BALLOT - we will describe a paper ballot for ease of visualization. If the ballot is implemented electronically the system must provide verifiable results that are consistent with the provisions of the paper ballot we describe. - the ballot shall be a single piece of paper with the date and place of the election, the name of the jurisdiction, the office to be filled, and each candidate's name arranged in alphabetical order, a place for the voter to mark the ballot, and no other information. There are STRONG arguments against alphabetical order - particular list positions attract voters. Normally need room for write-ins. Can need to support oddities such as electing three members for a board - I had to vote on exactly that this month. * VOTING - each member of the electorate may cast a single ballot. - each voter may mark the ballot to select a single candidate, or - each voter may mark as many candidates as desired with a weighting value between zero (0) and nine (9), where the higher the weighting value assigned to a candidate, the stronger the voter's support for that candidate. If a voter gives two candidates the same weighting value, the weighting values cancel each other and both candidates are assigned a weighting value of zero. Equal approval rating should be permitted (IRV chokes on such, but IRV should be rejected for other reasons). - by making a list of the candidates the voter approves, in which case the candidates are listed in order of preference. If the first candidate on the list does not get sufficient first place votes for election, that candidate is dropped from the list and the second candidate moves into the first position on that ballot. In this case, since anyone may nominate anyone else, voters may write the name of their candidate on the ballot. UNacceptable. Ranking is appropriate, but do it more like the weighting
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Morning, Dave Thank you for your comments on the outline I started for Juho. I will include it in this message, modified by adding the points you mentioned, striking some material (which can be reinstated, if appropriate), adding comments, and making a change suggested by one of Juho's comments. Perhaps we can flesh the material out. If so, I will maintain the list as well as time permits. Right now, the outline does not reflect my idea of a sound electoral method but many of the ideas are sketchy and vague. I would like to help hone them into robust form while gaining fresh insight into a complex problem. I hope, before we are done, we have an outline we can all be comfortable with. If you feel my efforts are intrusive or unwelcome, I shall, of course, desist. It is likely there will be alternate views on some items. I will show both sides of the issue until one or the other predominates. Some of the points may be divisive. If so, those who dissent may build a separate outline or maintain a separate branch of the discussion. Obviously, given the difficulty of communicating with clarity, there is a hazard in maintaining such an outline. If anyone notices an error, they should call it to my attention, preferably without rancor, so it can be corrected. At the moment, the outline is a bit of a jumble but it should improve in readability and understandability as we work on it. --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... * NOMINATIONS, NOMINATORS and NOMINEES - nominations are open to the entire electorate. - nominators may nominate anyone, including themselves. - nominations are incomplete until accepted by the nominee. - nominators may not nominate more than one nominee. - nominator and nominee must be part of the electorate. - nominees may provide a resume, not larger than the equivalent of [30?? flg] typewritten 8.5 x 11 pages. The resume may include references to additional source material describing the nominee's knowledge, experience and aspirations. * RESTRICTIONS - an educational minimum [define the minimum. flg] - if expertise is required in the area for which the person is nominated, a degree symbolizing competence in that area. [this item needs expansion. It should list the offices that require a degree and the degree required. flg] * ELECTION COORDINATOR - lists of nominators and nominees are maintained by an election coordinator and may be accessed by any member of the electorate. [should the election coordinator publish the list? Where? flg] - publishes the candidates' resumes and makes them available to the electorate. [how or where should the resumes be published flg] * BALLOT - we will describe a paper ballot for ease of visualization. If the ballot is implemented electronically the system must provide verifiable results that are consistent with the provisions of the paper ballot we describe. - the ballot shall be a single piece of paper with the date and place of the election, the name of the jurisdiction, the office to be filled, and each candidate's name arranged in alphabetical order, a place for the voter to mark the ballot, and no other information. * VOTING - each member of the electorate may cast a single ballot. - each voter may mark the ballot to select a single candidate, or - each voter may mark as many candidates as desired with a weighting value between zero (0) and nine (9), where the higher the weighting value assigned to a candidate, the stronger the voter's support for that candidate. If a voter gives two candidates the same weighting value, the weighting values cancel each other and both candidates are assigned a weighting value of zero. - by making a list of the candidates the voter approves, in which case the candidates are listed in order of preference. If the first candidate on the list does not get sufficient first place votes for election, that candidate is dropped from the list and the second candidate moves into the first position on that ballot. In this case, since anyone may nominate anyone else, voters may write the name of their candidate on the ballot. [This item was challenged, with the following statement: "REJECT - this has at least the smell of IRV. Condorcet uses the same ballot but shows more interest in honoring voter desires." The challenge provides no grounds, except for a purported odor, nor does it specify how the item should be restated.] VOTE COUNTING - where a voter may only vote for a single candidate, the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes wins. - where voters assign their personal weighting value to each candidate, the candidate that received the greatest cumulative total of weighted votes wins. --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... --- ... The foregoing assertions are intended as a start. They are all open to challenge, improvement and restatement. As the auct
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 30, 2008, at 5:44 , Fred Gohlke wrote: An electoral method that lets everyone participate, at whatever time in their lives and to whatever extent they are motivated to act, will give the people an opportunity that is now denied them. Given the opportunity, I've little doubt they will take an active part. The intense discussion of political topics on the internet gives us insight into their eagerness to participate. One more observation on the risks. Some people may feel participation in a triad to be more challenging than dropping a ballot n a box and therefore avoid taking part in such challenging activities where they are expected to perform and prove their viewpoint. We may be working at cross-purposes here. I feel no compulsion to discuss a different method, but if you are proposing one that is better than Active Democracy I want to consider it, carefully and in detail. Makes sense. I just tried to list an array of notable methods that have "party agnostic" and/or "bottom-up" characteristics (and that you therefore might consider to be good methods) (=> open democracy, delegable proxy, STV, a family of random ballot based methods). Methods must meet specific needs. In my state, there are well over 5 million voters. If everyone can nominate a candidate for office, how many nominations will we have? I agree that for one particular election the rules need to be very specific. re: "(It is also possible that the list of candidates nominated for governor is not that long since we may have some additional criteria here (since we may want to exclude the possibility of electing a random John Doe). Some other elections (with less strict requirements) might have longer lists than this one.)" What are the additional criteria? It is impossible to evaluate a concept if we can't describe it's elements in sufficient detail to allow others to critique our suggestions. No one of us is so knowledgeable we can craft an electoral method in our own minds. It is only through such a critique we can hope to devise a workable proposal. I haven't carefully thought what kind of method would be good for this purpose and I'm also not to familiar with the set-up. In some places one requires today either a nomination by some existing party (one name only) or to collect some high number of supporter names. That's one approach that can limit the number of candidates to really small numbers if we so want. re: I asked, "Does nominating someone for public office suggest a beneficial interest in that person's election? If so, should we be concerned?" and you responded, "I'm not sure if I caught the point, but I don't see a big difference between different candidates here." The point is that when someone nominates a person for office they may expect to benefit from that person's election. Parties, for example, nominate people they can rely on to enact the laws the party's fund-raisers sold to the vested interests that financed the party's campaigns. The same thing is likely to be true of any nomination. My question was whether we should be concerned about this circumstance. I tried to offer nomination practices that would be "equal to all". If parties have some special position and the party candidates would be labelled in some other way than others then we might have some candidates might benefit of this. But in general I don't see any major problems. re: "I think it's impossible to avoid all campaigning. Maybe the rules for campaigning are separate. In many cases I think it would be useful to limit the amount of campaigning to avoid the one- dollar-one-vote effect. One could e.g. set a fixed limit on the campaign costs." We should have learned by now that the need for campaign funds is the fundamental reason our system is corrupt. You may think it impossible to avoid campaigning, but I don't. I've outlined a method that does not involve campaigning and there are probably others. Political campaigning, by definition, guarantees the supremacy of money over intellect (and integrity). Yes, the triad method effectively limits campaigning. There may be also other means to limit the ill effects of costly campaigning. I can also imagine situations where some party campaigns for the benefit of all its candidates in the triads. Since campaigning is a self-defeating option, we need a method of examining the candidates and making the results available to the electorate. Can you suggest a method of doing so? One very simple rule is to let the government publish a leaflet that has same space reserved for all candidates to tell who they are and what they represent. Then distribute the leaflet to all homes. Additional paid campaigning is not allowed. Candidates are not allowed to appear in TV (unless we have a separate rule for that). Even if we have a 'family of met
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Evening, Juho With regard to my observation ... "Because our physical needs often dictate the course of our lives, most of those who would make the best leaders are unaware of their political talents and are never able to exercise them." You made three points ... "Or may think that it is not possible or tempting for them to first fight their way through the unpleasant jungle to then deliver something better than that fight through the jungle. Or they may think that the system is too rotten or too strong opponent for them to even provide good end results after the fight. Or they may think that those who seem to be more motivated also have better ideas than they do." An electoral method that lets everyone participate, at whatever time in their lives and to whatever extent they are motivated to act, will give the people an opportunity that is now denied them. Given the opportunity, I've little doubt they will take an active part. The intense discussion of political topics on the internet gives us insight into their eagerness to participate. re: "I don't think we can "find" them but we can increase the probability that they will find their way to the top." That's quibbling. If they find their way to the top, we found them. re: "Listing the nominators may not be always needed. In some cases there could be 100 nominators." Knowing who made the nomination is required. It gives us information about the candidate. re: "I guess "public" doesn't necessarily mean that the ballot would not be a secret/anonymous ballot." It may be clearer if we change: * The public votes for the candidate of their choice ... to * The people vote for the candidate of their choice ... re: "Yes, I tried to support this type of targets to meet the needs that you might have." We are seeking a method that benefits the people. Whether or not it suits me is not important. If any of the points I've made are worthy of consideration, we can blend them into the proposal as we describe it. re: "In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt. The rules also could be much simpler than including all the listed possibilities. My intention is just to show various paths that could be used to make the basic random vote method more applicable to the needs." Such an assertion works against devising a better method. How can the rules be simpler than listing the possibilities? My purpose in itemizing what I understood you to say was to allow careful examination of the elements of the method you suggested. If we do not list the elements, how can we examine them? We may be working at cross-purposes here. I feel no compulsion to discuss a different method, but if you are proposing one that is better than Active Democracy I want to consider it, carefully and in detail. I will avoid comment on Direct Democracy and Delegable Proxy unless and until they can be shown to be more effective in improving the people's control of their government than Active Democracy. re: "In cases where the number of candidates is large maybe the list of candidates could be just a check list of who has accepted / not refused to be a candidate. If the ballots have a list of candidates it is no problem if some of them are also ones that do not accept the nomination (we can skip to the next listed candidate in that case)." 'Maybe' is not a good basis for discussion. Methods must meet specific needs. In my state, there are well over 5 million voters. If everyone can nominate a candidate for office, how many nominations will we have? Several hundred thousand seems conservative. How would I get enough information to make a rational choice among the people in such a long list? If some of the people in the list have not accepted the nomination, how would I know? Will their names be marked with an asterisk? If so, why not just drop the name? re: "(It is also possible that the list of candidates nominated for governor is not that long since we may have some additional criteria here (since we may want to exclude the possibility of electing a random John Doe). Some other elections (with less strict requirements) might have longer lists than this one.)" What are the additional criteria? It is impossible to evaluate a concept if we can't describe it's elements in sufficient detail to allow others to critique our suggestions. No one of us is so knowledgeable we can craft an electoral method in our own minds. It is only through such a critique we can hope to devise a workable proposal. re: I asked, "Does nominating someone for public office suggest a beneficial interest in that person's election? If so, should we be concerned?" and you responded, "I'm not sure if I caught the point, but I don't see a big difference between different candidates here." The point is that when someone nomi
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 29, 2008, at 2:00 , Fred Gohlke wrote: We agreed that, when a person in a minority (a 'black' person), "sees himself (and those like him) as at a disadvantage, there is an excellent chance he will be more highly motivated than his counterparts to seek a position from which he can improve his (and their) lot." There is no justification for saying such a person would "feel weaker, being against the majority opinion". On the contrary, motivated people gain strength of purpose when they are challenged. Furthermore, saying the highly motivated individual is "less interested than the majority representatives" is a contradiction in terms. Ok, highly motivated individuals are likely to be interested and active. I just referred to the not so highly motivated ones that may have various reasons to be more passive. re: "Yes, he can influence, but if the other two are 'white' he may have to satisfy with a 'half white' solution anyway." Is that not the essence of compromise? Yes, but at the next higher level we might have lots of moderate 'whites' and fewer 'blacks' than what their proportional number would suggest. The 'whites' would again elect whites. Note that most of my detailed comments can still be linked to pointing out the non-proportional characteristics of the triad method. I want our electoral process to raise strong people who have the courage of their convictions and the ability to present and support them. One could claim that parties are the current path that offers strong fighters the opportunity to climb up in the hierarchy of the society. I mean that there are many similarities in how the parties work and on how the triads work, and strong people tend to find their way upwards, and we should consider to what extent that field should be open for all to play as they wish, and to what extent we should steer the process to avoid the strongest ones (in the climbing skills sense) making the system their own fortress. (There are of course also many meaningful differences between the current party system and the proposed triads.) "Some believe we cannot remove corruption from our political systems because humans are corruptible. Why should we believe such a canard? I tend to think that there is a balance of forces influencing in different directions. The forces include human interest to do things that are good for all, human interest to do selfish things (these two can be said to be about constant), the unwritten rules of the society, the written laws and law enforcement of the society, current level of corruption in the society, the interest within the society to improve itself, the level of understanding of social phenomena in the society, nearby alternative examples and their impact, different roles/morale/impact of the leaders/intelligentsia/regular people. re: "The technical problem is that any small bias will accumulate in the chained process. The voters thus need not hate the minority but just have some bias (to cause a bias to the proportionality)." It may be a misunderstanding on my part, but that assertion seems to contradict your main point: that minorities have no chance of survival in chained process (assuming the method I've outlined is a 'chained process'). I just meant that if 55% of the voters have opinion X and they tend to elect similar minded people with 55% probability, that is enough to cause some accumulating bias when we proceed towards the upper layers. re: "Here's one example. Two voters want less X, one voter wants more X. If the minority representative (who wants to advance) waits first to hear the opinions of the other two and then says "I also think less X might be better" or "both opinions have some justification" he may have better chances to proceed to the next level when compared to a situation where he is fully honest. It may thus pay off to hide one's true feelings and just be nice towards the others." and "(One could say that the rules of politics typically favour people that are politicians by nature. This is good in some sense but bad in another. You should know what "politicians" are like and what kind of people typically climb the ladders to the political elite :-).)" This broaches an important point. I thought of mentioning it in my previous post, but opted against it because that post was already too long. It is particularly good for you and I to examine it because we (seem to) bring opposing viewpoints to the discussion. You counter my optimistic view of human nature with a more pessimistic (or skeptical) one. I'm not sure I'm a pessimist. I just think that if people have managed to corrupt political systems before they might do that also to the new systems. And I also think that we should be prepared for that and develop tools that can both keep the corruption out of the new systems an
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Afternoon, Juho re: "Yes, many minority representatives may be highly motivated. (But they may also feel weaker, being against the majority opinion and less interested than the majority representatives.)" That statement begs analysis: We agreed that, when a person in a minority (a 'black' person), "sees himself (and those like him) as at a disadvantage, there is an excellent chance he will be more highly motivated than his counterparts to seek a position from which he can improve his (and their) lot." There is no justification for saying such a person would "feel weaker, being against the majority opinion". On the contrary, motivated people gain strength of purpose when they are challenged. Furthermore, saying the highly motivated individual is "less interested than the majority representatives" is a contradiction in terms. It would be more proper to say that, in some groups, the minority individual will encounter highly motivated representatives of the majority attitude. While that is true, since we have already decided the people holding the majority view are less motivated than those seeking recognition of a minority view, such instances will occur in a relatively small number of groups. In my state, the first level would comprise more than 1,800,000 three-person groups and the second level more than 600,000 such groups. The attitudes of these groups embrace the attitudes of the entire electorate. There will be groups with three members holding, to a greater or lesser degree, the combination of views you consider the majority view, three holding one or more minority views (and some combination of the majority views, as well), two of one and one of the other on both sides, and an incalculable mixture of people whose views can not be considered as supporting either side. In all cases, strong proponents of the minority views have the advantage of increased motivation because they are in the minority. Among thoughtful people, the challenge the minority individual faces is not antagonism but inertia. The majority opinion is established. It's proponents are secure in their own rectitude. They must be prodded to see that the minority view has merit. re: "Yes, he can influence, but if the other two are 'white' he may have to satisfy with a 'half white' solution anyway." Is that not the essence of compromise? There are trade-offs in all decisions. Compromise is the essence of problem solution. Failure to recognize there are views other than one's own is a form of idiocy called fanaticism. Fanatics are not the kind of people we wish to entrust with our government. re: "Also a majority representative in a group with two minority representatives might decide that since he was unlucky and ended "unfairly against all probabilities" in a group with two minority representatives it is fair enough not to vote at all." That is certainly true ... and it says more about the individual than it does about the system. For my part, I am delighted that a person so easily overwhelmed will not advance. I want our electoral process to raise strong people who have the courage of their convictions and the ability to present and support them. re: "(I was also not happy with the idea that those who want to advance do advance. Often it would be wise to elect people that would be happy to serve as the representatives of others but who do not have any unusually strong interest to take the power. Some people may also dislike politics since they expect those people to be corrupt/greedy/power hungry etc. Of course most political systems have this problem.)" It may surprise you to know I felt that way, too. The way I expressed my concern was: "Not everyone who wants to achieve public office should. In fact, those who desire public office are often the least fit to serve the public interest. In this instance, willingness is a better criterium than desire." I was dissuaded from this point of view by a gentleman in India. Unfortunately, I no longer have access to his explanation of my error, but you may be interested in my retraction: "Good Morning, Just a quick note to tell you I've been thinking more about people who want to achieve public office. I've decided my assertion that "... willingness is a better criterium than desire." is ... WRONG!!! I've spent so many years watching those who want public office sell their souls to our corrupt political system to achieve success, I've fallen victim to the very thing I warn others about. As I've said elsewhere: "Some believe we cannot remove corruption from our political systems because humans are corruptible. Why should we believe such a canard? "We are misled by the high visibility of deceit and corruption in our culture. The idea that it is inescapable leads to the self-defeating notion that trying to correct it is futile. "The reality is that the vast majority o
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Juho a écrit : I agree that for most elections the deterministic methods are more recommendable than the non-deterministic ones. Juho For the simple reason that deterministic methods can lead to a reproductible result, thus reducing potential fraud... S. Rouillon Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 28, 2008, at 1:24 , Dave Ketchum wrote: On Tue, 27 May 2008 19:33:29 +0300 Juho wrote: On May 27, 2008, at 18:52 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very > flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt. The rules > also could be much simpler than including all the listed possibilities. > My intention is just to show various paths that could be used to make > the basic random vote method more applicable to the needs. This puzzles. You need ONE set of rules for all to understand, with a few details such as number of nominators for a nominee tailored to getting reasonable quantities of candidates. Ok, the example below gave one set of rules for one need. Generally I just identified a list of tricks that can be used in a random vote based methods to make them usable in various situations. Looking at ALL the races voted on at a precinct, they share ONE set of voters, who can be expected to start asking questions if the rules differ. Yes, if there are several elections for the same set of voters then at least there should be a clear justification of any differences. I think people can understand if there are some extra limitations on who can be elected as the president when compared to who can be elected for some minor duties. Your reference to "random vote" sounds like a purpose would be to prevent winning by the candidate the voters prefer. Certainly we should want the voters to make intelligent informed choices. I agree that for most elections the deterministic methods are more recommendable than the non-deterministic ones. Juho >> At the moment, my grasp of your suggestion does not allow a firm >> opinion. Can we flesh out parts of it with greater detail? > > > I presented the proposal as a family of methods that might use > different rules in different ways. In order to go to greater detail > (maybe to lesser amount of details too) one could take some example > situation and example method. We could for example see what kind of > rules could be used in electing ten people of a city to act as trusted > citizens monitoring the criminal interrogations of the police. > > There is probably no reason to require any specific skills => normal > people will do. Maybe all volunteers can be expected to have good > intentions => no need to control the candidates from this point of view > either. Maybe we could require some width of support => let's say three > support votes needed. We could allow voters to list e.g. three > candidates. After collecting the ballots (and counting the number of > support votes for each candidate) we would pick random ballots and > elect the first candidate (who has not been elected yet) with at least > three support votes overall from each ballot. If we don't know if > someone has volunteered we could call him and check (and move to the > next candidate or ballot if the answer is negative). If all citizens > can be uniquely identified with good enough probability (in unclear > cases the previous ten elected citizens may interpret the intended > meaning of the vote) there may be no need for a formal nomination process. Good intentions? Desirable, but attempting non-destructive control could, itself, be destructive. My assumption here was that these positions were light weight enough to allow some fellow citizens to make the decisions according to their best understanding, and that would probably not lead to any major conflicts of interest. It is for example not very likely that any of the decision makes would know any of the to be elected candidates here. Again, all races should share one set of rules. Random ballots? I admit to choking at the thought: If the voters identify a winner, that should end it. If the leading candidates are near a tie then it matters little which wins, but I would go for chance only on a true tie. > > This method is quite simple and straight forward and might work well > enough for this simple task. Just one example among many. For most elections I am for Condorcet, which permits: Bullet voting, suitable when a voter does not care beyond naming a first choice. Ranking all liked candidates above those liked less. Ranking all candidates, suitable for ranking hated enemies at the end. Random ballot based methods were addressed to offer solutions to (what I thought to be) the requirements of Mr Gohlke. From this perspective random ballots can be used to open up the possibility to elect also some regular citizens in addition to (or instead of) the party controlled candidates. Juho -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If yo
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On Tue, 27 May 2008 19:33:29 +0300 Juho wrote: On May 27, 2008, at 18:52 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very > flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt. The rules > also could be much simpler than including all the listed possibilities. > My intention is just to show various paths that could be used to make > the basic random vote method more applicable to the needs. This puzzles. You need ONE set of rules for all to understand, with a few details such as number of nominators for a nominee tailored to getting reasonable quantities of candidates. Ok, the example below gave one set of rules for one need. Generally I just identified a list of tricks that can be used in a random vote based methods to make them usable in various situations. Looking at ALL the races voted on at a precinct, they share ONE set of voters, who can be expected to start asking questions if the rules differ. Your reference to "random vote" sounds like a purpose would be to prevent winning by the candidate the voters prefer. Certainly we should want the voters to make intelligent informed choices. >> At the moment, my grasp of your suggestion does not allow a firm >> opinion. Can we flesh out parts of it with greater detail? > > > I presented the proposal as a family of methods that might use > different rules in different ways. In order to go to greater detail > (maybe to lesser amount of details too) one could take some example > situation and example method. We could for example see what kind of > rules could be used in electing ten people of a city to act as trusted > citizens monitoring the criminal interrogations of the police. > > There is probably no reason to require any specific skills => normal > people will do. Maybe all volunteers can be expected to have good > intentions => no need to control the candidates from this point of view > either. Maybe we could require some width of support => let's say three > support votes needed. We could allow voters to list e.g. three > candidates. After collecting the ballots (and counting the number of > support votes for each candidate) we would pick random ballots and > elect the first candidate (who has not been elected yet) with at least > three support votes overall from each ballot. If we don't know if > someone has volunteered we could call him and check (and move to the > next candidate or ballot if the answer is negative). If all citizens > can be uniquely identified with good enough probability (in unclear > cases the previous ten elected citizens may interpret the intended > meaning of the vote) there may be no need for a formal nomination process. Good intentions? Desirable, but attempting non-destructive control could, itself, be destructive. My assumption here was that these positions were light weight enough to allow some fellow citizens to make the decisions according to their best understanding, and that would probably not lead to any major conflicts of interest. It is for example not very likely that any of the decision makes would know any of the to be elected candidates here. Again, all races should share one set of rules. Random ballots? I admit to choking at the thought: If the voters identify a winner, that should end it. If the leading candidates are near a tie then it matters little which wins, but I would go for chance only on a true tie. > > This method is quite simple and straight forward and might work well > enough for this simple task. Just one example among many. For most elections I am for Condorcet, which permits: Bullet voting, suitable when a voter does not care beyond naming a first choice. Ranking all liked candidates above those liked less. Ranking all candidates, suitable for ranking hated enemies at the end. Random ballot based methods were addressed to offer solutions to (what I thought to be) the requirements of Mr Gohlke. From this perspective random ballots can be used to open up the possibility to elect also some regular citizens in addition to (or instead of) the party controlled candidates. Juho -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 27, 2008, at 18:52 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very > flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt. The rules > also could be much simpler than including all the listed possibilities. > My intention is just to show various paths that could be used to make > the basic random vote method more applicable to the needs. This puzzles. You need ONE set of rules for all to understand, with a few details such as number of nominators for a nominee tailored to getting reasonable quantities of candidates. Ok, the example below gave one set of rules for one need. Generally I just identified a list of tricks that can be used in a random vote based methods to make them usable in various situations. >> At the moment, my grasp of your suggestion does not allow a firm >> opinion. Can we flesh out parts of it with greater detail? > > > I presented the proposal as a family of methods that might use > different rules in different ways. In order to go to greater detail > (maybe to lesser amount of details too) one could take some example > situation and example method. We could for example see what kind of > rules could be used in electing ten people of a city to act as trusted > citizens monitoring the criminal interrogations of the police. > > There is probably no reason to require any specific skills => normal > people will do. Maybe all volunteers can be expected to have good > intentions => no need to control the candidates from this point of view > either. Maybe we could require some width of support => let's say three > support votes needed. We could allow voters to list e.g. three > candidates. After collecting the ballots (and counting the number of > support votes for each candidate) we would pick random ballots and > elect the first candidate (who has not been elected yet) with at least > three support votes overall from each ballot. If we don't know if > someone has volunteered we could call him and check (and move to the > next candidate or ballot if the answer is negative). If all citizens > can be uniquely identified with good enough probability (in unclear > cases the previous ten elected citizens may interpret the intended > meaning of the vote) there may be no need for a formal nomination process. Good intentions? Desirable, but attempting non-destructive control could, itself, be destructive. My assumption here was that these positions were light weight enough to allow some fellow citizens to make the decisions according to their best understanding, and that would probably not lead to any major conflicts of interest. It is for example not very likely that any of the decision makes would know any of the to be elected candidates here. Random ballots? I admit to choking at the thought: If the voters identify a winner, that should end it. If the leading candidates are near a tie then it matters little which wins, but I would go for chance only on a true tie. > > This method is quite simple and straight forward and might work well > enough for this simple task. Just one example among many. For most elections I am for Condorcet, which permits: Bullet voting, suitable when a voter does not care beyond naming a first choice. Ranking all liked candidates above those liked less. Ranking all candidates, suitable for ranking hated enemies at the end. Random ballot based methods were addressed to offer solutions to (what I thought to be) the requirements of Mr Gohlke. From this perspective random ballots can be used to open up the possibility to elect also some regular citizens in addition to (or instead of) the party controlled candidates. Juho ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 27, 2008, at 1:29 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 02:23 PM 5/25/2008, Juho wrote: On May 25, 2008, at 4:16 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple. Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago. I didn't include Asset Voting or related features since it includes "cabinet negotiations" between the candidates and the to-be-elected representatives. That may be considered to open too many doors for the parties/groups/strong individuals to impact the outcome. Delegable proxy represents the idea of bottom-up influencing in a more basic way. Asset Voting is delegable proxy (or could be) with a secret ballot ground stage. That's all. Tell me, if you were deciding on who is to represent you, wouldn't you want to be able to sit down with candidates and ask questions? Would you want this to be secret or public? Either could be arranged, you know. Sequester the candidates who hold votes, like they did in Venice, give them each a room and a terminal that allows them to send messages to anyone. Public only. But I'm not sure it's a good idea. I think all methods allow this. It is very typical that candidates can arrange meetings where their potential voters may come and discuss with the candidates. I don't see how Asset Voting would be better than others here. (Was this the claim?) Even if this type of meetings where candidates and voters meet face to face are arranged it is usually considered to be a good practice to keep the votes secret. I can say that personally, I'd like to be able to look the candidates in the eye, see the high-bandwidth information that we get from personal presence, ask questions and see immediate responses, changes in respiration and pulse, body language, etc. Not necessarily consciously. And there is no way to make that public, in fact, with present technology (unless you spend a fortune on each meeting, and even then, what would you do with all that data?) Now, if you can't meet a candidate in person, how about someone you choose meeting the candidate. You choose someone you *can* meet in such a way. And that is whom you vote for in the election. Frankly, it's *stupid* under Asset to vote directly for the famous person who doesn't have time for you. You like that person, fine. Find someone you trust who also likes that person. And if you can't, well, that might say something to you! This is an example of applying party-system thinking to what, though simple, is really a radical reform. Warren Smith didn't get it, he was thinking of a candidate set more or less like what we already see. What I see is that there could be, in a large election, thousands upon thousands of "candidates." It would be the *norm* that nobody gets a quota in a multiwinner election in the secret ballot. But what is *not* secret is the vote reassignments. What an asset holder in an Asset election is, is nothing other than an elector, a public voter. That's crucial. The *negotiations* may be private, but the voting is pubic. Some kinds of negotiations might be illegal, that's another matter. Remember, all that is being chosen in an Asset PR election is an assembly. If one thinks that "secret deals" are going to be prevented by avoiding Asset Voting, what happens, then, once the seats are assigned. There are now -- unless we go whole hog and keep up with direct voting by electors allowed in the assembly -- specific people with voting power. Classic targets for corruption. The more concentrated power, the more attractive it becomes. Asset with direct voting is about the only idea I've seen that could really address this; generally, when power is more broadly distributed, corruption becomes more difficult, because it becomes more expensive. In Asset with direct voting allowed, the seats are proxies and represent the electors in deliberation. They also vote, but if an elector votes directly, this vote power is subtracted (fractionally ( from the vote of the seat. So, what a seat crucially does is to present arguments, and that is public. Corrupt a seat, and you may get corrupt arguments. But then around the seat is a penumbra of high-level proxies, i.e., electors holding lots of votes, and these are relatively likely to take an active interest in the business of the assembly. Collectively -- and they are in touch with each other -- they have the power to remove the seat, if needed, and they can gut the seat's voting power immediately even without removal process. On the other hand, because the relationship is voluntary and relatively uncoerced (for most seats), the level of trust and communication between the seat and the direct providers of seat votes should be high. And suddenly the seat is presenting some weird argument that, yes, we should use voting machines with particular specifications that favor a particular vendor
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
I see governor as the initial office to attend to. Simpler single person offices can be simplified from that base. Presidential race is even more important, but its extra complications deserve a separate discussion after this one. I see Condorcet and RV as the base election methods. I will argue against IRV for its problems, and against methods that are more difficult to do for multiple precincts. On Mon, 26 May 2008 22:14:43 +0300 Juho wrote: > On May 26, 2008, at 17:41 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > >> Because our physical needs often dictate the course of our lives, >> most of those who would make the best leaders are unaware of their >> political talents and are never able to exercise them. > > > Or may think that it is not possible or tempting for them to first > fight their way through the unpleasant jungle to then deliver something > better than that fight through the jungle. Or they may think that the > system is too rotten or too strong opponent for them to even provide > good end results after the fight. Or they may think that those who seem > to be more motivated also have better ideas than they do. > >> They are out there. Can we find them? My interest is in doing so. > > > I don't think we can "find" them but we can increase the probability > that they will find their way to the top. > >> In the course of outlining this suggestion, you mention several >> aspects. I will summarize my understanding of them ... >> >> >> * Nominations are open to the entire electorate. >> Agreed, but any one nominator cannot sign for more than one nominee - and must be in the electorate. Lists of nominators accessible to all, but not especially publishable. A goal here is to, usually, get a reasonable quantity of candidates: Perhaps aiming for at least five whenever at least that many wish to be candidates - anything working to limit to two major backers (parties) is unacceptable. Twenty should be acceptable, but too many to have as a goal. Number of nominators required to nominate a candidate seems like primary control toward this goal Nominee must accept nomination. Nominee expected to provide a resume, inside size limits, but permissibly linking to whatever else nominee feels needs saying. Election system publishes these resumes accessible to all. >> >> * Anyone can nominate anyone else, including oneself, for office, >> provided the nominated person accepts the nomination. If >> restrictions on the nominations are established, they might include: >> >> - an educational minimum >> >> - if expertise is required in the area for which the person is >> nominated, a degree symbolizing competence in that area. >> >> - if trust is required in the area for which the person is nominated, >> support of at least 100 persons in addition to the nominator, >> expressed by email or in some other form. >> By choosing to nominate, the nominators, whatever quantity required, have asserted this. >> >> * Nominations (the name of the nominator and nominated) are recorded >> by an election coordinator. > > > Listing the nominators may not be always needed. In some cases there > could be 100 nominators. > >> * The election coordinator publicizes the list of candidates. >> Plus resumes per above. >> >> * The public votes for the candidate of their choice ... > > > I guess "public" doesn't necessarily mean that the ballot would not be > a secret/anonymous ballot. > >> - by voting for a single person, or >> >> - by making a list of the candidates the voter approves, in which >> case the candidates are listed in order of preference. If the first >> candidate on the list does not get sufficient first place votes for >> election, that candidate is dropped from the list and the second >> candidate moves into the first position on that ballot. In this >> case, since anyone may nominate anyone else, voters may write the >> name of their candidate on the ballot. REJECT - this has at least the smell of IRV. Condorcet uses the same ballot but shows more interest in honoring voter desires. Write-ins belong. Think on a simplification for counting: Treat write-ins as if a candidate: Usually this will verify that there are not enough to affect results. When there are too many write-ins, redo the count with each such name treated as a separate candidate. >> >> - the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes wins. >> >> >> * Alternately, the preceding process is used to select those who will >> be candidates for election. Then, after these candidates are >> presented to the voters, an election determines the winner. >> Condorcet can tolerate a bunch of candidates without getting lost. >> >> * The purpose of the method is to ... >> >> - make candidacy available beyond the incumbent power structure. By asking for only voter nominations in reasonable quantities. >> >> - replace candidates who want a particular job with candidates the >> people want in that job. BETTER find
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
At 02:23 PM 5/25/2008, Juho wrote: On May 25, 2008, at 4:16 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple. Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago. I didn't include Asset Voting or related features since it includes "cabinet negotiations" between the candidates and the to-be-elected representatives. That may be considered to open too many doors for the parties/groups/strong individuals to impact the outcome. Delegable proxy represents the idea of bottom-up influencing in a more basic way. Asset Voting is delegable proxy (or could be) with a secret ballot ground stage. That's all. Tell me, if you were deciding on who is to represent you, wouldn't you want to be able to sit down with candidates and ask questions? Would you want this to be secret or public? Either could be arranged, you know. Sequester the candidates who hold votes, like they did in Venice, give them each a room and a terminal that allows them to send messages to anyone. Public only. But I'm not sure it's a good idea. I can say that personally, I'd like to be able to look the candidates in the eye, see the high-bandwidth information that we get from personal presence, ask questions and see immediate responses, changes in respiration and pulse, body language, etc. Not necessarily consciously. And there is no way to make that public, in fact, with present technology (unless you spend a fortune on each meeting, and even then, what would you do with all that data?) Now, if you can't meet a candidate in person, how about someone you choose meeting the candidate. You choose someone you *can* meet in such a way. And that is whom you vote for in the election. Frankly, it's *stupid* under Asset to vote directly for the famous person who doesn't have time for you. You like that person, fine. Find someone you trust who also likes that person. And if you can't, well, that might say something to you! This is an example of applying party-system thinking to what, though simple, is really a radical reform. Warren Smith didn't get it, he was thinking of a candidate set more or less like what we already see. What I see is that there could be, in a large election, thousands upon thousands of "candidates." It would be the *norm* that nobody gets a quota in a multiwinner election in the secret ballot. But what is *not* secret is the vote reassignments. What an asset holder in an Asset election is, is nothing other than an elector, a public voter. That's crucial. The *negotiations* may be private, but the voting is pubic. Some kinds of negotiations might be illegal, that's another matter. Remember, all that is being chosen in an Asset PR election is an assembly. If one thinks that "secret deals" are going to be prevented by avoiding Asset Voting, what happens, then, once the seats are assigned. There are now -- unless we go whole hog and keep up with direct voting by electors allowed in the assembly -- specific people with voting power. Classic targets for corruption. The more concentrated power, the more attractive it becomes. Asset with direct voting is about the only idea I've seen that could really address this; generally, when power is more broadly distributed, corruption becomes more difficult, because it becomes more expensive. In Asset with direct voting allowed, the seats are proxies and represent the electors in deliberation. They also vote, but if an elector votes directly, this vote power is subtracted (fractionally( from the vote of the seat. So, what a seat crucially does is to present arguments, and that is public. Corrupt a seat, and you may get corrupt arguments. But then around the seat is a penumbra of high-level proxies, i.e., electors holding lots of votes, and these are relatively likely to take an active interest in the business of the assembly. Collectively -- and they are in touch with each other -- they have the power to remove the seat, if needed, and they can gut the seat's voting power immediately even without removal process. On the other hand, because the relationship is voluntary and relatively uncoerced (for most seats), the level of trust and communication between the seat and the direct providers of seat votes should be high. And suddenly the seat is presenting some weird argument that, yes, we should use voting machines with particular specifications that favor a particular vendor. Why, ask the direct supporters of the seat? "Uh, well, it's really complicated, I'll get back to you next week" You know what I think would really happen? Remember, these people have good communication, they *like* each other. The seat would privately tell the proxies, "They offered me ten million dollars if I presented those arguments. Of course they are phoney baloney. I'm about to retire anyway, and, of course, I'm going to publicly present you with excellent arguments that this is great stuff to buy. Privately,
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 26, 2008, at 17:41 , Fred Gohlke wrote: Because our physical needs often dictate the course of our lives, most of those who would make the best leaders are unaware of their political talents and are never able to exercise them. Or may think that it is not possible or tempting for them to first fight their way through the unpleasant jungle to then deliver something better than that fight through the jungle. Or they may think that the system is too rotten or too strong opponent for them to even provide good end results after the fight. Or they may think that those who seem to be more motivated also have better ideas than they do. They are out there. Can we find them? My interest is in doing so. I don't think we can "find" them but we can increase the probability that they will find their way to the top. In the course of outlining this suggestion, you mention several aspects. I will summarize my understanding of them ... * Nominations are open to the entire electorate. * Anyone can nominate anyone else, including oneself, for office, provided the nominated person accepts the nomination. If restrictions on the nominations are established, they might include: - an educational minimum - if expertise is required in the area for which the person is nominated, a degree symbolizing competence in that area. - if trust is required in the area for which the person is nominated, support of at least 100 persons in addition to the nominator, expressed by email or in some other form. * Nominations (the name of the nominator and nominated) are recorded by an election coordinator. Listing the nominators may not be always needed. In some cases there could be 100 nominators. * The election coordinator publicizes the list of candidates. * The public votes for the candidate of their choice ... I guess "public" doesn't necessarily mean that the ballot would not be a secret/anonymous ballot. - by voting for a single person, or - by making a list of the candidates the voter approves, in which case the candidates are listed in order of preference. If the first candidate on the list does not get sufficient first place votes for election, that candidate is dropped from the list and the second candidate moves into the first position on that ballot. In this case, since anyone may nominate anyone else, voters may write the name of their candidate on the ballot. - the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes wins. * Alternately, the preceding process is used to select those who will be candidates for election. Then, after these candidates are presented to the voters, an election determines the winner. * The purpose of the method is to ... - make candidacy available beyond the incumbent power structure. - replace candidates who want a particular job with candidates the people want in that job. - allow the election of good and competent candidates. - favor candidates who are preferred by one voter and attract the support of many voters. - eliminate the need for a candidate to fight his way against challengers. - be fair to minorities. Yes, I tried to support this type of targets to meet the needs that you might have. * The challenge of the method is to insure that the person elected is the best for the job. In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt. The rules also could be much simpler than including all the listed possibilities. My intention is just to show various paths that could be used to make the basic random vote method more applicable to the needs. You also mentioned the possibility of direct democracy and delegable proxy. As to these ... * I find the description of direct democracy vague. The references I see to it assert it is an absolute good without taking the trouble to explain how that absolute good will work in practice. The closest analogy I've been able to draw is a desire for anarchism. Personally, I don't find that appealing. I was thinking in terms of direct vs. representative democracy. I.e people vote themselves on the decisions instead of electing representatives to vote for them. In my mind Switzerland is a classical example on how this could work in practice. (I don't think this is close to anarchism. Maybe this has some interesting differences to the more typical representative democracies with respect to populism, conservatism, expert vs. common opinions etc.) * Delegable proxy, to the extent I understand it, is the height of folly. The explanation I saw of the method was that a voter could give someone else his proxy, to vote as they see fit. As I said once before on this topic, such a method would have proxies available on eBay before the ink was dry on the enabling legislation. I agree that this is a risk. I'd like to keep the met
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 25, 2008, at 21:01 , Fred Gohlke wrote: If the 'black' person sees himself (and those like him) as at a disadvantage, there is an excellent chance he will be more highly motivated than his counterparts to seek a position from which he can improve his (and their) lot. Yes, many minority representatives may be highly motivated. (But they may also feel weaker, being against the majority opinion and less interested than the majority representatives.) In addition, the 'black' person is not without recourse. When he makes a choice, it can be one or the other of the whites ... or neither. Yes, he can influence, but if the other two are 'white' he may have to satisfy with a 'half white' solution anyway. And, as a last resort, if he perceives both of them as hostile, he can assure that neither advances by not voting at all. Also a majority representative in a group with two minority representatives might decide that since he was unlucky and ended "unfairly against all probabilities" in a group with two minority representatives it is fair enough not to vote at all. When viewed strictly in racial terms, the implication that two whites will not select a 'black' is a bit extreme. The technical problem is that any small bias will accumulate in the chained process. The voters thus need not hate the minority but just have some bias (to cause a bias to the proportionality). In many questions it is also quite ok to have different opinions and favour them (unlike in the racial questions). Two greens and one blue in a room could mean that the greens will say "of course we will elect a green since green ideas are good". And that would be considered ok. They picked the best candidate at least from their point of view. When three randomly chosen people from a neighborhood select one person to represent the other two, the chances are excellent that they will reject those who are obviously unfit. By the second iteration, the most objectionable people will have been eliminated by those who know them best. Yes, the ones that are no good and who make that obvious also to others will not advance far. While it is not unreasonable to imagine the people at the first level will pick those they believe best suited, those selected may not have a desire for public office. Yes, people who do not want the job will not go far. (I was also not happy with the idea that those who want to advance do advance. Often it would be wise to elect people that would be happy to serve as the representatives of others but who do not have any unusually strong interest to take the power. Some people may also dislike politics since they expect those people to be corrupt/greedy/ power hungry etc. Of course most political systems have this problem.) One may argue that the majority of those who advance will be people of poor judgment, but to do so is to assert that the people, in general, lack the ability to discern between those of good judgment and those of poor judgment. This could be claimed to be a negative property of almost any political system. (The random vote based methods that I discussed would alleviate these problems.) Here's one example. Two voters want less X, one voter wants more X. If the minority representative (who wants to advance) waits first to hear the opinions of the other two and then says "I also think less X might be better" or "both opinions have some justification" he may have better chances to proceed to the next level when compared to a situation where he is fully honest. It may thus pay off to hide one's true feelings and just be nice towards the others. People who are caught lying would be kicked out soon but people who are "diplomatic" (and hide their intentions and smile in all directions despite of their inner strong feelings and intentions) could advance far. I mean that you are right that people tend to elect good people but on the other hand "bad" people do tricks that will help them advance far. (One could say that the rules of politics typically favour people that are politicians by nature. This is good in some sense but bad in another. You should know what "politicians" are like and what kind of people typically climb the ladders to the political elite :-).) If that were true, the people would be incapable of governing themselves, in which case discussing electoral methods is moot. Thus, while it is not universally true that people of good judgment will be selected, it is generally true and can be accepted as a basis for proceeding. Interesting. Modern democratic methods could be claimed to be the best known methods, and at the same time methods that do not work well. I have heard you "complain" that the current position of the parties is not what it should be. Current political systems (and also e.g. current market economy) may be better than the laws of jun
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Evening, Juho Before considering the selection method your suggested, I would like to comment on one passage in your message. You mentioned my, "... interest to allow the ordinary people to make the decisions ..." That is not exactly where my interest lays. The point of the method I outlined is that we do not know down which streets, in which villages, at which desks, before which stoves are those of us most competent to serve in our government. We know individuals of exceptional talent and character are uniformly distributed throughout the population, but we have no means of identifying them. In terms of political leaders, finding the best of them is further hindered by the fact that each individual's interest in politics waxes and wanes throughout their lives. Because our physical needs often dictate the course of our lives, most of those who would make the best leaders are unaware of their political talents and are never able to exercise them. We do not know which individuals will thrive and blossom when their reason is consulted, when they are invited to discuss current and prospective concerns, when they learn they can persuade their peers of the value of their ideas. We will all benefit if we can devise an electoral method that encourages all people to exercise their wit and wisdom, their persuasiveness, their pride, their knowledge and understanding, and their desire to make a mark for themselves. They are out there. Can we find them? My interest is in doing so. re: "One can nominate candidates for some office/task freely." In the course of outlining this suggestion, you mention several aspects. I will summarize my understanding of them ... * Nominations are open to the entire electorate. * Anyone can nominate anyone else, including oneself, for office, provided the nominated person accepts the nomination. If restrictions on the nominations are established, they might include: - an educational minimum - if expertise is required in the area for which the person is nominated, a degree symbolizing competence in that area. - if trust is required in the area for which the person is nominated, support of at least 100 persons in addition to the nominator, expressed by email or in some other form. * Nominations (the name of the nominator and nominated) are recorded by an election coordinator. * The election coordinator publicizes the list of candidates. * The public votes for the candidate of their choice ... - by voting for a single person, or - by making a list of the candidates the voter approves, in which case the candidates are listed in order of preference. If the first candidate on the list does not get sufficient first place votes for election, that candidate is dropped from the list and the second candidate moves into the first position on that ballot. In this case, since anyone may nominate anyone else, voters may write the name of their candidate on the ballot. - the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes wins. * Alternately, the preceding process is used to select those who will be candidates for election. Then, after these candidates are presented to the voters, an election determines the winner. * The purpose of the method is to ... - make candidacy available beyond the incumbent power structure. - replace candidates who want a particular job with candidates the people want in that job. - allow the election of good and competent candidates. - favor candidates who are preferred by one voter and attract the support of many voters. - eliminate the need for a candidate to fight his way against challengers. - be fair to minorities. * The challenge of the method is to insure that the person elected is the best for the job. You also mentioned the possibility of direct democracy and delegable proxy. As to these ... * I find the description of direct democracy vague. The references I see to it assert it is an absolute good without taking the trouble to explain how that absolute good will work in practice. The closest analogy I've been able to draw is a desire for anarchism. Personally, I don't find that appealing. * Delegable proxy, to the extent I understand it, is the height of folly. The explanation I saw of the method was that a voter could give someone else his proxy, to vote as they see fit. As I said once before on this topic, such a method would have proxies available on eBay before the ink was dry on the enabling legislation. That summarizes my understanding of your suggestion. It raises some questions: Will the lists become unwieldy if the process extends beyond the local community? For example, the number of candidates nominated for governor of my state could be immense. Does nominating someone for public office suggest a beneficial interest in that person's election? If so, should we be concerned? When the list of candidates for a given offi
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 25, 2008, at 4:16 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple. Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago. I didn't include Asset Voting or related features since it includes "cabinet negotiations" between the candidates and the to-be-elected representatives. That may be considered to open too many doors for the parties/groups/strong individuals to impact the outcome. Delegable proxy represents the idea of bottom-up influencing in a more basic way. After the lists of electable persons (candidates) have been created we can arrange the election. Winners will be simply picked by random votes. How about simply allowing people to choose who represents them? At the end of my mail I mentioned delegable proxy as one method that is "party agnostic". At this point I covered only the random ballot based options (and tried to avoid collegial decision making as much as possible). (There are also other methods that are based on a very bottom-up oriented approach like direct democracy and delegable proxy.) Btw, I should have mentioned also STV as one central "party agnostic" method. Asset Voting is clean enough and simple enough and really can become DP beyond the secret ballot level. What property makes Asset Voting be better here? (DP and many methods may have problems when votes become public, but why does Asset Voting stand out here?) Juho ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Afternoon, Juho (For my writing ease, when speaking of unspecified individuals, I shall use a genderless he-him-his. I could as well use she-her-hers, but, at my age, attempting to achieve political correctness imposes a significant burden. My purpose is not to offend but to express myself clearly. I beg the indulgence of those who think the matter of greater importance than I attach to it.) re: "Note that there are also cases where the groupings can not be hidden. For example two white persons and one black person in a room might easily elect a white person even if the back person said nothing about the skin colours and all of them would behave politely etc." Oh, my goodness! I never meant to imply that one's affiliations should be hidden. Not even such superficial ones as skin color. Quite the contrary, I anticipate people will be quick to proclaim the qualities they hold in common with others as well as those that set them apart and make them worthy of selection. Before continuing, I must note that I am considering 'blacks' in the generic rather than the specific sense. In what follows, the term represents any group of people who are seen to be at a disadvantage relative to some other group of people, called 'whites'. That includes the Micks, Spics, Kikes, Gooks, Niggers and Wops of my youth and extends to the Towelheads, Latinos, Asians and Blacks of today. It also applies to a host of religious sects, including those now branded by some with the label 'Islamofascists' and includes those people who would abolish the Federal Reserve, seek ecological balance, advocate direct democracy, and prevent cruelty to animals. In short, I apply it to all groups that are considered minorities. In the instance you cited of two white people and one black person, the chance a white person will be selected exceeds the chance that the black person will be selected on purely mathematical grounds. The odds are 2 to 1. But the selection will not be made on mathematical grounds. Implying it will ignores the most significant aspects of the process: If a person wants to be selected to represent others, the first thing that person must do is describe himself. If one would make oneself appealing to others in a political sense, he must convince them he has a community of interest with them. Making such assertions is easy, politicians do it constantly. Backing them up when challenged is more difficult ... and more revealing. When a very small group of people meet to select one of their number to represent the other two, he who announces his attitudes and beliefs can expect to be examined on his assertions because his counterparts will, in the process of advancing their own candidacy, challenge him. Which of the three is selected depends on the qualities of each; their hopes, their fears, their biases, their knowledge, their personality, their judgment, their motivation and their persuasiveness. If the 'black' person sees himself (and those like him) as at a disadvantage, there is an excellent chance he will be more highly motivated than his counterparts to seek a position from which he can improve his (and their) lot. Motivation is only one of the qualities necessary for selection, but lack of it diminishes the chance of being selected. This dynamic improves the opportunity of the 'black' participants. Since it applies throughout the electoral process, members of a minority who embody the other qualities needed for selection gain an important advantage. In addition, the 'black' person is not without recourse. When he makes a choice, it can be one or the other of the whites ... or neither. The choice he makes depends on his perception of them. Since, in the case you cite, where he must choose one of the whites, it is reasonable to think he will choose the one he believes most likely to advance his interest. More than that, if he perceives one of them to be inimical to his interests, he can guarantee that person does not advance by refusing to vote for him. And, as a last resort, if he perceives both of them as hostile, he can assure that neither advances by not voting at all. When viewed strictly in racial terms, the implication that two whites will not select a 'black' is a bit extreme. I do not mean to imply racial bias does not exist for it certainly does, but it is a mistake to imagine it so beclouds the judgment of whites as to make them incapable of openmindedness. A part of my homeland that was almost exclusively Caucasian spent the lives of a reported 390,000 of their people in a brutal, bloody war, one purpose of which was to guarantee that their Negroid countrymen would have the same rights as they. re: "I also do not have full trust that only good properties of the people would propagate upwards in the election process. It may also be that people that are good at fooling other people and hiding their t
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
At 12:46 PM 5/22/2008, Juho wrote: Happens to me sometimes. I write interspersed, and some space accumulates at the bottom, and I don't see the rest of the original message. Sorry. When considering your interest to avoid strong party style groupings to take control of the political life, and on the other hand your interest to allow the ordinary people to make the decisions, I came to think that you might like (in addition to your "groups of three" method) also the following method. One can nominate candidates for some office/task freely. In some cases any nomination and/or volunteering is enough. In some other cases one might require the candidate to have some education/degree in some appropriate area. Or one could require the candidate to have at least 100 listed supporters (or 100 independent emails to the election coordinator). The need for this kind of additional criteria depends on if the position in question requires some specific skills, or some level of trust. But in general the lists of candidates are collected using this kind of open process that is not controlled by any parties or other existing bodies. One could also check from the "nominated" candidates if they volunteer for the task in case they are elected before their name appears in the candidate list. Wow! It certainly gets complicated when we try to anticipate all the details of a system we are not even close to implementing. How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple. Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago. After the lists of electable persons (candidates) have been created we can arrange the election. Winners will be simply picked by random votes. How about simply allowing people to choose who represents them? Officer elections can be handled deliberatively, by whatever deliberative body is created. Asset Voting was designed for true, non-party proportional representation. It is not *against* parties, but it makes them unnecessary for the purpose of representation. It finesses the whole question of district representation: let those who want a local rep have a local rep, and those who want an ideological rep for some minority position have that. I think that, practically by definition, most people will have local reps. And several per specific geographical location. The reps won't know, if it is a secret ballot system, which specific voters elected them, but they will know what precincts their votes came from, and, assuming they were not directly elected (I think that will become increasing rare except in assemblies for small-population jurisdictions), they will know what electors transferred votes to them. The voters will be able to see exactly where their vote went, if it's done right. This method also avoids the need of the candidates to be skilled in fighting their way up the ladders against other candidates. And it is reasonably fair towards minorities. (There are also other methods that are based on a very bottom-up oriented approach like direct democracy and delegable proxy.) Couple of years ago, "delegable proxy" would not have been mentioned. We have made progress. Asset Voting is not exactly delegable proxy, it, as designed, creates a peer assembly where every member has the same voting power, so it is closer to existing structures; it might actually become the government, as distinct from FA/DP organizations which *cannot* be governments. DP could be used in government, but that might also create serious opportunities for corruption that don't exist in the FA/DP model. Asset Voting is clean enough and simple enough and really can become DP beyond the secret ballot level. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
At 12:46 PM 5/22/2008, Juho wrote: Note that there are also cases where the groupings can not be hidden. For example two white persons and one black person in a room might easily elect a white person even if the back person said nothing about the skin colours and all of them would behave politely etc. I also do not have full trust that only good properties of the people would propagate upwards in the election process. It may also be that people that are good at fooling other people and hiding their true (maybe less noble) intentions will reach the top levels more often than others. Where I would agree with some in this discussion is that party representation isn't representation of the people, at least not directly. Political parties are really subsets of the electorate, and the question then arises as to how parties make their decisions. The answer to that has varied, but, often, the process is just as flawed as the overall process, or more flawed. The history of the FA/DP concept, for me, went through a stage where I considered fixed groupings. It never occurred to me to consider groups as small as three as a fixed size; rather, from my experience with group process, I usually thought of ten. Besides, it made the math easy However, I soon realized the loss of representation problem. I also started with the idea of some imposed schedule for meetings, as a national election process, but the bureaucratic complexity of it all, plus the representation problem, nixed that approach for me. Instead of having groups be composed by some external process, what if people voluntarily join groups? Indeed, what if they join groups based on the identity of the representative. Suddenly no election is needed. And, indeed, almost instantly, the possibility of delegable proxy presents itself. Suddenly there is representation that does not depend, at all, on what we ordinarily think of as elections. It is pure representation, voluntary, and chosen, not elected in some kind of contest. There are no losers. Now, TANSTAAFL. If someone is unable to trust others, they will end up, unless others trust them (which is unlikely, mistrust is commonly mutual), unrepresented at levels in such a structure high enough that some restriction must exist on participation. In a small town, individual might simply represent themselves at a Town Meeting. But even with some small towns, individual who do that can sometimes take up so much time that ultimately some controls or restrictions arise. Now, given that very large numbers of people could coherently organize themselves very quickly and efficiently with such a technique (no elections, no campaigns, people just name whom they most trust to represent them when they cannot represent themselves), it becomes possible to consider such organization when there is no public funding, no treasury, no large expenditures of funds. And it then becomes possible to apply this concept entirely outside of government, in very light, efficient organizations that would classically be called anarchist or libertarian, but without the political implications. I.e., they are "libertarian" because they, rigorously, do not coerce. They encourage participation because participation never is harmful. If you give $20 to some, say, environmental organization, they will decide how to spend it by some mechanism, and it could end up being spent quite contrary to how you would want. But Free Associations, as I came to call these, don't collect funds. They don't collect power. All they do is to facilitate, through the delegable proxy structure, the negotiation and discovery of consensus on a large scale. And then the whole vision of an FA/DP revolution, taking place with little fuss and no violence, the people simply waking up and exercising their natural power, became clear. I *do* think that wisdom and prudence and other qood qualities will increase as we move up the spontaneous hierarchy of a delegable proxy structure. The reason is that people will not be choosing strangers, media images, they will, I predict, in the long run, be choosing people with whom they can and do communicate directly. There really is no reason to do otherwise, you gain nothing by choosing the famous movie star, unless you are one of a few whom he is willing to communicate with directly. So media image becomes irrelevant. As to government, existing structures are already open to the power of the people, the only reason government doesn't function that way is that the people are asleep. And, in fact, the people, as individuals, are not going to wake up, at least not most of them. They have other things to do that don't involve being consciousy involved in government and large-scale cooperation. They will, quite properly, focus on raising their kids, taking care of their houses and their jobs. But they will make one decision with vast import. Among all those they kn
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
Good Morning, Juho You raise two issues in your post that require thoughtful responses. They give us an opportunity to discuss different aspects of each idea and how they might work in practice. I'll post as quickly as I can. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal
On May 22, 2008, at 16:00 , Fred Gohlke wrote: As I said in an earlier post, partisanship is a vital part of society ... provided it is always a voice and never a power. The danger is not in partisanship, it is in allowing partisans to control government. In my opinion, it is unwise to seek a mathematical relationship between ideas and legislative bodies. Ideas, by their nature, cannot be measured or controlled. They are malleable little balloon-like things that bounce off people, sometimes adjusting their shape a little as they do so, and occasionally exploding on the jagged points of reality. Rather than attempt to apportion ideas, we should strive to select representatives who are receptive to them. It's a bit of a digression, but I've been wondering: When describing Active Democracy for a community the size of New Jersey, I did not attempt to carry the process to the assignment of candidates to offices. Our discussion leads me to wonder if, when a suitable number of candidates has been selected, the people should make the final election to office by ranking their preferences of those nominated by the process? re: "... one can not rule out the possibility of people asking each others what party/ideology they represent and then making decisions based on this (rather than always making their decisions based on "the qualities of the candidates" only)." I would not want to rule out that possibility; it is such a good indication of the shallowness of the person asking. Obviously, since there is no such method extant, I can't prove it, but I suspect such people will rarely last beyond the second or third level of the process. As the levels advance, those with the wit and the will to attain office can be expected to evince a grasp of affairs far exceeding the facile one-liners of partisanship. Note that there are also cases where the groupings can not be hidden. For example two white persons and one black person in a room might easily elect a white person even if the back person said nothing about the skin colours and all of them would behave politely etc. I also do not have full trust that only good properties of the people would propagate upwards in the election process. It may also be that people that are good at fooling other people and hiding their true (maybe less noble) intentions will reach the top levels more often than others. When considering your interest to avoid strong party style groupings to take control of the political life, and on the other hand your interest to allow the ordinary people to make the decisions, I came to think that you might like (in addition to your "groups of three" method) also the following method. One can nominate candidates for some office/task freely. In some cases any nomination and/or volunteering is enough. In some other cases one might require the candidate to have some education/degree in some appropriate area. Or one could require the candidate to have at least 100 listed supporters (or 100 independent emails to the election coordinator). The need for this kind of additional criteria depends on if the position in question requires some specific skills, or some level of trust. But in general the lists of candidates are collected using this kind of open process that is not controlled by any parties or other existing bodies. One could also check from the "nominated" candidates if they volunteer for the task in case they are elected before their name appears in the candidate list. After the lists of electable persons (candidates) have been created we can arrange the election. Winners will be simply picked by random votes. One modification. One could include in the criteria of making someone electable that he/she must have received a certain number of votes in the election. In this case the voters could give a (maybe fixed length) list of candidates. All listed candidates get one support vote for electability. The first candidate on the list that is electable will be elected. (This rule could allow also write-ins.) Another modification. Elect that candidate from this voter's list who has most support overall. Third modification. Arrange two rounds. First round picks candidates for the second round. Candidates can be presented to the voters in more detail before the second round. Many of the possible rules that I described above take the method away from pure random vote method towards a method that favours candidates that are also competent (in addition to being the favourite of one of the voters) and that have wide support (not just the support of this one voter). I think it is possible to develop this type of methods that may freely elect candidates outside of the incumbent power structure, and candidates that are wanted for the job rather than candidates that want the job, and that s
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Good Morning, Juho re: "I do have some sympathy towards regional proportionality since in many systems one could otherwise soon get a very capital area centric set of representatives (who appear more often on TV and news etc.). Regional proportionality may thus help guaranteeing that all parts of the country will be represented well enough. On the other hand voters that think mostly in ideological terms (rather than regional) may not like being limited to regional candidates only." That is, I think, the essence of the problem. When there are competing views, each with a reasonable basis, there is no 'fair' or 'complete' answer that will satisfy everyone. As you say, "... different countries and elections have different needs", but that argues against a generally acceptable arrangement. re: "I also tend to think that any naturally occurring groupings among citizens are in most cases a richness of the society and they have a positive and trust creating influence on their members, and are therefore usually (at least as long as they are not targeted against other groups) worth supporting rather than something that should be rooted out." I quite agree. As I said in an earlier post, partisanship is a vital part of society ... provided it is always a voice and never a power. The danger is not in partisanship, it is in allowing partisans to control government. re: "For me proportional representation of minority opinions (5% of the seats for 5% of the voters) at the top level decision making bodies is at least not a negative thing. Other approaches can be used too." In my opinion, it is unwise to seek a mathematical relationship between ideas and legislative bodies. Ideas, by their nature, cannot be measured or controlled. They are malleable little balloon-like things that bounce off people, sometimes adjusting their shape a little as they do so, and occasionally exploding on the jagged points of reality. Rather than attempt to apportion ideas, we should strive to select representatives who are receptive to them. It's a bit of a digression, but I've been wondering: When describing Active Democracy for a community the size of New Jersey, I did not attempt to carry the process to the assignment of candidates to offices. Our discussion leads me to wonder if, when a suitable number of candidates has been selected, the people should make the final election to office by ranking their preferences of those nominated by the process? re: "... one can not rule out the possibility of people asking each others what party/ideology they represent and then making decisions based on this (rather than always making their decisions based on "the qualities of the candidates" only)." I would not want to rule out that possibility; it is such a good indication of the shallowness of the person asking. Obviously, since there is no such method extant, I can't prove it, but I suspect such people will rarely last beyond the second or third level of the process. As the levels advance, those with the wit and the will to attain office can be expected to evince a grasp of affairs far exceeding the facile one-liners of partisanship. re: "I think this is a continuous (and never ending) fight. We just need to work all the time to keep the system sound and well working. It's a living process." It is, indeed. I was encouraged recently to find it may not take another 200 years to make significant progress. I had the good fortune to be introduced to John Stuart Mill's treatise, "Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority only." It was written 147 years ago, so maybe we're further ahead than I thought. Even then, he was inveighing against the impositions of party: "At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by lavish expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs, as men whose votes the party can depend on under all circumstances." The fact that, in 147 years, the remedy he favored has either failed of adoption or of correcting the problem, we would do well to look more carefully at its actual cause. We should soon start to recognize that "The danger is not in partisanship, it is in allowing partisans to control government." Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Good Afternoon, Mr. Lundell Thank you for your lucid explanation. It, combined with the link you provided to the J. S. Mill discussion of the topic, explained an aspect of politics I hadn't considered. At first blush, I have no issue with political proportionality. In fact, based on your example of seeking to represent a new or different view of the peoples' interest, it is an essential element of democracy. As I said in an earlier post, progressive movements always start as a minority. We are strangled when new views are denied a voice. By way of explanation for my lack of awareness of this important point, the issue did not leap to mind because my approach to the problem is from a different perspective. I am disturbed by the usurpation of the people's right to govern themselves. I am not a professional in the field of politics, my attitudes were formed by years of observation. Over those years, it has become increasingly apparent that the root of the political problems in my homeland stem from the stranglehold parties have on our political infrastructure. I don't think in terms of electoral districts because they, and gerrymandering, and primaries, and all the other minutiae of politics, are artifices foisted on the people to deprive them of their right to govern themselves. In time, I realized that when those who hold political power are allowed to write the rules by which that power is attained and exercised, one can not expect good government. When I started this thread on March 2nd, I did so with the following introduction: "This site focuses on methods of conducting elections, but most posts address only a single aspect of that topic; the way votes are counted. Is not the object for which votes are cast a matter of even greater concern? When our public officials are not representative of the people who elect them and are masters of misdirection, obfuscation and deceit, ought we not ask ourselves whether there is a taint in the method by which they are selected? Ought we not consider the role of political parties in the political process?" Thus, my thoughts (and my comments) are mostly concerned with calling attention to the inherent danger of partisan politics and to urge consideration of electoral methods that seek the best of our people as our representatives rather than allowing political parties to dictate who we may elect. Again, I want to thank you for broadening my horizon. What you refer to as "a typical STV proposal for the California assembly" has the incomparable merit of being possible in the relatively short term. At the same time, I think it important to continue calling attention to the adverse effects of partisan politics. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Good Morning, Mr. Lundell I'm sorry my response is taking so long, but I'm working my way through the link you gave me to John Stuart Mill's treatise regarding Mr. Thomas Hare's proposal. He makes the case for political proportionality admirably, although his antipathy for his country's Conservative Party forces some extra care in considering his arguments. It will take me a bit longer to compose my response. The temptation to cite segments of Mill's essay and comment on them is strong, but I'd like to avoid doing so. I am posting now to thank you for providing such a powerful link. I'd had a small exposure to Mill in a different context, but was unaware of this treatise. I'm enjoying his thoughts and his mode of expressing them. Digesting them is worth the effort. I commend them to anyone with an interest in the topic. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On May 19, 2008, at 1:46 , James Gilmour wrote: Juho > Sent: Sunday, May 18, 2008 10:31 PM Single-seat districts (the usual ones) provide very tight regional representation / proportionality. True, if you are prepared to accept that you have "regional representation" when a majority of those elected are elected on minority votes. Political proportionality on the other hand is very poor. Multi-member districts provide less strict regional proportionality but better political proportionality. If the numbers of electors per member are similar, I don't see why the regional proportionality should be any less. I was thinking about the fact that in single-seat districts the geographical area that one representative represents is as small as it can be. Multi-member districts tend to be larger. I don't mean that single-seat districts would be any better. Bigger districts may well be sufficient to satisfy the need of regional proportionality. This depends of how people feel about the regions. (If there are e.g. 10 parties there could be also 10 regions and people could be happy with that.) (With STV-PR, strictly you have adjust on the assumed quota because the absolute value of the Droop quota increases with district magnitude. But that's all unnecessary anyway because the differences in turnout will make a complete nonsense of all the efforts to obtain perfect equality of numbers!) The number of seats per district is important. If one district has 5 seats and another has 10 seats the chances of small groups to get their candidates elected is different. The number of seats sets a limit on the size of the parties that they must reach to get their first seat (the case with one seat only is an extreme case that typically favours two large parties with about 50% support each). You must be careful to distinguish here between the proportion of votes to win one seat and the actual number of votes to win one seat. In a smaller district (fewer seats), the proportion is higher but the number of votes is smaller, and vice versa for a larger district. I think the key aspect of district magnitude that matters to electors is the number of different groups of voters who can obtain direct representation. So in a 5-member district only five different groups could be represented directly, but in a 10-member district, ten different groups could be represented directly. Of course, in both districts, the voters could choose direct representation of only two or three groups, but that would be the voters' choice. In Finland one of the experienced problems that led to the new proposal was that a vote to the Greens in some of the smallest districts was a "lost vote". In Finland there is currently one electoral reform proposal (with support of majority of the parties) under discussion. The current proposal gets rid of the current calculation rules that threat different size districts differently. The basic idea is that the number of representatives that each party will get will be counted first at national level, and then the seats will be distributed to the districts so that both political and regional proportionality requirements will be met. In the proposed system votes of a small group will thus be summed up at national level. Even if the votes at some district would not be enough to get even one seat the sum of votes in several districts may be enough to guarantee one seat (that will be allocated to that group in one of the districts). (The proposed system contains currently also a general threshold level that parties need to reach to get any seats, but that's another story.) Why go to the bother of summing the votes at national level to get better proportionality if you are then going to impose an arbitrary threshold? It is a very common feature of party list PR systems, but it seems crazy to me, especially as the threshold is completely arbitrary. One reason is the "lost votes". If one counts the votes at national level then minor party voters at regions where they have no chance of getting their candidate elected can still sincerely vote for their favourite party. I agree that the threshold is a bit weird, especially since earlier Finland has not had any such arbitrary thresholds. Earlier the number of seats per district did cut some of the smallest parties away. If votes are counted at national level that makes it possible to get seats with less votes. The threshold was invented by the current parties. It would roughly cut out parties that do not have any seats at the moment. This need has been called "avoiding the fragmentation of the political field" or something similar. I think there is no such major problem at the moment in Finland, so this should probably be classified more as "we don't want to donate all our sets to newcomers". The level of the threshold is not "completely arbitrary" in the sense th
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Juho > Sent: Sunday, May 18, 2008 10:31 PM > Single-seat districts (the usual ones) provide very tight regional > representation / proportionality. True, if you are prepared to accept that you have "regional representation" when a majority of those elected are elected on minority votes. Political proportionality on the > other hand is very poor. > > Multi-member districts provide less strict regional proportionality > but better political proportionality. If the numbers of electors per member are similar, I don't see why the regional proportionality should be any less. (With STV-PR, strictly you have adjust on the assumed quota because the absolute value of the Droop quota increases with district magnitude. But that's all unnecessary anyway because the differences in turnout will make a complete nonsense of all the efforts to obtain perfect equality of numbers!) > The number of seats per district is important. If one district has 5 > seats and another has 10 seats the chances of small groups to get > their candidates elected is different. The number of seats sets a > limit on the size of the parties that they must reach to get their > first seat (the case with one seat only is an extreme case that > typically favours two large parties with about 50% support each). You must be careful to distinguish here between the proportion of votes to win one seat and the actual number of votes to win one seat. In a smaller district (fewer seats), the proportion is higher but the number of votes is smaller, and vice versa for a larger district. I think the key aspect of district magnitude that matters to electors is the number of different groups of voters who can obtain direct representation. So in a 5-member district only five different groups could be represented directly, but in a 10-member district, ten different groups could be represented directly. Of course, in both districts, the voters could choose direct representation of only two or three groups, but that would be the voters' choice. > In Finland there is currently one electoral reform proposal (with > support of majority of the parties) under discussion. The current > proposal gets rid of the current calculation rules that threat > different size districts differently. The basic idea is that the > number of representatives that each party will get will be counted > first at national level, and then the seats will be distributed to > the districts so that both political and regional proportionality > requirements will be met. > > In the proposed system votes of a small group will thus be summed up > at national level. Even if the votes at some district would not be > enough to get even one seat the sum of votes in several districts may > be enough to guarantee one seat (that will be allocated to > that group in one of the districts). > > (The proposed system contains currently also a general threshold > level that parties need to reach to get any seats, but that's > another story.) Why go to the bother of summing the votes at national level to get better proportionality if you are then going to impose an arbitrary threshold? It is a very common feature of party list PR systems, but it seems crazy to me, especially as the threshold is completely arbitrary. > The system is not STV based but open party list based, so it is quite > straight forward to sum up the votes of candidates of each opinion > group although the candidates are different at different districts. > > It is thus possible to implement both regional and political > proportionality at the same time. And that is possible even if the > voters (of small parties/groupings) would be "forced" to vote > candidates of their own district. Of course, STV-PR is about proportionality of a different kind, that cannot be measured by summing votes regionally or nationally according to some party label. But THAT is, indeed, another story. James No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG. Version: 8.0.100 / Virus Database: 269.23.20/1452 - Release Date: 5/17/2008 6:26 PM No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG. Version: 8.0.100 / Virus Database: 269.23.20/1452 - Release Date: 5/17/2008 6:26 PM Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
At 01:00 PM 5/18/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote: Should I infer that there is a basis for opposing regional proportionality? I ask because it never occurred to me to question the wisdom of "forcing all voters to vote at their home region". Indeed, even the idea of "force" never occurred to me. I am of the opinion that voting is a right and that one's home region is the most logical place to exercise that right. The objection is to "spending" all of our opportunity for proportionality on regional proportionality; we're looking at the fundamental argument for PR. One of the problems with Mr. Gohlke's approach is that "logic" isn't directly applicable unless a series of assumptions have been made. Something may easily seem "logical" when enough considerations have been set aside. If we think of a representative, we'd want that representative to be someone local, sure. When state legislatures were being put together, and when the federal system was put together, the old feudal system of regions being represented rather than people seemed logical. And, in fact, it worked, more or less. California's two Senators are the "gentlepeople from California," and they represent California, not the voters of California; they are chosen by plurality vote. Gohlke discards some of the logic of this, but not all. In fact, though, it is possible that we could have both regional representation and representation of people. There are federal systems that do this, with complex schemes that assign some seats according to one formula, and other seats according to another. But there is an extraordinarily simple system that cuts to the chase. Turns out, by my analysis, that if you represent people through their free choice, you will *probably* get regional representation as well. After all, won't most people choose someone local? If you are a voter, which would you prefer to have, someone who represents your location, or someone who represents your views? With Asset Voting, you can vote for both. Normally, there will be someone local who represents your views, or whom you otherwise trust to be fair and to act properly and intelligently in office. Asset Voting places practically no constraints on you. Until recently, we thought that this was invented by Warren Smith, one busy little bee. However, when I first heard of Single Transferable Vote, and didn't know how it worked, I actually though it worked using the Asset Voting idea. In other words, if someone came in without the prejudices of knowing how things work, that person just might come up with Asset Voting. I didn't tell anyone, though, as far as I recall. But another out-of-the-box thinker did. In 1884. Charles Dodgson, better known as Lewis Carroll. It was, for him, simply a method of proportional representation. Only it truly represents the voters, though much might depend on implementation of details. In a party system, parties might be represented, but the method does not directly consider parties. It's up to the voters and the candidates. Asset Voting is also similar to the very old proxy system that is used for corporate governance. I've remarked many times that proxy voting is what we get when people who have means can demand what they desire, or leave. Conditions have changed somewhat with broad ownership of stock, but, centuries ago, corporations wanted to attract capital and they found it necessary to cede proportional control to investors. Investors did not want to have to attend tedious and inconvenient shareholder meetings, and, by common law and the practice of corporations, they could name proxies to serve. Proxies are "elected," technically, but through any kind of opposition or contested election. They are chosen. Perhaps without realizing the similarity with proxy voting, and just thinking about how to handle proportional representation -- he was certainly familiar with STV -- he realized that voters could simply vote for the candidate they most trust, and *that candidate* could, then, represent them in the process of electing a parliament. He used the Droop quota, I think, and any candidate with a Droop quota of votes was elected (I've noted that this candidate could also decide not to personally serve, but could instead election someone of his or her choice to serve instead). Just as with STV, if there were excess votes, those were still distributable, just as with candidates who did not receive a quota. This is really like STV, except that the reassignments aren't based on a list on the ballot, but on the judgement and action of candidates trusted by the voters. (There are also proposals whereby candidates publish a list of vote transfers, which might or might not be binding. But, personally, I prefer the much simpler system. Vote for the person you most trust, period. Situations and conditions change, and if your candidate ends up holding a few thousand unused votes, conversati
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Single-seat districts (the usual ones) provide very tight regional representation / proportionality. Political proportionality on the other hand is very poor. Multi-member districts provide less strict regional proportionality but better political proportionality. The number of seats per district is important. If one district has 5 seats and another has 10 seats the chances of small groups to get their candidates elected is different. The number of seats sets a limit on the size of the parties that they must reach to get their first seat (the case with one seat only is an extreme case that typically favours two large parties with about 50% support each). In Finland there is currently one electoral reform proposal (with support of majority of the parties) under discussion. The current proposal gets rid of the current calculation rules that threat different size districts differently. The basic idea is that the number of representatives that each party will get will be counted first at national level, and then the seats will be distributed to the districts so that both political and regional proportionality requirements will be met. In the proposed system votes of a small group will thus be summed up at national level. Even if the votes at some district would not be enough to get even one seat the sum of votes in several districts may be enough to guarantee one seat (that will be allocated to that group in one of the districts). (The proposed system contains currently also a general threshold level that parties need to reach to get any seats, but that's another story.) The system is not STV based but open party list based, so it is quite straight forward to sum up the votes of candidates of each opinion group although the candidates are different at different districts. It is thus possible to implement both regional and political proportionality at the same time. And that is possible even if the voters (of small parties/groupings) would be "forced" to vote candidates of their own district. Juho On May 18, 2008, at 20:00 , Jonathan Lundell wrote: On May 18, 2008, at 9:05 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "Political proportionality is the one that people most often discuss since the election methods/systems typically provide regional proportional automatically (e.g. in the form of single seat districts and forcing all voters to vote at their home region, without asking about the opinion of the voter)." Should I infer that there is a basis for opposing regional proportionality? I ask because it never occurred to me to question the wisdom of "forcing all voters to vote at their home region". Indeed, even the idea of "force" never occurred to me. I am of the opinion that voting is a right and that one's home region is the most logical place to exercise that right. The objection is to "spending" all of our opportunity for proportionality on regional proportionality; we're looking at the fundamental argument for PR. J S Mill makes the case better than I can: http:// etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645r/ chapter7.html [John Stuart Mill: "Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority only", Chapter 7 of Considerations on Representative Democracy (1861)] But of course I'll take my own shot at it, through example. California has an 80-seat state assembly, with 80 somewhat gerrymandered single-seat districts. Ignoring the subtleties of quotas and the mathematics of PR, let's say for convenience that each seat represents 1/80 of the voters of the state. As a voter, I'd like to be able to form a voting coalition with enough like- minded voters to elect a representative. Depending on how strongly I feel about which issues, how likely is it that I'll find enough like-minded voters within my district to send a representative to Sacramento? Not very likely, unless my some stroke of luck my interests happen to be aligned with the major party with a (probably gerrymandered) majority in my district. A Republican voter in San Francisco has no chance of direct representation in Sacramento, nor does a Democrat in Redding. Nor does a Green or Libertarian anywhere in the state, even though both parties have in aggregate enough members to justify 1/80 seats. A typical STV proposal for the California assembly has multimember districts of 5-10 seats, preserving a degree of geographic locality at the expense of raising the threshold for minority coalitions. Notice, though, that if the state were treated as a single 80-seat district, there'd be nothing under an STV system to prevent voters from forming geographically (vs party or issue) based coalitions. The difference with that these geographic coalitions become voluntary, based on common geographically based interests; they're not imposed (forced) on the voters by the district sy
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On May 18, 2008, at 19:05 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "Political proportionality is the one that people most often discuss since the election methods/systems typically provide regional proportional automatically (e.g. in the form of single seat districts and forcing all voters to vote at their home region, without asking about the opinion of the voter)." Should I infer that there is a basis for opposing regional proportionality? I'm open to all kind of proportionality scenarios (also other than political and regional). All this depends on the election and society in question. I do have some sympathy towards regional proportionality since in many systems one could otherwise soon get a very capital area centric set of representatives (who appear more often on TV and news etc.). Regional proportionality may thus help guaranteeing that all parts of the country will be represented well enough. On the other hand voters that think mostly in ideological terms (rather than regional) may not like being limited to regional candidates only. Regionally oriented voters may like the idea of having regional candidates much more. But as said, different countries and elections have different needs. (Also some more complex methods that would allow voters to give their opinions on all candidates but that would still maintain also regional proportionality are possible.) I also tend to think that any naturally occurring groupings among citizens are in most cases a richness of the society and they have a positive and trust creating influence on their members, and are therefore usually (at least as long as they are not targeted against other groups) worth supporting rather than something that should be rooted out. I urge consideration of the idea that seeking representation is a poor approach to resolving the imperative of pursuing minority interests. For me proportional representation of minority opinions (5% of the seats for 5% of the voters) at the top level decision making bodies is at least not a negative thing. Other approaches can be used too. In our electoral system, those who control the government are partisan. The primary purpose of their governmental acts is to preserve their primacy. Yes, at least it is typical that incumbent people and organizations tend to make choices that maintain their current power and position. It is good if the system has also some forces / features that work against letting this very basic trend become dominant. Partisan political structures retard the advance of progressive ideas. They are inherently backward-looking. I see this to be linked more to the incumbent nature of the current political parties rather than to calling various interest groups in the "political structure" "parties". The name doesn't thus make the parties bad but the power may corrupt them. The electoral method I've outlined addresses this by foregoing partisanship in the search for intellect, talent and integrity. Yes, it has many good features. But of course one can not rule out the possibility of people asking each others what party/ideology they represent and then making decisions based on this (rather than always making their decisions based on "the qualities of the candidates" only). I fear, though, it will be a long time before the advantages of looking forward can supplant the penchant for looking backward. I think this is a continuous (and never ending) fight. We just need to work all the time to keep the system sound and well working. It's a living process. Juho ___ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On May 18, 2008, at 9:05 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "Political proportionality is the one that people most often discuss since the election methods/systems typically provide regional proportional automatically (e.g. in the form of single seat districts and forcing all voters to vote at their home region, without asking about the opinion of the voter)." Should I infer that there is a basis for opposing regional proportionality? I ask because it never occurred to me to question the wisdom of "forcing all voters to vote at their home region". Indeed, even the idea of "force" never occurred to me. I am of the opinion that voting is a right and that one's home region is the most logical place to exercise that right. The objection is to "spending" all of our opportunity for proportionality on regional proportionality; we're looking at the fundamental argument for PR. J S Mill makes the case better than I can: http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645r/chapter7.html [John Stuart Mill: "Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority only", Chapter 7 of Considerations on Representative Democracy (1861)] But of course I'll take my own shot at it, through example. California has an 80-seat state assembly, with 80 somewhat gerrymandered single-seat districts. Ignoring the subtleties of quotas and the mathematics of PR, let's say for convenience that each seat represents 1/80 of the voters of the state. As a voter, I'd like to be able to form a voting coalition with enough like-minded voters to elect a representative. Depending on how strongly I feel about which issues, how likely is it that I'll find enough like-minded voters within my district to send a representative to Sacramento? Not very likely, unless my some stroke of luck my interests happen to be aligned with the major party with a (probably gerrymandered) majority in my district. A Republican voter in San Francisco has no chance of direct representation in Sacramento, nor does a Democrat in Redding. Nor does a Green or Libertarian anywhere in the state, even though both parties have in aggregate enough members to justify 1/80 seats. A typical STV proposal for the California assembly has multimember districts of 5-10 seats, preserving a degree of geographic locality at the expense of raising the threshold for minority coalitions. Notice, though, that if the state were treated as a single 80-seat district, there'd be nothing under an STV system to prevent voters from forming geographically (vs party or issue) based coalitions. The difference with that these geographic coalitions become voluntary, based on common geographically based interests; they're not imposed (forced) on the voters by the district system. So, "forced" in that respect. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Good Morning, Juho
You may have noticed that I digest ideas, particularly those involving
technical terms and usages, slowly. The process is delayed when I
suffer a misunderstanding. I would apologize if I didn't believe it
more a compliment than an insult, for careful consideration is surely
preferable to glibness. Since clarity in written exchanges is illusive,
lack of understanding can only be a vice when one is unwilling to
correct it.
re: "Political proportionality is the one that people most often discuss
since the election methods/systems typically provide regional
proportional automatically (e.g. in the form of single seat districts
and forcing all voters to vote at their home region, without asking
about the opinion of the voter)."
Should I infer that there is a basis for opposing regional
proportionality? I ask because it never occurred to me to question the
wisdom of "forcing all voters to vote at their home region". Indeed,
even the idea of "force" never occurred to me. I am of the opinion that
voting is a right and that one's home region is the most logical place
to exercise that right.
re: "The groups can also be hierarchical in the sense that e.g. left
wing may consist of smaller groupings, Christians may consist of
Catholics and Protestants etc. All affiliations at any level may thus
support other members of the groupings."
This is certainly true. The issue is less whether this condition exists
among humans (as it unquestionably does) than a question of the extent
to which it influences the actions of individuals.
Since our discussion centers on electoral methods, the question must be
how these smaller groupings can attain representation. How can they,
ultimately, attain their ends. That is something of a prickly fruit,
for attaining its sweetness runs the risk of pricking one's finger on a
basic tenet of democracy; majority rule.
I urge consideration of the idea that seeking representation is a poor
approach to resolving the imperative of pursuing minority interests.
In our electoral system, those who control the government are partisan.
The primary purpose of their governmental acts is to preserve their
primacy. They seek always to prevent the ascension of, and their own
replacement by, other partisans. To accomplish their end, they delude
the public with misdirection, deception, secrecy and obfuscation.
In such circumstances, minorities are reduced to beggary. Their only
hope of attaining the ends of their supporters is to make deals to help
more dominant groups achieve and retain power ('Politics makes strange
bedfellows'). More often than not, the result is sacrifice of the
minority group's goals and ideals ('Broken Campaign Promises').
The tragedy is that this situation obtains without consideration of the
validity of the minority group's goals, some of which may be beneficial
for society.
Progressive movements always start as a minority (when embraced by the
majority they are no longer 'progressive'). Partisan political
structures retard the advance of progressive ideas. They are inherently
backward-looking. They provide an excellent platform for inspiring
passion but no incentive for applying reason to contemporary situations.
The electoral method I've outlined addresses this by foregoing
partisanship in the search for intellect, talent and integrity. It is
not about issues, it is about the qualities of the candidates. It is
about finding people with the willingness and ability to apply reason to
existing circumstances and to consider new ideas rationally; in short,
to judge issues on their merits rather than their ideology. It replaces
the question of 'sides' with an evaluation of individual ability. It
seeks people who will hear a minority view and give it careful
consideration, knowing the road to the future traverses unknown territory.
That the process does not advance the interest of minorities is a given.
Neither is it beholden to the interest of majorities. Instead, it
creates an atmosphere in which competing views are sought and heard,
BEFORE a decision is reached. Unless and until we are able to select
the best of ourselves to perform this function, there can be no audience
for those with the wit to question the received wisdom.
I fear, though, it will be a long time before the advantages of looking
forward can supplant the penchant for looking backward.
Fred
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On May 14, 2008, at 17:26 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "If we assume that typically similar minded people elect similar minded people in the groups of three, the method gives some benefit to groups that are large and tightly bound ..." That's a fair assumption, except for the "and tightly bound" clause. The atomized nature of the method (the initially large number of very small, isolated and independent groups) suggests the 'similar minded people' must be widely dispersed throughout the electorate rather than tightly bound. Ok. With "tightly bound" I only wanted to say that groupings where one member trusts another member of the group and wants to support his/her election benefit of this property. I would also have been more exact if I had said "large OR tightly bound". The groups can also be hierarchical in the sense that e.g. left wing may consist of smaller groupings, Christians may consist of Catholics and Protestants etc. All affiliations at any level may thus support other members of the groupings. In an earlier message, you mentioned the need to find a balance between political and regional proportionality and I expressed the opinion that the method was inherently proportional. It struck me you did not agree, or, more properly, that my response did not satisfy the need that concerned you. My comments may have been confusing. When talking about proportionality I typically think of and mean political/ideological proportionality, and I typically use the full term "regional/ geographical proportionality" when I talk about regional/geographical proportionality. Political proportionality is the one that people most often discuss since the election methods/systems typically provide regional proportional automatically (e.g. in the form of single seat districts and forcing all voters to vote at their home region, without asking about the opinion of the voter). Juho ___ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Good Morning, Juho re: "If we assume that typically similar minded people elect similar minded people in the groups of three, the method gives some benefit to groups that are large and tightly bound ..." That's a fair assumption, except for the "and tightly bound" clause. The atomized nature of the method (the initially large number of very small, isolated and independent groups) suggests the 'similar minded people' must be widely dispersed throughout the electorate rather than tightly bound. In an earlier message, you mentioned the need to find a balance between political and regional proportionality and I expressed the opinion that the method was inherently proportional. It struck me you did not agree, or, more properly, that my response did not satisfy the need that concerned you. After wondering about it, it occurs to me that I concentrated my attention on the ascendancy of the current will of the people, without recognizing the possible validity of alternate attitudes in the electorate. Should I address that point? Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Good Morning, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax re: "Gohlke, in short, you are a fool." You demonstrate the quality of your posts more eloquently than I ever could. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On May 11, 2008, at 23:29 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "Only on the (country independent) technical properties of the "groups of three" method." "(If there are e.g. two parties, one small and one large, the probability of getting two small party supporters (that would elect one of them to the next higher level) in a group of three is so small that in the next higher level the number of small party supporters is probably lower than at this level.)" The significant word in the cited passage is the gigantic 'IF' that opens it. 'IF' one assumes the entire electorate is divisible into two parties, and 'IF' those two parties can be shown to embrace all the interests of the people, it is easy to show that the parties will achieve power in proportion to their distribution in the electorate. The two parties were given just as an example case (an extreme one). If we assume that typically similar minded people elect similar minded people in the groups of three, the method gives some benefit to groups that are large and tightly bound, whatever kind the space of opinions is (with or without formal parties). (The parties also do not achieve power in proportion to their distribution in the electorate but the bigger party gets more power than what its proportional share would suggest.) In an essay about the voter turnout problem in Great Britain, a Jennie Bristow, writing on 14 April 2005, made these cogent points: "The recent, in-depth discussion of the turnout crisis recognises that politics has changed - if the explanations for this change are somewhat garbled. It understands that people have real reasons for voting or not voting, and that their unwillingness to vote is a consequence, not of laziness or stupidity, but a more profound process of disengagement from formal politics. It accepts that tweaking parliamentary systems and voting processes is not going to make a fundamental difference." The analysis part seems quite accurate to me, describing the situation in many democracies. The conclusions are a bit more confusing. I think that "tweaking parliamentary systems and voting processes" may well be one of the tools when trying to recover from the disengagement. I think all systems have the tendency to corrupt in time (people are good at finding such paths) and one needs to be awake and continuously monitor the health of the system, and "tweak" it when needed. Not an easy task, but the alternative is to go down with the system when it slowly deteriorates. I believe I agree with Jennie Bristow in that politicians may easily end up treating the symptoms rather than the disease when trying to seek a cure for the low turnout. Any electoral process that is not designed to let the people make their own decisions is not a democratic process. I think most democratic processes have been designed with the help of some level of idealism and good intentions. It is another question how working and future proof the results were and what has happened to the system over time. recognizing your preference for party-based solutions I have no such general preference. My comments on how the proposed system behaves with respect to groupings of different size and strength are just technical observations on the properties of the proposed method. People tend to form groupings (and they may be well established or temporary) and they sometimes make harm and sometimes good things too, but I have no agenda to promote either strong parties nor individualism or anarchy. A working set-up is what is typically needed (one that keeps the discussions at suitable level and makes it possible to make progress in the wanted direction) (and to avoid the disillusionment and disengagement), and this may mean different things in different environments, and there may be many alternative working ways to achieve this. Juho ___ The all-new Yahoo! Mail goes wherever you go - free your email address from your Internet provider. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
At 05:03 PM 5/11/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax re: "Mr. Gohlke, do you care to look at this?" OK. Absent a specific definition of the group of voters to which you've assigned a ratio of 'p', 'p' can be taken to represent any group of people who have an identifiable political orientation, and 'x' is the balance of the electorate. Therefore, as you say, "With many layers, as is necessary for this system to represent a large population the proportion of p rapidly approaches zero ...", which shows that ideologues ... of any stripe ... will be eliminated, leaving the non-ideological majority of the people to select the best among themselves as their representatives. That is the purpose of the process. Nope, you misunderstood. p is the proportion of a *minority*. Not of "ideologues." Now, if we take p as the proportion of ideologues in the general population, the analysis given would show that if p > 0.5, the proportion of ideologues in the output will increase with level. If p < 0, then the proportion of ideologues will decrease. But "ideologues" had nothing to do with the objection. Having some position or prejudice is not being an "ideologue," it is not necessary that the person be attached, as an ideologue is. It simply means that, other things being equal, that person will tend toward a certain kind of decision or position. This is totally normal. And thus we can expect that if affinity, i.e., willingness to vote for a representative, is related to prejudices and positions, (and would you, with the random assignment system you have proposed, expect otherwise?), we can expect that any majority view or opinion or position will be amplified in the set of continuing representatives, increasing with level. From certain points of view, Mr. Gohlke, it's a brilliant idea. But from a metaperspective, from the point of view of others who have been considering ideas like this for a long time (for me it is more than thirty years), it is seriously flawed, and implemenation impracticality is only the start of this. Delegable proxy systems, based on voluntary free and unconstrained choice, address this. They can be implemented *today*, and it is starting to happen. They do not suffer from majority bias amplification, any bias remains at its natural level. Plus, I would argue, when people become familiar with others, they can make much better decisions about whom to trust and exactly how to trust, and so general trustworthiness can be expected to increase with level. A long time ago, I wrote before, when your idea was first presented here, I came up with something similar in certain ways. Certain problems with it were apparent. You addressed *one* of those problems with your solution, but missed the others, apparently. I abandoned fixed group size and went to entirely voluntary group *formation*, which then allows groups to be *unanimous*, effectively, in choosing ongoing representation. Thus there is no loss of representation with increasing level. The structure becomes a fractal, quite complex, but self-similar at each level (according to the natural patterns of affinity), and to each individual, it is not complex, it is, rather, extraordinarily simple. People get headaches trying to understand what the whole system would look like, but to an individual, there is only the proxy, and the proxy's proxy, and the proxy's proxy's proxy, etc., up to the top level, which would be a virtual commitee that represents everyone, as far as voting is concerned, but which probably self-restricts, through voting in which everyone may participate who chooses to do so, to a certain defined set of participating members who have the right to address the whole. Complex input from people below that level of access right would be through similar virtual committees set up by the proxies for their clients. And none of it is coercive. None of it is imposed from the top. There is only voluntary choice and cooperation, and yet ... TANSTAAFL. If people can't find sufficient support for there ideas, there is no collective strength to implement them. The organization is fail-safe, as long as it does not collect power. And how *government* is structured is an entirely different question. A delegable proxy system can be used to create a parliamentary assembly that is proportionally representative, but that's a question that I'd leave to those in a position to implement it. I'm trying to create the institutions that would facilitate the voluntary cooperation of people in the exercise of their *individual* power. This is, in fact, a solution to the problem of government, for that is what government legitimately is, but Montesquieu quite wisely, a long time ago, noted that separation of judgement (the faculty of intelligence, really) and the executive (the exercise of power) should be rigorously separated. And a lot of people listened, an
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Responding to this again, from a somewhat different perspective. At 05:03 PM 5/11/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax re: "Mr. Gohlke, do you care to look at this?" OK. Absent a specific definition of the group of voters to which you've assigned a ratio of 'p', 'p' can be taken to represent any group of people who have an identifiable political orientation, and 'x' is the balance of the electorate. This isn't what was proposed, actually. p represents the proportion of representation of some characteristic of the voters in those whom the voters vote to represent them. I.e., if the choice process amplifies the representation of some trait, unless some countervailing process intervenes, that multiplication repeated over the selection process stages continues to increase the representation. Equating this with "political orientation," and assuming that it must be "indentifiable," restricts the application such that the point is more easily missed, even though that is one example. A single stage election ordinarily amplifies like this. Single-winner elections inherently, as ordinarily accomplished (contested elections, where some voters win and some lose), have this problem. That a particular political party is disproportionally represented is only an example. Proportional representation systems counter the effect. *Some* of these are party-based, but not all. STV, for example, in common use, is not intrinsically party-based and party choices aren't a critical part of the process, but, typically, voters have been allowed to vote for a party slate (which is ordered in a way that the party has decided) rather than for candidates individually), but it is still the voter's choice, the voter can vote entirely without regard for party. And then the degree of warping of representation varies inversely with the number of seats elected from a particular district. A single parliament elected for one single district does not warp much. Therefore, as you say, "With many layers, as is necessary for this system to represent a large population the proportion of p rapidly approaches zero ...", which shows that ideologues ... of any stripe ... will be eliminated, leaving the non-ideological majority of the people to select the best among themselves as their representatives. Two problems with this comment: first of all, the assumption made was that there were at least two exclusive traits or sets of traits, and that one of them was in the majority. However, that's not the core of the problem. The problem is selection bias. If some characteristic of the voters leads them to preferentially select for some trait, then that trait will be amplified over its natural frequency among the voters, in those whom the voters select. Political affiliation *could* function this way. However, the problem is much more general. Suppose people tend to choose taller people, other things being equal. We could expect that average height would increase with stage. What I want to happen is that voters select preferentially for trustworthiness. They will probably tend to do this when they are in relatively homogenous groups. People who think alike are more likely to trust each other. For *representation*, trust is crucial. I can't really be represented by someone I trust. The system proposed allows people to be misrepresented: either they got stuck with a group where there were two others who more easily agree with each other, or in a group where there were three who could not agree, and neither of these is necessarily due to any fault of the voter. And the process, inherently, does not allow the necessary time for getting to know each other; and whatever time is spent doing this is wasted when the next election round occurs, because, presumably, the groups will be different. The complex rules which Mr. Gohlke made up are an ingenious solution to *certain* problems. Unfortunately, he neglected to solve the fundamental problem, which is representation in deliberation; and his structure will leave a substantial portion of the population, essentially, out in the cold. As I mentioned, for making a single decision where people's minds are already made up, it would work quite well, but that's a lot of complicated process to apply when there are much simpler ways of doing that! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
At 04:29 PM 5/11/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "Only on the (country independent) technical properties of the "groups of three" method." "(If there are e.g. two parties, one small and one large, the probability of getting two small party supporters (that would elect one of them to the next higher level) in a group of three is so small that in the next higher level the number of small party supporters is probably lower than at this level.)" The significant word in the cited passage is the gigantic 'IF' that opens it. 'IF' one assumes the entire electorate is divisible into two parties, and 'IF' those two parties can be shown to embrace all the interests of the people, it is easy to show that the parties will achieve power in proportion to their distribution in the electorate. No. Gohlke missed the point, entirely, and so misstated what Juho had stated. He wrote the *opposite* of what Juho had said. The parties will *not* achieve such power, with a system that consolidates at a low level, it's the opposite. The party which has a distributed majority will have essentially all the power, and the other party will not have representation *at all*. But, to say that is to say nothing, for the assumption is faulty. The point is missed. Absolutely, there is no such party, there is what Gohlke goes on to state. But to the extent that there is a single issue which is considered important by a majority, so important that position on it influences their choice of continuing representative, the majority position becomes rapidly the *only* position represented. Now, if a single decision were being made, and deliberation were not important, this would be fine. This would be a method of discovering a true majority position. But the discovery of existing positions is actually a small part of democracy. Democracy, of the functional and wise kind, is about *deliberation*, not about *aggregation*. Consensus does not exist such that all we have to do is rip off the blankets and there it is in all its naked glory; it is something that is constructed through the collection of evidence, the development and presentation of arguments, and *then* aggregation. Direct democracy fails because the process breaks down when there are too many direct participants, and, further, collective decision-making is only a small part of what the social organism must do; most of the parts (i.e., individual people) have personal lives to attend to. So we tend, when groups become large, to move to representative democracy of some kind. Gohlke is using a highly restricted and controlled kind of delegable representation -- not "proxy," since proxies are inherently chosen by a sovereign agent to be represented -- to put together a representative body, but he's using a purely aggregative technique (on the identity of the continuing representative) that loses minority representation very early on. It is designed to force the kind of compromise that is ultimately important in decision-making, but without allowing the deliberative process *on each issue* that is essential to democracy. The goal of representative democracy generally is that the people are represented in two ways: in collective deliberation, so that all the significant evidence and arguments are considered, and in aggregation, or voting, not only on final questions, but on all the intermediate process details that determine the exact questions asked. There are several important aspects of my own work; delegable proxy is an idea that is actually pretty old, Dodgson came up with it and published it in 1886 as a method of proportional representation. (It looks like a modification of STV, but, in fact, it's delegable proxy, the "candidates" serve as proxies, who then elect the actual representatives in the parliament deliberatively, negotiation being an aspect of deliberation. Because each seat is created by the voluntary assignment of votes, the seats represent unconditional proxies assigned by voters to the candidates and then by the candidates to seats, and the deviation from pure delegable proxy only takes place with the dregs, the votes not used to create a seat. Dodgson used the Droop quota, so there are such dregs. I would probably use the Hare quota, because the dregs don't lose voting rights under systems I'd design, and so it is simpler to not assign their voting power to any seat at all if they have not been able to find a compromise. In any case, the aspect that I'm mentioning here is that I realized that it was possible -- and desirable -- to separate voting rights from the right to participate in deliberation by other than voting. What causes direct democracy to break down isn't voting, it's deliberation, it's the noise, essentially, the redundant or crackpot arguments, and the people who, as a local pastor here put it when I was explaining DP to him, who have nothing to say and are willing to take a
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Good Afternoon, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax re: "Mr. Gohlke, do you care to look at this?" OK. Absent a specific definition of the group of voters to which you've assigned a ratio of 'p', 'p' can be taken to represent any group of people who have an identifiable political orientation, and 'x' is the balance of the electorate. Therefore, as you say, "With many layers, as is necessary for this system to represent a large population the proportion of p rapidly approaches zero ...", which shows that ideologues ... of any stripe ... will be eliminated, leaving the non-ideological majority of the people to select the best among themselves as their representatives. That is the purpose of the process. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Good Afternoon, Juho re: "Only on the (country independent) technical properties of the "groups of three" method." "(If there are e.g. two parties, one small and one large, the probability of getting two small party supporters (that would elect one of them to the next higher level) in a group of three is so small that in the next higher level the number of small party supporters is probably lower than at this level.)" The significant word in the cited passage is the gigantic 'IF' that opens it. 'IF' one assumes the entire electorate is divisible into two parties, and 'IF' those two parties can be shown to embrace all the interests of the people, it is easy to show that the parties will achieve power in proportion to their distribution in the electorate. But, to say that is to say nothing, for the assumption is faulty. It fails to recognize that, among the people, there are an agglomeration of parties ... so many they defy enumeration. Therefore, it is facile to suggest the technical properties of the 'groups of three' method will grant dominance to one party, unless one acknowledges that the party is society itself, in which case, it is (or, at least, ought to be) the goal of a democratic electoral process. It seems fairly common among those with a professional or passing interest in politics to base their assumptions and arguments on artificial delineations of human attitudes and to ignore the fictitious lines they've introduced, in spite of accumulated knowledge that shows such boundaries do not exist. It has long been known that people vote on the basis of bread-and-butter issues. They vote on the basis of what matters to them. What matters to the people comprises a long list and the components of the list are in a constant state of flux, depending on circumstances. The rank of partisanship (or ideology) in that list varies in inverse proportion to the intensity of the people's needs and desires. It is rarely, if ever, the foremost concern of the majority of people. We are surrounded by evidence of the declining influence of party politics on the electorate, not least of which is found in the reams written about declining voter turnout. In an essay about the voter turnout problem in Great Britain, a Jennie Bristow, writing on 14 April 2005, made these cogent points: "The recent, in-depth discussion of the turnout crisis recognises that politics has changed - if the explanations for this change are somewhat garbled. It understands that people have real reasons for voting or not voting, and that their unwillingness to vote is a consequence, not of laziness or stupidity, but a more profound process of disengagement from formal politics. It accepts that tweaking parliamentary systems and voting processes is not going to make a fundamental difference." and "... until it can be established that people can make a difference to society, rather than simply exercising a narrow consumer choice, it doesn't really matter whether they vote or not." Ms. Bristow's essay is well worth reading. She offers an unusually keen insight into proposals for dealing with political problems (some of which are discussed on this site). You can find her essay at: http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/000CA9A1.htm If government is to be by the people, it must, by definition, come from the people. That does not mean telling the people what they want. It means asking them. Any electoral process that is not designed to let the people make their own decisions is not a democratic process. Having said all this, and recognizing your preference for party-based solutions, I wonder if we have reached the point where we will be best served by acknowledging that we have irreconcilable differences. I have genuinely enjoyed our exchanges and the challenges you have posed, but I've no wish to harangue you with the repetitious assertion of views inimical to your beliefs. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
At 05:33 PM 5/8/2008, Juho wrote: (If there are e.g. two parties, one small and one large, the probability of getting two small party supporters (that would elect one of them to the next higher level) in a group of three is so small that in the next higher level the number of small party supporters is probably lower than at this level.) Okay, let's do the math. Suppose the ratio of voters who are of some group is p, where 0 < p < 1. If x is not-p, then the permutations and probabilities for the four possibilities of 0 members, 1 member, 2 members, and three members, are: xxx, (1-p)^3 = P(0) xxp, xpx, pxx, 3 * (1 - p)^2 * p = P(1) xpp, pxp, ppx, 3 * (1 - p)* p^2 = P(2) ppp, p^3 = P(3) expanding those, P(0) = 1 - 3p +3p^2 -p^3 P(1) = 3p -6p^2 +3p^3 P(2) = 3p^2 - 3p^3 P(3) = p^3. To check, the sum simplifies to 1. These four are the only possibilities. If the group selects based on majority p, then we have a p choice with P(2) and P(3). That occurs with probability 3p^2 -2p^3. If p = 0.1, then the probability of a group choosing a p representative is .03 - .002 equals .028. p is 10% of the population, but is represented in the next layer with only 2.8% of the elected representatives. And then the same phenomenon occurs in the next layer, etc., with the proportion of p declining more rapidly with each layer. I get 0.23% for the next layer. With many layers, as is necessary for this system to represent a large population the proportion of p rapidly approaches zero, and it becomes extraordinarily unlikely for the minority to be represented at all, even with an Assembly of, say, 100 members or more. And that is already a fairly large assembly, in my opinion. Assemblies that large tend to function mostly in committee. Now, perhaps my math is wrong, I'm rusty and all that, and I make mistakes even when I understand clearly what to do. Mr. Gohlke, do you care to look at this? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On May 8, 2008, at 5:52 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "I already commented earlier that the "groups of three" based method that you have studied does not implement proportionality in the traditional way." You're right. It's not traditional, but it sure is proportional. One of the unspecified conditions I intended for the 'groups of three' method was that participation in the election process should be mandatory, as it is in (I believe) Australia, Singapore and New Zealand. If every person in the electorate participates in the process of selecting those who will represent them in their government, there can be no greater proportionality. Well, I think proportionality is at its best / strongest when n% of the voters get n% of the seats. Extensive participation in the election process is a good thing but "proportionality" is not a very descriptive name for this. re: "Large parties (or whatever opinion camps) tend to get more representatives to the higher layers (more than their proportional size is)." Is that assertion not based on the assumption that large parties (or opinion camps) must dominate our political existence? Only on the (country independent) technical properties of the "groups of three" method. (If there are e.g. two parties, one small and one large, the probability of getting two small party supporters (that would elect one of them to the next higher level) in a group of three is so small that in the next higher level the number of small party supporters is probably lower than at this level.) Juho ___ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
At 10:52 PM 5/7/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Evening, Juho re: "I already commented earlier that the "groups of three" based method that you have studied does not implement proportionality in the traditional way." You're right. It's not traditional, but it sure is proportional. One of the unspecified conditions I intended for the 'groups of three' method was that participation in the election process should be mandatory, as it is in (I believe) Australia, Singapore and New Zealand. If every person in the electorate participates in the process of selecting those who will represent them in their government, there can be no greater proportionality. The problem is that selection takes place in assigned groups, and that causes "proportionality" to disappear beyond the very primitive proportionality that can exist in a group of three choosing one. The groups will indeed represent factions; however, I haven't seen any analysis from Mr. Gohlke as to how this affect proportionality, just assertions. Mandatory participation is just one aspect of the coercive nature of this proposal. Highly restrictive rules on how representatives are chosen are its nature. It requires trusting the "authorities" in ways that could be extraordinarily difficult to prove. By selective assignment of people to the groups, one could actually bury any minority effectively. Just insure that few groups have two members of that minority. Coerced voting requires the participation of people who have no idea what they are voting about. In Australian, "donkey voting" is common, where people just mark the ballots in the most convenient way in races they don't know about. It's great to make voting easy. Not great to require it. Participation bias is actually a phenomenon which can be shown, through social utility analysis, to improve election results from the point of view of overall social satisfaction with the results. It's a form of rough Range voting. As to proportionality, STV is in common use -- including in Australia -- and, with large enough districts (i.e., many members) it is quite good, but still depends on the political system. However, there is another method which is far, far simpler and which is *totally* proportional, in which all voters actively participate, and all voters and votes count, and a resulting Assembly is as proportional as is possible. I.e., any faction large enough to command a quota of votes is seated. It's now called Asset Voting, but it was first proposed by Lewis Carroll in about 1886. A ballot could be as simple as a standard vote-for-one Plurality ballot, though there are better possible designs. (Warren Smith, who named it Asset Voting, used real numbers for each vote in the range of 0-1, with the constraint that all votes must add up to 1 (or less. That's probably impracticably complex, but there is a simpler variant I called FAAV: Fractional Approval Asset Voting. Pretty simple: vote for as many as you like. Your single vote will be divided equally among them.) Then, if any candidate receives a quota of votes, they are elected. All surplus votes are "assets" of the candidate receiving them, and the candidate may recast them at will to create seats. They do this deliberatively. And Delegable Proxy could make this renegotiation very simple, even for candidates holding as few as one vote. And direct democracy for the Assembly becomes possible, i.e., direct voting becomes a possibility, even though representation in deliberation must be restricted to elected seats. (I call candidates who have received votes "electors," because that is what they are, they are public voters. If an elector, who doesn't have a seat, votes, his or her vote is subtracted frationally from the vote of the seat. Normally, these direct votes, I expect, would only be a small fraction of the total votes on any issue, but that they are possible means that citizens would be directly represented by people they chose, without restriction beyond simple eligibility to receive votes, which could be very simple indeed. Probably registration of consent to receive votes, being already a registered voter and not otherwise disqualified, would do it.) re: "Large parties (or whatever opinion camps) tend to get more representatives to the higher layers (more than their proportional size is)." Is that assertion not based on the assumption that large parties (or opinion camps) must dominate our political existence? No. It's a statement of fact, as to what will happen if such parties exist. Now, given that they do exist, another "feature" of this method might be that they will be outlawed, and anyone found guilty of voting in accordance with party recommendations would be disqualified from voting. Asset Voting makes parties irrelevant for the purpose of finding representation. If you want to elect based on party, fine. You can do it. The method doesn't care. What i
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Good Evening, Juho re: "I already commented earlier that the "groups of three" based method that you have studied does not implement proportionality in the traditional way." You're right. It's not traditional, but it sure is proportional. One of the unspecified conditions I intended for the 'groups of three' method was that participation in the election process should be mandatory, as it is in (I believe) Australia, Singapore and New Zealand. If every person in the electorate participates in the process of selecting those who will represent them in their government, there can be no greater proportionality. re: "Large parties (or whatever opinion camps) tend to get more representatives to the higher layers (more than their proportional size is)." Is that assertion not based on the assumption that large parties (or opinion camps) must dominate our political existence? What is, is not necessarily what must be. Partisan interest can not compete with private interest when private interest is given a means of expression. When each member of the electorate can pursue their own political interest, the sum total of their interests must always be the interest of society. When people have an opportunity to exercise their own judgment, they may be influenced by family, race, education, partisanship, national heritage, age, health and a multitude of other minor considerations, but none of these will override their vital interest in the specific issues of their time and place. If the preponderance of a community has a coherent desire, it will, given the means to do so, achieve it ... regardless of whether the desire is labeled liberal, conservative, or any other doctrine. It is a fallacy bordering on foolhardiness to seek the solution to societal problems in doctrinaire proposals. The difficulties we face, the wars we wage, the threat to our environment, are real. They require real thought, not the pseudo-thought of partisanship. Doctrines may attract adherents but they beget confrontations rather than solutions. That the concepts I speak of do not exist is a given. The question in my mind is whether we can look past the mind-numbing influence of partisanship to seek empowerment of the humans among us. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On May 4, 2008, at 19:10 , Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Morning, Juho re: "... I'm more inclined to see the parties still as units that still get their strength and mandate to rule from the citizens themselves (and from their lack of interest to make the parties better and control them better)." Although I (obviously) don't share your view, I will agree that the parties get their strength from the subset of the electorate that supports them. My dissent is based on (1) the fact that the so- called 'mandate' comes from a tiny subset of the electorate, (2) the 'mandate' results in destruction of the separation of powers intended to protect us from improper concentrations of political influence, and (3) it is maintained by the absolute suppression of alternatives. Instead of democracy, a tiny minority of the people provide the "strength and mandate to rule" that dictates the choices available to the rest of us. I guess different countries are in quite different position here. The change / improvements may come different ways, in regular elections, by mass movements, even by revolutions in the worst case. re: "Strong emphasis on the regional representation and close contacts between the representatives and voters may to some extent also reduce the need to offer full political proportionality." We should consider the possibility that focusing on 'regional representation' and 'proportionality' are misleading. An electoral method that empowers each and every member of the electorate to the extent of their desire and ability is regional and proportional, by definition. Methods that involve people at root level (like your "groups of three" based method) typically are regionally oriented. They need not necessarily be geographically regional here but can also be based on other proximity criteria / groupings like political, religious, work, ethnic or hobby/interest/philosophical groups. I already commented earlier that the "groups of three" based method that you have studied does not implement proportionality in the traditional way. Large parties (or whatever opinion camps) tend to get more representatives to the higher layers (more than their proportional size is). Juho Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Apr 29, 2008, at 1:24 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > re: "In US all the elected political decision makers have a mandate > that > the citizens have given them. If those politicians are not good, we > can > put some part of the blame also on the citizens." > > This is probably the crux of the difference in our views. There > can be > no mandate when, as I said in an earlier message, "The only choices > the > people have are those foisted on them by those who control the > political > parties that have a stranglehold on our nation's political processes." Yes, seems so. Your image of the situation seems to be that the parties are already out of any proper control while I'm more inclined to see the parties still as units that still get their strength and mandate to rule from the citizens themselves (and from their lack of interest to make the parties better and control them better). > As my friend and I discussed our views, one of the things that came to > the fore was a version of "... that would probably make the ties > between > the representatives and their voters tighter." I now think that > idea is > a major breakthrough. I plan to modify the 'outline' by changing the > label from Active Democracy to Dynamic Democracy and including a brief > description of how "tighter ties between representatives and their > voters" will occur. When one ponders complex relationships for a long > time and then finds a fresh perspective, it can be quite exciting. Since you don't value the current parties that much putting more weight on the local representation makes sense. Multi-winner voting methods often try to find a balance between political and regional proportionality. Strong emphasis on the regional representation and close contacts between the representatives and voters may to some extent also reduce the need to offer full political proportionality. It is also possible to try to satisfy both needs in one system. Juho ___ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
At 06:24 PM 4/28/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote: >This is probably the crux of the difference in our views. There can be >no mandate when, as I said in an earlier message, "The only choices the >people have are those foisted on them by those who control the political >parties that have a stranglehold on our nation's political processes." While I'll agree that "mandate" can be problematic, it is not a general truth that the only choices the people have are those "foisted" on them; however, if the people are asleep and are unaware of other choices, it could seem so, likewise if they are unwilling to pay the cost of those other choices. When an election result seemed unfair in the Ukraine, the people went into the streets. Here, they complained about how unfair it was and did nothing. Did we have a choice? Sure we did. But we are variously asleep, afraid, greedy, ignorant, cynical, and often in despair. "They" are not going to fix this for us! If we wanted a different system, and were willing to take, really, some very small steps, we'd have a different system, and quite rapidly. But one of my slogans is: Lift a finger, save the world. But most people won't lift a finger. Why not? Well, they don't believe it will do any good. Then, periodically, they engage in a burst of false hope and try to make a change that hasn't been deeply considered, and, then, when they get the same old same old, which is not surprising if what they do to change things is the same old same old, they relapse, exhausted, into despair and cynicism again, having confirmed once again that it's hopeless, things will never change, etc., etc. What it takes to break out of this is astonishingly simple. But, watch. Very, very few people are willing to look at it seriously enough to recognize it. Definitely not to test it. Testing it takes far less involvement than most political actions. But it has taken years to find a handful of people willing to actually *talk* about the change, and more to begin to create the structures. It's happening. Slowly. All over the world. The plan, as I formulated it, involves two elements: the Free Association concept pioneered by Alcoholics Anonymous, generalized for general applications. (It's incorporated in the operating traditions of AA, specifically the Twelve Traditions and the Twelve Concepts for World Service. It was *phenomenally* successful, in spite of being radically libertarian. It had to be such or alcoholics would have fought each other continually over the structure; Bill Wilson's brilliant design (forged, I'm sure, in cooperation and consultation with a lot of very bright people) sidestepped all that, allowing AA to focus on finding consensus and unity. But AA confines the vast bulk of decision-making to the group level, which is very small scale. Groups are all independent, not controlled in any way by national or international organizations. All control and support moves in the other direction; power is ultimately retained by members and local groups, and the national organization would collapse if not for the continual voluntary support of groups. How could something like AA function for decision-making on a large scale? AA did -- and does -- have some decisions to make on a large scale, and they use a delegate Conference to handle this. They elect delegates by supermajority and repeated balloting. If, after what is considered many ballots, they don't find a candidate with at least two-thirds support, they choose the delegate by lot from the top two. It was a simple device that worked well enough for them but there is another possibility, more recently proposed, though the roots, in fact, go back to Dodgson (Lewis Carroll). Over the last decade or so, this idea started popping up around the world: delegated voting in Europe. Liquid democracy in certain internet circles. My own delegable proxy. There has now been a paper published in an academic journal on the behavior of "delegated democracy," which is, pretty simply, delegable proxy. It's a device for collecting representation and participation on a large scale, based on the accumulated and analyzed individual choices of members. With it, it is possible to create a representative assembly, or, really, various ad-hoc committees, that are broadly representative. Without elections. So. Take the Free Association concept and add to it delegable proxy. That's FA/DP, and there is absolutely nothing stopping it except ignorance, cynicism, and despair. We have seen very little opposition that is based in any understanding of how it would work. Attempts were made to introduce delegable proxy to Wikipedia, which badly needs a method of measuring consensus on a large scale; the effort was, shall we say, vigorously opposed, almost violently opposed. By whom? By the oligarchy, the very vocal and very active core of Wikipedia, the kind of people who spend countless hours, often doing mi
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Apr 24, 2008, at 1:55 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > re: "Maybe other viewpoints like the wasted money and problems of > one-dollar-one-vote may have more impact on them than the interest to > limit the size of the entertaining media event." > > Aren't you and I wasting effort focusing on such matters? They are > symptoms of a deeper malaise. Ought we not seek to eliminate the > disease? It is hard to say what is the original reason and what is a consequence. And it is hard to say what reasoning makes people understand the problem and solutions, and where one should make the first fixes. > If you and I (and others) selected those who enact the ordinances and > budget for our community, wouldn't we seek to insure the best > resolution > of those matters for ourselves and our community? Given the deceit > we've seen partisans practice when entrusted with our affairs, > would we > allow them to decide these matters for us if we had an alternative? > > Certainly not! In US all the elected political decision makers have a mandate that the citizens have given them. If those politicians are not good, we can put some part of the blame also on the citizens. > re: "Yes. The starting point (or current point of interest since the > process is continuous) could be in understanding/education since I > don't > see yet any clear public consensus opinion on what the correct > direction > of change would be." > > Can a "clear public consensus opinion" spring forth on it's own? If > such a goal is desirable, and I think it is, is it not up to us to > provide the seeds from which it can sprout ... and then cultivate and > nurture them to the best of our ability? Yes. > re: It doesn't set any responsibility but I think it may do pretty > good > job in revealing to the listeners that the job is not that difficult > after all and the change is up to them. If people change opinions > from > Coca-Cola towards Pepsi that may have major commercial impacts. > Changes > are almost as simple in politics (and easy as well once people have > made > up their mind). If there is sufficient interest, some new paths > will be > found (not always in the correct direction at the first try, but > people > learn). > > I'm afraid I disagree. People do not "change opinions from Coca-Cola > towards Pepsi" unaided. Nor will the people change their political > system if someone doesn't seek out a new path and blaze a trail for > them > to follow. These things do not flow from passivity, they flow from > conscious effort. Lamenting darkness does not bring forth light. I agree that people need to assume many kind of roles to achieve the target together. Some will find the path, some advertise it to others, some implement it, some give mental support etc. > Juho, I fear you may find the tone of my comments too aggressive. You > have been unfailingly courteous, but I don't understand what course > you > advocate for resolving the political problems we face. No problem. I do enjoy straight talk. The skill to identify problems and solutions to the problems maybe comes first and skill of marketing them second. All the different individuals form a society that hopefully can sum up all the skills to something constructive. I don't really know but I guess my approach is heavily focused on first understanding the field and then trying to influence things, and especially fellow people that might then carry their version of the message forward. If one wants to make an elephant move forward to some better place the best solution may not be to push and shout. Opening the gates and putting few straws of hay in some strategic positions on the other hand may make a big difference. The elephant will move when it thinks the time is right and it has understood the benefits of moving forward. If I believe that the elephant would be happier in the new location there with good probability is also a thinking model that would make the elephant move there. We need to develop those thinking models, and sell them first to individuals, then as a consensus opinion to the society. > I am anxious > to work on solutions, whether the one I've outlined or another that > addresses the causes of our problem rather than its many symptoms. Ok, that's what I'm doing too, from day to day. Humans and societies are rather complex, so that means lots of learning and maybe less often simple actions and long leaps forward. Big changes may happen slowly and unnoticed. Better just keep working if the correct direction is already clear. Juho ___ The all-new Yahoo! Mail goes wherever you go - free your email address from your Internet provider. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Apr 22, 2008, at 3:51 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > What is stopping us? > > We are stopping us. Not "they." > What you will find here is people who will tell you, straightly, what > they think. It's not always very polite, but it isn't vicious; > rather, it is the kind of discourse that takes place among peers in > certain segments of society, such as the student body at the > California Institute of Techology, my home for a few years. One interesting observation when looking at the election methods community is that many seem to have their own ideal model to promote. People seem to feel that they are absolutely right and people whose opinions deviate from their opinions are absolutely wrong. Almost like "looking near to find one's enemies" (i.e. against the popular idea to find one's friends near and enemies far). Often there seems to be no energy left for co-operation to drive the common targets forward. I think this is one key property of humans in the sense that it often tends to stop progress by replacing it with local and less important territorial battles. People seem to be generally unable to master a complex environment where one is expected at the same time to 1) compromise and co-operate with colleagues that have rather similar ideas and targets, 2) promote one's own views to the colleagues in the hope of moving the consensus opinion in a better direction and 3) influence the surrounding society jointly based on the current consensus on the best way forward. Maybe it is not always the "ignorant citizens", "power hungry politicians" and "businessmen with money" that are stopping the progress but simply the experts themselves (that are supposed to show the way to others) ;-). Juho ___ The all-new Yahoo! Mail goes wherever you go - free your email address from your Internet provider. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Apr 21, 2008, at 22:55 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > re: "It is a pity that the needs of show business may sometimes > conflict > with the needs of a simpler and more practical (and maybe also better > working) political process." > > Is it enough to merely tut-tut the show business aspect of > politics? Is > it not time for specific complaints and specific alternatives? Yes, it is time to improve things. Entertainment industry is however powerful and much liked. People do however understand the serious nature of politics and will (to some extent) accept the need to have some separation between politics and entertainment. Maybe other viewpoints like the wasted money and problems of one-dollar-one-vote may have more impact on them than the interest to limit the size of the entertaining media event. > re: "It is probable that the changes will take time and they may > happen > as many small steps." > > As I once said, about 200 years ... if we're lucky. As far as the > many > small steps are concerned, where do we start? Would it make sense to > outline an alternative, analyze it, critique it, amend it and seek the > guidance of other thoughtful people about how to improve the role > of the > people in their government? Yes. The starting point (or current point of interest since the process is continuous) could be in understanding/education since I don't see yet any clear public consensus opinion on what the correct direction of change would be. > re: "As already said, if people want some changes, in a democracy they > can get it." > > Not when all political activity is controlled and directed by vested > interests. The only alternative available to the people is violence, > and that's the poorest choice possible. Much better if we apply our > intellect to seeking a solution. Violence usually doesn't help (since it may harm more than it might even theoretically help). I believe much more in seeking the best solution. I expect (healthy) people to be inclined towards adopting good solutions. Finding working and popular solutions is not always easy work. > re: "Much depends on how well the change promoters (as well as the > opponents) can formulate and justify their proposals." > > Are you among them? As a promoter or an opponent? I think healthy humans have the interest to improve things. Vested interests in some existing structure and disappointments in life (and in making the changes) may twist that approach a bit. > re: "I also note again that people will roughly get the kind of system > that they deserve." > > As an old saw, that one is pretty good ... but it fails to lay the > responsibility at the feet of the people's leaders. It doesn't set any responsibility but I think it may do pretty good job in revealing to the listeners that the job is not that difficult after all and the change is up to them. If people change opinions from Coca-Cola towards Pepsi that may have major commercial impacts. Changes are almost as simple in politics (and easy as well once people have made up their mind). If there is sufficient interest, some new paths will be found (not always in the correct direction at the first try, but people learn). > re: "Maybe one could consider better education etc. to achieve better > results." > > We've had compulsory education in this country for over 150 years. > Can > we be sure the educational system is not one of the causes of the > problem? Yes, the system may tend to teach the children that the current system is good. Luckily there is also more independent education (parents, friends, universities, media, music, literature). > Our local institute of higher learning has a substantial > political science department. It does a nice job of telling students > what's wrong with the system (I sat in on a course, last year), but it > does nothing to encourage them to develop thoughtful alternatives. Often science is just about cold information and research. That may give support to some "more goal seeking" approaches too. > Should we be content to watch and, perhaps, smile at the foibles of > our > society without making a judgment as to the wisdom or rectitude of > what > we see? As an intermediate step plain watching and learning and smiling is sometimes useful. That doesn't stop making progress when oneself and others are ready for that. > We have described how our political parties (in the U. S.) have > taken control of our government, why it happened, and why it is not > good > for the humans among us. We have hypothesized that ... > > ... political parties are conduits for corruption. > > ... political parties control all political activity in the United > States and are in no sense democratic. > > ... allowing those who control political parties to usurp the power of > governing our nation is the antithesis of self-government. > > ... to improve our political system, we must fin
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
At 03:55 PM 4/21/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote: >Good Afternoon, Juho > >re: "I guess US is still a democracy in the sense that people can decide >otherwise if they so wish." > >That is inaccurate. The only choices the people have are those foisted >on them by those who control the political parties that have a >stranglehold on our nation's political processes. This is the myth we have swallowed. *Within the official system* we only have those choices. But there is *nothing* stopping us from acting outside the system except our own belief that it is impossible. Why is it impossible? Because we believe it is impossible, and if everyone believes it is impossible, they won't lift a finger to try, and if nobody lifts a finger to try, definitely, it's impossible. Very impossible, not to put too fine a point on it. What is to prevent *two* people from deciding to cooperate toward making this a better system? Three? Three hundred? Three million? How many would it take to have an effect? Two. Now, just try to get two people to cooperate in this way. It can be extraordinarily difficult, unless the method being used fits into ... the system as it is. People *do* organize to try to change the system, but they do it using the same defective methods that have been tried over and over again, and that always produce the same results. The faces change but the system does not change. This is why I claim that if we really are going to change the world, we must change the way we try to change the world, and our method of changing the world must *be* what we are trying to produce. So we organize with FA/DP in order to create an FA/DP environment, which, if it works, requires no changes in law or official procedure at all. FA/DP is designed to facilitate the formation and measurement of consensus, and if you can find consensus, you can use the existing system, if you have a majority participating and, because the existing system is vulnerable to manipulation by organized special interests, you need far less than a majority in order to exert major influence. What is stopping us? We are stopping us. Not "they." >re: "Probably also the media loves the massive and long campaigns and >the numerous intermediate steps (primaries, elections per state) on the >way, and many citizens probably enjoy them too." > >Not as much as they (the media) love the political system that helped >them achieve immense size and influence. Do you blame them? >re: "It is a pity that the needs of show business may sometimes conflict >with the needs of a simpler and more practical (and maybe also better >working) political process." > >Is it enough to merely tut-tut the show business aspect of politics? Is >it not time for specific complaints and specific alternatives? Complaint is going to accomplish nothing. Immediate and practical alternatives may. They must be *easy.* And they must be *efficient*. And they must be sufficiently effective, even when engaged in on a small scale, that they will continue to attract energy so that they can grow. >re: "It is probable that the changes will take time and they may happen >as many small steps." Actually, there is a single change required, it can happen overnight. The only thing that takes time is that this change, to be visible on a large scale, must take place within many individuals. There is no specific time that it will take. It could happen very rapidly. >As I once said, about 200 years ... if we're lucky. As far as the many >small steps are concerned, where do we start? Would it make sense to >outline an alternative, analyze it, critique it, amend it and seek the >guidance of other thoughtful people about how to improve the role of the >people in their government? (I may be able to point you to an >entertaining approach to this question in the near future. I have a >friend in the U. K., who is implementing a neat idea.) Hey, something possibly interesting! I'm not personally much interested in complex utopian concepts, but rather in ideas that could actually be implemented *now*, by a small number of people. >re: "As already said, if people want some changes, in a democracy they >can get it." > >Not when all political activity is controlled and directed by vested >interests. The only alternative available to the people is violence, >and that's the poorest choice possible. Much better if we apply our >intellect to seeking a solution. It's a false dichotomy. First of all, what was said is true. If the people want a change, they can get it. Yes, that's not unconditional. But in a democracy, it quite simply is not true that "all political activity is controlled and directed by vested interests." Rather, *public* activity, involving spending a lot of money, is so controlled. Private activity, where people actually ... t a l k ... to each other, amazing concept, eh?, or now, communicate with each other by email, etc., isn't controlled. This kind of organiza
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Apr 19, 2008, at 15:44 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "... it might be good to find some ways to reduce the spending a bit (=> better chances to all candidates, less dependences in the direction of the donators)." The spending is welcomed by politicians and those who support them for the precise reason that it eliminates challengers. I guess US is still a democracy in the sense that people can decide otherwise if they so wish. Probably also the media loves the massive and long campaigns and the numerous intermediate steps (primaries, elections per state) on the way, and many citizens probably enjoy them too. It is a pity that the needs of show business may sometimes conflict with the needs of a simpler and more practical (and maybe also better working) political process. re: "One could also try to arrange some more serious discussions about the policies (maybe more frequent, with less preparation) rather than leaving it to a free style marketing campaign." Yes, but how? I've suggested one method and I'm sure there are others. We need to hear them and examine them. It is probable that the changes will take time and they may happen as many small steps. Also bigger changes are possible but I don't see any such movements in US at the moment. As already said, if people want some changes, in a democracy they can get it. There will be counter forces as well. Much depends on how well the change promoters (as well as the opponents) can formulate and justify their proposals. (I also note again that people will roughly get the kind of system that they deserve. Maybe one could consider better education etc. to achieve better results.) Juho ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" The Wall Street Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Sorry for being off-line / busy with other things for a while. On Apr 15, 2008, at 3:16 , Fred Gohlke wrote: re: "Maybe there is also a difference between maximizing the consumption of goods, and organizing the current system in some new better way (maybe sometimes making it more stable and/or less waste producing)." Examining the economic effects of changing the method by which we select those who represent us in our government would introduce considerable complexity to the discussion. Even so, it seems likely that finding and electing the best among us as our representatives would soon put an end to the fake capitalism practiced in my country, where our laws increasingly foster the growth of financial and commercial monopolies. I guess it is one of the "duties" of democratic systems to harness the "natural forces" in a way that makes them most useful for all. This is part of the journey from the laws of jungle to something better. And the front line keeps changing. Good rules, voting methods etc. are there waiting to be discovered and generally approved. (I need to add here that in addition to fighting against the rules of jungle we need to fight against the growth of bureaucracy (and excessive control of the system) too. In the US set-up this seems to be particularly relevant due to the discussions on the required strength of Washington.) re: "One might try to make some steps e.g. on the war related aspects (wider than just concerning one of the wars) now when that topic is hot." Prior to our most recent election, we had an enormous hullabaloo about the war. As soon as the election was over and those who professed their anti-war fervor were elected to public office ... presumably to implement the will of the people ... the topic disappeared from our political horizon. It is not wise to underestimate those who finance our political parties. They don't not act on principle. They corrupt both parties with equal facility. Nothing will change until we change the method by which we select and elect those who represent us in our government. I'm afraid you might be right again. But one must try. It is also true that during a war (well, at least in Iraq there is officially no more war) it is better to just work together and wait for the time after the war and then discuss what would be a good approach to the global conflicts. But of course things look different then, many things have been forgotten, and new topics are on the agenda, and new topics pushed in the public debates. (Btw, in the US presidential elections it might be good to find some ways to reduce the spending a bit (=> better chances to all candidates, less dependences in the direction of the donators). One could also try to arrange some more serious discussions about the policies (maybe more frequent, with less preparation) rather than leaving it to a free style marketing campaign. Some rules or pre- election agreements would be needed to direct the campaigns. This however limits the campaigns a bit and is not necessarily approved in the US where the freedom to drive all business in the most efficient way is a strong value in itself. Now the campaigns at least seem to be a bit too much based on marketing skills and yellow press. Well, maybe I must also repeat the famous rule that the citizens will get as good government as they deserve => some citizen activity / better participation / better understanding needed if one wants to improve the level of the governments.) Juho ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Apr 13, 2008, at 19:16 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > The point is that neither of us sought to prove the other > "wrong". Instead, we looked at the merit in each other's point of > view > and found a way to meld the strengths of both to sketch a better > solution. I agree that discussions tend to get better when people concentrate on positive/constructive things. Unfortunately humans do have tendencies e.g. to "win" a discussion (and thereby make the others "lose"), to prove one's own viewpoints to be right, to believe that only one theory can be "the truth", to believe that here is nothing to learn from points of view that are different than one's own. I prefer to view different viewpoints on some single topic as richness (that gives all the involved people a better basis for moving forward in he path of understanding the topic). > Contradictory as it may seem, I'm not a fan of change ... > we live in an era when the economic benefit of fads and fashion > inundate > us with waste ... but that doesn't stop me from suggesting change when > it seems necessary. Maybe there is also a difference between maximizing the consumption of goods, and organizing the current system in some new better way (maybe sometimes making it more stable and/or less waste producing). > re: "... I think the new president, whoever he/she will be, has an > opportunity to do something meaningful if he/she so wants and has the > idea and strength." > > I agree the opportunity will be there but I've been through far too > many > of these changes in the power structure to believe they will work > to the > benefit of the humans among us. During my lifetime, I've watched the > growing dominance of our government by vested interests and seen > humanity squeezed out of our society. I see nothing in the present > farce that will counter the trend. Unfortunately you may be right. The probability that this change would make some clear change to better may not be much bigger than usual. One might try to make some steps e.g. on the war related aspects (wider than just concerning one of the wars) now when that topic is hot. Juho ___ Now you can scan emails quickly with a reading pane. Get the new Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Apr 10, 2008, at 5:24 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > Good Evening, Juho > > I, too, believe in the power of understanding. It is the basis for > everything I write; seeking guidance and instruction wherever I can > find > it and explaining as thoroughly as I'm able, when asked about my > views. > When we can replace passion with understanding we can apply > reason to > our acts. Apples fell before Newton was struck by one, but it took > aeons before anyone could explain why they fell. Yes, exactly. A relatively simple theory that all scientists soon agreed, and probably soon didn't even remember that they had thought otherwise before. > re: "If the claim is a valid claim and not too far/theoretical then > people are likely to get the point sooner or later. There will be also > other competing arguments, but if people see the new reasoning to be > superior they will be happy to follow it." > > That's true enough, but people will not get the point if the claim is > not challenged, analyzed and discussed. You have been looking at this > idea. I'm not sure you feel it has merit, but you have, at least, > considered it. The process would accelerate if others had the courage > to submit their challenges. Yes, certainty and trust comes from testing. No need to have very strong opposing arguments, but the new theory must be given enough time and thinking/discussion so that people feel it is safe to jump into that new boat. > re: "Often the change comes when things get bad enough." > > Yes, it does. Quite often the change is accompanied by violence. I'd > like to avoid that. I believe humans have the intellect to consider > 'bad' things and devise ways to lessen their impact. That process has > been impeded because we have been dominated by one-way communications; > radio, television, newspapers, books, magazines, and so forth, > which do > not support discourse. It is only in recent years we've had the means > to discuss ideas in depth, as we can on this site. I hope we can > use it > to develop intelligent solutions to the problems of our society. > > > You say the U. S. is a great nation ... and it is! I'm proud of my > homeland, but I'm not blind to its warts. I hope we can build a > better > America and, through it, a better world. Btw, I think the new president, whoever he/she will be, has an opportunity to do something meaningful if he/she so wants and has the idea and strength. At least according to the media US citizens would at the moment be ok with some fresh initiatives / changes. Unfortunately we may need to thank again the current dissatisfaction if anything positive (and permanent) will occur. There are also scenarios where some positive drive leads to further positive changes, but at least so far our societies are not so well developed that they could make this a rule. Juho > Fred > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for > list info ___ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Apr 7, 2008, at 23:43 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > re: "The decisions that politicians make do involve large sums of > money, > and there are nice job opportunities and also publicity etc. In these > circumstances it may be difficult to get through the buzzing crowd and > meet the original intention of politics, to improve the system." > > But, as you said, "... this is how the system typically works". When > such circumstances are deeply woven into the fabric of our political > existence, they tend to be seen as 'inevitable', That dissuades many > from believing it possible to correct them. In addition, the symptoms > of corruption become so common we waste ourselves battling the > symptoms > instead of curing the disease. Yes, people may easily become blind to problems that they see every day, and think that they are part of the laws of nature that can not be changed. > re: "In politics the dependences to various directions may easily get > too strong." > > And THAT'S a fact ... but knowing it is not enough ... the question is > how do we use the knowledge? We know these things work to our > detriment > and we lament them vigorously. We would do better to weaken the bonds > that make them possible. I generally believe in the power of understanding. One can systematically promote e.g. the idea that too strong links between x and politics are not good, and then wait until this becomes a common understanding, and eventually makes the change possible. If the claim is a valid claim and not too far/theoretical then people are likely to get the point sooner or later. There will be also other competing arguments, but if people see the new reasoning to be superior they will be happy to follow it. People with vested interests may fight against the change, but if the logic and need for change is strong enough... > You feel my estimate of 200 years to make a significant change in our > political system is pessimistic. Perhaps, but so far it looks like it > will take 199 of those years for the people to recognize the kudzu- > like > effects of partisan politics. By then, perhaps we'll have gained the > wit to design an alternative that selects the best of our people and > raises them to positions of leadership in our government. Often the change comes when things get bad enough. One problem with the USA is that it is so big that comparison to others is difficult and it may take a long time before people realize that improvements are needed. It is a great nation, and sincerely believes so too (=best without need for comparisons). This attitude may help keeping the moral high, but it may also delay the changes when they would be needed (together with the large size, strong economy, no close same size neighbours that could be seen as examples etc). Juho ___ The all-new Yahoo! Mail goes wherever you go - free your email address from your Internet provider. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 31, 2008, at 20:33 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > re: "... one needs to adapt to a situation where the main decisions > and > most powerful streams and even highest respect in the society will > occur > at a suboptimal level." > > I agree we must adapt to such a situation, for we have little choice, > but I don't think we should accept it. The essence of progress is > considering possibilities and alternatives, often to things thought > immutable. Ok, I didn't really mean "accept" in the sense of giving up any hope of change. I used "accept" in the meaning that while trying to improve the system we should take into account that this is how the system typically works. > In the final analysis, I think those of us who feel compelled to > "find a > better way" must do our utmost to be reasonable, seek the guidance of > those with expertise, and carefully consider the thoughtful > opinions of > others. Yes, makes sense. That is not always the most painless path. But trying to find better solutions (not just push one's own solutions that one might consider to be the best) and thereby improve the world that we live in is a good and essential feature in us humans. > One thing I learned was that it is well-nigh > impossible to defeat the persistent access professional lobbyists have > to our elected representatives, an access that fosters subornation. Yes. I think where there is honey there are also flies and wasps flying around. The decisions that politicians make do involve large sums of money, and there are nice job opportunities and also publicity etc. In these circumstances it may be difficult to get through the buzzing crowd and meet the original intention of politics, to improve the system. > It seems to me our elected representatives are in service, just like > members of the armed services. Like members of our armed forces, I > think elected officials should be kept at a government installation > and > access to them should be restricted. I think Montesquieu was right when proposing the separation of powers. I'd actually take few steps forward and add few more separations in the list. In politics the dependences to various directions may easily get too strong. (Money is often involved, as in the discussion on how to make the financial situation of the representatives safe enough, in political campaigning etc.) Juho ___ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 29, 2008, at 5:05 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > Good Morning, Juho > > Very well said. I hope you're right. I hope we can improve our > political systems in less than 200 years. But, as you point out, "... > the current establishment always has clear reasons to oppose any > changes." That will make the process slow, and, possibly, painful. > > You mention the growth of corruption as a possible alternative to the > attainment of a more democratic government. There is little doubt of > the cyclical nature of human interaction; "a tide in the affairs of > man" > as Shakespeare put it. Society constantly moves between states of > high > principle and abject baseness We can never know precisely where we > are > in that cycle. > > In fact, even though we are all a part of it, people's perception > of the > cycle differs. Not many young people can see the change from the > human-oriented society of my youth to the corporate-dominated > society we > endure today. For most of them, "It is what it is". They attach > little > importance to the obscure and arcane legislation that enabled the > transition and are even less inclined to seek an understanding of how > and why it happened. Yes, I think this is a valid description of one segment of one cycle. (There may be many overlapping cyclic processes going on at the same time and that makes them always a bit vague, and allows different interpretations too.) > Is it hopeless to think we will ever look inside > ourselves and learn to harness our own natures to the task of > improving > society? One viewpoint to the world is to see it as processes at different layers. It is possible to make advancements also at the "higher layers" (of understanding, of modelling) and thereby make it easier to avoid repeating some mistakes at the "lower layers". One small example might be democracy. Before that concept gained popularity many people surely felt that any thoughts of people taking control and guiding the direction the society were just high hopes that would never materialise since the powerful people would always find their way to control other people. But once getting the idea through in some places (well, maybe there have been many trials and stable democratic systems in history but now I'm talking only about how our current history books describe the evolution of democracy) it happened that the idea was viable enough to be persistent and spread around. And it can be considered to be one way of "harnessing our own natures to the task of improving society". I'm sure that is not the last meaningful step in the evolution of political systems. > > > re: "... change will come when ... the citizens have some basic reason > (dissatisfaction) to change the current system." > > One of our challenges is to prepare well-reasoned alternatives before > any change occurs. There is a risk that dissatisfaction will lead to > violence, and violence thrives on emotion at the expense of > reason. We > would do well to forestall that eventuality. > > > Since our political institutions reflect our nature, do you think I > should be surprised that so few seem willing to look at how our > systems > evolved? Are we so proud of our tendency toward partisanship that > we're > unwilling to look at how easily it is used to exploit us? Are we so > anxious to say "I'm right. You're wrong." that we won't consider > alternatives? I'd compare the situation to a situation (extreme one) where there is a fire in a dance hall. Some people try to shout good advices. Some people think that it is best to just get quickly out as soon as one can. People have many needs in real life. Maybe the biggest power is at the level of making practical decisions on a daily basis. Politicians have some interest in reaching good positions, or getting elected in the next elections. And if they believe that they are the best persons to guide the society, stepping over some of the competitors and collaborators on the way may well feel like the right choice. People also have the need to base their actions on good principles, and to believe that their current principles (and resulting practices) are the right ones. They will fight against models that some other people may consider superior. In summary, one needs to adapt to a situation where the main decisions and most powerful streams and even highest respect in the society will occur at a suboptimal level. > It is unfortunate that those who have written to me > privately on this topic have not added their expertise to our public > discussion. > > I'm deeply grateful for your participation which helps me see the > issues > more clearly. Your comments on secret voting led me to examine the > voting process in greater detail than I had before. There are any > number of other subtleties worthy of deeper thought. For example in a > dynamic system of the type we've been discu
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
--- Fred Gohlke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > It took 200-odd years for what De > Tocqueville called The > Great Experiment to reach its current state of > disrepair. It will > probably take as long before we learn to implement a > more democratic > form of government. Most of that time will be spent > examining ideas. Few comments on the ability of old and large systems to fix their internal problems. You may be a bit pessimistic when assuming that it would take 200 years to change. I think changes will materialize when the time is right and the opinions and proposals have matured. But it is very difficult to make the changes happen now or in any planned schedule. You may be a bit optimistic when you assume that the system would strive to seek some more democratic model to adopt. I think the history shows that organizations (especially large ones) tend to corrupt in time. One could thus as weel expect corruption to grow. According to this theory the chnages would come in the form of some sort of revolutions. Whether one calls these steps the death of the old system and the birth of the new one or as a change of the old system is a matter of taste. In USA there have been maybe two major changes. The first one was the birth of the nation some 200 years ago. That can be called a revolution and a birth of a new system. The second one was the civil war. That introduced some clear changes to how the country was managed. Also that event could be called a revolution, but now we are talking about just changing or continuation of the old system (at least from the northern point of view). There have been also some other improvements like evolving towards equal rights to all. Maybe also such events could be called small revolutions. >From this perspective, maybe also the next changes in the democratic system would require strong campaigns by the citizen (and a small revolution). There should maybe be one simple theme around which people could gather (in the spirit of "I have a dream"). When changing the rules on how political leaders will be elected one must also take into account that the current establishment always has clear reasons to oppose any changes. That is because the current system elected them and gave them power and any changes in that system (that obviously worked well for them (and for the country too, as they see it)) would probably make their position weaker. To summarize this. Maybe the change will come when clear and simplifying reasonig is found and the citizens have some basic reason (dissatisfaction) to change the current system. That could happen any time, but could also take a long time. At the very moment there is some considerable dissatisfaction on how the system works. But that could be easily forgotten again after the next elections. It is too difficult to try to guess what will happen. But it is easier to say which change patterns might have the potential to materialize. Juho __ Sent from Yahoo! Mail. More Ways to Keep in Touch. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
--- Fred Gohlke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I hope you'll read (or re-read) the February 4th > post. I already earlier tried to summarize my viewpoint when I said "As you can see my concerns and possible improvements that I'd like to study are mainly in the areas of privacy of the votes and in proportional representation." On the positive side e.g. the impact of the person-to-person level direct contacts (in the small groups) are interesting. The method now presents one very clean viewpoint. The method introduces some clear benefits but also some problems. I'd maybe try to find a method that would keep most of the benefits and eliminate most of the problems. (There could be many paths forward.) Juho __ Sent from Yahoo! Mail. More Ways to Keep in Touch. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
At 08:03 PM 3/18/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote: >Good Evening, Dave > >re: "In New York, at least, the two major parties each do such as >appoint half the members of the Boards of Elections." and also in regard >to the related comments about "party leadership", "party activities", >"party business", "state party", and "county organizations". > >To me, this says "the structure of government" and the "responsibilities >of voters" are what the parties say they are. I think that degree of >control is pretty much the same in all the states. Yes, more or less. >Ought we not question such an arrangement? Why? Isn't the status quo the arrangement God has provided us? > Nothing in our Constitution >grants such rights to political parties, yet they dictate all of our >political activity. Do we see nothing wrong with that? Is that not, >indeed, the cause of our political system's failure? Have we become so >accustomed to partisan dictatorship that we can't see how destructive it is? Seriously: (1) The political system has not "failed." It merely does not work as well as it could, and it has very obvious flaws, which have persisted a long time. Those flaws, under some conditions, can be practically fatal. Philip K. Dick wrote a book, "It Can't Happen Here." Some seem to think that true, that Americans are specially graced to never suffer a spectacular failure. Though I suppose the Civil War was pretty spectacular. Famous abolitionist and anarchist thinker, brilliant guy whose name someone escapes me at the moment, was seriously against slavery and seriously against using military coercion to end it. He was right. Other nations ended slavery without such major disruption. The Civil War was phenomenally bloody. (2) There are some very simple reasons why the system does not change. If those reasons are not understood and addressed, reform is impossible. You can come up with a totally ideal political system, and waste your life designing and promoting it, all for nothing if the path from here to there is not described and followed in a way that works. >re: "In at least most states electors are not directed by their party >but by party members in elections and/or caucuses." Shocked, I'm shocked. Yes, that's the system. It is not what was designed, the original design was corrupted through a loophole left in the Constitution, a loophole left because it was too difficult to negotiate at the time. The original design was actually more like what Warren Smith has proposed as Asset Voting. Sort of. Lewis Carroll came up with the same plan, it is an old idea. >Yes. But what is the rationale for a few of our citizens ... the >so-called "party faithful" ... dictating the actions of people who are >supposed to, after they study "such candidates as become visible to >them, do their voting." No, they don't dictate the actions of the voters. If the voters were organized, they could elect anyone whom they choose. Problem is, the voters think of the government as their organization. It is not, it does not belong to them, it belongs to a very diffuse and chaotic entity called "the plurality." Not a problem. Plurality ovting is not really the problem. The problem is that people depend on government, a necessarily coercive and centralized mechanism, to be the means by which they come to agreement. If the people could come to agreement outside of government, practically any mechanism on the table would work quite well. Too many reformers, though, completely miss this point, and what they want to do is have the government force the use of better election process. But that runs into severe problems. Thankfully, actually! >re: "You start with the size of legislature desired. If legislators >should each represent about 750, multiply my numbers by 10." > >That's fine. The question I'm interested in, though, is how the >legislators are selected. Who names the candidates? Would we not be >better off finding a way to select them from among ourselves? In what >way do we benefit by having them named by people who can control their >votes? We do that with Asset Voting, and it is very, very simple. You vote for anyone you like. This person then represents you in subsequent process, including the election of a seated assembly, which is elected, again, by voluntary agreement between those holding the "assets," or votes. No coercion. No complicated structures. You can vote for anyone. Practically no votes are wasted. No use of majority power to dominate *representation*.(And it is quite possible to allow these electors to vote when convenient, in which case we can say *no* votes are wasted, and the seated assembly is a collection of proxies for the electors, for purposes of representation in deliberation as well as default representation in voting. But, of course, this is a utopian model. How do we get there? You've got to understand why, though this was proposed over a hundred and twenty years a
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Sat, 22 Mar 2008 18:17:48 -0500 Fred Gohlke wrote: > Good Afternoon, David > > re: "How would you do better?" > > Well, for starters, I'd ponder ways to empower the electorate by > harnessing our nature and de-emphasizing partisanship. I'm sure there > are many ways that can be done. You'll find an outline of one > possibility at > > [Election-Methods] > Selecting Leaders From The People > Monday, February 4th, 2008 I see an 'Election Commission' there. I see nothing about keeping them honest, which was the current topic. The context was parties. I understand you would not have parties, but I have seen no mention of a magic spell that might do away with greed. > > > re: "Somehow that is a disconnect from what I had said." > > Perhaps. I, too, sometimes get the sense that we are talking at cross > purposes. My purpose is, and has been, to call attention to the dangers > inherent in allowing two political parties to maintain a stranglehold on > our nation's political infrastructure. I offered a brief overview of the > problem in my initial post on this topic: > > [Election-Methods] > Partisan Politics > Sunday, March 2nd, 2008 You offer beginnings of an idea that is DIFFERENT. Yet, it has possibilities, so I commented a bit. Here we stumbled a bit, for: I wrote of groups electing legislators without parties, with size of groups being self-controlled to get size of legislature desired. You responded with a thought that size of groups was based on a constant, such that a larger population would result in too many legislators. I clarified that size of legislature and population to be served controlled acceptable size of groups. Then you combined two thoughts, which puzzle when placed in the same paragraph (since my thoughts were tailored to EXACTLY that desire): >> The question I'm interested in, though, is how the >> legislators are selected. Who names the candidates? Would we not be >> better off finding a way to select them from among ourselves? So I said 'disconnect'. > > Fred -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
--- Fred Gohlke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Again, I must apologize for my tardiness, but I've > been away. Not a problem. I think it is one of the benefits of email and lists that everyone can keep their own schedule. > 1) if a selection is made, the only person whose > vote is unknown is the > selected person's. ... I note that you make the assumption that nobody will vote for himself. There mey be a need to somehow guarantee that the voters will vote this way. And that should possibly happen without revealing the vote. > The huge difference is that those we select do not > owe their election to > those "similar-minded" people ... they were elected > on their own merit. This might mean that candidate nomination is not done by parties. Candidates might however indicate that they will represent the values of some party/ideology. (And in some election methods their votes might be summed up with votes of other candidates that have chosen to representt the same ideology.) > However much they may like those they associate > with, they are not > compelled to cede their votes to them. I guess my comment above was based on voluntary association with one party/ideology. > They don't > need campaign funds, Ok, financing is a problem area of its own. If one wants to have independet candidates I think some limitations on capaign funding or could be in place. Also cheap methods like some public web site could be used. > they don't need the party to "get out the vote", Does this mean that the representatives can vote themselves? > and > they have no > obligation to vote the party line. They can be > persuaded, but they can > not be coerced. This might mean that party disciplinary actions would be forbidden. > The difference between that and party politics is > incalculable. I see this as careful finetuning of the rules to maintain independent decision making by the representatives. Juho ___ Rise to the challenge for Sport Relief with Yahoo! For Good http://uk.promotions.yahoo.com/forgood/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Tue, 18 Mar 2008 19:03:34 -0500 Fred Gohlke wrote: > Good Evening, Dave > > re: "In New York, at least, the two major parties each do such as > appoint half the members of the Boards of Elections." and also in regard > to the related comments about "party leadership", "party activities", > "party business", "state party", and "county organizations". > > To me, this says "the structure of government" and the "responsibilities > of voters" are what the parties say they are. I think that degree of > control is pretty much the same in all the states. > > Ought we not question such an arrangement? Nothing in our Constitution > grants such rights to political parties, yet they dictate all of our > political activity. Do we see nothing wrong with that? Is that not, > indeed, the cause of our political system's failure? Have we become so > accustomed to partisan dictatorship that we can't see how destructive it is? > How would you do better? Letting AN elected official have control, as in Ohio, etc., is definitely worse than letting two parties, hopefully competitive, look over each others shoulders. True that these may have no sympathy for minor parties. > > re: "In at least most states electors are not directed by their party > but by party members in elections and/or caucuses." > > Yes. But what is the rationale for a few of our citizens ... the > so-called "party faithful" ... dictating the actions of people who are > supposed to, after they study "such candidates as become visible to > them, do their voting." > I SAID "party members". > > re: "You start with the size of legislature desired. If legislators > should each represent about 750, multiply my numbers by 10." > > That's fine. The question I'm interested in, though, is how the > legislators are selected. Who names the candidates? Would we not be > better off finding a way to select them from among ourselves? In what > way do we benefit by having them named by people who can control their > votes? > Somehow that is a disconnect from what I had said. > > re: "You had mentioned pr, so I propose THE VOTERS organizing themselves > into the right size districts with no boundaries" > > We have no means for the voters to organize themselves. The parties > define the districts. It's called gerrymandering. It is an example of > how the parties control our political process. These are the grave > inequities we must find a way to correct. I SAID for the voters to organize themselves. Agreed there are no means for such now - that would have to be designed. > > We can count the votes any way we like. As long as the parties control > the process, we will lose. To say that vote counting must be correct is an obvious detail. > > Fred -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 17, 2008, at 3:02 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > re: "As you can see my concerns and possible improvements that I'd > like > to study are mainly in the areas of privacy of the votes and in > proportional representation." > > As far as I'm concerned, the voting process should be secret. > Obviously, if one person gets two votes, it is obvious how the > other two > people voted. Until then, I see no reason why one should be > required to > divulge their vote. I prefer secret votes in political elections since that allows voters to give their sincere opinions better. The problem is just that in groups of three one can not expect one's vote to remain secret, and that may impact one's voting behaviour. > Isn't proportional representation a party concept; the idea that one > group of partisans should have a number of representatives > proportional > to their part of the electorate? As long as you think parties are > necessary, you will have to seek that goal. The Active Democracy > concept does much better: Each person elected represents the same > number of people ... and I think people are more important than > parties, > by a long shot. Proportional representation is in a way a "party concept" (but not necessarily one that would strengthen the party control in the way that you described as negative. PR can also be applied to areas. Eg. the number of representatives from each state can be in proportion to the number of citizens there. PR may make the voters and their different opinions better represented in the way that it allows also small groups to have their voice heard by giving them a small number of representatives. There are also PR methods like STV that do not assume a party structure (maybe that would appeal to you). It is however possible that a party structure will emerge (or stay) even if the method itself would not recognize any such structure among the candidates. This may apply to your method too. I think also you felt that this is natural and good if not too strong / power seeking. One way of allowing richer set of opinions than what large monolithic parties would provide is to allow a hierarchy of opinions (smaller groupings within a party etc.). I do not "seek the goal" of making parties dominant but I find it natural (and to some extent even unavoidable) that people do group together with other similar minded people. Also voters may prefer to see some structure in the potentially vast array of candidates that they need to choose from. Juho ___ Now you can scan emails quickly with a reading pane. Get the new Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Sun, 16 Mar 2008 20:04:12 -0500 Fred Gohlke wrote: > Good Evening, Dave > > re: "What the parties do is more a response to the structure of > government and the responsibilities of voters." > > Can you describe these two points more clearly? Do not the party > leaders direct the parties actions? In what way(s) does the structure > of government affect them? How does the responsibility of the voters > figure into this. In what way can voters alter the course of a party? > How, for example, would they have stopped their party from supporting > the changes in the bankruptcy law? > In New York, at least, the two major parties each do such as appoint half the members of the Boards of Elections. Major parties are based on getting votes when electing governor - can change instantly if Reps or Dems nominate enough of a reject. To have authority to act on such, party leadership MUST be elected during primary elections by party members - and must meet as legislative bodies for party activities such as the above. A recent court battle in NY involved nomination for a multi-county office. The nomination was party business but: Were all the county organizations involved valid. Should this nomination have been done by the state party? > > re: "Take a look at the Electoral College. What would fit with what the > Constitution SAYS fits with the legislatures appointing electors who, > after studying such candidates as become visible to them, do their voting." > > The Constitutional theory was fine, but it was undermined at the state > level. The critical phrase is "... after studying such candidates as > become visible to them, do their voting." Electors don't study the > candidates, they vote as they are directed by their party. That result > flowed directly from the ability of parties to implement rules and pass > laws ... at the state level ... that give them control of the electors. > My point was that the EC COULD operate more in line with what you are promoting. In at least most states electors are not directed by their party but by party members in elections and/or caucuses. > > re: "Perhaps their thoughts can move us toward a structure that gives > citizens more actual control ..." > > I hope so because that is what democracy is supposed to be. > > > re: "I see Fred's groups of 3 as too small for practicality." > > Can you explain why? The process is simple, understandable and > straightforward. Why is it impractical? > I only offer an opinion, with no defense today. > > re: "Let citizens choose and back members of the legislature's territory > as legislators. > > Assuming a legislature would fit for each member to represent about 75 > citizens. Then, according to backing: > > Right to vote based on quantity of backers, but getting an excess does > not give more voting rights than 100. > > Right to speak depends on having at least 50 backers. > > Legislators at lower level legislatures act as citizens in next level > legislature, with their strength based on quantity of real citizens they > represent." > > Can you help me understand this more clearly? I'm not sure what you are > suggesting. I tried to apply the math to my state but ran into a snag. > My state had a voting-eligible population of 5,637,378 in 2004. > Depending on whether they represented 75 or 100 people, that would have > produced between 58,373 and 75,165 members. I'm not sure what you see > as the next step. Given our present transporation and communications > capabilities, I'm sure we could poll such numbers on all matters coming > before the legislature, but I'm not sure that's what you have in mind. You start with the size of legislature desired. If legislators should each represent about 750, multiply my numbers by 10. Another thought for your state would be two levels - one for the state and a bunch at a lower level. You had mentioned pr, so I propose THE VOTERS organizing themselves into the right size districts with no boundaries: Truly small groups get encouraged to band together such that their legislator can speak. Large groups get encouraged to split up to max their voting power, rather than letting someone amass enough votes to control the legislature. > > Fred -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Fri, 14 Mar 2008 08:42:17 +0200 Juho wrote: > On Mar 14, 2008, at 5:34 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > > >>In the U. S., our major political parties are quasi-official entities >>that control the selection of candidates for public office. They >>raise >>the immense amounts of money needed to get their candidates elected by >>selling the votes of their candidates to vested interests. They meet >>their commitment to the donors by picking politicians who can be >>relied >>upon to enact the laws and implement the policies the donors' desire. >>In other words, political parties are nothing but conduits for >>corruption. > > > Ok, it seems that the border line that you consider harmful is where > the political parties break out from their simple role as groups of > similar minded people and start exercising power outside of the role > originally planned for them. > I suspect "break out" is not the right phrase. What the parties do is more a response to the structure of government and the responsibilities of voters. Take a look at the Electoral College. What would fit with what the Constitution SAYS fits with the legislatures appointing electors who, after studying such candidates as become visible to them, do their voting. Fred and Abd are each into amending structure. Perhaps their thoughts can move us toward a structure that gives citizens more actual control while minimizing responsibilities which are both beyond their abilities and an inspiration to what parties have become. > >>re: "... where I end up in the same room with a drug dealer that wants >>to expand his influence in the city. Should I vote against him if he >>seems to be determined to get that position and tells me that I should >>understand that we should elect him." >> >>Doesn't that depend on whether you know the person is a drug >>dealer? If >>not, you will have an extended period of time to evaluate him (or >>her). >> All you can base your decision on is what you hear and observe, the >>information you are able to glean from your examination of the person, >>and your evaluation of material supplied by others, if there is any. >>For example, wouldn't you be likely to ask the people in your group >>where they work and try to assess the forthrightness of their >>response? >> >>Furthermore, you are not alone in the process. Others, too, will >>evaluate this person. If you misjudge, others may not. There is >>always >>the possibility that a scoundrel will run the gauntlet >>successfully, but >>the odds against it are infinitely better than we endure now, with >>political parties selecting our candidates. > > > My concern is that the person himself may make it known that he is no > ordinary person since he knows that it will have an effect on the > other persons in the room. Maybe there are rumours that last year > some voter that stopped him on his way upwards disappeared > mysteriously. The problem thus is that since the votes in practice > are not secret bad mannered people like this drug dealer could make > use of that. > > (In lesser scale this problem will be present also when other people > in the room include one's boss, friend, tax official, a person that > might be hurt if not elected, a person known to tell everyone whom > you supported etc. Maybe the results of the groups of three will be > published, and in that case everyone can guess everyone else's > opinions => better vote party x if you plan career in a x minded > company.) > > >>So far, >>we've barely scratched the surface of an extremely complex topic. >>Ideas, to have value, must be challenged. > > > As you can see my concerns and possible improvements that I'd like to > study are mainly in the areas of privacy of the votes and in > proportional representation. In USA proportional representation is > not a tradition (except to some extent between the two parties of the > two-party system) so it may not be seen to be that critical. Don't > know about privacy since people anyway do register as supporters of > one party. The new set-up brings new challenges in the area of > privacy though (like the drug dealers). I see Fred's groups of 3 as too small for practicality. I also vote against what I see for pr. Let citizens choose and back members of the legislature's territory as legislators. Assuming a legislature would fit for each member to represent about 75 citizens. Then, according to backing: Right to vote based on quantity of backers, but getting an excess does not give more voting rights than 100. Right to speak depends on having at least 50 backers. Legislators at lower level legislatures act as citizens in next level legislature, with their strength based on quantity of real citizens they represent. Secrecy as to who backs a legislator is sticky. Knowing the quantity of backing is essential, but difficult to do without knowing who. If enough citizens in a
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 14, 2008, at 5:34 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > In the U. S., our major political parties are quasi-official entities > that control the selection of candidates for public office. They > raise > the immense amounts of money needed to get their candidates elected by > selling the votes of their candidates to vested interests. They meet > their commitment to the donors by picking politicians who can be > relied > upon to enact the laws and implement the policies the donors' desire. > In other words, political parties are nothing but conduits for > corruption. Ok, it seems that the border line that you consider harmful is where the political parties break out from their simple role as groups of similar minded people and start exercising power outside of the role originally planned for them. > re: "... where I end up in the same room with a drug dealer that wants > to expand his influence in the city. Should I vote against him if he > seems to be determined to get that position and tells me that I should > understand that we should elect him." > > Doesn't that depend on whether you know the person is a drug > dealer? If > not, you will have an extended period of time to evaluate him (or > her). > All you can base your decision on is what you hear and observe, the > information you are able to glean from your examination of the person, > and your evaluation of material supplied by others, if there is any. > For example, wouldn't you be likely to ask the people in your group > where they work and try to assess the forthrightness of their > response? > > Furthermore, you are not alone in the process. Others, too, will > evaluate this person. If you misjudge, others may not. There is > always > the possibility that a scoundrel will run the gauntlet > successfully, but > the odds against it are infinitely better than we endure now, with > political parties selecting our candidates. My concern is that the person himself may make it known that he is no ordinary person since he knows that it will have an effect on the other persons in the room. Maybe there are rumours that last year some voter that stopped him on his way upwards disappeared mysteriously. The problem thus is that since the votes in practice are not secret bad mannered people like this drug dealer could make use of that. (In lesser scale this problem will be present also when other people in the room include one's boss, friend, tax official, a person that might be hurt if not elected, a person known to tell everyone whom you supported etc. Maybe the results of the groups of three will be published, and in that case everyone can guess everyone else's opinions => better vote party x if you plan career in a x minded company.) > So far, > we've barely scratched the surface of an extremely complex topic. > Ideas, to have value, must be challenged. As you can see my concerns and possible improvements that I'd like to study are mainly in the areas of privacy of the votes and in proportional representation. In USA proportional representation is not a tradition (except to some extent between the two parties of the two-party system) so it may not be seen to be that critical. Don't know about privacy since people anyway do register as supporters of one party. The new set-up brings new challenges in the area of privacy though (like the drug dealers). Juho ___ Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 13, 2008, at 2:00 , Fred Gohlke wrote: However, as discussed before, as the levels advance, those who advance can be expected to be marked, more and more, as people who want to advance. That sort of favours electing hard core career seeking politicians. Is the intention to elect those people who are best in fighting their way through? (This may be one measure of general competence but I wouldn't put too much weight on this one.) re: "It may be that in some time periods the 'science of and skills in marketing' evolves faster than the 'individual level understanding of these concepts and their impact on one's life'." Not, "It may be", IT IS!!! When marketing can persuade people to buy Pet Rocks for their home, it is no longer a question. It is a fact. One new formulation of Descartes' famous "I think, therefore I am" is "I consume, therefore I am". Juho ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" The Wall Street Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 13, 2008, at 1:57 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > As to any specific group, one may question the wisdom of their > selection. To doubt the wisdom of all the groups is to doubt the > wisdom > of humanity. I think humans are wise but not flawless. They tend to need some support, e.g. in the form of good rules of behaviour, to reach the best possible results. > As I've said before, partisanship is > healthy. The danger is in allowing partisans to gain power. We have > far too much experience with the excesses of partisans in power to not > recognize the danger. If you feel that politics should be based on > partisanship, you should be happy with the systems extant. I > don't, and > I'm not. You say that partisanship is healthy but on the other hand you say that partisans should not be allowed in power. I interpret this so that you are mainly like "low layer partisanship" in the discussions of small groups but do not like some individual partisans gaining power and e.g. use "mass manipulation of the media" to distribute their partisan viewpoints to others. This I can understand and also agree to in the sense that partisanship can be seen as a rich source of ideas and viewpoints when it is not forced on anyone, but that it may be a more destructive force when applied by someone over the others (e.g. in a dictatorship or in a dominant party or by strong individuals). > I'm not sure why you resist the concept > of a political system that allows people to consider issues, > individually, rather than having answers, which they personally > believe > to be wrong, provided for them by mass marketing techniques. Of course I don't. I'm only addressing some potential problems in the proposed model. As I already said I do recognise the benefits of discussions in small groups. But small groups have also their problems. One potential problem is that the privacy of the opinions is partially lost. People may tend to have opinions in line with what they are expected to have (thanks to mass marketing or society and strong figures around them) if their opinions and vote will be revealed in the small group discussions. Two minority opinion holders in a room may not even recognise each others and will yield to the assumed majority opinion proudly presented by the third member. Another problematic scenario is one where I end up in the same room with a drug dealer that wants to expand his influence in the city. Should I vote against him if he seems to be determined to get that position and tells me that I should understand that we should elect him. I think one should try to seek a balance between the problems of centralized power, mass marketing, privacy, mathematical properties of different election methods etc. > Perhaps you'd like to look my "Partisan Politics" post of Sunday, > March > 2nd. You may feel what it says is not commonly approved. I will > agree > ... as soon as someone rationally explains the flaws in the reasoning > offered in that post. I think I already posted some comments. I also proposed that people need a good model to follow. I appreciate that you make a serious attempt to do so. As you say the models need to gradually evolve. I think the target is that people will eventually adapt something useful as a general guideline that is worth following. Consider me as random noise that may be useful in fine-tuning the message so that eventually it is in a form that all can relate to. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 10, 2008, at 1:59 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > re: "The point is just that although I assume that the 'willing' > people > might be more responsible and as efficient leaders as the 'seeking' > ones > also the seeking ones may in some cases work quite well.)" > > I suspect our views on this are similar because, as you say, "... > people > have many kind of drivers." Even so, you may not share my confidence > that my peers will evaluate those they are grouped with and select the > person best equipped to serve the public interest. I think I share your understanding that in small groups the close contacts between the members (and the ability to spend some time together) do help in making better judgement on other members of the group. I may feel that in the long chained process some of the benefits may be lost, and that the small groups have also some small group related problems (like e.g. ability to exercise some personal level pressure (unlike in closed elections) on the other group members). > When we can be swayed by mass merchandising > techniques, when we can be convinced it is proper to perform an act > for > which we condemn others, we need to be aware the trait can be > dangerous > for society and seek a means of restricting its adverse effects. It may be that in some time periods the "science of and skills in marketing" evolves faster than the "individual level understanding of these concepts and their impact on one's life". This would be unfortunate (if true for our time) since it would e.g. weaken the basis of democracy, voters that have sufficient understanding to steer the society. Juho ___ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 9, 2008, at 16:55 , Fred Gohlke wrote: "As the levels advance, the participants need more time to evaluate those they are grouped with." I don't trust that groups of three would always make good decisions even if given time. I really don't think "getting appropriate competitors/supporters when the election tree was constructed" is a valid concern. The tree is not constructed in advance; each level generates the next level. Given the vagaries of human nature, it is impossible to predict which of the three people will advance. The only thing you can say with certainty is that, as the levels advance, the people selected seek continued advancement. Also I referred to the unpredictability of the tree construction. Having said that, I think we must acknowledge the possibility that a glib individual will advance solely on that talent. While I believe such instances can occur, I think they will be rare. The people who reach the upper levels will be intelligent as well as persuasive. Hoodwinking them will not be easy; they, too, want to advance. The elected ones are of course likely to be "masters of three party negotiations". The idea that randomly selected citizens "could name someone else if they do not feel like being a representative themselves" is appallingly bad. Vested interests would buy the votes of the selected citizens before the ink was dry on the enabling legislation. Yes, there are problems if vote buying is allowed. One approach would be to name the representatives before selecting the voters. And the transfer ballots could be anonymous. "Willing" candidates could be known beforehand. This method is more or less a random ballot method. So, instead of a chain of groups of three one would just bypass the chain and let one vote do the job. One could limit the range of possible candidates to local "willing" people if one wants to avoid electing "the national superstars" every time. re: "Why is "partisans controlling government" a bad thing?" We need look no further than National Socialism and Communism to understand why partisans controlling government is a bad thing. Both had features that attracted broad public support throughout a national expanse and both degenerated into destructive forces because their partisans gained control of their governments. Actually, we need look no further than the events of 2002 to understand why partisans controlling government is a fearful thing. I find it disconcerting and a bit frightening that so many people are able to ignore the lesson of that period. The flood of manipulative news, distorted propaganda and witless hyperbole that engulfed my homeland before the invasion of Iraq was so outrageous I was moved to post this message on August 13th, 2002, on an internet site I frequent: All countries including stable democracies are to some extent vulnerable to ending up on a path to catastrophes. The whole political system can be changed (e.g. democracy ended) if people with that intent have sufficient support at some point in time. I still find it problematic to say that partisans should be blamed since they can do both good an bad things. One single ideology or group of people (r.g. party offices) gaining more power than the citizens would be willing to give them is a problem. Still I see "good" and "bad" partisans. We need to try to make the atmosphere and rules such that the good part gets more power and the risk of the system escalating to strange paths is small. AM I ALONE? I also dislike some phenomena in politics like using war as a tool in internal politics (or personal career), non-defensive use of military force, projection of problems to external (typically distant, poorly known and "different") enemies (so easy to think that one's current problems are someone else's fault), black and white colouring. It turned out I was alone. I'm sure there were people that felt something similar. Many people don't open their mouth if they see the mainstream appearing to go in some other direction that what they would take. Somehow, some way, we must learn to put our faith in the humans among us rather than relinquishing our right to govern ourselves to unknown people who proclaim themselves our agents. I do trust on better understanding and good models of thinking also here. I think we are to some extent missing a commonly approved theory that would explain such phenomena where the current leaders may not take us into the right direction (applies also to business life, families etc. in addition to politics). We have some old ones like "The Emperor's New Clothes" by Hans Christian Andersen, but maybe we need also new ones. Once understood people are less likely to make the same mistakes again. If people do not get the picture same mistakes could be repeated any number of times. Juho
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 8, 2008, at 22:35 , Fred Gohlke wrote:
> re: "Small groups may also have problems like strong individuals
> simply
> running over the less aggressive and less confident ones."
>
> This will surely happen at the lower levels because humans are
> characterized by varying degrees of aggressiveness. Since passive
> people are unlikely to advance, the more aggressive will. However,
> undue aggressiveness will quickly become a liability. As the levels
> advance, all members of each group will have some degree of
> aggressiveness. Those who combine other qualities ... knowledge,
> eloquence, forthrightness and judgment among them ... will shun those
> whose greatest claim to fame is aggressiveness.
Some people can be both convincing and persuasive at the same time.
> re: "It is also possible to try to improve the behaviour of the
> (potentially larger) groups (to avoid monologues and other strong
> individual related problems) by setting some clear rules and
> procedures
> for them."
>
> I disagree. We have no shortage of rules and procedures in politics.
> Rules seek to identify and inhibit perverse actions rather than
> rendering the actions unproductive. The essence of the Active
> Democracy
> concept is that it harnesses our natural pursuit of our own
> interest by
> penalizing negative traits (excessive aggressiveness, for example) and
> rewarding positive ones (like intellect and integrity).
>
> However, having said that, I agree that the "Search of optimal
> parameters should continue." Perhaps someone with expertise in the
> group dynamics field can contribute ideas of value.
Some rules always exist. And (formal) groups need rules to operate. I
think also in groups of three (just like in mid size and large
groups) some good and some bad properties of humans will surface.
There is home violence and there are wars. Good planning (and
sometimes rules, written laws and unwritten practices) is needed to
adjust different mechanisms so that they will work well enough.
> re: This next one, which really tickled me ...
>
> "One general comment. It is typical that people of category 3
> ("seeking
> selection") are overrepresented in a political system (representatives
> and civil servants). I tend to think that a political system that
> would
> favour more category 2 candidates ("willing to be selected") would
> be a
> happier one."
>
> ... because I made a similar assertion to an acquaintance in India,
> when
> I said ...
>
> "Not everyone who wants to achieve public office should. In fact,
> those
> who desire public office are often the least fit to serve the public
> interest. In this instance, willingness is a better criterium than
> desire."
>
> He responded by pointing out (approximately) that reforms are carried
> out by people who believe they have a better idea and seek office in
> order to make it reality. It's a good point.
>
> I think what you and I mean is that those who seek public office
> for the
> prestige and power it brings are poor choices ... and we have too many
> of them, already.
I also think that those who are only "willing" may be as efficient or
more efficient in running the joint matters than those who focus
mostly on guaranteeing their own success in the political game. One
problem is that those who are in power do believe that they are in
power because they are the best (the most competent from all points
of view).
(One viewpoint that has been presented is to categorize people in 1)
those who feel that one should respect one's principles and follow
and demonstrate them even if others and the majority would have
different thoughts and 2) those who think that in order to achieve
something one must follow the pack/majority and try to influence the
system from inside (since being in opposition and outside of the
mainstream would mean not being able to influence at all). In this
set-up one may assume that some of those people who seem like power
and position seeking political animals may actually sometimes work
also for the benefit of the society with good intentions, i.e. not
only for themselves. This is quite rough exaggeration since people
have many kind of drivers. The point is just that although I assume
that the "willing" people might be more responsible and as efficient
leaders as the "seeking" ones also the seeking ones may in some cases
work quite well.)
> ... we humans are blessed (or cursed, depending on your
> perspective) with a will-to-believe what we are told about matters
> beyond our personal knowledge or expertise.
One could say that people want to synchronize their thinking models
with the environment and the world (either based on direct
observations or based on what others say about the world).
> This is a group phenomenon; it's particularly noticeable among
> groups of
> people who share a common ideology.
Continuing from above, we are in a way social animals with a
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 7, 2008, at 16:40 , Fred Gohlke wrote: > Good Morning, Juho > > re: "... not having parties or other groupings may also cause problems > to the voters since they have hard time finding out what each > individual > candidate stands for." > > The purpose of Active Democracy is to guarantee that individual > candidates are required to explain their positions to the most > critical > audience possible ... other candidates. Yes, that is a good source of criticism. But citizens may also feel that some of the elected representatives got through without any wide support, just based on their capability to explain their way through and having good luck in getting appropriate competitors/supporters when the election tree was constructed. So, good and bad, critical audience but only limited audience. I also tend to think that having some clear association to a party or some named targets that the representative drives is in many cases a positive thing. Btw, what do you think of a somewhat related method of arranging a lottery among the citizens. Maybe e.g. so that the elected citizens could name someone else if they do not feel like being a representative themselves. (This would probably also increase the percentage of representatives that are "willing" but not "seeking" selection.) > re: "Some small parties could get together under a common umbrella > organization." > > That is exactly how the major party system works in the U. S., right > now. Fringe groups align themselves with major parties to > influence the > party's platform. The down side is exactly what you described in an > earlier message: The large devour the small. My intention is to arrange the election in this case so that the smaller fragments would get their proportional share of the seats. They could thus continue driving their own agenda (I assume that those parties that got together have relatively similar targets). The method works also the other way around (breaking monolithic blocks to smaller parts). If large parties allow their different internal segments to be visible in the election that would lead to voters having their say on how strong those different segments are, and representatives of the segments would be expected to act in line with the targets of that segment. > A small group can insist that the party install one of their number > in a > position of power, but the effectiveness of that approach depends > on (at > least) two things: (1) whether the small group is large enough to > adversely affect the party if the party refuses, and (2) whether the > party strategists feel the small group's representative will > enhance the > party's prospects. Since few of the smaller groups have enough > strength > to influence the party, the party usually pays lip service to the > small > group's adherents while ignoring their interest. From the small > group's > perspective, this is beneficial because the lip service publicizes > their > position and provides a rallying point for adherents ... "much ado > about > nothing". If one part consists of one large group and few small ones the position of the small ones in negotiations is weaker. If different subgroups are of more similar size then the negotiation process is more balanced. Small groups can also join together (if they are ideologically close to each others) and thereby gain more strength in negotiations. The whole system is a tree like hierarchy, hopefully not too unbalanced. > re: "Having no parties may be impossible." > > It is impossible. Partisanship is natural for humans. We seek out > and > align ourselves with others who share our views. Through them, we > hone > our ideas and gain courage from the knowledge that we are not alone in > our beliefs. Partisanship gives breadth, depth and volume to our > voice. > In and of itself, partisanship is not only inevitable, it is > healthy. > The fault lies, not in partisanship but in allowing partisans to > control government. I hope the process is lively and takes lots of new input while still maintaining some widely agreed basic concepts steady (=stability in critical areas). Why is "partisans controlling government" a bad thing? Maybe there are two kind of partisans, those that use their position to learn and guide more are those that just want power and control??? I tend to think that many regular people have thought a lot how the society should be run, but in the political hierarchy while the skills and capabilities of people grow when we go towards the upper layers the morale and sincerity does not necessarily follow. Often it is so that people who want power do work for it and eventually get it, while people who are interested in what would be the best way to arrange things in the society do not work to achieve power and as a result they also will not get power (just a rule of balance and statistic
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 7, 2008, at 0:03 , Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Juho (I just noticed that I have another message from you, in another area. I will copy it and respond as quickly as I can, probably tomorrow. I'm inexpert at navigating this site, but learning. flg) In the message I'm responding to, you raise several important issues. IMPROVEMENT You mentioned several reasons why improving our political system is an uphill battle. I would add the complexity of human nature as another. Overcoming them is difficult, but "A trek of a thousand miles begins with a single step." In my view, the first step is to seek understanding. I tend to think that often the understanding is also the most crucial step. I mean that after such understanding and model is found that it covers all aspects and players and can be accepted by all, then people tend to think that actually it is obvious and it is natural to follow the model. The practical implementation of the model is then just straight forward work. The forces that guided our political development over the past 200 years are clear enough. So far, we've tended to think of them as inevitable. We've failed to examine them analytically for the purpose of deflecting the worst of them. (I had the privilege of sitting in on a political science course last year. It described many of the blemishes in our political process, historically and present, but did not address them from the perspective of learning to correct them. Neither, to my dismay, did it encourage such an intellectual approach.) We did not reach our present situation by accident. If we are to improve, we must learn to anticipate and inhibit the forces that derailed The Noble Experiment. It will be a long, hard road, not to be completed in my lifetime, but that is no excuse for not making the first "... small steps forward." LARGE GROUPS You make the excellent point that, under the method I outlined, large groups will succeed better than small groups. Warren Smith made the same point to me, privately. Where you suggest partisan dominance, he used advanced math to show that, based on purely racial attitudes, whites would dominate blacks. The rationale supporting some of Smith's mathematical terms were obscure, but I don't doubt the conclusion. I have no doubt the attitudes of the largest group of voters will prevail. However, the group that prevails will not be party and will not be race. It will be society (at least, insofar as society is reflected in the electorate) ... and the most common attitude in society is a desire for tranquility. Note that also the current two-party system of the USA has similar characteristics. The society will be run by the representatives of the largest faction. One could say that in a two-party system the opinions of the parties are not fixed but must move to follow the median opinion of the voters. If party X loses several elections in a row due to some particular opinion, it must change that opinion to better reflect the opinion of the voters to get the required 51% of the votes (in sufficient number of states). One alternative to allowing the largest faction to take control is to elect the representatives proportionally (and possibly also to use coalition governments instead of single party governments). Society is us. All of us; our friends, relatives, co-workers, neighbors and acquaintances. We have partisan feelings, we are influenced by our family, our race, our education, our national heritage, our age, our health and our status, but none of these are greater than the fact that we are, in toto, decent, law-abiding people. Society could not exist if we were not. Yes. I believe the level to which the citizens feel that the society is their own and tend to live in line with the ideal model is very important. Well working societies have high values, and low vales mean a non-working society. It is a question if people want to respect the rules of the society and see them as a set of rules that have been jointly agreed. This is the large group that will prevail; these are the "whites" in Smith's equations; these are the people whose attitudes will triumph ... if they are given a voice and a choice. A healthy society behaves like this. One must however watch the politicians so that they will not start driving their own personal interests. I mean that one should encourage the kind of behaviour you describe but one can not trust that the imperfect society would always take that route. Especially in politics the risks of corruption are not very far. There are also risks in allowing some single group to take strong control. => Maybe better to include also the minority opinions in the process some way. GROUP SIZE and PERSUASION You suggested larger groups and fewer layers. I am not averse to such a change, but would like to describe the rational
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 4, 2008, at 23:56 , Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Dave If I gave you the impression I was "... demanding that it (the party system) release control", I erred. I make no such demand, nor do I believe one to be practical. Strong party structure has its problems. Having no parties may be impossible. And not having parties or other groupings may also cause problems to the voters since they have hard time finding out what each individual candidate stands for. I note these problems of the two extremes since I want to present one intermediate approach. That approach is to allow and encourage having a more detailed group structure than just few monolithic parties. It could be possible e.g. to name different fractions within one major party. Some small parties could get together under a common umbrella organization. And all the groups could in principle be split into smaller groups until they have only two members. This would lead to a hierarchical structure of parties/ideologies/ groupings. It is possible to have a green wing under some right wing party, and a right wing section within the green party. It is quite easy to calculate proportional representation within such hierarchical structure. The benefits when compared to a partyless system is that now the voters can see better who represents what and what such candidates there are that are close to my preferences. The representatives also show clearly "colour" before the elections and are therefore to some extent bound to promoting the kind of policy they said they would drive. (It would not be as easy to say different things to each audience.) Just an idea in case you are interested in seeking alternatives to strong monolithic parties and total lack of parties. Juho ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Yes, agreed. In addition to having some targets on improving the society politicians (and any human beings) are often interested (to a varying degree) also in power, money and fame. Politics can offer all this to them. Another problem is that all aging "systems" have the risk of stagnation and gradual corruption. You mentioned also the problem of people believing that their own and dear system is already the best possible. And (as you also noted) the incumbents in good positions in the current system have no interest in changing the system (since that system was the one that gave them their current position). Improving such a system is always an uphill battle. I note that the financing of the campaigns may be a serious problem. One could try to do something with that also without the proposed method (e.g. by setting some limits on TV time and/or newspaper rows and/or number of phone calls and/or letters). Fraud is also a serious problem. In this case I do believe that also the current systems can be made practically fraud free, if there is just some political will to do so. (One just needs to make the ballots and process clear and count the results locally in the presence of representatives from multiple interest groups and then make the results public.) Few notes on the "Selecting Leaders From The People" method. The first possible theoretical problem is the fact that electing one candidate from each group to some extent favours large groups. I make a simplifying assumption that also in the new system there are two parties with 55% and 45% support. I also assume that a group that has two or three representatives from one party always elects a a candidate from that party. As a result the probability of electing a candidate from the bigger party is higher than 55%. And when one repeats this procedure multiple times hierarchically, eventually almost all representatives would be from the bigger party. My assumptions simplified the set-up a lot, but the trend of favouring large groupings is there. I don't know if this is ok to you or not. The basic idea that representatives at one layer will be elected by representatives at one step lower layer makes the gap between voters and representatives smaller than what it typically is today, and thereby makes the relationship stronger (this has many good implications). One can achieve these effects also with larger groups and fewer layers. One extreme is the electoral college in US that reduces the number of steps in two (I don't claim that it would have the same properties though). Another slightly different approach would be to elect not one but several representatives at each layer. This would reduce the problem of favouring large groupings. A similar tree style hierarchy could be constructed e.g. from groups of 1000 voters electing 50 representatives for the next higher layer. Also this hierarchy still favours large groupings but to a lesser degree. (This method would be in style more like a multi-winner multi-party method.) I wonder if the groups of three (or more) always represent some specific region. I guess this was the intention. I.e. if the process starts at the backyard will it also continue to electing the representatives of neighbourhoods, towns etc. If so, that would probably make the ties between the representatives and their voters tighter. If the relationship is tight and will be about the same also in the next elections that would make the representatives one step more responsible towards their voters (=> leads to some sort of a "village chief/representative" system). One problem is that even if the process, when started from a backyard, has no party influence at the beginning, it is possible that the party influence will infiltrate the system from top down (in good and bad). I.e. if there are some groupings/parties at the top level, the candidates at one level below could make their affiliations clear, and their voters might request them to do so. And that could then continue downwards in chain. The long chain in decision making is likely to lead also to complaints that the highest level decision makers do not listen to the lowest level voters any more, and that thers is some sort of corruption "in the chain". Maybe the chain should not be too long. And in some elections (or part of them) voters might also like to elect their representative directly. (For example how should one elect a president of a mayor? Maybe direct voting would be used in some cases instead of the chained voting model.) The practical problem of making the politicians adopt this proposal is of course huge. But one must start somewhere. Making people aware of the problems and offering them also good solutions to the problems may some day lead to small steps forward. Juho On Mar 4, 2008, at 23:54 , Fred Gohlke wrote: Good After
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Sun, 02 Mar 2008 10:45:42 -0500 Fred Gohlke wrote: > This site focuses on methods of conducting elections, but most posts > address only a single aspect of that topic; the way votes are counted. > Is not the object for which votes are cast a matter of even greater > concern? When our public officials are not representative of the people > who elect them and are masters of misdirection, obfuscation and deceit, > ought we not ask ourselves whether there is a taint in the method by > which they are selected? Ought we not consider the role of political > parties in the political process? > Reading this I think of: A direct attack on the party system, demanding that it release control. The party system, having the power to do so, retaliates - nets much pain and no gain. I have two thoughts: Let Fred establish a group for his goal. Let Election Methods stick with its current efforts. EM can and should think more of our environment, toward making our proposals more salable. Burying Plurality voting deserves to be an easy sale Think of three Presidential elections (though I am NOT ready to touch the Electoral College - that would need careful separate thought): 2000 and 2004 - with main race in a near tie, interaction as to how Plurality handles third parties caused much pain. NOTE that we are not against third parties; just against Plurality's handling. 2008 - Hillary and Barack are in a desperate struggle grasping for the single slot the Democrat party can offer due to Plurality's weakness. Letting both get to the general election and be handled reasonably would be better. Note that eliminating Plurality makes for healthier elections and more power to third parties. However, it does not prevent major parties from adapting and continuing - assuming they earn this. ... -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
On Mar 2, 2008, at 17:45 , Fred Gohlke wrote: SEEKING IMPROVEMENT We do not need partisanship, which sets one person against another; we need independent representatives who will think for themselves and reach intelligent decisions on matters of public concern. In other words, to improve our government, we must change the way we select our representatives. This sounds like you would be happy with something like STV. Parties do cause problems but also the other extreme where the representatives are all totally independent has some problems. I'd expect the totally independent representatives to associate themselves with some known groupings or ideologies to clarify their position. And this is not that far from having a new party structure. Another approach to expressing how the political system (of USA and many other countries too) should change is to say that the party behaviour and rules of behaviour should be improved. (Parties need not be tyrants and nests of evil but just free groupings of people with similar opinions.) Typical problems are having individual representatives that have no own power but that need to follow the policies set by the party leaders. Another might be too strong connections to some interest groups. Third one might be lack of contact to the voters and their true needs/interests. And fourth one use of cheap propaganda instead of open discussion. Any system has some tendency to corrupt in time. Political parties and the political system are no exceptions. One needs to stay awake and not let the system slide into something less good than what it was or what people expect it to be or become. One could also start by seeking the problems from the voters. There is a saying that citizens will get as good government as they deserve. I mean the voters that are well educated and that are offered good information on the state and plans and actions of the society throughout the election period may be capable of making wiser decisions in the elections than those who are just briefly targets of the marketing campaigns before the elections. Political systems are always an embodiment of human nature. Until we learn to harness our own nature, we can improve neither our politics nor our society. Yes. One viewpoint to the evolution of our societies is that we are on a journey from the laws of jungle towards societies that take the human needs better into account. There is no reason to believe that the current systems would be perfect. We have taken many steps from the pure "laws of jungle" model but certainly also further improving steps are possible. Such changes occur slowly. Ought we not start to consider the methods by which they can be accomplished? Yes. I do believe that many of the shortcomings of politics do have strong links and may be traced back to the incumbent political parties and the way they operate. But that doesn't necessarily mean that parties would be evil as such, or that political systems without parties would automatically perform better. Thorough understanding of the dynamics of the political system is needed to make its operation better (in small or large steps). Juho ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" The Wall Street Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics
Hi, Fred Gohlke wrote: > This site focuses on methods of conducting elections, but most posts > address only a single aspect of that topic; the way votes are counted. > Is not the object for which votes are cast a matter of even greater > concern? When our public officials are not representative of the people > who elect them and are masters of misdirection, obfuscation and deceit, > ought we not ask ourselves whether there is a taint in the method by > which they are selected? Ought we not consider the role of political > parties in the political process? > -snip- My view is that the reason we have two large parties that each nominate one candidate per office is the bad voting method, which punishes people who fail to form the largest coalition. It also punishes those who seek the best compromise, by reducing the "votes" cast for them (if they bothered to compete) by squeezing them between other candidates. Fix the voting method to change the parties and promote cooperation. Regards, Steve Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
