Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
On Dec 10, 2007, at 16:40 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 01:12 AM 12/5/2007, Juho wrote: On Dec 5, 2007, at 5:24 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: If someone can buy a candidate's withdrawal, they could presumably also buy the candidate if the candidate wins, and the latter is actually more dangerous! Buying the withdrawal of a losing candidate is probably cheaper. Cheaper and less effective. Essentially, one is buying fewer votes. Now, how is the winner going to know that he should be grateful to Mr. Bigpockets for the bribe? Tell him, it might backfire. (Either the winner is ethical and reports the attempt to align him with Mr. Bigpocket's desires, or he is not and, of course, wants more money, and what was paid to the loser isn't of any benefit to him he *might* think it was, and *might* go along, but it's risky for Bigpockets. Buy the winner and you have control over the process of legislation. Buy a loser, you merely gain a shaky opportunity. The deal could be e.g. such that there are three looped candidates A>B>C>A. A has the smallest defeat and is about to win before the "withdrawal rounds". Candidate B can now withdraw and make C the winner. C offers B some nice position to B for a withdrawal (C will be the winner so he can arrange this). B may also actually prefer C to A and will withdraw from that reason since based on the results B>C>A was probably a common opinion among the C supporters, and maybe B's personal opinion too. B might claim that the reason for his withdrawal is the high number of strategic votes that made A unjustly the winner. We have no way of knowing if that is the truth. Juho ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" The Wall Street Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
On Dec 11, 2007, at 0:02 , Steve Eppley wrote: > If candidates may not withdraw after the voting, some of them may be > forced to withdraw before the voting (also known as "deciding not to > run, out of fear of being a spoiler that worsens the outcome") or some > voters may be induced to vote insincerely. Fortunately the results of the election are typically not known beforehand. Therefore the reasons and information behind a withdrawal before the election are typically quite different from what they would be after the election. I also note that e.g. in the US presidential elections there have been few spoilers and many candidates that could have become spoilers but I think there are not many that would have given up the race already before the election. > I've observed considerable > voter negativity regarding not having a good enough candidate to vote > for on election day, in systems where spoiling prevents candidates > from > running, and having to "hold one's nose" while casting a vote for a > less-preferred candidate. I expect there would be considerable voter > negativity regarding the need to vote strategically in systems that do > not permit withdrawal. After an election with withdrawals there can be two winners - one that would have won based on the ballots and one that won as a result of the withdrawals. Maybe the voters that supported the first "winner" are also disappointed with the method. That may be true especially if the first winner did not "win" as a result of strategic voting. Or if most of his supporters think so. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
Hi, Diego Santos wrote: > 2007/12/3, Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > >> Perhaps I failed to emphasize, when I mentioned the withdrawal option a >> few days ago, that it sharply reduces the incentive to vote >> strategically? A candidate strategically raised over the sincere winner >> could withdraw if necessary to elect the sincere winner, and typically >> would have strong incentives to do so, so why would voters bother >> organizing to misrepresent their preferences? >> >> If it is agreed that the withdrawal option sharply reduces the voters' >> incentive to vote strategically, then it makes little sense to choose a >> voting method based on comparisons only of methods that don't permit >> withdrawal, and then graft withdrawal onto the chosen method. It makes >> more sense to include methods that permit withdrawal in the set of >> methods being compared, and choose a method from this larger set. > - Sometimes withdraw option is not applicable (e. g., referenda) > - I think that effective use of CWO should be avoided, because of their > possible negative perception of change of winner after elections. > > Diego Santos > The withdrawal option can be used for referenda and other ballot propositions. Each referendum or proposition is placed on the ballot by someone, who can be authorized to withdraw it. Obviously, there is no empirical evidence there will be a negative perception that the winner has changed wrongfully after a candidate's withdrawal influences the outcome. I do not agree that the possibility some voters will view the outcome negatively is sufficient reason not to allow withdrawal. Think about the candidates' incentives. The candidates will expect scrutiny of their decisions whether or not to withdraw, and if their decisions do not pass muster then their political futures will be undermined. Also, think about the voters' learning process. I do not believe it would take more than one or two election cycles before most voters understand the usefulness of the withdrawal option to society. If candidates may not withdraw after the voting, some of them may be forced to withdraw before the voting (also known as "deciding not to run, out of fear of being a spoiler that worsens the outcome") or some voters may be induced to vote insincerely. I've observed considerable voter negativity regarding not having a good enough candidate to vote for on election day, in systems where spoiling prevents candidates from running, and having to "hold one's nose" while casting a vote for a less-preferred candidate. I expect there would be considerable voter negativity regarding the need to vote strategically in systems that do not permit withdrawal. A couple of weeks ago in this thread of messages, I wrote about voting methods in which each candidate publishes an ordering of the candidates prior to election day. Another advantage of such methods (besides simplifying election day for the voters) is that the published orderings would serve to forecast the candidates' decisions whether to withdraw. A candidate whose withdrawal decision is inconsistent with his published ordering would presumably attract intense scrutiny, undermining his political future. Also, the candidates' orderings would help prepare voters in advance for the withdrawal decisions, and (the few) voters who might respond negatively could choose to vote for someone else. --Steve Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
2007/12/3, Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Perhaps I failed to emphasize, when I mentioned the withdrawal option a > few days ago, that it sharply reduces the incentive to vote > strategically? A candidate strategically raised over the sincere winner > could withdraw if necessary to elect the sincere winner, and typically > would have strong incentives to do so, so why would voters bother > organizing to misrepresent their preferences? > > If it is agreed that the withdrawal option sharply reduces the voters' > incentive to vote strategically, then it makes little sense to choose a > voting method based on comparisons only of methods that don't permit > withdrawal, and then graft withdrawal onto the chosen method. It makes > more sense to include methods that permit withdrawal in the set of > methods being compared, and choose a method from this larger set. > > - Sometimes withdraw option is not applicable (e. g., referenda) - I think that effective use of CWO should be avoided, because of their possible negative perception of change of winner after elections. Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
At 01:12 AM 12/5/2007, Juho wrote: >On Dec 5, 2007, at 5:24 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > >>If someone can buy a candidate's withdrawal, they could presumably >>also buy the candidate if the candidate wins, and the latter is >>actually more dangerous! > >Buying the withdrawal of a losing candidate is probably cheaper. Cheaper and less effective. Essentially, one is buying fewer votes. Now, how is the winner going to know that he should be grateful to Mr. Bigpockets for the bribe? Tell him, it might backfire. (Either the winner is ethical and reports the attempt to align him with Mr. Bigpocket's desires, or he is not and, of course, wants more money, and what was paid to the loser isn't of any benefit to him he *might* think it was, and *might* go along, but it's risky for Bigpockets. Buy the winner and you have control over the process of legislation. Buy a loser, you merely gain a shaky opportunity. >>Consider an asset system where the electors maintain the right of >>recall -- essentially vote reassignment. > >This kind of systems would keep the voters in touch and in charge of >what is happening in politics. Probably not, at least not the average voter. But it creates a class of voters who *are* likely to be more interested, because their interest can result in changes. Immediate changes, if there are enough of them. > The inability of voters to change >their opinion in midterm can also be intentional. It is. > This kind of an >arrangement guarantees the representatives a more steady basis for >work and makes it possible to make decisions that are not very >popular among the voters (e.g. taxes) (but that might be better >understood among them by the next election). Yes, this is the classic argument. It's a fundamentally antidemocratic argument, I'll note. The same principle is used to argue against *any* democracy, except among an elite. The argument is actually sound, in a way, given the existing structure. Implement direct democracy, you'll see serious problems. But Asset Voting is not direct democracy, and the Direct/Representative hybrid I've proposed doesn't interfere with the ability of representatives to *work.* The "work" is deliberative process, and there is no need to bounce elected representatives from that process immediately, even if they lost all their votes. Only if they were seriously disruptive would it become necessary to relieve them of their seat quickly. And any assembly can do that anyway under current conditions. The basic concept that has been introduced here is a separation between deliberative process (which requires a smaller participating group) and voting (which need not be so restricted). Routinely, I expect that nearly all votes would be cast by those with seats and only a few by electors outside the assembly. However, if the assembly seriously departs from representing the voters (through the freely chosen electors), there is then a safety valve, a penumbra of electors starts to become more active, reweighting the assembly toward representing the people. Gradually, the seats are recomposed, but not quickly, unless there are immediate recall actions. I'd discourage that, absent true emergency, and I can't imagine one that would require it. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
On Dec 5, 2007, at 5:24 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > If someone can buy a candidate's withdrawal, they could presumably > also buy the candidate if the candidate wins, and the latter is > actually more dangerous! Buying the withdrawal of a losing candidate is probably cheaper. > Consider an asset system where the electors maintain the right of > recall -- essentially vote reassignment. This kind of systems would keep the voters in touch and in charge of what is happening in politics. The inability of voters to change their opinion in midterm can also be intentional. This kind of an arrangement guarantees the representatives a more steady basis for work and makes it possible to make decisions that are not very popular among the voters (e.g. taxes) (but that might be better understood among them by the next election). Juho ___ Copy addresses and emails from any email account to Yahoo! Mail - quick, easy and free. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/trueswitch2.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
At 12:29 AM 12/4/2007, Juho wrote: >Withdrawal option has both positive and negative impact. The positive >side was already discussed. On the negative side there are problems >like candidates deciding the outcome of the election instead of the >voters and risk of corruption. Also in the case of a natural loop >there is the possibility to buy the withdrawal of one of the >candidates. I've seen this kind of argument against Asset Voting, which puts even more power, of course, into the hands of those holding votes. In the case of Asset, if the rules are as needed, though, the entire political structure could change; in particular, anyone could register and, if nothing else, vote for himself or herself; more to the point, candidates could and, I predict, would collect votes on a very small scale. People would end up voting for someone they know or at least can communicate personally with. Here, though, we'd have something much more like a traditional election. What is missed by these arguments is that elections are held for a purpose, and the purpose is not (both from the voter and the candidate's perspective, as well as from the perspective of one who would attempt to corrupt the process) to get elected, per se, but to exercise power. If someone can buy a candidate's withdrawal, they could presumably also buy the candidate if the candidate wins, and the latter is actually more dangerous! There seems to be some kind of automatic reaction to the idea of candidates deciding election outcomes, even if those candidates have specifically been given that power by voters deciding to trust them with their votes. Again, if we can't trust the judgement of a candidate in how he or she would transfer votes, why would we trust the candidate in office? For many offices, and certainly for major ones, the ability to make good choices in the delegation of power is crucial. Someone not good at it, someone corruptible in it, will be corruptible in either position: as an "elector" or as a winner holding office. There is an endemic and deep distrust of politicians. While it's certainly understandable, it's also abusive. Power corrupts, we definitely need to understand that, but it also corrupts through specific mechanisms; when power is concentrated on a mass scale with no close responsibility, it becomes easily corrupted. Consider an asset system where the electors maintain the right of recall -- essentially vote reassignment. If an office holder were responsible to -- and recallable by -- say, twenty electors who had, directly and indirectly, assembled the votes to elect him or her, the responsibility, the connection with the source of power, i.e., the people, would be immediate and effective. One who would corrupt by exerting influence over a power node could easily find that they succeed in influencing the official, who then loses office because of losing the trust of the twenty. So, then, the effort would be focused on the twenty. Besides becoming many times as expensive, each of those twenty has been assigned votes by, say, twenty. The one corrupted is going to have to come up with some very good arguments in order to be able to convince those who maintain his or her power. And if those arguments exist, why not just use the arguments instead of trying to buy compliance? Not only is it cheaper, it's also legal and not risky. On the other hand, trying to buy influence in such a system is only a problem if it is concealed and focused (this is necessary when it's truly corruption, i.e., the influence is contrary to the interests of whose power is being corrupted, but who do not receive the benefit of the payoff). If it is open, it is not corruption, it is mitigation and negotiation. These benefits become, I expect, quite clear when terms of office are abolished, that is, officers serve, as in a parliamentary system, only with the maintained consent of those they serve. Terms are typically long enough that a great deal of damage can be done before a miscreant who simply loses trust -- which might be a matter of intuition -- can be removed. Only if the misbehavior is blatant can recall, a cumbersome, difficult and expensive process in itself, possibly succeed, unless proof of criminal activity can be found. (Recall is also used abusively by well-funded political interests who can sometimes capitalize on weaknesses in the public perception of some officeholders.) I think we need to start looking at how to realize, much more fully, efficiently, and effectively, the promise of democracy: government by the consent of the governed. And we can do even better than that; it may be possible to remove much or even most of the coercive nature of government, when people begin to truly trust it as an institution that serves them, listens to them, is responsible and responsive to them, personally as well as collectively. And it's possible to get from here to there, one step
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
The withdrawal option could encourage sincere voting in Condorcet style elections. If so, that would again put more weight on evaluating (the rest of) the method based on how it behaves with sincere votes. I hope there would not be need to use the withdrawal option often. Withdrawal option has both positive and negative impact. The positive side was already discussed. On the negative side there are problems like candidates deciding the outcome of the election instead of the voters and risk of corruption. Also in the case of a natural loop there is the possibility to buy the withdrawal of one of the candidates. Sometimes it also makes sense for one candidate (in a sincere loop) to withdraw to avoid electing (from his/her point of view) some reasonably good candidate instead of a bad candidate. One option to reduce the problems would be to require a court decision on if strategic manipulation of the election outcome was likely (or a possibility), and only then allow candidates to withdraw. Of course the decision would still be very difficult, and in some cases one would not know if independent individuals decided to vote strategically (e.g. based of reading the EM list). Having such a "court decision" rule could make at least public recommendations to vote strategically less tempting. I also note that strategic voting and recommendations to vote strategically appear to be quite rare in current systems like top two runoff (based on my personal relatively limited visibility to them). Good morale, uncertainty of the opinions, heterogeneous voters and the difficulty of controlling the voters may often be enough to keep strategic voting at low levels although there could be some strategic options open (theoretically). Juho On Dec 3, 2007, at 17:43 , Steve Eppley wrote: Perhaps I failed to emphasize, when I mentioned the withdrawal option a few days ago, that it sharply reduces the incentive to vote strategically? A candidate strategically raised over the sincere winner could withdraw if necessary to elect the sincere winner, and typically would have strong incentives to do so, so why would voters bother organizing to misrepresent their preferences? If it is agreed that the withdrawal option sharply reduces the voters' incentive to vote strategically, then it makes little sense to choose a voting method based on comparisons only of methods that don't permit withdrawal, and then graft withdrawal onto the chosen method. It makes more sense to include methods that permit withdrawal in the set of methods being compared, and choose a method from this larger set. --Steve --- Juho wrote: On Nov 30, 2007, at 19:33 , Diego Santos wrote: I think that cloneproof violation is not severe when a method meets Smith. Probably near all majority rule cycles in contetions elections will be caused by burying. Then, additional resistance to this strategy will be desirable for a Condorcet method. If clone independence is desirable too, "Smith,IRV" is an alternative. Why do you expect burying to be the main reason to cycles? Does this apply to exceptionally contentious elections only or to all typical elections? The cycles may also be caused also by "random like" variation in opinions in close races. Also natural cycles where the voter opinions really are cyclic are quite possible. Factors that may reduce the probability of strategic cycles are e.g. changing opinion poll results before the elections and inability of the voters to use the strategies in the strategically optimal way. In general I tend to think that Condorcet methods are at their best when strategic voting is not widespread or is not well organized (=hopefully reduces to just noise). I really wouldn't like to see general public use all the various Condorcet strategies that are discussed on this list. In most cases Condorcet based methods are maybe immune enough to strategic voting (especially when compared to other commonly used methods). If this is the case then the best method may be the one that performs best with sincere votes (possibly slightly random and marginally strategic). Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" The Wall Street Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
Perhaps I failed to emphasize, when I mentioned the withdrawal option a few days ago, that it sharply reduces the incentive to vote strategically? A candidate strategically raised over the sincere winner could withdraw if necessary to elect the sincere winner, and typically would have strong incentives to do so, so why would voters bother organizing to misrepresent their preferences? If it is agreed that the withdrawal option sharply reduces the voters' incentive to vote strategically, then it makes little sense to choose a voting method based on comparisons only of methods that don't permit withdrawal, and then graft withdrawal onto the chosen method. It makes more sense to include methods that permit withdrawal in the set of methods being compared, and choose a method from this larger set. --Steve --- Juho wrote: > On Nov 30, 2007, at 19:33 , Diego Santos wrote: > > >> I think that cloneproof violation is not severe when a method meets >> Smith. Probably near all majority rule cycles in contetions >> elections will be caused by burying. Then, additional resistance to >> this strategy will be desirable for a Condorcet method. If clone >> independence is desirable too, "Smith,IRV" is an alternative. >> > > Why do you expect burying to be the main reason to cycles? Does this > apply to exceptionally contentious elections only or to all typical > elections? > > The cycles may also be caused also by "random like" variation in > opinions in close races. Also natural cycles where the voter opinions > really are cyclic are quite possible. > > Factors that may reduce the probability of strategic cycles are e.g. > changing opinion poll results before the elections and inability of > the voters to use the strategies in the strategically optimal way. > > In general I tend to think that Condorcet methods are at their best > when strategic voting is not widespread or is not well organized > (=hopefully reduces to just noise). I really wouldn't like to see > general public use all the various Condorcet strategies that are > discussed on this list. In most cases Condorcet based methods are > maybe immune enough to strategic voting (especially when compared to > other commonly used methods). If this is the case then the best > method may be the one that performs best with sincere votes (possibly > slightly random and marginally strategic). > > Juho > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
On Nov 30, 2007, at 19:33 , Diego Santos wrote: > I think that cloneproof violation is not severe when a method meets > Smith. Probably near all majority rule cycles in contetions > elections will be caused by burying. Then, additional resistance to > this strategy will be desirable for a Condorcet method. If clone > independence is desirable too, "Smith,IRV" is an alternative. Why do you expect burying to be the main reason to cycles? Does this apply to exceptionally contentious elections only or to all typical elections? The cycles may also be caused also by "random like" variation in opinions in close races. Also natural cycles where the voter opinions really are cyclic are quite possible. Factors that may reduce the probability of strategic cycles are e.g. changing opinion poll results before the elections and inability of the voters to use the strategies in the strategically optimal way. In general I tend to think that Condorcet methods are at their best when strategic voting is not widespread or is not well organized (=hopefully reduces to just noise). I really wouldn't like to see general public use all the various Condorcet strategies that are discussed on this list. In most cases Condorcet based methods are maybe immune enough to strategic voting (especially when compared to other commonly used methods). If this is the case then the best method may be the one that performs best with sincere votes (possibly slightly random and marginally strategic). Juho ___ Does your mail provider give you FREE antivirus protection? Get Yahoo! Mail http://uk.mail.yahoo.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
2007/11/30, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > I agree, they should. But how can you promise it? I cannot do it. But pairwise sorted plurality, like DMC, gives more freedom than winning votes, because wv advantage over margins is based in truncation. However, using the plurality vote as the strength of a defeat would cause > clone independence to be violated. More importantly, it's likely that this > measure would mean that you need to rank a viable candidate in the top > position on your ballot, or risk causing him to lose. I think that cloneproof violation is not severe when a method meets Smith. Probably near all majority rule cycles in contetions elections will be caused by burying. Then, additional resistance to this strategy will be desirable for a Condorcet method. If clone independence is desirable too, "Smith,IRV" is an alternative. In my opinion it's better for it to be safer to be sincere about your first > preference, than for it to be safe to rank less preferred candidates whose > supporters you fear will use strategy against you. I am not advocating pairwise sorted plurality as a definitive voting method, it is only an initial thought. I have fear that some methods can encourage people to bullet their vote. Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
