Re: Dark Matter, dark eneggy, & conservation

2003-11-06 Thread James N Rose
If we are now observing acceleration,
that means there was Inflation (huge acceleration)
and then a huge reduction in acceleration.

So, what bled off the extra original acceleration
momentum?  Or countered it?  

Are we do believe that this 'dark matter' which
is out there 'increasing acceleration' is also 
responsible for the phase of 'decelerating
acceleration' that had to have been in place 
prior to the current cosmological era??!

James



Re: Dark Matter, dark eneggy, & conservation

2003-11-06 Thread Ron McFarland
On 3 Nov 2003 at 16:45, Joao Leao wrote:
> Part II:
> >It is not the distance that contributes, it is the
> > relative rate of expansion that contributes to the apparent 
redshift
> > (all other factors that can contribute to redshift being ignored 
for
> > the purpose of concentrating only on the affect caused by 
inflation
> > itself). The further something is away from us, relatively 
speaking,
> > then the faster it is moving away from us. With inflation being 
on
> > an
> >
> > ever increasing rate, there comes a point in finite time when the
> > expansion rate reaches a level that causes the entire universe to
> > appear dark and at absolute zero in temperature in reference to 
all
> > its matter relative to itself.
> 
> If the acceleration persists, which is may or not be the case, that 
is
> surely a possibility, depending on some other features of the
> concordance model being verified or not. But we are still not sure
> that the acceleration is forever...

That's both an astonishing and maybe just a little bit of a scary 
thought. Is there some hint of any kind that the acceleration of the 
universe might have a limiting factor?

> > In other words, the redshift at all points within the universe 
will
> > have shifted to a level of absolute zero observable energy at 
some
> > future time because the universe is then expanding (at every 
point
> > within itself) at or beyond a rate that would allow energy to 
find
> > anything in the universe that it could be relative to.
> 
> I don't quite understand this last sentence. 

Assume that at some distant time the inflation rate of space/time has 
exceeded the speed of light. At that moment, and forever thereafter, 
no particle within that inflation region could interact with another -
- because the distance between particles is increasing faster than a 
particle can transverse any distance at the speed of light or below. 
That leads to the conclusion that the affected particle is then no 
longer relative to anything but itself. As far as that affected 
particle is concerned it IS the entire universe and nothing else 
exists. This of course is an illusion, from the larger viewpoint of 
the meta universe. But I argue that when the particle becomes in that 
way relative only to itself then it has in fact melded with the meta 
universe, meaning that its energy has in fact returned to the meta 
universe from which it was spawned during the big bang.

>But it may be worth
> pointing
> out that dark energy is uniformely and isotropically distributed so
> that

It is? That would infer a homogeneous distribution of energy that 
does not appear to hold true with any other observation of the 
universe. If the big bang had resulted in an observable universe that 
is uniform in structure or composition throughout then one might 
expect the same of dark energy, but this does not appear to be the 
case. I would argue that when/if we are able to measure (as opposed 
to just infer) dark energy then we will find it to be distributed in 
much the same way as is energy that we can now measure.

> it seems to be something akin to the largest scales of 
matter/energy
> distribution, for example, inertial mass distibution (dark and lit) 
or
> better still, curvature or torsion. There are several models of DE
> proposed along these lines...

Perhaps. As you say, it's too early to know. But our closed universe 
has of late been attributed to have a shape that is NOT a smooth 
spheroid. Amazingly, it appears to be composed of interlocking shapes 
that are not that of a sphere, but because the universe is closed the 
aggregate appearance is theat of a non smooth spheroid. Maybe this is 
not so amazing, since no perfect sphere seems to exist in nature.

> > In that
> > situation a particle would never be able to travel from any point 
A
> > to any point B, although it might try to do so for as long as it
> > existed.  Eventually the particle could no longer exist, because 
it
> > itself would loose coherency as its integral parts moved away 
from
> > each other as a consequence of the space it occupies continuing 
to
> > inflate, and thereby move its parts away from each other until
> > nuclear forces could no longer maintain the attraction that keeps
> > the
> >
> > particle (of any type whatsoever) from totally disintegrating.
> 
> Well, I can't quite make out what you are saying here! I don't 
think
> the "integrity of particles" is threteaned by universal 
acceleration.

Perhaps not if indeed a particle, once the inflation rate has reached 
a rate relative to a particle so that the particle can no longer 
itneract with any other particle, then the particle has indeed melded 
with an thereby returned its energy to the meta universe from which 
it originated to begin with.

But if it does not, then ALL points in space relative to that 
particle, including at all points within and exterior to the 
particle, keep increasing in expansion rate. In that case the 
distance between b

Re: Request for a glossary of acronyms

2003-11-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 16:54 05/11/03 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:


Hal Finney wrote:

One correction, in the descriptions below I should have said multiverse
for all of them instead of universe.  The distinction between the SSA
and the SSSA is not multiverse vs universe, it is observers vs observer-
moments.  I'll send out an updated copy when I get some more links and/or
corrections and new definitions.
Hal

> SSA - The Self-Sampling Assumption, which says that you should consider
> yourself as a randomly sampled observer from among all observers in the
> multiverse.
>
> SSSA - The Strong Self-Sampling Assumption, which says that you should
> consider this particular observer-moment you are experiencing as being
> randomly sampled from among all observer-moments in the universe.
>
> ASSA - The Absolute Self-Sampling Assumption, which says that you should
> consider your next observer-moment to be randomly sampled from among all
> observer-moments in the universe.
>
> RSSA - The Relative Self-Sampling Assumption, which says that you should
> consider your next observer-moment to be randomly sampled from among all
> observer-moments which come immediately after your current observer-moment
> and belong to the same observer.
In your definition of the ASSA, why do you define it in terms of your next 
observer moment? Wouldn't it be possible to have a version of the SSA 
where you consider your *current* observer moment to be randomly sampled 
from the set of all observer-moments, but you use something like the RSSA 
to guess what your next observer moment is likely to be like?

Also, what about a weighted version of the ASSA? I believe other animals 
are conscious and thus would qualify as observers/observer-moments, which 
would suggest I am extraordinarily lucky to find myself as an 
observer-moment of what seems like the most intelligent species on the 
planet...but could there be an element of the anthropic principle here? 
Perhaps some kind of theory of consciousness would assign something like a 
"mental complexity" to different observer-moments, and the self-sampling 
assumption could be biased in favor of more complex minds.

Likewise, one might use a graded version of the RSSA to deal with "degrees 
of similarity", instead of having it be a simple either-or whether a 
future observer-moment "belongs to the same observer" or not as you 
suggest in your definition. There could be some small probability that my 
next observer-moment will be of a completely different person, but in most 
cases it would be more likely that my next observer-moment would be 
basically similar to my current one. But one might also have to take into 
account the absolute measure on all-observer moments that I suggest above, 
so that if there is a very low absolute probability of a brain that can 
suggest a future observer-moment which is very similar to my current one 
(because, say, I am standing at ground zero of a nuclear explosion) then 
the relative probability of my next observer-moment being completely 
different would be higher. Again, one would need something like a theory 
of consciousness to quantify stuff like "degrees of similarity" and the 
details of how the tradeoff between relative probability and absolute 
probability would work.




In my opinion, and if I understand Jesse Mazer
properly, he is right. Now, with the comp. hyp. you have
(obviously) constraints coming from computer science
(itself related to number theory including universal one
not depending of any particular implementation).
A theory of consciousness which suits well both the
traditional thought experiment (self-duplicability) and
self-referential discourse can be extracted from what
a machine can, in general, correctly bet
on its possible consistent computational extensions.
That moves corresponds to comp-immortality,
we just don't take into account the cul-de-sac worlds, (which
corresponds to the world with no more accessible worlds
in the Kripke semantics of the logic of self-reference).
It is the move going from the logic of machine-provability
to the logic of machine "provability & consistency",
or the move from  []p to a *new* box defined by []p&-[]-p.
From this (when p is restricted on the DU accessible proposition),
(the $\Sigma_1 proposition for the logicians), you get A quantum
logic, from which you get, I think, the similarity relations
you are searching. (This because from the yes/no quantum
logic you can derive an angle of PI/2 radians, and from that angle
you can derive all the angles, well if THAT quantum logic behaves
sufficiently well, and that's not yet clear at this point.
Of course at this point things are rather technical.
Just to make a link with what Hal Finney said, I have provide
indeed an argument showing that if we (I) are machine then
physics comes from computer science, but I have also provide
the more technically involved arithmetical translation of that
argument in the language of a "mean" self-referentially consistent
universal Tu

Re: Request for a glossary of acronyms

2003-11-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 09:24 06/11/03 +0100, Alberto Gómez wrote:


For me there is no bigger step between to wonder about how conscience
arises from a universe made by atoms in a Newtonian universe, particles
in a quantum universe, quarks in a quantum relativistic universe and
finally, superstring/n-branes in a 11 dimensional universe for one side
and, on the other side, to wonder about how SAS in a complex enough
mathematical structure can have a sense of conscience.
I agree. It is a genuine point.

[SNIP]

That must be true either in our "physical"
world or the world of a geometrical figure in a n-dimensional spacetime,
or in a computer simulation defined by a complex enough algorithm (These
three alternative ways of describing universes may be isomorphic, being
the first a particular case or not. The computability of our universe
doesn't matter for this question).


I disagree, because if you take the comp. hyp. seriously enough
the physical should emerge as some precise modality from an
inside view of Arithmetical Truth. See UDA ref in Hal Finney's post.



So the mathematical existence, when SAS are possible inside the
mathematical formulation, implies existence (the expression "physical
existence" may be a redundancy)


Same remark. What you say is not only true, but with comp it is
quasi-constructively true so that you can extract the logic and probability
"physical rules" in computer science (even in computer's computer science).
making the comp. hyp. popper-falsifiable.


But, for these mathematical descriptions to exist, it is necessary the
existence of being with a higher dimensionality and intelligence that
formulate these mathematical descriptions?  That is: every mathematical
object does exist outside of any conscience? The issue is not to
question that "mathematical existence (with SAS) implies physical
existence", (according with the above arguments it is equivalent). The
question is the mathematical existence itself.


Now, it is fact, the failure of logicism, that you cannot define integers
without implicitely postulating them. So Arithmetical existence is a
quasi necessary departure reality. It is big and not unifiable by any
axiomatisable theory (by Godel).
(axiomatizable theory = theory such that you can verify algorithmically
the proofs of the theorems)
I refer often to Arithmetical Realism AR; and it constitutes 1/3 of
the computationalist hypothesis, alias the comp. hyp., alias COMP:
   COMP = AR + CT + YD(Yes, more acronyms, sorry!)

AR = Arithmetical Realism (cf also the "Hardy post")
CT = Church Thesis
YD = (I propose) the "Yes Doctor",  It is the belief that you can be
decomposed into part such that you don't experience anything when
those parts are substituted by functionnaly equivalent digital parts.
It makes possible to give sense saying yes to a surgeon who propose
you some artificial substitution of your body. With COMP you can justify
why this needs an irreductible act of faith (the consistency of
COMP entails the consistency of the negation of COMP, this is akin
to Godel's second incompleteness theorem.
It has nothing to do with the hypothesis that there is a physical universe
which would be either the running or the output of a computer program.
Hal, with COMP the "identity problem" is tackled by the venerable old
computer science/logic approach to self-reference (with the result by Godel,
Lob, Solovay, build on Kleene, Turing, Post etc...).
I will comment Jesse's post later, because I must go now.

Bruno











Re: SAS and mathematical existence

2003-11-06 Thread David Kwinter
On Thursday, November 6, 2003, at 01:24  AM, Alberto Gómez wrote:

But, for these mathematical descriptions to exist, it is necessary the
existence of being with a higher dimensionality and intelligence that
formulate these mathematical descriptions?  That is: every mathematical
object does exist outside of any conscience? The issue is not to
question that "mathematical existence (with SAS) implies physical
existence", (according with the above arguments it is equivalent). The
question is the mathematical existence itself.


I think Tegmark's level 4 explains-away any fine tuning of our 
understanding of math/physics by allowing infinite sets (MWI).. every 
conscience observer may wonder why their maths are setup just right. In 
the universes which have magical math that lacks whatever consistency 
evolution needs  - there are presumably no observers.



SAS and mathematical existence

2003-11-06 Thread Alberto Gómez
For me there is no bigger step between to wonder about how conscience
arises from a universe made by atoms in a Newtonian universe, particles
in a quantum universe, quarks in a quantum relativistic universe and
finally, superstring/n-branes in a 11 dimensional universe for one side
and, on the other side, to wonder about how SAS in a complex enough
mathematical structure can have a sense of conscience. 

Conscience has evolutionary advantages in biological terms, and probably
the conscience will emerge, with time, in any description in which the
rules permit a replication-with-variations/selection and where one
objects feeds from others. It doesn't matter if the description is made
of n-branes in 11 dimensional spaces or in any other
mathematical/algorithmical construct.

These self aware structures in their particular space-time will describe
trajectories in which a superintelligent and supradimensional observer
could see, inside the SAS, some components: neurons, or alike, that
shows signs of troughs about themselves and the rest of their world in a
way that interactions between SAS will depend on the changes of their
brains -or something like brains-. This is the most that an external
observer can experience about the conscience of other beings. These
beings will think, so they will exist -and they will think that they
exist, that is crucial - . That must be true either in our "physical"
world or the world of a geometrical figure in a n-dimensional spacetime,
or in a computer simulation defined by a complex enough algorithm (These
three alternative ways of describing universes may be isomorphic, being
the first a particular case or not. The computability of our universe
doesn't matter for this question).

So the mathematical existence, when SAS are possible inside the
mathematical formulation, implies existence (the expression "physical
existence" may be a redundancy) 

But, for these mathematical descriptions to exist, it is necessary the
existence of being with a higher dimensionality and intelligence that
formulate these mathematical descriptions?  That is: every mathematical
object does exist outside of any conscience? The issue is not to
question that "mathematical existence (with SAS) implies physical
existence", (according with the above arguments it is equivalent). The
question is the mathematical existence itself.




Re: Quantum accident survivor

2003-11-06 Thread David Kwinter
On Tuesday, November 4, 2003, at 10:47  AM, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
Let me stress this point: *I am, for all practical purposes,
one and only one specific configuration of atoms in a
specific universe. I could never say that ' I ' is ALL the
copies, since I NEVER experience what the other copies
experience. The other copies are just similar
configurations of atoms in other universes, which shared
the same history, prior to a given point in time.*


I would consider these other copies entirely equal to myself IF AND 
ONLY IF they are succeeding RSSA observer-moments.



Glossary references   : )

RSSA - The Relative Self-Sampling Assumption, which says that you should
consider your next observer-moment to be randomly sampled from among all
observer-moments which come immediately after your current 
observer-moment
and belong to the same observer.