Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
At 13:55 27/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Ok, one last stab. You are going to be copied and teleported to 1000 different planets. Only your body and your brain will be copied. On 999 of these planets, everyone speaks Spanish, and on one planet, everyone speaks French. You don't know either language, and you are only allowed to learn one of them before your departure. From my perspective, learning Spanish is the correct choice. From your perspective, there's no reason to chose one over the other. Is there? -- Kory I would learn Spanish before teleportation, in order to give my descendants the best chance of success; but going on what I said above, I shouldn't care at all, because I'll be dead and someone else (or 1000 others) will take my place! But you will be dead in the same sense that you will be dead in the next instant, at least with what I understand when you quote Parfit. In THAT case you shouldn't care at all in the presence of any possible threats, no? (BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book Reasons and Persons) that we are token. I have already argued that with the comp hyp we can only be type. That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument Parfit gives for our token self-identity is that we would be immortal if we were type. That's not so easy, but even if it were I don't think it is a convincing argument.) I don't think we need a sophisticate theory of personal identity for understanding the consequence of comp. We need just not to confuse the first person, which are not duplicable, from their body (third person describable) which are duplicable. Your comments and answers to Kory seems rather unclear to me. What do you mean by I'll be dead giving that the comp hyp makes you dead in that sense (annihilated and then reconstituted) at each conceivable instant? Actually you do the 1/3 distinction when you say someone else (or 1000 others) will take my place. it is someone else from the 1-view, and 1000 others from the 3 view. Now we must derive physics from the 1-view of 3-splitted-differentiating machines in platonia. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Quantum mechanics without quantum logic
At 17:28 17/04/04 +0200, I wrote: I do believe this has no bearing at all with any magical trick capable of making vanishing the other relative worlds, histories, minds, maximal consistent extensions, possibilities ... That seems to me the most preposterous part of Slavnov paper. In 1939 von Neumann still invokes a magical role of consciousness in his singling out a collapsed reality. Well sorry, but von Neumann did invoke consciousness in 1932. I was wrong, and it remains an open question for me if von Neumann was hoping that his (modular) Quantum Logic could give light on the conceptual problem of QM. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
Hi Bruno, At 06:46 AM 4/26/04, Bruno Marchal wrote: The important point is that once we keep up comp through the eight points, we see that the laws of physics, whatever they are, must be given by the invariant in the comp-accessible worlds. I'm pretty sure I now understand points 1-8, but let me confirm something: the conclusion of points 1-8 is *not* that comp is true. The conclusion is that *if* comp is true, then the invariant predicted by that model will ultimately match the laws of physics that we have discovered empirically. One could accept points 1-8, but still remain agnostic about whether or not the invariant actually does match the empirical laws of physics - that is, agnostic about whether or not comp is actually true. Correct? The task of point 9 is to start showing mathematically what the invariant actually looks like. You make the tantalizing claim that the invariant actually looks like quantum physics, but for the moment I have to remain agnostic, because I don't know enough about the mathematics of provability, nor do I know enough about quantum physics. From your perspective, are your results strong enough to make you suspect that comp is true? That would make a great part of quantum physics into physical laws in the sense of comp. It would be a pleasure to explain this with more details. Are you willing to hear a little bit about Godel's theorem and some of its generalisation by Lob and Solovay? I am certainly willing to hear about it - I know more about Godel's Theorem and the theory of computation than I do about quantum physics - but I doubt I know enough to make much sense of your explanations, so it might be a waste of your time. Perhaps all I can pick up right now is the flavor of your results. For instance, does your position entail that the weirdness of quantum physics is deeply connected to the weirdness of provability theory? -- Kory
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
At 06:08 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote: (BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book Reasons and Persons) that we are token. I have already argued that with the comp hyp we can only be type. That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument Parfit gives for our token self-identity is that we would be immortal if we were type. That's not so easy, but even if it were I don't think it is a convincing argument.) I agree that it's not a convincing argument, but it does seem like an easy statement. If comp is true, aren't we immortal? If not, why not? -- Kory
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
At 08:23 27/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote: Hi Bruno, At 06:46 AM 4/26/04, Bruno Marchal wrote: The important point is that once we keep up comp through the eight points, we see that the laws of physics, whatever they are, must be given by the invariant in the comp-accessible worlds. I'm pretty sure I now understand points 1-8, but let me confirm something: the conclusion of points 1-8 is *not* that comp is true. The conclusion is that *if* comp is true, then the invariant predicted by that model will ultimately match the laws of physics that we have discovered empirically. One could accept points 1-8, but still remain agnostic about whether or not the invariant actually does match the empirical laws of physics - that is, agnostic about whether or not comp is actually true. Correct? Correct. The task of point 9 is to start showing mathematically what the invariant actually looks like. You make the tantalizing claim that the invariant actually looks like quantum physics, but for the moment I have to remain agnostic, because I don't know enough about the mathematics of provability, nor do I know enough about quantum physics. From your perspective, are your results strong enough to make you suspect that comp is true? It makes me suspect indeed that comp is plausible, at least. Actually that plausibility comes both for the 1-8 reasoning which forces us to believe in some many world, so the fact that some physicists begin to think seriously about the possibility of many-things is by itself a sort of confirmation. Interviewing the machines should give more quantitative information about the interference between the possibilities. Here too I want to say I got a confirmation, but, as I will try to explain, I got something weaker than quantum logic, and I am afraid only the future will decide. The problem is that 1) physicists propose not *one* quantum logic, but a labyrinth of QL (to quote van Fraassen), and my interview gives rise also to different sorts of QL. But forget all that, I will really try to give (new) flavors of the mathematical confirmation of comp. That would make a great part of quantum physics into physical laws in the sense of comp. It would be a pleasure to explain this with more details. Are you willing to hear a little bit about Godel's theorem and some of its generalisation by Lob and Solovay? I am certainly willing to hear about it - I know more about Godel's Theorem and the theory of computation than I do about quantum physics - but I doubt I know enough to make much sense of your explanations, so it might be a waste of your time. We will see. Don't hesitate to tell me you don't understand, or that you are bored. Strictly speaking the math are much more simple than people imagine, at least for a passive understanding. But you should be frustated at the end, because we will arrive at my incompetence point, that is, a set of open questions. Perhaps all I can pick up right now is the flavor of your results. For instance, does your position entail that the weirdness of quantum physics is deeply connected to the weirdness of provability theory? Yes. The flavor is that eventually physics is equal to a sort of integral on machine's self-ignorance, that is on machine's incompleteness. But today I still don't have, for example, a proof of something as simple as the violation of Bell's inequality, although I can argue it would be a miracle if they are not violated (in the comp physics I mean) due to the high non booleanity of the Arithmetical QL we obtain. Don't worry, I will try NOT to give a 120h course in mathematical logic which is just impossible without chalk black board. But I will try to give some insights. I must think how to do it. It will help me, btw, to prepare my talk in Paris and Amsterdam so that any critics is welcome. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
At 08:34 27/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote: At 06:08 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote: (BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book Reasons and Persons) that we are token. I have already argued that with the comp hyp we can only be type. That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument Parfit gives for our token self-identity is that we would be immortal if we were type. That's not so easy, but even if it were I don't think it is a convincing argument.) I agree that it's not a convincing argument, but it does seem like an easy statement. If comp is true, aren't we immortal? If not, why not? I do thing that comp (and/or Everett QM) leads to a form, perhaps more than one form actually, of immortality. But the very meaning of such statement will remain very ambiguous without digging deeper in the personal identity issue (which, despite Stathis Papaioannou's remark, is not necessary for getting the physics/psycho reversal). It is perhaps less misleading to say that what comp shows is that mortality is no more obvious. It is less misleading because comp will appear to have a necessary interrogative status: no sound machine can ever entirely be convinced of the truth of comp; a comp-practitioner should infer it again and again. (I think the brain does just that in the form of an instinctive dialog between the cerebral stem and the cortex). Look perhaps at some of James Higgo immortality posts for previous discussions on that not so obvious thread. Jacques Mallah gave interesting rebuttal ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
At 10:17 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote: Don't worry, I will try NOT to give a 120h course in mathematical logic which is just impossible without chalk black board. But I will try to give some insights. I must think how to do it. It will help me, btw, to prepare my talk in Paris and Amsterdam so that any critics is welcome. Ok! I'm very interested to hear it, and I'll let you know where I'm confused, and where I'm bored. :) -- Kory
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
Bruno: I really TRY to catch up with the discussions - however I can't help feeling that what's going on is a physicalistic (?) *translation* of Judeo-Christian theology: whe we die, we (soul?) transfer to the Dear Good Lord's Heaven/Paradise (= called1000 different planets) - sometimes expressed as quantum imortality...(of the soul?) Then again, just like in the Christian myth, in heaven everybody (including God) speaks the one human language we know (or not). Everything is in the pattern of our terrestrial physical taste and comp imagination. Maybe we get to hell: the mathematically illiterate planet? Can't we do better? John Mikes - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 6:08 AM Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer? At 13:55 27/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Ok, one last stab. You are going to be copied and teleported to 1000 different planets. Only your body and your brain will be copied. On 999 of these planets, everyone speaks Spanish, and on one planet, everyone speaks French. You don't know either language, and you are only allowed to learn one of them before your departure. From my perspective, learning Spanish is the correct choice. From your perspective, there's no reason to chose one over the other. Is there? -- Kory I would learn Spanish before teleportation, in order to give my descendants the best chance of success; but going on what I said above, I shouldn't care at all, because I'll be dead and someone else (or 1000 others) will take my place! But you will be dead in the same sense that you will be dead in the next instant, at least with what I understand when you quote Parfit. In THAT case you shouldn't care at all in the presence of any possible threats, no? (BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book Reasons and Persons) that we are token. I have already argued that with the comp hyp we can only be type. That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument Parfit gives for our token self-identity is that we would be immortal if we were type. That's not so easy, but even if it were I don't think it is a convincing argument.) I don't think we need a sophisticate theory of personal identity for understanding the consequence of comp. We need just not to confuse the first person, which are not duplicable, from their body (third person describable) which are duplicable. Your comments and answers to Kory seems rather unclear to me. What do you mean by I'll be dead giving that the comp hyp makes you dead in that sense (annihilated and then reconstituted) at each conceivable instant? Actually you do the 1/3 distinction when you say someone else (or 1000 others) will take my place. it is someone else from the 1-view, and 1000 others from the 3 view. Now we must derive physics from the 1-view of 3-splitted-differentiating machines in platonia. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Definitation of Observers
pattern | physical pattern (constraint on the arrangement of matter and energy in space and time) | physical process (physical pattern with characteristics like that some regular and often localized, and yet complex form of change is of its essence. Can be described as comprised of states, events, and subprocesses) | | physical computational process physical sensing process | mind-of-intelligent-observer The | relation is "is-a" inheritance. Does that help successfully communicate what I mean by a pattern that computes and stores information about its surroundings? Eric Brent Meeker wrote: Eric Hawthorne wrote An observer is a pattern in space-time (a physical process) which engages in the processing and storage of information about its surroundings in space-time. This seems like a failure to communicate because of mixing levels of description. If you're going to define "observer" as a pattern you need to say what kind of pattern it is. If you skip to a functional, "processing and storage" or intentional "engages in" level of description then you introduce terms with no definite relation to patterns. Brent Meeker
