Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example
Rich, are you familiar with the work of R.D. Laing? He was the illustrious founder of the anti-psychiatry movement in the 60s. One never hears of him these days. He had all the other thinkers on the hop for quite a while. Your thoughts represent no interruption whatsoever. Kim On 29/05/2006, at 1:09 PM, Rich Winkel wrote: At the risk of wasting more bandwidth than I alread have I'd like to apologize for any discomfort I've caused on the list. Sometimes I feel like a jewish person arguing the reality of the holocaust to doubters. Such is the hidden record of psychiatry and the power of its PR machine. Please excuse the interruption. Rich --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Reasons and Persons
Russell Standish writes: Even though it is very unlikely to happen in reality, it is easy enough to imagine that the relatively minor physical/psychological changes that have occurred in the past day are exaggerated, so that instead of changing from me-yesterday to me-today, I change from me-yesterday into Napoleon. The point is that this type of radical change would be different in *degree*, not different in kind from the type of change that occurs normally. One could even argue that turning Sure, but that's exactly where I'm in disagreement. The change into Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as one would have to pass through non-functional brain structures in order to change from me to him. Whereas to change from me to me as I was twenty years ago can be achieved by passing through functional brain structures (all the instances of me over the last twenty years). I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all, there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum. However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that *if* (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that your thoughts became more and more Napoleonic and less and less Standishian, then by this process, you would become Napoleon. It is analogous to the situation where the old man remembers being a young man, the young man remembers being a child, but the old man does not remember being a child. Although the old man has no recollection of being a child, he still identifies as being the same person as that child because there is a continuous series of intermediates each of whom recalls the one immediately prior, if not the ones several stages earlier. This is what people actually believe and act on, for example if a person is found guilty of a crime which he has since genuinely forgotten committing. The whole thrust of Parfit's philosophizing involves taking such normative definitions of personal identity and, by trying them out in various irregular situations and thought experiments, showing up their deficiencies. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Reasons and Persons
I read the remark of Russell and Satathis's reply with great interest. Russell wrote (among others): * ...The change into Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as one would have to pass through non-functional brain structures in order to change from me to him. * reflecting a rather mechanistic-physicalist view of a mentality in 'degrees' followable by (not substantial?) alterations from a (nonfunctioning, but assumed?) prior state, I would suggest: in infinitesimal steps as in the well esstablished qualia of calculus. Russell seems to disagree, taking the analog view (in kind). Let me return to this after 2 quotes from Stathis's reply: * 1. However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that *if* (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that your thoughts became more and more Napoleonic and less and less Standishian, then by this process, you would become Napoleon. * 2. ...the old man remembers being a young man, the young man remembers being a child, but the old man does not remember being a child. Although the old man has no recollection of being a child, he still identifies as being the same person as that child because there is a continuous series of intermediates each of whom recalls the one immediately prior, if not the ones several stages earlier. * Comparing the two I find Russell's position more mentality-oriented than Stathis' (more mechanistic), however he mentions Parfit's personal identity tested in thought-experiments. (I dislike thought experiments as artefacts composed to rationalize upon one's not so rational ideas into a fabricated sci-fi situation.) The personal identity (I call it: SELF?) is an open question. The old man identifies himself with all stages of his earlier life even if episodes emerge he did not actively remember. (I know, I do). It is more than stepping backwards in phases. It transcends time, particular qualia-attributes, rationale and approval. I identify (an arthritic octagenerian) with the teen youngster who made that memorable ski-jump. I feel it... also the frustration when at school I was not prepared and could not recite the poem which I now know quite well. Self is more than 'degrees of bodily, emotionally or mentally experienced states', it is myself in total ambiance (a situation psych cannot handle and physics has no units to measure). It does not end by the skin and not by personal thoughts. It includes a complexity of the 'situations' without transition of yesterday's me into Napoleon. Triggered? yes. Explained? not yet. (My problem with MWI transitions of Q-suicide ideas: what part of 'SELF' are we talking about? it includes the totality as e/affecting us (and vice versa), very much as THIS universe circumstances and in another ambiance the same 'self' is not identifiable. Same question as in reincarnation: who is I reincarnated?) Self is a mentally interrelated part of the totality with some inside reflection to itself (no good words available). Sort of a duality? Relational compolsition? It works in all of us, I have no idea if less neuronic animals have it (never asked them) or plants, galaxies? Besides: 'self' related things go atemporal - aspatial. Not followable in time-series or state-space series. It is not analysably changing details from A-C through B. It is - well, who knows? - a (complex) quality-jump in some 'analog'(?) manner, if we think comp. I still do not know HOW to think about it. John M --- Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish writes: Even though it is very unlikely to happen in reality, it is easy enough to imagine that the relatively minor physical/psychological changes that have occurred in the past day are exaggerated, so that instead of changing from me-yesterday to me-today, I change from me-yesterday into Napoleon. The point is that this type of radical change would be different in *degree*, not different in kind from the type of change that occurs normally. One could even argue that turning Sure, but that's exactly where I'm in disagreement. The change into Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as one would have to pass through non-functional brain structures in order to change from me to him. Whereas to change from me to me as I was twenty years ago can be achieved by passing through functional brain structures (all the instances of me over the last twenty years). I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all, there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum. However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that *if* (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that
RE: Reasons and Persons
L'esprit de l'escalier: after reading my post below as an interesting list-post it occurred that I left out an important addage: I may feel as the same person (self) in my earlier life and situations - I do not IDENTIFY with 'it'. I know: it is me but not I am like that. Not even: I was like that - I observe it as an interesting book I read already. Or something thelike. Just to add to the happy misunderstanding John M --- John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I read the remark of Russell and Satathis's reply with great interest. Russell wrote (among others): * ...The change into Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as one would have to pass through non-functional brain structures in order to change from me to him. * reflecting a rather mechanistic-physicalist view of a mentality in 'degrees' followable by (not substantial?) alterations from a (nonfunctioning, but assumed?) prior state, I would suggest: in infinitesimal steps as in the well esstablished qualia of calculus. Russell seems to disagree, taking the analog view (in kind). Let me return to this after 2 quotes from Stathis's reply: * 1. However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that *if* (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that your thoughts became more and more Napoleonic and less and less Standishian, then by this process, you would become Napoleon. * 2. ...the old man remembers being a young man, the young man remembers being a child, but the old man does not remember being a child. Although the old man has no recollection of being a child, he still identifies as being the same person as that child because there is a continuous series of intermediates each of whom recalls the one immediately prior, if not the ones several stages earlier. * Comparing the two I find Russell's position more mentality-oriented than Stathis' (more mechanistic), however he mentions Parfit's personal identity tested in thought-experiments. (I dislike thought experiments as artefacts composed to rationalize upon one's not so rational ideas into a fabricated sci-fi situation.) The personal identity (I call it: SELF?) is an open question. The old man identifies himself with all stages of his earlier life even if episodes emerge he did not actively remember. (I know, I do). It is more than stepping backwards in phases. It transcends time, particular qualia-attributes, rationale and approval. I identify (an arthritic octagenerian) with the teen youngster who made that memorable ski-jump. I feel it... also the frustration when at school I was not prepared and could not recite the poem which I now know quite well. Self is more than 'degrees of bodily, emotionally or mentally experienced states', it is myself in total ambiance (a situation psych cannot handle and physics has no units to measure). It does not end by the skin and not by personal thoughts. It includes a complexity of the 'situations' without transition of yesterday's me into Napoleon. Triggered? yes. Explained? not yet. (My problem with MWI transitions of Q-suicide ideas: what part of 'SELF' are we talking about? it includes the totality as e/affecting us (and vice versa), very much as THIS universe circumstances and in another ambiance the same 'self' is not identifiable. Same question as in reincarnation: who is I reincarnated?) Self is a mentally interrelated part of the totality with some inside reflection to itself (no good words available). Sort of a duality? Relational compolsition? It works in all of us, I have no idea if less neuronic animals have it (never asked them) or plants, galaxies? Besides: 'self' related things go atemporal - aspatial. Not followable in time-series or state-space series. It is not analysably changing details from A-C through B. It is - well, who knows? - a (complex) quality-jump in some 'analog'(?) manner, if we think comp. I still do not know HOW to think about it. John M --- Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish writes: Even though it is very unlikely to happen in reality, it is easy enough to imagine that the relatively minor physical/psychological changes that have occurred in the past day are exaggerated, so that instead of changing from me-yesterday to me-today, I change from me-yesterday into Napoleon. The point is that this type of radical change would be different in *degree*, not different in kind from the type of change that occurs normally. One could even argue that turning Sure, but that's exactly where I'm in disagreement. The change into Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as one would have to pass through non-functional brain structures in order to change from me to him. Whereas to change from me to me as I was twenty years ago can be
Re: Reasons and Persons
On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all, there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum. However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that *if* (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that your We need to be a bit more precise than magically. In Parfit's book he talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and suffices for doing the teleporting experiment. The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain. Perhaps there is some other way of passing through functioning brain states, but not in the way Parfit describes it. Perhaps there is a way going through a sequence of brains states to when I was an embryo, then reversing the process via developing Napoleon's brain. But would each stage be conscious? It is still debatable whether children under the age of 12 months are conscious (eg in the sense of being self-aware), let alone the mind of a foetus. All I can say is that things are definitely more subtle than Parfit was implying. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all, there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum. However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that *if* (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that your We need to be a bit more precise than magically. In Parfit's book he talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and suffices for doing the teleporting experiment. The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain. I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a nonfunctional state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a sort of split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting in the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings. But this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was making, because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like let's assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons and synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and Napoleon's brain such that every intermediate state would have a single integrated consciousness. There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists (and of course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible. Jesse --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in terms of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the high-level algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified by the neural network. The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high level language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the other. For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the program to the corresponding neural network. - Original Message - From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all, there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum. However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that *if* (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that your We need to be a bit more precise than magically. In Parfit's book he talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and suffices for doing the teleporting experiment. The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain. I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a nonfunctional state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a sort of split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting in the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings. But this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was making, because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like let's assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons and synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and Napoleon's brain such that every intermediate state would have a single integrated consciousness. There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists (and of course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible. Jesse --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Ascension (was Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example)
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-mai-06, à 19:35, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Bruno,
You are starting to perturb me! I guess that comes with the territory
where you're leading us.
You should not worry too much. I confess I am putting your mind in the
state of mathematicians before the Babbage Post Markov Turing Church
discovery. Everything here will be transparently clear.
But of course being perturbed doesn't
necessarily imply being correct. I will summarize my perturbation
below. But for now, specifically, you're bringing in transfinite
cardinals/ordinals.
Only transfinite ordinal which are all countable, and even nameable,
for example by name of growing computable functions as I am
illustrating.
Be sure you understand why G is a well defined computable growing
function, and why it grows faster than each initial Fi. If you know a
computer programming language, write the program!
This is where things get perverse and perhaps
inconsistent. For instance, couldn't I argue that G is also infinite?
In which sense? All functions are infinite mathematical object.
Factorial is defined by its infiinite set of inputs outputs: {(0,1)
(1,1)(2,2) (3,6) (4,24) (5,120) ...}.
Take n = some fixed N1. Then F1(N) 1, F2(N) 2, F3(N) 3, ...
and Fn(N) n, for all n. So each member of the whole sequence F1, F2,
F3 ... G is greater than the corresponding member of the sequence 1, 2,
3, ... aleph_0 (countable infinity). Thus, G (=) countable infinity,
even for a fixed n=N1.
You are right but G is a function. Actually it just does what it has
been programmed to. I don't see any problem here.
OK. I see that so far (above) there's no problem. (See below for
where I still have concern(s).) Here I was taking a fixed N, but G is
defined as the diagonal, so my comparison is not valid, and so my proof
that G is infinite for a fixed N is not valid. I was taking G's
assignment of an ordinal of omega as being that it is in every way
larger than all Fi's, but in fact G is larger than all Fi's only when
comparing G(n) to Fn(n), not when comparing G(Nfixed) to Fi(N) for all
i's.
Oh Oh Oh Oh Oh A new pattern emerge (the Ackerman Caylor one, at
a
higher level).
F_omega,
F_omega + omega
F_omega * omega
F_omega ^ omega
F_omega [4] omega (omega tetrated to omega, actually this ordinal got
famous and is named Epsilon Zéro, will say some words on it later)
F_omega [5] omega
F_omega [6] omega
F_omega [7] omega
F_omega [8] omega
F_omega [9] omega
F_omega [10] omega
F_omega [11] omega
...
In this case they are all obtained by successive diagonalzations, but
nothing prevent us to diagonalise on it again to get
F_omega [omega] omega
OK, I think the following finite number is big enough:
F_omega [omega] omega (F_omega [omega] omega (9 [9] 9))
Next, we will meet a less constructivist fairy, and take some new kind
of big leap.
Be sure to be convinced that, despite the transfinite character of the
F_alpha sequence, we did really defined at all steps precise
computable growing functions ... (if not: ask question please).
It seems to me that you are on very shaky ground if you are citing
transfinite numbers in your journey to showing us your ultimate
argument.
Please Tom, I did stay in the realm of the finitary. Even intutionist
can accept and prove correct the way I named what are just big finite
number. I have not until now transgressed the constructive field, I
have not begin to use Platonism! There is nothing controversial here,
even finitist mathematician can accept this. (Not ultra-finitist,
though, but those reject already 10^100)
I also think that if you could keep your arguments totally
in the finite arena it would less risky.
I have. You must (re)analyse the construction carefully and realize I
have not go out of the finite arena. Ordinals are just been used as a
way to put order on the successive effective diagonalizations. Those
are defined on perfectly well defined and generable sequence of well
defined functions. I have really just written a program (a little bit
sketchily, but you should be able to add the details once you should a
programming language).
OK. I think you are just throwing me off with your notation. Do you
have to use transfinite ordinals (omega) to do this? Couldn't you just
stay with successively combining and diagonalizing, like below, without
using omegas?
G(n) = Fn(n)+1
Gi(n) = G(...G(n)), G taken i times
Then instead of using more and more additional letters, just add
subscripts...
H1(n) = Gn(n)+1
H1i(n) = H1(...H1(n)), H1 taken i times
H2(n) = H1n(n)+1
H2i(n) = H2(...H2(n)), H2 taken i times
Then the subscripts count the number of diagonalizations you've done,
and every time you do the Ackermann thing, instead of adding an omega
you add another subscript. Then it continues ad infinitum. You can
do the Ackermann thing with the *number* of subscripts,
Re: Ascension (was Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example)
I meant that it makes intuitive sense that you *cannot* sequence effectively on all computable growing functions. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
