Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno Marchal writes: The UD is both massively parallel and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism sequentially. Given that no actual physical hardware is needed to run it, why did you choose the UD to generate all the computations rather than just saying they are all run in parallel. There is enough room in Platonia for infinite parallel virtual machines, isn't there? This is an interesting and key question. It is also a rather difficult one. To answer it we have to dig deeper on the importance and miraculous aspect of Church thesis, which makes existing a universal dovetailer, and which makes precise what a computational states is, and why we have to postulate Arithmetical Realism, and why we have to be cautious with any form of larger mathematical platonism (but such platonism is not prohibited per se). Now with comp, and Church thesis in particular, it can be shown that the computational states can be said to exist (in the same sense than numbers) and it can be defined thoroughly by the UD. If you introduced infinite machines (and I agree that it is defensible that some of such machine exists in Platonia) , either you will lose Church thesis, or you will lose the YES DOCTOR, at least in the form I usually gave it. Your move here can be done, nevertheless, without changing the mathematical structure of the hypostases, but this asks for a non trivial generalization of comp, and of Church thesis in particular. I would not do that unless it is needed to get the physics (and then this would be a refutation of comp, or more precisely here: of Sigma_1 comp). The Chuch thesis concerns what can in theory be computed by a physical computer with unlimited resources. Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute all computable functions from N to N. It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does not invoke physical machine at all. It seems that this is the computer you have in mind to run the UD. Only for providing a decor for a story. This assumption is eliminated when we arrive (step eight of UDA-8) at the conclusion that universal digital machine cannot distinguish any reality from an arithmetical one. That's OK and the argument works (assuming comp etc.), but in Platonia you have access to hypercomputers of the best and fastest kind. Fastness is relative in Platonia. Universal machine can always been sped up on almost all their inputs (There is a theorem by Blum and Marquez to that effect). Then indeed there are the angels and hierachies of non-comp machine. A vast category of angels can be shown to have the same hypostases (so we cannot tested by empirical means if we are such angels). Then they are entities very closed to the one, having stronger hypostases, i.e. you need to add axioms to G and G* (or V, V* with explicit comp) to get them. This does not invalidate CT - it still applies to the physical world, such as it is - but it does make it unnecessary when the resources of Platonia are available. Also, I don't see how introducing infinite machines invalidates yes doctor, since if anything it adds to the choice of hardware when considering your replacement brain. You are right here, I agree. But this makes the thought experiment longer to describe. Mathematically Sigma1-comp, which is the standard traditionnal comp, is easier to handle than their hyper or super generalization. G, G* and all the hypostases remains correct and complete for much weaker form of comp. That's correct. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Time, Causality and all that
Le 21-oct.-06, à 21:52, Charles Goodwin a écrit : [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Peter D Jones The problem is not that there are no such resemblances in a Multiverse, it is that ther are far too many. How does one distinguishing real ones from coincidental ones. How does a Harry Potter film differ from a documentary? The only way I know of that the MWI distinguishes these is that the measure of the real ones is Vastly larger than the measure of the rest. But that is just restating things. Except, I would say that QM-without-collapse + decoherence theory explains the measure of the real one is vaster than the measure of the Harry-Potter (HP) stories, and, as DD said himself, why the probability to remains in a Harry Potter story is negligible. In a a-la-Feynman nutshell: QM entails a phase randomization making the HP story amplitude of probabilities self-destroying. But now, most presentation of QM-without collapse assumes the classical turing emulability of the observer. Then, (it is my main point), it remains to explain why we are not confronted with the classical HP stories, which, at least at first sight, have purely additive probabilities and no phase randomization to eliminate the HP one. The high non triviality of the classical turing emulability of the observer hypothesis (computatiionalism), forces to justfify the appearance of (which btw remains true in the Hamerov doctrine where the brain is a quantum machine, it is only false in Penrose doctrine where consciousness is supposed to be both physical and non turing emulable) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Time, Causality and all that
Le 21-oct.-06, à 21:52, Charles Goodwin wrote : [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Peter D Jones The problem is not that there are no such resemblances in a Multiverse, it is that ther are far too many. How does one distinguishing real ones from coincidental ones. How does a Harry Potter film differ from a documentary? The only way I know of that the MWI distinguishes these is that the measure of the real ones is Vastly larger than the measure of the rest. But that is just restating things. Except, I would say that QM-without-collapse + decoherence theory explains the measure of the real one is vaster than the measure of the Harry-Potter (HP) stories, and, as DD said himself, why the probability to remains in a Harry Potter story is negligible. In a a-la-Feynman nutshell: QM entails a phase randomization making the HP story amplitude of probabilities self-destroying. But now, most presentation of QM-without collapse assumes the classical turing emulability of the observer. Then, (it is my main point), it remains to explain why we are not confronted with the classical HP stories, which, at least at first sight, have purely additive probabilities and no phase randomization to eliminate the HP one. But then the high non triviality of the classical turing emulability of the observer hypothesis (computationalism(*)), makes it possible to justfify the appearance of physicalness. (*) which btw remains true in the Hamerov doctrine where the brain is a quantum machine, comp is only false in Penrose doctrine where consciousness is presupposed to be both physical and non turing emulable. Le 21-oct.-06, à 21:52, Bob Schott wrote: I actually adhere, just as a point of reference, to the consciousness-created interpretation of QM, which is also held by John Wheeler (or at least was the last I heard; he seems to change his mind often about such matters) and some other respected physicists. Like them, I have not as of yet fallen into the murky realm of idealism, but who knows. It would appear to quite nicely answer a multitude of seemingly perplexing questions, such as: How could insentient matter ever become conscious; ever feel? Does matter produce consciousness or visa versa? Is there really any fundamental proof for one over the other? I think there are arguments showing that if we assume we are digital machines then the theory of matter should be retrieved from computer science/number theory/information theory. This makes the comp hyp empirically testable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Time, Causality and all that
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-oct.-06, à 21:52, Charles Goodwin a écrit : [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Peter D Jones The problem is not that there are no such resemblances in a Multiverse, it is that ther are far too many. How does one distinguishing real ones from coincidental ones. How does a Harry Potter film differ from a documentary? The only way I know of that the MWI distinguishes these is that the measure of the real ones is Vastly larger than the measure of the rest. But that is just restating things. Except, I would say that QM-without-collapse + decoherence theory explains the measure of the real one is vaster than the measure of the Harry-Potter (HP) stories, and, as DD said himself, why the probability to remains in a Harry Potter story is negligible. In Barbour-style theories, every Now (3D configuration of matter) is exemplified exactly once. In a a-la-Feynman nutshell: QM entails a phase randomization making the HP story amplitude of probabilities self-destroying. That's multiversal, not omniversal. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Infinitesimal roadmap (was Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted)
Le 21-oct.-06, à 02:12, David Nyman a écrit : Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the data'. And my point is also that a model which is, in this respect particularly, so counter to 'normal science' is especially provocative and deserves much attention. Well, it gets it on this list but unfortunately much of the debate goes round in circles because the concepts are hard to grapple with, let alone master sufficiently to rebut (short of IMHO sterile debates about 'reification'). Hence we don't get very far... hence (please) THE ROADMAP. But I wouldn't want Bruno to feel I was harrassing him... Not at all. Actually, you just make higher the probability that I write that [censored] english version of my thesis. Let me give you an infinitesimal roadmap: 1) UDA UDA shows that if we are digital machine then we cannot distinguish any reality from purely arithmetical one, and that we have to justify the physical laws by some measure on some relations between numbers. It fits a recurring intuition in this list: we have to define observer moments and we have to find a measure on them (absolute for some, relative for others, ...) UDA uses the comp hypothesis: YD + CT + AR(Yes doctor + Church Thesis + Arithmetical Realism) 2) AUDA Mmmmh Let me put it in this way. AUDA is the same as UDA except that it uses the a-comp hypothesis. a-comp is just CT + AR. a is for arithmetical. No need to implicate yourself personally with complex personal questions like should I say yes to the doctor and what happens after self-duplication The trick is simple if not naive. Instead of interviewing you or humans like in the UDA, I interview directly the machine. Not all machines are interesting here, but thanks to AR, or classical AR, I can limit the interview on a platonist (here it means a theorem prover accepting the P v ~P principle) self-referentially correct sufficiently chatty (proving) universal machine. Things to understand for AUDA: 1) The absoluteness of the notion of computability (this is equivalent with the understanding that CT is not trivial at all: CT entails that absoluteness. Such absoluteness are rare events in mathematics and logics). 2) The irreducible relativeness of the notion of provability (this is incompleteness, and it follows also from CT, through very few diagonalizations). 3) The provability logics. G, G* and their intensional (modal) variants. David, what is your relation with computers? Do you know one or two programming languages? Do you know classical propositional logic? formally, informally? I can really start from zero, if only (obviously) that is what I have to do with the universal machine in the interview! Nevertheless, according to your background I can accelerate here and there at least in the roadmap. I appreciate your interest, don't hesitate to harass me more. I feel I little bit guilty for the list which does not always appreciate the importance of putting all the cards on the table at some point, but then it has to be a little more technical. Perhaps it could be an opportunity also to take the train ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. No, not entirely opaque. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not the conclusion. David David Nyman wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way tojudge whether it is a good model to see how it corresponds with mere appearance; just like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real model - but so might any other model that fits all the data. Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the data'. Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. No, not entirely opaque. Could you illuminate? Maybe physics is relations all the way down. Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not the conclusion. Yes indeed, but the conclusions (e.g. the explanatory direction of 3-person -- 1-person) are surely somewhat different? They are very different, and a lot of the work is done by the Platonic assumption. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. No, not entirely opaque. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not the conclusion. David David Nyman wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way tojudge whether it is a good model to see how it corresponds with mere appearance; just like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real model - but so might any other model that fits all the data. Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the data'. Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. David David Nyman wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way tojudge whether it is a good model to see how it corresponds with mere appearance; just like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real model - but so might any other model that fits all the data. Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the data'. Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: Maybe physics is relations all the way down. Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you propose as the relata (i.e. when you've gone 'all the way down')? They are very different, and a lot of the work is done by the Platonic assumption. Good, we seem to agree that the conclusions of comp1 and comp2 are different. And specifically the question of recursive priority - what emerges from what - is hardly a trivial difference. Bruno has argued, if I've got it right, that comp supports 1--3 over 3--1 (3 = 'the relata'). Do you have a knock-down argument to the contrary, other than a philosophical commitment to the priority of what can be 'seen' (as opposed to, as Colin would no doubt say, *that* it can be seen)? BTW, I'm not arguing from the perspective of a 'convert' to comp, merely as an interested seeker. However, like Colin, I don't feel that physics as normally practised takes seriously enough the *fact* of there being an observation (as opposed to the *effect* of an observational process). When considered at all, it's as a putative 'relational side effect' of the physics (e.g. standard computationalism). So part of my interest in comp is motivated by the fact that it treats this aspect of 'everything' with maximum seriousness, explicitly seeking a theory that elucidates the structure of 'observation' equally with that of the 'observables' thus revealed. Consequently, it may be of value to put final judgement on what sort of state-of-affairs could support 'RITSIAR' on hold, pending an exploration of these very interesting implications of comp. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. No, not entirely opaque. Could you illuminate? Maybe physics is relations all the way down. Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not the conclusion. Yes indeed, but the conclusions (e.g. the explanatory direction of 3-person -- 1-person) are surely somewhat different? They are very different, and a lot of the work is done by the Platonic assumption. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. No, not entirely opaque. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not the conclusion. David David Nyman wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way tojudge whether it is a good model to see how it corresponds with mere appearance; just like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real model - but so might any other model that fits all the data. Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the data'. Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. No, not entirely opaque. Could you illuminate? Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not the conclusion. Yes indeed, but the conclusions (e.g. the explanatory direction of 3-person -- 1-person) are surely somewhat different? David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. No, not entirely opaque. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not the conclusion. David David Nyman wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way tojudge whether it is a good model to see how it corresponds with mere appearance; just like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real model - but so might any other model that fits all the data. Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the data'. Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Maybe physics is relations all the way down. Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you propose as the relata (i.e. when you've gone 'all the way down')? Primary matter of course. They are very different, and a lot of the work is done by the Platonic assumption. Good, we seem to agree that the conclusions of comp1 and comp2 are different. And specifically the question of recursive priority - what emerges from what - is hardly a trivial difference. Bruno has argued, if I've got it right, that his version of comp supports 1--3 over 3--1 (3 = 'the relata'). Do you have a knock-down argument to the contrary, other than a philosophical commitment to the priority of what can be 'seen' (as opposed to, as Colin would no doubt say, *that* it can be seen)? I have several arguments. Principally against Platonism, without which he does not obtain his UD without building it. (I have noticed that you seem to equate a relation-only universe with Platonia. But the point about Platonia is is that there is no contingency there. A relation-only universe can still be a contingent universe, in which a UD fails to exist for some contingent reason). BTW, I'm not arguing from the perspective of a 'convert' to comp, merely as an interested seeker. However, like Colin, I don't feel that physics as normally practised takes seriously enough the *fact* of there being an observation (as opposed to the *effect* of an observational process). Surely that is a psychological question. When considered at all, it's as a putative 'relational side effect' of the physics (e.g. standard computationalism). PhysicalISM requires one to believe that. But physicalism isn't physics -- it is a metaphysical claim. So part of my interest in comp is motivated by the fact that it treats this aspect of 'everything' with maximum seriousness, explicitly seeking a theory that elucidates the structure of 'observation' equally with that of the 'observables' thus revealed. Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for qualia than physicalism. Consequently, it may be of value to put final judgement on what sort of state-of-affairs could support 'RITSIAR' on hold, pending an exploration of these very interesting implications of comp. If a computation is only a subset of, or abstraction from, a physical process (as in non-Bruno computationalism), how can it explain things physics can't? David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. No, not entirely opaque. Could you illuminate? Maybe physics is relations all the way down. Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not the conclusion. Yes indeed, but the conclusions (e.g. the explanatory direction of 3-person -- 1-person) are surely somewhat different? They are very different, and a lot of the work is done by the Platonic assumption. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing and highly significant. It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism is much less so. Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. No, not entirely opaque. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not the conclusion. David David Nyman wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way tojudge whether it is a
To observe is to......EC
= STEP 5: The rolling proof NOTES: 1) There is only 1 proof in EC. (Symbolically it has been designated U(.) above) 2) It consists of 1 collection of basic EC primitives (axioms) 3) The current state of the proof is 'now' the thin slice of the present. 4) The documentation of all the outpouring prior states (configuration of the entire set of axioms) is what would be regarded as a standard proof - A theorem evolving under the guiding hand of the mathematician. It's just that there is 1 mathematician per axiom in EC. 5) In effect, all that every happens in EC is rearrangement of axioms into a new configuration, which then becomes a new configuration of axioms. 6) The 'theorem' proof never ends. 7) This process, when viewed from the perspective of being part of EC looks like time. Local regularity in the state transition processes would mean that local representations of behaviour could have a t parameter in them. 8) Each fluctuation can be regarded as a 'mathematician'. This makes EC a single gigantic parallel theorem proving exercise where at each 'state', each mathematician co--operates with a local subset of other mathematicians and where possible they merge their work and then form a 'team' which then works with other local mathematicians. 7) The local options for a mathematician are totally state dependent i.e. depending in what other mathematicians (or teams of merged mathematicians) are available to merge with. 8) The rules for cooperation between mathematicians will look like the 2nd law of thermodynamics from within EC. Those rules will emerge later. === Well I hope they will!. NEXT: some of the rules. Remember we are headed towards analysing the nature of the structure of the EC proof and at the mechanism of 1-person. In terms of EC, if local structure in EC is a part of the single EC proof, then it is a 'sub-proof' in EC. At the outermost structural levels the proof literally is 'matter'. The 1-person is a virtual-proof performed by matter. Virtual matter. It's done under the same rules. Nothing special. Everything is the same in EC. We can then look at what COMP would do to it. cheers, colin hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal writes: Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno Marchal writes: The UD is both massively parallel and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism sequentially. Given that no actual physical hardware is needed to run it, why did you choose the UD to generate all the computations rather than just saying they are all run in parallel. There is enough room in Platonia for infinite parallel virtual machines, isn't there? This is an interesting and key question. It is also a rather difficult one. To answer it we have to dig deeper on the importance and miraculous aspect of Church thesis, which makes existing a universal dovetailer, and which makes precise what a computational states is, and why we have to postulate Arithmetical Realism, and why we have to be cautious with any form of larger mathematical platonism (but such platonism is not prohibited per se). Now with comp, and Church thesis in particular, it can be shown that the computational states can be said to exist (in the same sense than numbers) and it can be defined thoroughly by the UD. If you introduced infinite machines (and I agree that it is defensible that some of such machine exists in Platonia) , either you will lose Church thesis, or you will lose the YES DOCTOR, at least in the form I usually gave it. Your move here can be done, nevertheless, without changing the mathematical structure of the hypostases, but this asks for a non trivial generalization of comp, and of Church thesis in particular. I would not do that unless it is needed to get the physics (and then this would be a refutation of comp, or more precisely here: of Sigma_1 comp). The Chuch thesis concerns what can in theory be computed by a physical computer with unlimited resources. Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute all computable functions from N to N. It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does not invoke physical machine at all. In a sense that is true, but a TM is still a model of what could possibly be built in a physical universe such as ours. Of course the model is still valid irrespective of the existence of a physical machine or indeed a physical universe, but if you abandon the idea of a physical universe there is no need to constrain yourself to models based on one. So I suppose the two questions I have (which you partly answer below) are, having arrived at step 8 of the UDA could you go back and say that the UD is not really necessary but all the required computations exist eternally without any generating mechanism or program (after all, you make this assumption for the UD itself), or alternatively, could you have started with step 8 and eliminate the need for the UD in the argument at all? It seems that this is the computer you have in mind to run the UD. Only for providing a decor for a story. This assumption is eliminated when we arrive (step eight of UDA-8) at the conclusion that universal digital machine cannot distinguish any reality from an arithmetical one. That's OK and the argument works (assuming comp etc.), but in Platonia you have access to hypercomputers of the best and fastest kind. Fastness is relative in Platonia. Universal machine can always been sped up on almost all their inputs (There is a theorem by Blum and Marquez to that effect). Then indeed there are the angels and hierachies of non-comp machine. A vast category of angels can be shown to have the same hypostases (so we cannot tested by empirical means if we are such angels). Then they are entities very closed to the one, having stronger hypostases, i.e. you need to add axioms to G and G* (or V, V* with explicit comp) to get them. Of course I was joking when I said best and fastest. In Platonia there is no actual time and everything is as fast and as perfect as you want it. This does not invalidate CT - it still applies to the physical world, such as it is - but it does make it unnecessary when the resources of Platonia are available. Also, I don't see how introducing infinite machines invalidates yes doctor, since if anything it adds to the choice of hardware when considering your replacement brain. You are right here, I agree. But this makes the thought experiment longer to describe. Mathematically Sigma1-comp, which is the standard traditionnal comp, is easier to handle than their hyper or super generalization. G, G* and all the hypostases remains correct and complete for much weaker form of comp. That's correct. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
RE: To observe is to......EC
=== STEP 6: Initial state, 'axioms' (*) The initial state of the EC axiom set is 1 huge collection of phase related fluctuations. The (*) means that all the axioms are coincident - there is no 'space' yet. No concept of place. The number of spatial dimensions is equal to the number of axioms. NOTES: 1) Think of ( ) as a loop that goes up and around the left bracket, across to the top of the right bracket, down the right bracket and across to the left again. Serendipitously the match with Church's Lambda calculus is not altered by this mental trick. 2) To initialise a relevant collection of ( ) as axioms is to construct them, but to construct them IN PHASE. Not all exactly in phase. All that is needed is to have the ( ) sufficiently in phase to enable their mutual interaction. Two ( ) can merge if they happen to transit through the same state as another coincident ( ) in such a way as they a) simply take over each other (in of phase) or combine to construct a single structure (notionally larger). In the process unused portions can be shed this is a dissipative process. If there is no shedding then the combining process is lossless. 3) This is where an understanding of dynamic hierarchies will help. Turtles. The initialisation (construction) of EC axioms can happen from sea of randomness. In other words the fluctuations are made of sub-fluctuations. The origins of the sea of randomness can be traced back to more esoteric considerations of 'nothing' and the 'infinite' - outside the necessary scope of EC. All that has to happen is that ever so often - very very rarely, but statistically inevitable, like the one raindrop that hits your nose, you will get massive numbers of simultaneous phase coherence of similar ( ) fluctuations. The phase coherence doesn't have to be perfect. 4) The EC fluctuations, being made of sub-fluctuations (turtles) will have a characteristic depending on the ratio of the EC axiom 'extent' (the number of sub-fluctuations that create one EC fluctuation). This means that the final EC outcome will be critically dependent on the dynamic of the EX axiom. 5) This process is, I think, what we would call the big bang. The phase variance is, I think, made visible in what we see as the cosmic background radiation. 6) The process of reversion of EC axioms to their original noise is that we see as reality driven by the 2nd law of thermodynamics. Each time a chunk of on of the original EC axiom is dispersed to a lower level of organisation within the proof, the net proof === --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
