Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical logic is sound for arithmetic. I use often the expression platonia for a place where all machines run forever or stop. Or, if I refer to Plato, it means I refer to some precise proposition in Plato's Theaetetus, or in its Parmenides. So AR is indeed a very weak hypothesis, and has nothing to do with what you call Platonism. Given that platonism seems to be too much charged, I propose to keep the expression Arithmetical realism instead. It is, I recall, the belief that arithmetical propositions are true or false. (Excluded middle applies). Le 22-oct.-06, à 20:31, David Nyman a écrit : Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by: Computationalism entails COMP. But I prefer to consider COMP just as a precise version of standard computationalism. Then the UDA shows, or is supposed at least to show, that if we believe in computationalism (perhaps even motivated by materialism at first) then we get an epistemological contradiction, so that we have to abandon either computationalism or materialism. The contradiction is only epistemological: it is possible to keep a belief in material stuff with comp, but it is impossible to relate that stuff with consciousness and subjective experience, including consciousness of experimental result in physics. So UDA shows that the notion of primitive or fundamental matter can not been used to explain result of any experience in physics. Of course such a result is annoying for materialist because computationalism is their favorite implicit or explicit theory of mind. My point is that it does not work. Although Penrose uses incorrectly Godel theorems, I agree with his conclusion: if you want a universe made of primitive matter, then the only way to make consciousness physical or material will consist in abandoning comp in the philosophy of mind. You will have to attach consciousness to actual material infinite. If you want to keep comp instead, you have to abandon the notion of primitive matter. But in that case, of course, you have to explain the appearance of matter from and only from comp. OK? Descartes was already aware that mechanism (even non digital) is a threat for materialism. His solution has consisted in positing an infinitely good God, unable to cheat us, so that our material illusion is founded by God's Goodness. I don't follow him that far, but Descartes solution is in the same spirit as the use of self-consistency bets explanation of matter by the lobian machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit : As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not prove Platonism. By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of OR statements. So where is the UD running? If Platonia doesn't exist, how can I be in it? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Bruno Marchal writes: Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno Marchal writes: The UD is both massively parallel and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism sequentially. Given that no actual physical hardware is needed to run it, why did you choose the UD to generate all the computations rather than just saying they are all run in parallel. There is enough room in Platonia for infinite parallel virtual machines, isn't there? This is an interesting and key question. It is also a rather difficult one. To answer it we have to dig deeper on the importance and miraculous aspect of Church thesis, which makes existing a universal dovetailer, and which makes precise what a computational states is, and why we have to postulate Arithmetical Realism, and why we have to be cautious with any form of larger mathematical platonism (but such platonism is not prohibited per se). Now with comp, and Church thesis in particular, it can be shown that the computational states can be said to exist (in the same sense than numbers) and it can be defined thoroughly by the UD. If you introduced infinite machines (and I agree that it is defensible that some of such machine exists in Platonia) , either you will lose Church thesis, or you will lose the YES DOCTOR, at least in the form I usually gave it. Your move here can be done, nevertheless, without changing the mathematical structure of the hypostases, but this asks for a non trivial generalization of comp, and of Church thesis in particular. I would not do that unless it is needed to get the physics (and then this would be a refutation of comp, or more precisely here: of Sigma_1 comp). The Chuch thesis concerns what can in theory be computed by a physical computer with unlimited resources. Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute all computable functions from N to N. It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does not invoke physical machine at all. In a sense that is true, but a TM is still a model of what could possibly be built in a physical universe such as ours. That may be true, but if it is , it is true because of the empirically-arrived-at laws of physics, not because of apriori reasoning of the CT. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical logic is sound for arithmetic. You need a UD -- a UD which exists. Somehow, somewhere. I use often the expression platonia for a place where all machines run forever or stop. Or, if I refer to Plato, it means I refer to some precise proposition in Plato's Theaetetus, or in its Parmenides. So AR is indeed a very weak hypothesis, and has nothing to do with what you call Platonism. Given that platonism seems to be too much charged, I propose to keep the expression Arithmetical realism instead. It is, I recall, the belief that arithmetical propositions are true or false. (Excluded middle applies). Le 22-oct.-06, à 20:31, David Nyman a écrit : Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by: Computationalism entails COMP. But I prefer to consider COMP just as a precise version of standard computationalism. Then the UDA shows, or is supposed at least to show, that if we believe in computationalism (perhaps even motivated by materialism at first) then we get an epistemological contradiction, so that we have to abandon either computationalism or materialism. Contradiction? Haven't you previously claimed that COMP only makes matter redundant. Where is the UD? surely it has to exist. Somehow, somewhere. The contradiction is only epistemological: it is possible to keep a belief in material stuff with comp, but it is impossible to relate that stuff with consciousness and subjective experience, including consciousness of experimental result in physics. So UDA shows that the notion of primitive or fundamental matter can not been used to explain result of any experience in physics. Does the UDA show that physics cannot generate consciousness non-computationally? Of course such a result is annoying for materialist because computationalism is their favorite implicit or explicit theory of mind. My point is that it does not work. Although Penrose uses incorrectly Godel theorems, I agree with his conclusion: if you want a universe made of primitive matter, then the only way to make consciousness physical or material will consist in abandoning comp in the philosophy of mind. You will have to attach consciousness to actual material infinite. If you want to keep comp instead, you have to abandon the notion of primitive matter. But in that case, of course, you have to explain the appearance of matter from and only from comp. OK? If you have an argument from contradiction, and not, as previously stated a redundancy argument. Descartes was already aware that mechanism (even non digital) is a threat for materialism. His solution has consisted in positing an infinitely good God, unable to cheat us, so that our material illusion is founded by God's Goodness. I don't follow him that far, but Descartes solution is in the same spirit as the use of self-consistency bets explanation of matter by the lobian machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by: Computationalism entails COMP. Bruno, could you distinguish between your remarks vis-a-vis comp, that on the one hand: a belief in 'primary' matter can be retained provided it is not invoked in the explanation of consciousness, and on the other: that under comp 'matter' emerges from (what I've termed) a recursively prior 1-person level. Why are these two conclusions not contradictory? You will have to attach consciousness to actual material infinite. Why is this the case? David Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical logic is sound for arithmetic. I use often the expression platonia for a place where all machines run forever or stop. Or, if I refer to Plato, it means I refer to some precise proposition in Plato's Theaetetus, or in its Parmenides. So AR is indeed a very weak hypothesis, and has nothing to do with what you call Platonism. Given that platonism seems to be too much charged, I propose to keep the expression Arithmetical realism instead. It is, I recall, the belief that arithmetical propositions are true or false. (Excluded middle applies). Le 22-oct.-06, à 20:31, David Nyman a écrit : Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by: Computationalism entails COMP. But I prefer to consider COMP just as a precise version of standard computationalism. Then the UDA shows, or is supposed at least to show, that if we believe in computationalism (perhaps even motivated by materialism at first) then we get an epistemological contradiction, so that we have to abandon either computationalism or materialism. The contradiction is only epistemological: it is possible to keep a belief in material stuff with comp, but it is impossible to relate that stuff with consciousness and subjective experience, including consciousness of experimental result in physics. So UDA shows that the notion of primitive or fundamental matter can not been used to explain result of any experience in physics. Of course such a result is annoying for materialist because computationalism is their favorite implicit or explicit theory of mind. My point is that it does not work. Although Penrose uses incorrectly Godel theorems, I agree with his conclusion: if you want a universe made of primitive matter, then the only way to make consciousness physical or material will consist in abandoning comp in the philosophy of mind. You will have to attach consciousness to actual material infinite. If you want to keep comp instead, you have to abandon the notion of primitive matter. But in that case, of course, you have to explain the appearance of matter from and only from comp. OK? Descartes was already aware that mechanism (even non digital) is a threat for materialism. His solution has consisted in positing an infinitely good God, unable to cheat us, so that our material illusion is founded by God's Goodness. I don't follow him that far, but Descartes solution is in the same spirit as the use of self-consistency bets explanation of matter by the lobian machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not prove Platonism. By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of OR statements. Lest we go yet another round in the 'reification' debate, is it not possible to reconcile what is being claimed here? Bruno, I'm assuming that when you eschew 'Platonic existence' for AR, you are thereby saying that your project is to formalise certain arguments about the logical structure of possibility - and through this, to put actuality to the test in certain empirical aspects. Questions of how this may finally be reconciled with 'RITSIAR' (I hope you recall what this means) are in abeyance. Nevertheless, some aspect of this approach may ultimately be ascribed a status as 'foundational existent' analogous to that of 'primary matter' in materialism. Alternatively, such a hypothesis may be shown to be redundant or incoherent. Peter, as we've agreed, materialism is also metaphysics, and as a route to 'ultimate reality' via a physics of observables, is vulnerable to 'reification'. Might it not be premature to finalise precisely what it is that physical theory decribes that might actually be RITSIAR? You may be tempted to respond, Johnsonianly, that it is precisely the world that kicks back that is RITSIAR, but theoretical physics and COMP are both in the business of modelling what is not so directly accessible. This notwithstanding that we may believe one or other theory to be further developed, more widely accepted, or better supported empirically. Or is there some irreducible sense in which 'primary matter' could be deemed to exist in a way that nothing else can? David Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit : As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not prove Platonism. By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of OR statements. Do you recall the proof I have given that there exists a couple of irrational numbers a and b such that a^b is rational? The proof was not constructive and did show only that such a number was in a two element set without saying which one. AR means we accept such form of reasoning. Formally it means I accept that the principle of excluded middle holds for the arithmetical propositions (that is those build in first order predicate calculus + the symbols =, 0, s, +, *). For example I believe that either every positive integer bigger than four can be expressed as the sum of two primes or there is a positive integer which is bigger than four and which cannot be written as the sum of two primes. This is exactly what I mean by being platonist or better realist about numbers and their relations. I put it explicitly in the hypotheses for avoiding sterile debates with ultra-constructivists or ultra-intuitionist. Note that I have no problem with moderate constructivism/intuitionism: non classical results can be recasted there through the use of the double negation. Without AR I am not sure CT makes any sense. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not prove Platonism. By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of OR statements. Lest we go yet another round in the 'reification' debate, is it not possible to reconcile what is being claimed here? Bruno, I'm assuming that when you eschew 'Platonic existence' for AR, you are thereby saying that your project is to formalise certain arguments about the logical structure of possibility - and through this, to put actuality to the test in certain empirical aspects. Questions of how this may finally be reconciled with 'RITSIAR' (I hope you recall what this means) are in abeyance. Nevertheless, some aspect of this approach may ultimately be ascribed a status as 'foundational existent' analogous to that of 'primary matter' in materialism. Alternatively, such a hypothesis may be shown to be redundant or incoherent. Peter, as we've agreed, materialism is also metaphysics, and as a route to 'ultimate reality' via a physics of observables, is vulnerable to 'reification'. Might it not be premature to finalise precisely what it is that physical theory decribes that might actually be RITSIAR? The point of the phrase RITSIAR is to leave it deliberately unstated what that reality consists of. If Bruno is going to come to conclusions about my reality, RITSIAR, he must be making *some* sort of ontological assumption, even without knowing what specific kind of ontology is involved in RITSIAR. Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The answer is that not all bundles of posible properties are instantiated, that they exist. What does it mean to say something exists ? ..exists is a meaningful predicate of concepts rather than things. The thing must exist in some sense to be talked about. But if it existed full, a statement like Nessie doesn't exist would be a contradiction ...it would amount to the existing thing Nessie doesnt exist. However, if we take that the some sense in which the subject of an ...exists predicate exists is only initially as a concept, we can then say whether or not the concept has something to refer to. Thus Bigfoot exists would mean the concept 'Bigfoot' has a referent. What matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility. Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of contingency or somethingism -- the idea that only certain possible things exist. The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something. It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all changes are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself change and must endure through change. In more detail here The Case Against Mathematial Monism Mathematical monism is both too broad and too narrow. Too broad: If I am just a mathematical structure, I should have a much wider range of experience than I do. There is a mathemtical structure corresponding to myself with all my experiences up to time T. There is a vast array of mathematical structures corresponding to other versions of me with having a huge range of experiences -- ordinary ones, like continuing to type, extraordinary ones like seeing my computer sudenly turn into bowl of petunias. All these versions of me share the memories of the me who is writing this, so they all identify themselves as me. Remember, that for mathematical monism it is only necessary that a possible experience has a mathematical description. This is known as the White Rabbit problem. If we think in terms of multiverse theories, we would say that there is one me in this universe and other me's in other universes,a nd they are kept out of contact with each other. The question is whether a purely mathematical scheme has enough resources to impose isolation or otherwise remove the White Rabbit problem. Too narrow: there are a number of prima-facie phenomena which a purely mathematical approach struggles to deal with. * space * time * consciousness * causality * necessity/contingency Why space ? It is tempting to think that if a number of, or some other mathematical entity, occurs in a set with other numbers, that is, as it were, a space which is disconnected from other sets, so that a set forms a natural model of an *isolated* universe withing a multiverse, a universe which
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Hi Stathis, I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send successfully. (Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for Peter and David). Le 23-oct.-06, à 04:35, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute all computable functions from N to N. It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does not invoke physical machine at all. In a sense that is true, but a TM is still a model of what could possibly be built in a physical universe such as ours. Of course the model is still valid irrespective of the existence of a physical machine or indeed a physical universe, but if you abandon the idea of a physical universe there is no need to constrain yourself to models based on one. I am not sure why you say the TM model is based on what we can build in the physical universe. Both with comp and without, the physical universe is a priori far richer than a UTM. The UTM of Turing relies explicitly on an analysis of human capacity for computations. Post universal systems are based on analysis of mathematician psychology. So I suppose the two questions I have (which you partly answer below) are, having arrived at step 8 of the UDA could you go back and say that the UD is not really necessary but all the required computations exist eternally without any generating mechanism or program (after all, you make this assumption for the UD itself), or alternatively, could you have started with step 8 and eliminate the need for the UD in the argument at all? This is the way I proceed in Conscience and Mechanism. I begin, by using the movie graph argument MGA, to show that consciousness cannot be attached to physical activities, and then I use the UD to explain that the comp-physics get the form of a measure on all computations. In my Lille thesis I do the opposite because the UDA is simpler than the MGA. It is not so important. UD is needed to justify and to make mathematically precise the ontic 3-observer moments. They correspond to its (the UD) accessible states. It seems that this is the computer you have in mind to run the UD. Only for providing a decor for a story. This assumption is eliminated when we arrive (step eight of UDA-8) at the conclusion that universal digital machine cannot distinguish any reality from an arithmetical one. That's OK and the argument works (assuming comp etc.), but in Platonia you have access to hypercomputers of the best and fastest kind. Fastness is relative in Platonia. Universal machine can always been sped up on almost all their inputs (There is a theorem by Blum and Marquez to that effect). Then indeed there are the angels and hierachies of non-comp machine. A vast category of angels can be shown to have the same hypostases (so we cannot tested by empirical means if we are such angels). Then they are entities very closed to the one, having stronger hypostases, i.e. you need to add axioms to G and G* (or V, V* with explicit comp) to get them. Of course I was joking when I said best and fastest. In Platonia there is no actual time and everything is as fast and as perfect as you want it. OK. But of course there exist notion of relative time: a fast Fourier transform is faster than a slow Fourier transform, even in Platonia. Of course this can be said in term of number of steps in computations (no need to invoke time). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: To observe is to......EC
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: 3) The current state of the proof is 'now' the thin slice of the present. Just a couple of questions for the moment Colin, until I've a little more time. Actually, that's precisely what it's about - 'time'. Just how thin is this slice of yours? And is it important whether we conceive it as Now-You-See-It-Now-You-Don't time, or does it work in 'block' time? This may be a maths vs. 'primitive' EC issue. Anyway, if NYSINYD, what is the status of the 'thens'? That is, if nothing but a wafer-thin 'now' is actual, how does this effect process-structure at the macro-level, which we encounter as Vast ensembles of events? Does reality work as just the flimsiest meniscus? This is presumably not a problem in a block version. Also, what about STR with respect to 'now' and the present? But perhaps I'm jumping the gun. David = STEP 5: The rolling proof NOTES: 1) There is only 1 proof in EC. (Symbolically it has been designated U(.) above) 2) It consists of 1 collection of basic EC primitives (axioms) 3) The current state of the proof is 'now' the thin slice of the present. 4) The documentation of all the outpouring prior states (configuration of the entire set of axioms) is what would be regarded as a standard proof - A theorem evolving under the guiding hand of the mathematician. It's just that there is 1 mathematician per axiom in EC. 5) In effect, all that every happens in EC is rearrangement of axioms into a new configuration, which then becomes a new configuration of axioms. 6) The 'theorem' proof never ends. 7) This process, when viewed from the perspective of being part of EC looks like time. Local regularity in the state transition processes would mean that local representations of behaviour could have a t parameter in them. 8) Each fluctuation can be regarded as a 'mathematician'. This makes EC a single gigantic parallel theorem proving exercise where at each 'state', each mathematician co--operates with a local subset of other mathematicians and where possible they merge their work and then form a 'team' which then works with other local mathematicians. 7) The local options for a mathematician are totally state dependent i.e. depending in what other mathematicians (or teams of merged mathematicians) are available to merge with. 8) The rules for cooperation between mathematicians will look like the 2nd law of thermodynamics from within EC. Those rules will emerge later. === Well I hope they will!. NEXT: some of the rules. Remember we are headed towards analysing the nature of the structure of the EC proof and at the mechanism of 1-person. In terms of EC, if local structure in EC is a part of the single EC proof, then it is a 'sub-proof' in EC. At the outermost structural levels the proof literally is 'matter'. The 1-person is a virtual-proof performed by matter. Virtual matter. It's done under the same rules. Nothing special. Everything is the same in EC. We can then look at what COMP would do to it. cheers, colin hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send successfully. (Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for Peter and David). Bruno, I think it's the Beta version that's intermittently losing posts - Colin lost one, and I've lost two. I've posted a topic to this effect for the list. You may wish to revert to the old version. David Hi Stathis, I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send successfully. (Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for Peter and David). Le 23-oct.-06, à 04:35, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute all computable functions from N to N. It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does not invoke physical machine at all. In a sense that is true, but a TM is still a model of what could possibly be built in a physical universe such as ours. Of course the model is still valid irrespective of the existence of a physical machine or indeed a physical universe, but if you abandon the idea of a physical universe there is no need to constrain yourself to models based on one. I am not sure why you say the TM model is based on what we can build in the physical universe. Both with comp and without, the physical universe is a priori far richer than a UTM. The UTM of Turing relies explicitly on an analysis of human capacity for computations. Post universal systems are based on analysis of mathematician psychology. So I suppose the two questions I have (which you partly answer below) are, having arrived at step 8 of the UDA could you go back and say that the UD is not really necessary but all the required computations exist eternally without any generating mechanism or program (after all, you make this assumption for the UD itself), or alternatively, could you have started with step 8 and eliminate the need for the UD in the argument at all? This is the way I proceed in Conscience and Mechanism. I begin, by using the movie graph argument MGA, to show that consciousness cannot be attached to physical activities, and then I use the UD to explain that the comp-physics get the form of a measure on all computations. In my Lille thesis I do the opposite because the UDA is simpler than the MGA. It is not so important. UD is needed to justify and to make mathematically precise the ontic 3-observer moments. They correspond to its (the UD) accessible states. It seems that this is the computer you have in mind to run the UD. Only for providing a decor for a story. This assumption is eliminated when we arrive (step eight of UDA-8) at the conclusion that universal digital machine cannot distinguish any reality from an arithmetical one. That's OK and the argument works (assuming comp etc.), but in Platonia you have access to hypercomputers of the best and fastest kind. Fastness is relative in Platonia. Universal machine can always been sped up on almost all their inputs (There is a theorem by Blum and Marquez to that effect). Then indeed there are the angels and hierachies of non-comp machine. A vast category of angels can be shown to have the same hypostases (so we cannot tested by empirical means if we are such angels). Then they are entities very closed to the one, having stronger hypostases, i.e. you need to add axioms to G and G* (or V, V* with explicit comp) to get them. Of course I was joking when I said best and fastest. In Platonia there is no actual time and everything is as fast and as perfect as you want it. OK. But of course there exist notion of relative time: a fast Fourier transform is faster than a slow Fourier transform, even in Platonia. Of course this can be said in term of number of steps in computations (no need to invoke time). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter Jones writes: Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical logic is sound for arithmetic. You need a UD -- a UD which exists. Somehow, somewhere. If I could interrupt, the core of the disagreement is what Bruno calls step 8 of the UDA, invoking his movie graph and Maudlin's Olympia argument. Bruno's interpretation is that consciousness does not supevene on actual physical activity, and thereby the naked computations are freed to weave a virtual world without need of any computer on which to run. But there are other possible explanations: computationalism may be false; the accessory non-functional apparatus for handling the counterfactuals (for example, non-firing neurons in the brain) may make an instantaneous difference to conscious experience, or may make a difference by virtue of the fact that it is active in other multiverse branches; the counterfactuals may not be neccesary for consciousness and a recording may hence be conscious; some sort of primary matter in any configuration may be necessary to anchor the computations in the real world. You have to decide which of these explanations is the least incredible, and I don't think the correct answer really leaps out at you. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: To observe is to......EC
Colin Hales wrote: 3) The current state of the proof is 'now' the thin slice of the present. Just a couple of questions for the moment Colin, until I've a little more time. Actually, that's precisely what it's about - 'time'. Just how thin is this slice of yours? And is it important whether we conceive it as Now-You-See-It-Now-You-Don't time, or does it work in 'block' time? This may be a maths vs. 'primitive' EC issue. Anyway, if NYSINYD, what is the status of the 'thens'? That is, if nothing but a wafer-thin 'now' is actual, how does this effect process-structure at the macro-level, which we encounter as Vast ensembles of events? Does reality work as just the flimsiest meniscus? This is presumably not a problem in a block version. Also, what about STR with respect to 'now' and the present? But perhaps I'm jumping the gun. David Jump away! I'm letting EC 'rules of formation' ferment at the moment Preamble... the mental secret to EC is to attend to one of my all time faves: Leibniz. His approach has always born fruit in my analyses. What he was on about, translated into modern jargon, was that brain operation is a literal metaphor for the deep structure of matter. Brain operation is a whole bunch of nested resonating loops. I have observed in general and found the same pattern in a lot of things - trees, clouds... and most wonderfully in the boiling froth... rice is best. :-) Time. It's important to distinguish between the mental perception of it and the reality of it. * TIME PERCEIVED There is a neurological condition (name escapes me) where the visual field is updated on mass as usual but at a repetition rate much lower than usual. Try pouring a glass of wine you see the glass at one instant and the next time you see it: overfull. Try crossing a road. A car is 200m away... you walk and bang, it's 10m away. All throughout this, EC state changes have been running normally. In a normally operating brain in the face of novelty, where more brain regions are involved as a result of dealing with the novelty (such as when traveling in a new area), more energy is recruited, more brain regions are active and the cognitive update rate is increased. Time feels like its going slower. All throughout this, EC state changes have been running normally. * TIME REALITY according to EC Time is virtual. There is only EC proof and its current state. The best way of imaging it is to think of it as a nested structure of nearest neighbour interactions according to a local energy optimization rule. Energy is a metric counting how many ()s there are in a given structure and how many it can do without and still remain the same thing. () () could go to (()()) or vice versa. It doesnt matter. Overall its a one way trip (door slams behind you) depending on what nearest neighbour situation results from the present nearest neighbour situation. Locally there can be lossless EC transformations. Globally the net result is dissipation back to primitive () (and then to its constituents (noise). There is no future, only next state. It looks like 2nd law of thermodynamics from within it. By traveling fast through the EC string (like a wave through water) the faster you go compared to the refresh rate of EC-you by the () structure that is you, your structural state-evolution will proceed at a lower rate than other pieces of the EC string. EC you (organisation only) is moving, but your structure is merely being replicated within the EC string, not moving at all. If we have had a previous metaphor for the EC string Id call it what was once called the ether. Although its not real in the sense that it was once thought just a concept a way of viewing the EC string. When you are in EC it looks like more relative speed (compared your local EC string), time goes slower. Traveling faster than the speed of light is meaningless EC cant construct/refresh you beyond the rate its () operate at. Theres nothing to travel in anything and nothing to travel. Its meaningless. In deep time (many more state changes in the proof beyond now) EC predicts (I think) the equivalent of approaching the speed of light, only not through moving fast, but by dissipation of the fabric of space/matter (there is no time). To be alive then (see how our words are troublesome?) would feel the same. But if you compared the rate of progress of EC would be different. An EC aging process of the time it takes to write WORD in the year 10^^25 could be our equivalent of 3 months of current EC state evolution. Its the same effect as that got by going really fast. When you are inside EC and local structure evolves in an organised way and achieves regularity it means an abstraction of an EC structure can have a t in it. Unfortunately.then we get distracted by the t possibly being negative and now and start talking as if time was real and the abstraction was more than an abstraction.
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
In an excellent and clear post Peter Jones writes: Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The answer is that not all bundles of posible properties are instantiated, that they exist. What does it mean to say something exists ? ..exists is a meaningful predicate of concepts rather than things. The thing must exist in some sense to be talked about. But if it existed full, a statement like Nessie doesn't exist would be a contradiction ...it would amount to the existing thing Nessie doesnt exist. However, if we take that the some sense in which the subject of an ...exists predicate exists is only initially as a concept, we can then say whether or not the concept has something to refer to. Thus Bigfoot exists would mean the concept 'Bigfoot' has a referent. What matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility. Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of contingency or somethingism -- the idea that only certain possible things exist. So on this basis alone are you opposed to a *physical* multiverse, in which every possibility is physically instantiated somewhere, but some possibilities are more common/ have greater measure than others? The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something. It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all changes are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself change and must endure through change. In more detail here Why must change... be change in something? It sort of sounds reasonable but it is our duty to question every assumption and weed out the superfluous ones. If there is an object with (space, time, colour) coordinates (x1, t1, red) and another object (x1, t2, orange), then we say that the object has changed from red to orange. This could describe a poker left in a fire, for example. We only need to talk about properties (and we can add as many as we like to be sufficiently specific); we don't need the propertiless substrate. The Case Against Mathematial Monism Mathematical monism is both too broad and too narrow. Too broad: If I am just a mathematical structure, I should have a much wider range of experience than I do. There is a mathemtical structure corresponding to myself with all my experiences up to time T. There is a vast array of mathematical structures corresponding to other versions of me with having a huge range of experiences -- ordinary ones, like continuing to type, extraordinary ones like seeing my computer sudenly turn into bowl of petunias. All these versions of me share the memories of the me who is writing this, so they all identify themselves as me. Remember, that for mathematical monism it is only necessary that a possible experience has a mathematical description. This is known as the White Rabbit problem. If we think in terms of multiverse theories, we would say that there is one me in this universe and other me's in other universes,a nd they are kept out of contact with each other. The question is whether a purely mathematical scheme has enough resources to impose isolation or otherwise remove the White Rabbit problem. I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to flow and they do not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate rooms, to be separate. If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. Too narrow: there are a number of prima-facie phenomena which a purely mathematical approach struggles to deal with. * space * time * consciousness * causality * necessity/contingency Why space ? It is tempting to think that if a number of, or some other mathematical entity, occurs in a set with other numbers, that is, as it were, a space which is disconnected from other sets, so that a set forms a natural model of an *isolated* universe withing a multiverse, a universe which does not suffer from the White Rabbit problem. However, maths per se does not work that way. The number 2 that
