Re: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Hello Dave/Chris, I agree with everything you say, and have long admired The Hedonistic Imperative. Motivation need not be linked to pain, and for that matter it need not be linked to pleasure either. We can imagine an artificial intelligence without any emotions but completely dedicated to the pursuit of whatever goals it has been set. It is just a contingent fact of evolution that we can experience pleasure and pain. I don't know how you can be sure of that. How do you know that being completely dedicated is not the same has having a motivating emotion? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Brent Meeker writes: I agree with everything you say, and have long admired The Hedonistic Imperative. Motivation need not be linked to pain, and for that matter it need not be linked to pleasure either. We can imagine an artificial intelligence without any emotions but completely dedicated to the pursuit of whatever goals it has been set. It is just a contingent fact of evolution that we can experience pleasure and pain. I don't know how you can be sure of that. How do you know that being completely dedicated is not the same has having a motivating emotion? My computer is completely dedicated to sending this email when I click on send. Surely you don't think it gets pleasure out of sending it and suffers if something goes wrong and it can't send it? Even humans do some things almost dispassionately (only almost, because we can't completely eliminate our emotions) out of a sense of duty, with no particular feeling about it beyond this. I don't even think my computer has a sense of duty, but this is something like the emotionless motivation I imagine AI's might have. I'd sooner trust an AI with a matter-of-fact sense of duty to complete a task than a human motivated by desire to please, desire to do what is good and avoid what is bad, fear of failure and humiliation, and so on. Just because evolution came up with something does not mean it is the best or most efficient way of doing things. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit : It looks like I might have timed out. Hopefully this doesn't appear two times. On Dec 24, 8:55 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit : Bruno, ... I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. Hmmm Perhaps in some symbolical way. The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. Of course that *is* a pity. It is bad, for human, to develop such self-eliminating belief. It is not rational either. I agree. cf my examples (Skinner...) in response to Stathis. But how do *you* define rationality and persons? A richer lobian machine (like ZF) can define those notions with respect to a simpler lobian machine (like PA), and then lift the theology of the simpler machine to themselves (a third lobian machine or entity, richer than ZF, can justified such induction. Then rationality can be defined by relative provability or representability in some shared theories. This leaves open the interpretations of those theories which ask for us implicit faith in our own consistency or relative correctness. The notion of persons are defined by each hypostases (third person = Bp, first person = Bp p, etc.). You also seem to reduce it, to numbers. It is a reduction only if you already defend a reductionist conception of numbers, and this can be considered as doubtful from the study of numbers, especially from the things that can emerge from their collective behaviors (arithmetical relations). I think the sophistication of incompleteness simply hides the fact that it is still a castle in the sky. Like any falsifiable but not yet falsified theory. By the direction of replacement I didn't mean chronologically, like Plato replaces Aristotle. ... in Plotinus, ok. I meant that the impersonal core replaced the real personal core, independent of Aristotle's views. You have said before that the Christians emphasize matter more than mind, as opposed to the Platonists and neo-Platonists. There may have been a few Christians who reclaimed a belief in nature, like Thomas Aquinas, when the mind/grace was being emphasized too much. But, as can be seen in the Christian interpretation of the Greek hypostases, the core of Christianity, being rooted in the Hebrew God who is the source of all things/persons, is really first of all a downward emanation, like the neo-Platonists thought. There can be no upward emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided. In Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the upward emanation is We love God. Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and upward emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with this, even if negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure theological imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story telling and examples, like jurisprudence in the application of laws. But then there is a proviso: none of the stories should be taken literally. He (the Holy Spirit) fills in the gaps when we cannot find words to talk to him. Like G* minus G does for any self-referentially classical machine. (The lobian machine). Yes. By the way, you said to Brent that you know that you are lobian. How do you know? OK, sorry, I was assuming (weaker-)comp. Any machine or even larger non godlike entity believing in a sufficient amount of arithmetical truth is lobian. Actually a lobian machine, as I have define it, is just a universal machines knowing that she is universal (more precisely such a machine/entity can prove that if p is accessible by its own local provability ability, then she can prove that fact. I can take this as a poetical description of the relation between the internal modalities or the hypostases. This is not poetry. Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to the content, but just to the fact that there is a poet, which gives us hope that there is meaning. However, unfulfilled hope does not provide meaning. Hope is something purely first-personal, if I can say. So I have no clue how hope does
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit : The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not knowing the other things too. For a personal God, taking on our form (incarnation), especially if we were made in the image of God in the first place, and showing through miracles, and rising from the dead..., his dual nature (Godman, celestialterrestial, G*G) seems to make a lot more sense than something like a cross in earth orbit. For example, giving a hug is a more personal (and thus a more appropriate) way of expressing love, than giving a card, even though a card is more verifiable in a third person sense, especially after the hug is finished. But we do have the card too: God's written Word, even though this is not sufficient, the incarnate hug was the primary proof, the card was just the historical record of it. There can be no upward emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided. In Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the upward emanation is We love God. Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and upward emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with this, even if negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure theological imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story telling and examples, like jurisprudence in the application of laws. But then there is a proviso: none of the stories should be taken literally. I agree with the use of stories. Jesus used stories almost exclusively to communicate. Either the hearers got it or not. But this does not imply that stories are the only form of downward emanation. The incarnation was the primary means. Otherwise, who would have been the story-teller? What good are stories if the story is not teaching you truth? How do we know that the ultimate source of stories is a good source. Jef and Brent and others seem to be basing their truth on really nothing more than pragmatism. This is not poetry. Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to the content, but just to the fact that there is a poet, which gives us hope that there is meaning. However, unfulfilled hope does not provide meaning. Hope is something purely first-personal, if I can say. So I have no clue how hope does not provide meaning. Even little (and fortunately locally fulfillable hope) like hope in a cup of coffee, can provide meaning. Bigger (and hard to express) hopes can provide genuine bigger meaning, it seems to me. I am not opposed to some idea of ultimate meaning although both personal reasons and reflection on lobianity make me doubt that communicating such hopes can make any sense (worse, the communication would most probably betrays the possible meaning of what is attempted to be communicated, and could even lead to the contrary). Even poetry must be based eventually on some meaning. Even minimalism or the Theatre of the Absurd is based on some form to attempt to communicate meaninglessness. I am glad that your aren't opposed to some idea of ultimate meaning. My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the absence of hope. The content of these words speak of the *actual* fulfillment of the hopes of the Greeks expressed in their hypostases.? Are you talking about mystical enlightening experiences. Like losing any remaining doubts about immortality because you have already seen the whole of the eternal tergiversations all at once ? By these words I was referring to the John quote from the Bible. The actual fulfillment was Jesus (the Word/Logos). He spanned the infinite gap, like you said above, perhaps analogous to hypercomputation,...all in one step. We have seen his glory, the glory of the One and Only, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth. (John 3:1,2,3,14) So the particular finite form that we have, God somehow took on that same form. It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he said he was one with the Father and before Abraham was, I AM, for no one can say that they are God. the mistake is the missing phrase at the end: ...except God. OK. I mean, here, that we can agree on an important disagreement, making both of us quite coherent with respect to my faith in comp and your faith in
Re: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I agree with everything you say, and have long admired The Hedonistic Imperative. Motivation need not be linked to pain, and for that matter it need not be linked to pleasure either. We can imagine an artificial intelligence without any emotions but completely dedicated to the pursuit of whatever goals it has been set. It is just a contingent fact of evolution that we can experience pleasure and pain. I don't know how you can be sure of that. How do you know that being completely dedicated is not the same has having a motivating emotion? My computer is completely dedicated to sending this email when I click on send. Actually, it probably isn't. You probably have a multi-tasking operating system which assigns priorities to different tasks (which is why it sometimes can be as annoying as a human being in not following your instructions). But to take your point seriously - if I look into your brain there are some neuronal processes that corresponded to hitting the send button; and those were accompanied by biochemistry that constituted your positive feeling about it: that you had decided and wanted to hit the send button. So why would the functionally analogous processes in the computer not also be accompanied by an feeling? Isn't that just an anthropomorphic way of talking about satisfying the computer operating in accordance with it's priorities. It seems to me that to say otherwise is to assume a dualism in which feelings are divorced from physical processes. Surely you don't think it gets pleasure out of sending it and suffers if something goes wrong and it can't send it? Even humans do some things almost dispassionately (only almost, because we can't completely eliminate our emotions) That's crux of it. Because we sometimes do things with very little feeling, i.e. dispassionately, I think we erroneously assume there is a limit in which things can be done with no feeling. But things cannot be done with no value system - not even thinking. That's the frame problem. Given a some propositions, what inferences will you draw? If you are told there is a bomb wired to the ignition of your car you could infer that there is no need to do anything because you're not in your car. You could infer that someone has tampered with your car. You could infer that turning on the ignition will draw more current than usual. There are infinitely many things you could infer, before getting around to, I should disconnect the bomb. But in fact you have value system which operates unconsciously and immediately directs your inferences to the few that are important to you. A way to make AI systems to do this is one of the outstanding problems of AI. out of a sense of duty, with no particular feeling about it beyond this. I don't even think my computer has a sense of duty, but this is something like the emotionless motivation I imagine AI's might have. I'd sooner trust an AI with a matter-of-fact sense of duty But even a sense of duty is a value and satisfying it is a positive emotion. to complete a task than a human motivated by desire to please, desire to do what is good and avoid what is bad, fear of failure and humiliation, and so on. Yes, human value systems are very messy because a) they must be learned and b) they mostly have to do with other humans. The motivation of tigers, for example, is probably very simple and consequently they are never depressed or manic. Just because evolution came up with something does not mean it is the best or most efficient way of doing things. But until we know a better way, we can't just assume nature was inefficient. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ?
Brent, you don't REALLY put strange (implied?) words in my mouth, but that gives the impression to the innocent byreader that I said anything like that. BM: Did I claim that we had reached a complete inventory?? JM: No, you only said: It is only your opinion that the inventory is *necessarily* incomplete. Presumably not YOUR opinion, implying completeness of our (cognitive) inventory. I apologize for a typo: what I wrote 1006 was meant indeed 2006(AD), if this number has some connotations in our minds. Now if (as you seem to agree) we increase our cogniotive inventory even to date, it is necessarily incomplete. QED * BM: Does the fact that we don't now know everything prove that there are things we will never know? JM: You cannot paste this nonsense onto my neck. However we have limited means in our mental arsenal - what you may call material tools eg. the 'brain' - which does not imply our capability to collect an unrestricted, limitless (I almost wrote: infinite) knowledge-base (=cognitive inventory). Such consideration, however, does have nothing to do with *proving* what you asked upon the condition you used. * BM: Does the fact that a reductionist analysis is incomplete imply that a wholistic theory is correct? JM: Are you asking me, or are you just ironic? So far I did not experience in your writings logical flaws, I valued your opinion for that. I read in your sentence an affirmative to the incompleteness of a reductionist analysis, so we agree. I pointed to this as a flaw that may be deducted from not thinking wholistically enough. Would you be so kind to explain to me what is the 'wholistic theory'? I am working 'on it' but so far it is only a name - not even an identifiable domain. * Finally: BM: Until 1859 we couldn't explain the origin of species. Should Darwin have concluded that the problem was insoluble? JM: I don't feel like editing good old Chuck,. I did not edit even my contributing authors when I was editor in chief of Ion Exchange and Membranes mag. I value DARWIN for his advanced thinking within his era, do not judge his pre-1859 ideas in our 3rd millennial positions. * I hope I gave a 'civil' response without any aggressivity. John Mikes On 12/25/06, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John Mikes wrote: On 12/25/06, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... JM: Are you sure there is NO [unlimited] impredicative - non (Turing-emulable), all encompassing interrelatedness? (which I did not call a whole) Sorry. You called it a totality. Thanx, makes a difference. I consider a whole identified (maybe it is my feeble English). Is it an essential point: and which sure is not 'the whole' with 'everything included into its boundaries', eo ipso NOT a whole. No I am empathically *not* sure - but I agree with Darwin who wrote, Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge: it is those who know little, and not those who know much, who so positively assert that this or that problem will never be solved by science. --- Charles Darwin, The Ascent of Man The separately quoted 2nd part of my sentence points to my doubt about physics (or any other 'science', for that matter) whether they are capable in a 'synthetic' effort to encompass ALL interrelations into a buildup step when many of them still may be undiscovered?. A reductionist 'synthesis' works on the available inventory and ends up with an Aris-Total-like incompleteness (i.e. that the 'total' is more than the 'sum' of the parts.). Just as a reductionist analysis is inventory-related and so incomplete. It is only your opinion that the inventory is *necessarily* incomplete. Is it? try to compare our (cognitive etc.) inventories of 3000BC, 1000AD, 1006AD, and tell me which year did we reach omniscience? John Did I claim that we had reached a complete inventory?? Tell me in which year did our knowledge cease to increase? Until 1859 we couldn't explain the origin of species. Should Darwin have concluded that the problem was insoluble? Does the fact that we don't now know everything prove that there are things we will never know? Does the fact that a reductionist analysis is incomplete imply that a wholistic theory is correct? Brent Meeker - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ?
John Mikes wrote: Brent, you don't REALLY put strange (implied?) words in my mouth, but that gives the impression to the innocent byreader that I said anything like that. BM: Did I claim that we had reached a complete inventory?? JM: No, you only said: It is only your opinion that the inventory is *necessarily* incomplete. Presumably not YOUR opinion, implying completeness of our (cognitive) inventory. I apologize for a typo: what I wrote 1006 was meant indeed 2006(AD), if this number has some connotations in our minds. Now if (as you seem to agree) we increase our cogniotive inventory even to date, it is necessarily incomplete. QED Of course I agree that it is incomplete. But you seem to assume that it can never be complete - that even if reductionist physics bottoms out with a single unified field, our inventory will be incomplete because it will not include all the complex relations of those elementary inventory items. I think this is begging the question against reductionism. * BM: Does the fact that we don't now know everything prove that there are things we will never know? JM: You cannot paste this nonsense onto my neck. However we have limited means in our mental arsenal - what you may call material tools eg. the 'brain' - which does not imply our capability to collect an unrestricted, limitless (I almost wrote: infinite) knowledge-base (=cognitive inventory). Is this what you meant to write?: ~[limited means - ability to collect unlimited knowledge-base)] It certainly seems true - but trivial. Such consideration, however, does have nothing to do with *proving* what you asked upon the condition you used. * BM: Does the fact that a reductionist analysis is incomplete imply that a wholistic theory is correct? JM: Are you asking me, or are you just ironic? So far I did not experience in your writings logical flaws, I valued your opinion for that. I read in your sentence an affirmative to the incompleteness of a reductionist analysis, so we agree. I pointed to this as a flaw that may be deducted from not thinking wholistically enough. I think reductionist/wholistic it is a false dichotomy. Reductionist theories are only successful when they explain the more wholistic theory (which looked at from the other end is called emergent); as statistical mechanics explained thermodynamics and biochemistry is aiming to explain life. Physicist are motivated by wholism, as in the current effort to find a unifying theory of quantum gravity. But a theory that does not reduce the phenomena will be as much a mystery as the phenomena itself. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. I'm not sure what you're thinking of. Do you think of beliefs as all-or-nothing? Can you give some examples? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2006 14:59:17 -0800 I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express this belief of his in the form of a tautology. I've observed that he is generally both thoughtful and precise in his writing, so I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occams's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn something of its source. We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm wonder where that open door is intended to lead. --- In response to John Mikes: Yes, I consider my thinking about truth to be pragmatic, within an empirical framework of open-ended possibility. Of course, ultimately this too may be considered a matter of faith, but one with growth that seems to operate in a direction opposite from the faith you express. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. Dr. Minsky, In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of will: The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false. Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)? Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will, but something. And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no ultimate source that we could find. Do you agree with this statement? Tom Caylor --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Tom Caylor wrote: On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. Dr. Minsky, In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of will: The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false. Whether it is false depends on what you mean by free will. Dennett argues persuasively in Elbow Room that we have all the freedom of will that matters. Our actions arise out of who we are. If you conceive yourself comprehensively, all your memories, values, knowledge, etc. then you are the author of your action. If you conceive yourself as small enough, you can escape all responsibility. Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)? Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will, but something. And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no ultimate source that we could find. Do you agree with this statement? It would be futile - but not circular. It is circular to argue that belief is evidence for the thing believed. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
On Dec 26, 7:53 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. Dr. Minsky, In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of will: The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false. Whether it is false depends on what you mean by free will. Dennett argues persuasively in Elbow Room that we have all the freedom of will that matters. Our actions arise out of who we are. If you conceive yourself comprehensively, all your memories, values, knowledge, etc. then you are the author of your action. If you conceive yourself as small enough, you can escape all responsibility. Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)? Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will, but something. And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no ultimate source that we could find. Do you agree with this statement? It would be futile - but not circular. It is circular to argue that belief is evidence for the thing believed. Brent Meeker I was providing a belief as evidence not for free will but for some invariant reality/truth, e.g. the source of actions in your words, who we are. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ?
Tom Caylor wrote: On Dec 26, 7:53 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. Dr. Minsky, In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of will: The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false. Whether it is false depends on what you mean by free will. Dennett argues persuasively in Elbow Room that we have all the freedom of will that matters. Our actions arise out of who we are. If you conceive yourself comprehensively, all your memories, values, knowledge, etc. then you are the author of your action. If you conceive yourself as small enough, you can escape all responsibility. Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)? Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will, but something. And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no ultimate source that we could find. Do you agree with this statement? It would be futile - but not circular. It is circular to argue that belief is evidence for the thing believed. Brent Meeker I was providing a belief as evidence not for free will but for some invariant reality/truth, e.g. the source of actions in your words, who we are. OK. But we know of many beliefs that are false and people sometimes act on false as well as true beliefs. Since it is circular to argue that a belief is evidence for the thing believed, then it is also circular to argue from belief in general to the existence of truth in general. A fortiori it is circular to argue from a single belief, belief in free will, to the existence of truth in general or to any true statement, except that some people believe in free will. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
