Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On 12/06/07, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... > 'Humans are complex and are conscious' > 'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' > therefore > 'The biosphere is conscious' That conclusion is spurious, but it is the case that non-coscious evolutionary processes can give rise to very elaborate "technology", namely life, which goes against your theory that only consciousness can produce new technology. That assumes that complexity itself (organisation of information) is the > origin of consciousness in some unspecified, unjustified way. This > position is completely unable to make any empirical predictions about the > nature of human conscousness (eg why your cortex generates qualia and your > spinal chord doesn't - a physiologically proven fact). > Well, why does your eye generate visual qualia and not your big toe? It's because the big toe lacks the necessary machinery. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
Hi again, Russel: I'm sorry, but you worked yourself up into an incomprehensible rant. Is evolution creative in your view or not? If it is, then there is little point debating definitions, as we're in agreement. If not, then we clearly use the word creative in different senses, and perhaps defintion debates have some utility. Colin: There wasn't even the slightest edge of 'rant' in the post. Quite calm, measured and succinct, actually. Its apparent incomprehensibility? I have no clue what that could be it's quite plain... RE: 'creativity' ... Say at stage t the biosphere was at complexity level X and then at stage t = t+(something), the biosphere complexity was at KX, where X is some key performance indicator of complexity (eg entropy) and K > 1 This could be called creative if you like. Like Prigogine did. I'd caution against the tendency to use the word because it has so many loaded meanings that are suggestive of much more then the previous para. Scientifically the word could be left entirely out of any desciptions of the biosphere. The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... 'Humans are complex and are conscious' 'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' therefore 'The biosphere is conscious' That assumes that complexity itself (organisation of information) is the origin of consciousness in some unspecified, unjustified way. This position is completely unable to make any empirical predictions about the nature of human conscousness (eg why your cortex generates qualia and your spinal chord doesn't - a physiologically proven fact). The same bogus logic happens in relation to quantum mechanics and conscsiousness: "Quantum mechanics is weird and complex" "Consciousness is is weird and complex" therefore "Quantum mechanics generates consciousness" I caution against this. I caution against using the word 'creativity' in any useful scientific discussion of evolution and complexity. cheers colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Penrose and algorithms
cheers Bruno. :) >From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: Penrose and algorithms >Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2007 18:40:50 +0200 > > >Hi Chris, > >Le 09-juin-07, à 13:03, chris peck a écrit : > > > > > Hello > > > > The time has come again when I need to seek advice from the > > everything-list > > and its contributors. > > > > Penrose I believe has argued that the inability to algorithmically > > solve the > > halting problem but the ability of humans, or at least Kurt Godel, to > > understand that formal systems are incomplete together demonstrate that > > human reason is not algorithmic in nature - and therefore that the AI > > project is fundamentally flawed. > > > > What is the general consensus here on that score. I know that there > > are many > > perspectives here including those who agree with Penrose. Are there any > > decent threads I could look at that deal with this issue? > > > > All the best > > > > Chris. > > >This is a fundamental issue, even though things are clear for the >logicians since 1921 ... >But apparently it is still very cloudy for the physicists (except >Hofstadter!). > >I have no time to explain, but let me quote the first paragraph of my >Siena papers (your question is at the heart of the interview of the >lobian machine and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus). > >But you can find many more explanation in my web pages (in french and >in english). In a nutshell, Penrose, though quite courageous and more >lucid on the mind body problem than the average physicist, is deadly >mistaken on Godel. Godel's theorem are very lucky event for mechanism: >eventually it leads to their theologies ... > >The book by Franzen on the misuse of Godel is quite good. An deep book >is also the one by Judson Webb, ref in my thesis). We will have the >opportunity to come back on this deep issue, which illustrate a gap >between logicians and physicists. > >Best, > >Bruno > > >-- (excerp of "A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, >Interpretation of Plotinus¹ Theory of Matter" Cie 2007 ) >1) Incompleteness and Mechanism >There is a vast literature where G odel¹s first and second >incompleteness theorems are used to argue that human beings are >different of, if not superior to, any machine. The most famous attempts >have been given by J. Lucas in the early sixties and by R. Penrose in >two famous books [53, 54]. Such type of argument are not well >supported. See for example the recent book by T. Franzen [21]. There is >also a less well known tradition where G odel¹s theorems is used in >favor of the mechanist thesis. Emil Post, in a remarkable anticipation >written about ten years before G odel published his incompleteness >theorems, already discovered both the main ³G odelian motivation² >against mechanism, and the main pitfall of such argumentations [17, >55]. Post is the first discoverer 1 of Church Thesis, or Church Turing >Thesis, and Post is the first one to prove the first incompleteness >theorem from a statement equivalent to Church thesis, i.e. the >existence of a universalPost said ³complete²normal (production) >system 2. In his anticipation, Post concluded at first that the >mathematician¹s mind or that the logical process is essentially >creative. He adds : ³It makes of the mathematician much more than a >clever being who can do quickly what a machine could do ultimately. We >see that a machine would never give a complete logic ; for once the >machine is made we could prove a theorem it does not prove²(Post >emphasis). But Post quickly realized that a machine could do the same >deduction for its own mental acts, and admits that : ³The conclusion >that man is not a machine is invalid. All we can say is that man cannot >construct a machine which can do all the thinking he can. To illustrate >this point we may note that a kind of machine-man could be constructed >who would prove a similar theorem for his mental acts.² >This has probably constituted his motivation for lifting the term >creative to his set theoretical formulation of mechanical universality >[56]. To be sure, an application of Kleene¹s second recursion theorem, >see [30], can make any machine self-replicating, and Post should have >said only that man cannot both construct a machine doing his thinking >and proving that such machine do so. This is what remains from a >reconstruction of Lucas-Penrose argument : if we are machine we cannot >constructively specify which machine we are, nor, a fortiori, which >computation support us. Such analysis begins perhaps with Benacerraf >[4], (see [41] for more details). In his book on the subject, Judson >Webb argues that Church Thesis is a main ingredient of the Mechanist >Thesis. Then, he argues that, given that incompleteness is an easyone >double diagonalization step, see aboveconsequence of Church Thesis, >G odel¹s 1931 theorem, which proves incompleteness without appeal to >Church Thesis, can be taken
Re: Asifism
On Jun 1, 6:04 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I look at myself in the third person view. I then see a lot of protons > reacting with eachother, and I see how they explain my behavior and the words > I produce. I see how they cause me saying "I am conscious! I have a free > will! I am happy!". Torgny, you give yourself away in the phrase 'I look at myself in the third person view'. The 3rd-person world thus revealed to you can only be encountered in the way you describe within a 1st-person pov where it is modelled and grasped. Given that you directly refer to this view in your justification, and further given that you have passed, as far as I'm concerned, the Turing Test, you indeed do possess such a 1st-person pov. Consequently you are as conscious as I am, and you are just doing what Galen Strawson calls 'looking- glassing' - i.e. "using a term in such a way that whatever one means by it, it excludes what the term means". It is a category error of the first magnitude to believe that the 3rd- person world simply exists 'out there by itself'. To claim this is to try to claim that there is nothing, and nobody to care about it - the ultimate attempt at self-defeating nihilism. The source of the error - ironically - is that it's the 1st-person pov alone that allows us to create the 3rd-person models that we are then at liberty to mistake for *that which is modelled*. This very act conjures up the 'zombie 3rd-person world' *which exists only in our imagination* (what Bruno I think calls 1st-person plural). What is in fact 'out there' beyond the 1st person - i.e. whatever is unconscious from one's own pov - is *not* a 3rd-person world. It is the rest of the *participatory* world, within which one gets a vote solely in virtue of the fact that one is emergently constituted by participatory 'elements' (i.e. process and structure). These, by directly *grasping* each other, without mediation, are the foundation of everything that 'knows' and 'acts'. If you're not participating, you can't exist, or know, or act. Sorry - welcome to the club! David > Bruno Marchal skrev:Le 01-juin-07, à 14:35, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :The only > thing that exists is a lot of protons, neutrons, and electrons reacting with > each other inside my brain.Are you *sure*? > By the way, are you more sure about proton than about your belief in proton? > What would that mean? > I look at myself in the third person view. I then see a lot of protons > reacting with eachother, and I see how they explain my behavior and the words > I produce. I see how they cause me saying "I am conscious! I have a free > will! I am happy!". This is all that is. This explains everything. > -- > Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism
On 11/06/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Mark Peaty skrev: > > * Then again it may be that I have misunderstood TT's grammar > > and that what he is denying is simply the separate existence of > > something called 'consciousness'. If that be the case then I > > would not argue because I agree that the subjective impression > > of being here now is simply what it is like to be part of the > > processing the brain does, ie updating the model of self in the > > world. > > > Yes, I simpy deny the separate existence of something called > 'consciousness'. You could deny that there is any difference between conscious behaviour and conscious-like behaviour, equivalent to denying the *separate* existence of consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism
Mark Peaty skrev: > MP: There is possibly a loose end or two here and perhaps > clarification is needed, yet again: > > * Or this could conceivably be construed as a 'state of grace' > in that Torgny is operating with no mental capacity being wasted > on self-talk or internal commentary: 'just doing' whatever needs > to be done and 'just being' what he needs to be; very Zen! > To discuss the nature of consciousness is waste of time, because consciousness or mind is not an entity that exists in the real world. The only thing that exists in the real world is matter. What you can talk about is consciouslike behaviour, objects that behave as if they were conscious, objects that claim that they are conscious. > * Then again it may be that I have misunderstood TT's grammar > and that what he is denying is simply the separate existence of > something called 'consciousness'. If that be the case then I > would not argue because I agree that the subjective impression > of being here now is simply what it is like to be part of the > processing the brain does, ie updating the model of self in the > world. > Yes, I simpy deny the separate existence of something called 'consciousness'. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism
On Jun 10, 1:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Up to here comp basically agree (modulo misunderstanding of my part,
> sure).
> I mean that what you say is not just consistent with comp (which is not
> a lot after Godel: even inconsistency is consistent with comp!) but
> probably near truth.
Phew! This will help with what follows, I hope.
> Well, perhaps OK, unless by field you assume geometry at the start.
> (Geometry like physics is secondary with comp).
> You could perhaps elaborate of what you mean by field.
In this case by 'field' I simply mean a self-asserting (i.e.
primitive) subjective ground (in my view equating to the least we can
say about existence per se) conceived as logically prior to any
differentiation. Thereafter we and all phenomena (including geometry)
emerge by some self-motivated action of symmetry breaking (e.g.
vibrating strings, COMP?). Field may well be the wrong word.
> Careful: comp cannot equate consciousness and computation. It can only
> "equate" consciousness with higher order emergent modality (emergent on
> a continuum of computations).
Yes, I agree, in the sense of 'reflexive self-consciousness'. I meant
rather that no consciousness of whatever sort can be associated with
purely 'computational' processes within a 'physical computer', as
opposed to those actions that emerge 'organically' from self-acting
processes of symmetry breaking. In my scheme, the sense-action that
we experience as conscious subjects (and that of everything else we
observe) must inherit its awareness ('sense') and its causal power
('action') directly from fundamental self-sensing and self-acting
symmetry-breaking.
> > The reason is that computational
> > 'causation' depends on the introjection of 'rules' from a context
> > external to the computed 'world',
>
> I don't see why.
My use of the term 'self' here is intended (Occamishly) to halt
explanatory regression, and this is why we must not rely on superadded
'rules' coming from 'outside the system' (if so, we must go 'further
out' to incorporate them). 'Computation', in the sense of the
programmed action of a 'physical computer', exists only at a
metaphorical level, one that we *impute* to the behaviour of a system,
rather than one which emerges from its intrinsic sense-action. In
this sense, the 'rules of programmed behaviour' are introjected from
our mental context, which is *external* to the computer itself.
> > and hence loses contact both with
> > intrinsic causal self-motivation and the fundamental linkage of felt-
> > sense and action.
>
> You are quick here ...
Have I slowed down at all? What I'm saying is that as layers of
phenomena emerge self-actingly and self-sensingly (self-graspingly?),
a distinction must always be made between what is an 'organic'
emergent - which can be the basis for quasi-independent sensing and
acting, inherited directly from the fundamental level - and what is an
imputed or metaphorical narrative - meaning it exists merely as a
model *within* an organic emergent. In that sense it has 'lost
contact' with the direct sense-action from which all higher-level
sensing and action emerge. All the content of our consciousness
exists in the form of such narratives, models or metaphors - my
*model* of 'Bruno' doesn't have independent consciousness *as such*.
Likewise, a 'program' (whether intended by a programmer, or imputed to
random activity) is merely a mental introject imposed *by us* on
organic action whose intrinsic felt-sense is independent of this
interpretation.
If you'll bear with me, Bruno, it may be possible to reconcile my
scheme with AR+COMP. The 'realism' of AR posits that everything real
(necessarily including the subjectively real) emerges from what is
axiomatically intrinsic to AR. ISTM then that the self-sensing, self-
acting process of differentiation or symmetry-breaking looks like the
detailed working-out of AR's 'active potential' through COMP. I
really feel that much of this is an implicit aspect of your scheme,
because, by analogy with my argument above, AR+COMP *must* be
(Occamishly) self-sensing, self-acting and self-justifying so that we
who are posited to emerge from it can inherit precisely those
characteristics. Else, we would have nothing left but a perversely
incoherent appeal to something 'external' to this universe of
explanation.
If one uses 'computation' in the sense merely of the behaviour of a
'physical' computer (already a higher-level emergent in either
scheme), then purely metaphorical interpretations of its behaviour do
indeed 'lose contact', as I argue above, with its organically
inherited self-sense-action. But if by 'computation' we mean the
fundamental emergence of phenomena by AR+COMP, then in such a scheme
we retain the ability to track self-sense-action through layers of
emergence. We can also differentiate those narratives which 'exist'
metaphorically as mental models and hence could never account for real
states of existence-consciousn
Re: Asifism
The question was "what's in your head...?" If you don't have subjective (inner) experiences... then yes, you are a zombie, and you should go to a museum... You 'll be then the first real zombie on earth ! Quentin 2007/6/11, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev: > What is the subjective experience then? > The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You can make > computers show the same sort of behavior, if the computers are enough > complicated. > -- > Torgny Tholerus > > > > On 6/8/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > The question, as I see it, is if there is anything "more" than just atoms > reacting with each other in our brains. I claim that there is not anything > "more". The atoms reacting with each other explain fully my (and your...) > behaviour. Our brains are very complicated structures, but it is nothing > supernatural with them. Physics explains everything. > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev: What is the subjective experience then? The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You can make computers show the same sort of behavior, if the computers are enough complicated. -- Torgny Tholerus On 6/8/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: The question, as I see it, is if there is anything "more" than just atoms reacting with each other in our brains. I claim that there is not anything "more". The atoms reacting with each other explain fully my (and your...) behaviour. Our brains are very complicated structures, but it is nothing supernatural with them. Physics explains everything. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
