Re: QTI & euthanasia
On 30 Oct 2008, at 07:51, Kory Heath wrote: > > > On Oct 28, 2008, at 12:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Measure theory is the branch of math which has been invented to >> tackle >> those infinities, and those similarity relations. > > I don't know much about measure theory. I understand a bit about how > it's supposed to tackle those infinities, but I don't understand how > it relates to similarity relations. OK, measure theory theory does not relate directly to the similarity relations. This happens with the comp hyp through indiscernability relations. Indeed you cannot distinguish the computations which differ below the level of substitution, like you cannot distinguish your state of mind you would have if some electron has this or that position within the same energy level. The measure on first person histories has to take this equivalence into account. But we cannot know our level, we can only make some empirical bets. Strictly speaking the equivalence relation is not constructive. We don't really can know who we are, and the probabilities cannot be defined with certainty. If some probability calculus works well, empirically, it would give evidences (not proof) for some level, and if QM can be extracted from comp, this would mean that empirical quantum mechanics would assess the idea that, roughly speaking, our level of substitution is given by the position of our particles up to the Heisenberg uncertainiy relations. The quantum indeterminacy would, in that case directly results directly from the 1-person comp indeterminacy, but we don't yet know this. That would be nice because the empirical many-world (the empirical reasons for not believing in a collapse of the wave packet) would comfort the fact that we share histories (given that we can share the quantum indeterminacy). Quantum Mechanics would really be a non-solipsistic first person *plural* indeterminacy calculus, and physical reality as we know it today, would really be the product of dream sharing. QM would comfort that we belong to the same "matrix". > What bearing does it have on the > case when you make exactly two copies of a person, one which is exact > and one which contains (say) roughly half of that person's memories, > personality, or whatever? To make a prediction on the future from the past you have to remember the past (or at least some relevant part of the past). If you allow (partial) amnesia, it could depend on many things including the type of computations allowing the amnesia: it makes almost no sense a priori. It would be like asking what is probability to get six (subjectively or as first person experience, like we have to do assuming comp) when throwing a dice knowing in advance that once you have thrown the dice you will forget that you have thrown the dice! So I am not sure the question can even make sense. I said to George Levy a long time ago (in this list) that all first person probabilities in self-multiplication experiments presuppose that the level of substitution (of brain material) has been chosen correctly, and thus serendipitously given that we cannot known for sure our own substitution level. Now, your question could still make sense if you accept the idea that there is only one person possible. We would all be the same person in different context. With this you can predict that amnesia would be lived as a remembering of your more correct identity. Unfortunately record of amnesia by wounded person does not confirm this, except, apparently for some drug induced amnesia, like the one provoked by the use of the plant salvia divinorum (there are many reports available on the net). So it looks like some type of amnesia (which belong to some type of computation) could confirm "we are the same person", and in that case, those amnesia would not change the probability rules. But all this is much more speculative so I conjure you to take this with a bit of a distance. Of course if you are lucky to belong to a country where the consumption of salvia divinorum is authorized, you could test it on yourself but read the manual before and be cautious. I have tested it and I do find the effect very interesting for learning things about identity and reality, but not to the point of having get any definite conclusion. It certainly opens me to be more interested in the amnesia phenomenon, and it makes me more open to the "only one person" proposition, but it is not a sort of knowledge easily sharable, except, well like consciousness, through sharing identical brain transformation, which of course is very hazardous when they are produce through the use of some chemicals (but still less hazardous than using an hammer on your skull or getting a car accident). The day will come (not tomorrow) where we will bet on some effective artificial brain, and this will lead to more systematic way to handle such
Re: Emotions
2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > The seven first steps of the UD Argument show this already indeed, if > you accept some Occam Razor. The movie graph is a much subtle argument > showing you don't need occam razor: not only a machine cannot > distinguish real from virtual, but cannot distinguish real from > arithmetical either. Many people does not know enough in philosophy of > mind to understand why the movie graph argument is necessary to > complete the proof, so I rarely insist. Maudlin's 1989 paper can be > said answering to the "counterfactual- objection" against the MGA > (Movie-Graph Argument). Bruno, I'm not sure why you de-emphasise step 8 of the UDA. The other steps are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial compared to step 8. People who encounter the argument will naturally ask, how can you have a computation without a computer or a mind without a brain? I think I understand your reasoning (and Maudlin's) here, but it needs to be spelled out if the UDA is not to be dismissed on the grounds that it proves nothing about reality, assumed to be at the bottom level comprised of hard physical objects. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia
2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > To make a prediction on the future from the past you have to remember > the past (or at least some relevant part of the past). If you allow > (partial) amnesia, it could depend on many things including the type > of computations allowing the amnesia: it makes almost no sense a > priori. It would be like asking what is probability to get six > (subjectively or as first person experience, like we have to do > assuming comp) when throwing a dice knowing in advance that once you > have thrown the dice you will forget that you have thrown the dice! > So I am not sure the question can even make sense. I said to George > Levy a long time ago (in this list) that all first person > probabilities in self-multiplication experiments presuppose that the > level of substitution (of brain material) has been chosen correctly, > and thus serendipitously given that we cannot known for sure our own > substitution level. Your teleportation thought experiments seem quite straightforward and intuitive to me: if I am copied to two separate locations, then I should have a 1/2 first person probability of finding myself in one or other location. We can assume for the sake of the experiment that the copying is close enough to perfect, and dismiss the possibility that the copies will be zombies. So, will the probability of finding myself in each location still be 1/2 if one of the copies is perfect but the other is 99% or 50% or 1% faithful, by whatever criterion you care to define these percentages? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > >> The seven first steps of the UD Argument show this already indeed, if >> you accept some Occam Razor. The movie graph is a much subtle >> argument >> showing you don't need occam razor: not only a machine cannot >> distinguish real from virtual, but cannot distinguish real from >> arithmetical either. Many people does not know enough in philosophy >> of >> mind to understand why the movie graph argument is necessary to >> complete the proof, so I rarely insist. Maudlin's 1989 paper can be >> said answering to the "counterfactual- objection" against the MGA >> (Movie-Graph Argument). > > Bruno, I'm not sure why you de-emphasise step 8 of the UDA. The other > steps are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial compared to > step 8. People who encounter the argument will naturally ask, how can > you have a computation without a computer or a mind without a brain? I > think I understand your reasoning (and Maudlin's) here, but it needs > to be spelled out if the UDA is not to be dismissed on the grounds > that it proves nothing about reality, assumed to be at the bottom > level comprised of hard physical objects. Stathis, you see I cannot doubt about consciousness, so I can doubt only matter, and my research is in big part motivated by explaining what is matter without taking granted it exists or what it can be, i.e. my goal consists in explaining matter from non material entities which I can understand; like numbers and simple sets (of numbers). It took some time for me to realize that most people really take the existence of matter for granted. But then what is it? Despite appearance, physics never relies on the materialist assumption, except in the background, as an excuse for not dwelving into what they take, with Aristotle, as metaphysics. Physical theories are mathematical theories, with conventional and relative "unities". To invoke "matter" as an explanation for actuality or reality seems to me as erroneous as using the notion of God for justifying the creation. At the origin, the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) was an attempt to explain the mind body problem once we assume comp, and to show the difficulties of the notion of matter to the materialists. But your remark is fair enough, and eventually we have to spelled out all the details for having a proof or completely convincing argument. I will try to build an argument developed through little steps; like I have done for the UDA, but note that even for UDA it is rare people tells the step where they stop to understand. We will see. I guess sometimes that people are a bit anxious with those matter and I don't want to push them too much. yet I am very glad you understand it, so perhaps you will be able to help. I will send, in a new MGA thread, a first step. OK. I will go slowly (if only because I am a bit busy). You wrote also: > > 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > >> To make a prediction on the future from the past you have to remember >> the past (or at least some relevant part of the past). If you allow >> (partial) amnesia, it could depend on many things including the type >> of computations allowing the amnesia: it makes almost no sense a >> priori. It would be like asking what is probability to get six >> (subjectively or as first person experience, like we have to do >> assuming comp) when throwing a dice knowing in advance that once you >> have thrown the dice you will forget that you have thrown the dice! >> So I am not sure the question can even make sense. I said to George >> Levy a long time ago (in this list) that all first person >> probabilities in self-multiplication experiments presuppose that the >> level of substitution (of brain material) has been chosen correctly, >> and thus serendipitously given that we cannot known for sure our own >> substitution level. > > Your teleportation thought experiments seem quite straightforward and > intuitive to me: if I am copied to two separate locations, then I > should have a 1/2 first person probability of finding myself in one or > other location. We can assume for the sake of the experiment that the > copying is close enough to perfect, and dismiss the possibility that > the copies will be zombies. So, will the probability of finding myself > in each location still be 1/2 if one of the copies is perfect but the > other is 99% or 50% or 1% faithful, by whatever criterion you care to > define these percentages? Hmmm... Sometime ago I would have refuse to answer this question. I know that for the exact and precise derivation of physics from computer (mathematical) science, we need to be able to answer this, but my point has never been to derive physics from comp, it consists just to explain why, assuming comp, we *have to* derive physics from comp (independently of the difficulty of the task). But ok, perhaps I have make some progre
Re: QTI & euthanasia
At some point, doesn't it just become far more likely that the teleporter just doesn't work? I know that might seem like dodging the question, but it might be fundamentally impossible to ignore all possibilities. 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > The seven first steps of the UD Argument show this already indeed, if > > you accept some Occam Razor. The movie graph is a much subtle argument > > showing you don't need occam razor: not only a machine cannot > > distinguish real from virtual, but cannot distinguish real from > > arithmetical either. Many people does not know enough in philosophy of > > mind to understand why the movie graph argument is necessary to > > complete the proof, so I rarely insist. Maudlin's 1989 paper can be > > said answering to the "counterfactual- objection" against the MGA > > (Movie-Graph Argument). > > > Bruno, I'm not sure why you de-emphasise step 8 of the UDA. The other > steps are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial compared to > step 8. People who encounter the argument will naturally ask, how can > you have a computation without a computer or a mind without a brain? I > think I understand your reasoning (and Maudlin's) here, but it needs > to be spelled out if the UDA is not to be dismissed on the grounds > that it proves nothing about reality, assumed to be at the bottom > level comprised of hard physical objects. > > > > Stathis, you see I cannot doubt about consciousness, so I can doubt only > matter, and my research is in big part motivated by explaining what is > matter without taking granted it exists or what it can be, i.e. my goal > consists in explaining matter from non material entities which I can > understand; like numbers and simple sets (of numbers). It took some time for > me to realize that most people really take the existence of matter for > granted. But then what is it? Despite appearance, physics never relies on > the materialist assumption, except in the background, as an excuse for not > dwelving into what they take, with Aristotle, as metaphysics. Physical > theories are mathematical theories, with conventional and relative > "unities". To invoke "matter" as an explanation for actuality or reality > seems to me as erroneous as using the notion of God for justifying the > creation. At the origin, the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) was an attempt to > explain the mind body problem once we assume comp, and to show the > difficulties of the notion of matter to the materialists. But your remark is > fair enough, and eventually we have to spelled out all the details for > having a proof or completely convincing argument. > I will try to build an argument developed through little steps; like I have > done for the UDA, but note that even for UDA it is rare people tells the > step where they stop to understand. We will see. I guess sometimes that > people are a bit anxious with those matter and I don't want to push them too > much. yet I am very glad you understand it, so perhaps you will be able to > help. I will send, in a new MGA thread, a first step. OK. I will go slowly > (if only because I am a bit busy). > > > You wrote also: > > > 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > To make a prediction on the future from the past you have to remember > > the past (or at least some relevant part of the past). If you allow > > (partial) amnesia, it could depend on many things including the type > > of computations allowing the amnesia: it makes almost no sense a > > priori. It would be like asking what is probability to get six > > (subjectively or as first person experience, like we have to do > > assuming comp) when throwing a dice knowing in advance that once you > > have thrown the dice you will forget that you have thrown the dice! > > So I am not sure the question can even make sense. I said to George > > Levy a long time ago (in this list) that all first person > > probabilities in self-multiplication experiments presuppose that the > > level of substitution (of brain material) has been chosen correctly, > > and thus serendipitously given that we cannot known for sure our own > > substitution level. > > > Your teleportation thought experiments seem quite straightforward and > intuitive to me: if I am copied to two separate locations, then I > should have a 1/2 first person probability of finding myself in one or > other location. We can assume for the sake of the experiment that the > copying is close enough to perfect, and dismiss the possibility that > the copies will be zombies. So, will the probability of finding myself > in each location still be 1/2 if one of the copies is perfect but the > other is 99% or 50% or 1% faithful, by whatever criterion you care to > define these percentages? > > > > Hmmm... Sometime ago I would have refuse to answer this question. I know > that for the exact and precise derivation of physics from computer >
Re: QTI & euthanasia
On Oct 30, 2008, at 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer > that the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability > remains equal to 1/2 in the imperfect duplication (assuming 1/2 is > the perfect one). > But of course you have to accept that if a simple teleportation is > done imperfectly (without duplication), but without killing you, the > probability of surviving is one (despite you get blind, deaf, > amnesic and paralytic, for example). This is the position I was arguing against in my earlier post. Let's stick with simple teleportation, without duplication. If the data is scrambled so much that the thing that ends up on the other side is just a puddle of goo, then my probability of surviving the teleportation is 0%. It's functionally equivalent to just killing me at the first teleporter and not sending any data over. (Do you agree?) If the probability of me surviving when an imperfect copy is made is still 100%, then there's some point of "imperfection" at which my chances of surviving suddenly shift from 100% to 0%. This change will be marked by (say) the difference of a single molecule (or bit of data, or whatever). I don't see how that can be correct. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia
Kory Heath wrote: > > On Oct 30, 2008, at 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer >> that the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability >> remains equal to 1/2 in the imperfect duplication (assuming 1/2 is >> the perfect one). >> But of course you have to accept that if a simple teleportation is >> done imperfectly (without duplication), but without killing you, the >> probability of surviving is one (despite you get blind, deaf, >> amnesic and paralytic, for example). > > This is the position I was arguing against in my earlier post. Let's > stick with simple teleportation, without duplication. If the data is > scrambled so much that the thing that ends up on the other side is > just a puddle of goo, then my probability of surviving the > teleportation is 0%. It's functionally equivalent to just killing me > at the first teleporter and not sending any data over. (Do you agree?) > If the probability of me surviving when an imperfect copy is made is > still 100%, then there's some point of "imperfection" at which my > chances of surviving suddenly shift from 100% to 0%. This change will > be marked by (say) the difference of a single molecule (or bit of > data, or whatever). I don't see how that can be correct. > > -- Kory But there are many ways for what comes out of the teleporter to *not* be you. Most of them are "puddles of goo", but some of them are copies of Bruno or imperfect copies of me or people who never existed before. Suppose it's a copy of you as you were last year - is it 100% you. It's not 100% the you that went into the machine - but if you're the same person you were last year it's 100% you. Of course the point is that you're not the same "you" from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information down to the molecular level, or even the neuron level. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emotions
On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 05:48:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 29 Oct 2008, at 06:09, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 09:04:15AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >> Ah! See my papers for a proof that indeed consciousness does not > >> emerge from brain function. See the paper by Maudlin for an > >> independent and later argument (which handles also the > >> "counterfactual > >> objection"). You have to assume the body is a machine. > > > > I presume by "emerge", you mean "supervene on". > > > I was trying not to be technical, nor more precise that is needed. (cf > the 1004 fallacy). > "supervene on" already means different things according to mechanism, > naturalism, etc. > By supervenience, I mean that there is some underlying state such that if my consciousness differed from what it is now, then the underlying state must differ also. In this case, the underlying state being discussed is the state of the brain. Emergence also has many meanings, supposedly. The meaning I use (which is the most coherent I've come across) as described in chapter 2 of my book would make "emerge from" and "supervene on" equivalent, when referring to consciousness and brain states. > > ... without which supervenience? > Is it the usual physical supervenience (called just supervenience by > most philosopher of mind), or my 1988 (see also 1998) > "computationalist supervenience"? > > Just to be clear, and for the benefits of the others: > > Physical supervenience is the conjunction of the following assumptions: > > -There is a physical universe > -I am conscious (consciousness exists) > -(My) consciousness (at time x, t) supervenes on some physical > activity, at time (x, t) of a portion of the physical universe. Supervenience (of consciousness on brain states) is just the latter two assumptions. The brain need not exist in some concrete fashion. It could be some illusionary phenomena for instance. I took your work as negating the conjunction of the first assumption and computationalism, but saying nothing about the latter two. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
