Re: Dreaming On
Very important post, Peter. We are progressing. On 06 Aug 2009, at 19:09, 1Z wrote: On 31 July, 18:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Jul 2009, at 18:05, 1Z wrote: If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical proofs only prove mathematical existence, not onltolgical existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 exists mathematically, but is not RITSIAR. The same goes for the UD Is an atom RITSIAR? Is a quark RITSIAR? If current physics is correct. Then it is not RITSIAR in the sense of the discussion with David. Real in the sense that I am real. is ambiguous. Either the I refers to my first person, and then I have ontological certainty. As I said on FOR, I can conceive that I wake up and realize that quark, planet, galaxies and even my body were not real. I cannot conceive that I wake up and realize that my consciousness is not real. Ontological first person does not need an IF this or that theory is correct. You are reifying theoretical constructions. The point is just that IF you survive in the RITSIAR sense, with a digital (even material, if you want) brain, then materiality has to be retrieved by coherence or gluing property of immaterial computation, or there is an error in the UD Argument. It is not clear what you mean by that. If I am transferred from a phsycial brain into a physcial computer, physicalism is unscathed. Your argument against physcialism is that is unnecessary because something else is doing the work -- My argument is not that. From what you say, I infer that you understand the seven first steps of the UD-Argument. You seem to have a problem with the 8th step, which is the step showing that no work is needed at all. The usual number relations do the work, and this without any need to reify them. that I could be running on some immaterial UDA. But you have to assume Platonism to get your UDA, so you have to assume Platonism to refute physicalism. Without that assumption, the rest doesn't follow.. It is step 0. Do I need platonism to believe in the existence of prime numbers? I need only the amount of arithmetical realism for saying that the (mathematical) machine x stop or doesn't stop on input y. This is enough for the computational supervenience. And physical supervenience does not work, as the step 8 of UDA shows. wihout a UDA there are no generated minds, without generated minds there is no illusory matter. Sure. But the UD exists, like prime number exists. Which for a non-Platononists is not at all in the relevant sense. Again, if that is true, there must be something wrong in the UD Argument. Which one? The *implict* assumption of Platonism. Step 0. It is a relief for me to see that you did look at the papers, and realise I do not postulate platonism, only realism. So now you have to attribute this assumption as an implicit assumption. I'm afraid that such an implicit assumption exists only in your imagination. You reify a physical primitive reality to instantiate consciousness, and you attribute me a reification of the numbers to get the same, but the point of step 8 is to show that such a reification, be it with matter or number, cannot work. You don't have a problem with step zero (the real one in the papers). I think that you have a problem with step 8. In step seven the UD running is still primitively material, and the step 8 shows that such an ontological materiality does not help, *cannot* help. How can a conlusion that the material world doesn't exist be neutrral about Platonism? The point is that Platonism is in the conclusion, not in the hypothesis. It has to be in the hypothesis. Otherwise you need to show that your UDA is a phsycal entity floating in space somwhere. A physical UD does not change anything, by step 8. In fact, you have explictly said that the UDA has Platonic existence: But the UD exists, like prime number exists. I said this to explain that the existence of the UD is of the same mathematical nature as the existence of the prime number. No need to double the mathematical ontology. If Platonism is false, the mathematical world doesn';t exist either. and there is nowhere for the UD to exist at all. Why do you want the UD to exist somewhere? Because I exist somewhere, and I can;t be generated out of shear non-existence. You talk like if mathematical existence = non existence. I think Quentin made a similar remark. But I believe in elementary arithmetic. I can prove that prime numbers and UDs exist, and by step 8 that is enough. No need to reify such existence. And step 8 shows that this entails that reification of the physical objects is a red herring too. Does prime numbers need to exist somewhere to exist at all? I say hey don't. So you believe in the mathematical existence of prime numbers. Good. You say they do.: But the UD exists, like prime number exists.
Re: Dreaming On
Bruno Marchal skrev: Then it is not RITSIAR in the sense of the discussion with David. Real in the sense that I am real. is ambiguous. Either the I refers to my first person, and then I have ontological certainty. As I said on FOR, I can conceive that I wake up and realize that quark, planet, galaxies and even my body were not real. I cannot conceive that I wake up and realize that my consciousness is not real. When I woke up this morning, I realized that my consciousness was not real... -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
Hi, 2009/8/7 Torgny Tholerus tor...@dsv.su.se: Bruno Marchal skrev: Then it is not RITSIAR in the sense of the discussion with David. Real in the sense that I am real. is ambiguous. Either the I refers to my first person, and then I have ontological certainty. As I said on FOR, I can conceive that I wake up and realize that quark, planet, galaxies and even my body were not real. I cannot conceive that I wake up and realize that my consciousness is not real. When I woke up this morning, I realized that my consciousness was not real... Like before... If you are a zombie, the sentence above has no meaning... (there exists no 'I') and if you're not, either you're deluded or you 're lying ;) Regards, Quentin -- Torgny Tholerus -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreams and Machines
On 22 July, 17:15, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Dinna fash yursel laddie, trnaslation: Faut pas te facher. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 07 Aug 2009, at 10:09, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 2009/8/7 Torgny Tholerus tor...@dsv.su.se: Bruno Marchal skrev: Then it is not RITSIAR in the sense of the discussion with David. Real in the sense that I am real. is ambiguous. Either the I refers to my first person, and then I have ontological certainty. As I said on FOR, I can conceive that I wake up and realize that quark, planet, galaxies and even my body were not real. I cannot conceive that I wake up and realize that my consciousness is not real. When I woke up this morning, I realized that my consciousness was not real... Like before... If you are a zombie, the sentence above has no meaning... (there exists no 'I') and if you're not, either you're deluded or you 're lying ;) Or you have a good sense of humor. The idea of a dreaming zombie, waking up to realize that he was dreaming being conscious, is rather funny. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
Bruno Marchal wrote: Very important post, Peter. We are progressing. On 06 Aug 2009, at 19:09, 1Z wrote: On 31 July, 18:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Jul 2009, at 18:05, 1Z wrote: If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical proofs only prove mathematical existence, not onltolgical existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 exists mathematically, but is not RITSIAR. The same goes for the UD Is an atom RITSIAR? Is a quark RITSIAR? If current physics is correct. Then it is not RITSIAR in the sense of the discussion with David. Real in the sense that I am real. is ambiguous. Either the I refers to my first person, and then I have ontological certainty. As I said on FOR, I can conceive that I wake up and realize that quark, planet, galaxies and even my body were not real. I cannot conceive that I wake up and realize that my consciousness is not real. But as Bertrand Russell, David Hume and many mystics have pointed out you can wake up and realize there is consciousness but the I that possesses it is a fiction. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On Fri, 2009-08-07 at 11:35 -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: But as Bertrand Russell, David Hume and many mystics have pointed out you can wake up and realize there is consciousness but the I that possesses it is a fiction. There are also many common reports of what is colloquially called ego loss in the hallucinogenic literature. Users report the experience of being conscious in that they are awake, perceiving sensory data, and performing motor functions, but they have no sense of self or I. Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or something else? Ronald On Aug 6, 10:23 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Colin Hales wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Colin Hales wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Colin Hales wrote: Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed refutation of computationalism. It's going through peer review at the moment. The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of 'physics-as-computation' with the type of computation that is being carried out in a Turing machine (a standard computer). In the paper I drew an artificial distinction between them. I called the former NATURAL COMPUTATION (NC) and the latter ARTIFICIAL COMPUTATION (AC). The idea is that if COMP is true then there is no distinction between AC and NC. The distinction should fail. I found one an one only situation/place where AC and NC part company. Call this situation X. If COMP is false in this one place X it is false as a general claim. I also found 2 downstream (consequential) failures that ultimately get their truth-basis from X, so they are a little weaker as formal arguments against COMP. *FACT*: Humans make propositions that are fundamentally of an informal nature. That is, the utterances of a human can be inconsistent and form an fundamentally incomplete set (we don't 'know everything'). The quintessential definition of a scientist is a 'correctable liar'. When a hypothesis is uttered it has the status indistinguishable of a lie. Humans can participate in the universe in ways which can (apparently) violate any law of nature. Humans must be able to 'violate' laws of nature in the process of accessing new/novel formal systems to describe the unknown natural world. Look at the world. It is not hard to see how humans exemplify an informal system. All over the world are quite normal (non-pathologically affected) humans with the same sensory systems and mental capacities. Yet all manner of ignorance and fervently held contradictory belief systems are ‘rationally’ adopted. === COMP fails when: a) You assume COMP is true and build an artificial (AC/computer) scientist Sa and expect Sa to be able to carry out authentic original science on the a-priori unknownidentically to humans. To do this you use a human-originated formal model (law of nature) ts to do this your computer 'computes ts, you EMBODY the computer in a suitable robotic form and then expect it to do science like humans. If COMP is true then the human scientist and the robot scientist should be indistinguishable. b) You then discover that it is a fundamental impossibility that Sa be able to debate/propose that COMP is a law of nature. c) Humans can debate/propose that COMP is a law of nature. BECAUSE: (b) (c) they are distinguishable. NC and AC are different THEREFORE: ts cannot be the 'law of nature' for a scientist. THEREFORE: COMP is false in the special case of (b) THEREFORE: COMP is false as a general claim. (b) is not a claim of truth or falsehood. It is a claim that the very idea of Sa ever proposing COMP (= doubting that COMP is true) is impossible. This is because it is a formal system trying, with a fixed, formal set of rules (even self modifying according to yet more rules) to construct statements that are the product of an informal system (a human scientist). The very idea of this is a contradiction in terms. I don't see it. I can write a simple computer program that constructs statements which are a subset of those produced by humans (or any other system). Bruno's UD produces *all* such statements. So where's the contradiction? Yes you can generate all such statements. /But then what*/*so what? /* *Please re-read the scenarioThis situation is very very specific: 1) Embodied situated robot scientist Sa is doing science on the 'natural world'. 2) As a COMP artificial scientist Sa, you are software. A formal system *ts* computes you. 3) All you ever do is categorise patterns and cross-correlate patterns in massive streams of numbers that arrive from your '/robot scientist suit/'. 4) Sa is a SCIENTIST. The entirety of the existence of Sa involves dealing with streams of numbers that are the result of an encounter with the radically unknown, which Sa is trying to find a 'universal abstraction' for = 'a law of nature'. 5) There is no 'out there in an environment' for Sa. There is only an abstraction (a category called) out there. You cannot project any kind of human 'experience' into Sa. REASON: If COMP is true, then computation (of abstract symbol manipulation of formal *ts*) is all COMP Sa
