Re: Against Physics
On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 8:35 PM, David Nyman wrote > > What of course is striking > about your proposals is that in reality nobody behaves as though they > believe this sort of thing: which is not of course to say that this > makes it uninteresting. You speak as if though we have a choice as to how we behave! This I can't see at all. Whether our behavior is caused subatomic particles or arithmetic, or is completely uncaused, there is no room for libertarian free will. > I wonder if I can encourage you to take a break from contemplating the > block universe 'out there' and meditate on the intrinsic inwardness > that lies all around us? Well, I'm just using the block universe as a way of trying to make my point more clear. My point being that consciousness is fundamental and uncaused. My secondary point being that even if consciousness is NOT fundamental, then it is STILL ultimately uncaused if it results from any system that is itself uncaused... My tertiary point being that if we have no evidence which points one way or the other between consciousness being fundamental or not, the default position would seem to be that it is fundamental. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I don't see the theory. What do you ask us to agree on, if only for > the sake of the argument. So, while the contents of my experience...the things that I'm conscious OF are complex and structured, my conscious experience of these things is singular and indivisible. As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious experience itself is uncaused and fundamental. Given that conscious experience is uncaused, it can't be explained in terms of other things, like quarks and electromagnetism or numbers and arithmetic. Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. So what causes the complexity and structure of the things that I am conscious of? Nothing. That's just the way my experience is. No explanation can be given for uncaused fundamental events or entities. And further, no meaningful explanation can be given for events or entities that are themselves *wholly* caused by uncaused events. These things just are. So let's say a closed system of entities comes into being uncaused. Any properties that the individual components of this system have are also uncaused, and the ways that the components interact are uncaused as well. This system is a universe unto itself. So I am saying that no matter how this system evolves, no aspect of the system can ever be given a meaningful explanation. The meaningless of it's initial state means that all subsequent states are equally meaningless in an absolute sense. All that we can do is describe what the system does. But description is not explanation. Further, even if the system seems predictable, there is no reason to think that it will continue in it's predicitablity. And neither is there any reason to think that it won't continue it's predictable pattern. The system follows it's own "uncaused" rules, which we may be able to guess at, but which we cannot know, due to the system's fundamentally uncaused nature. I think this is more obvious if you look at the system as a "block universe", where time is treated as a sort of spatial dimension, and so all states of the system exist simultaneously, like my previous example of the block of granite. Why does state B follow state A? Why is slice B adjacent to slice A? Because that's just the way this uncaused system is. Looking for meaning in the system is like looking for hidden messages in randomly generated character strings. You may find them, but the messages can not have any real meaning, no matter how meaningful they look. > In the conclusion I don't understand the last sentence, which seems to > me a proposition for abandoning theorizing in that field. Well, the search for a theoretical model that is fully consistent what what we consciously observed is still a reasonable goal in terms of challenging intellectual endeavor. And if that's what your future conscious experiences hold for you, then that's what you will do (no free will here). >> Machines are >> more fundamental than consciousness? Or machines are just a way of >> representing conscious experience? > > Machines/numbers cannot represent conscious experiences. You are correct, I misspoke. I should have said "machines are just a way of representing the CONTENTS of conscious experience." > Comp can make the conscious experience much more fundamental than the > Aristotelian materialist usually think, yet consciousness is > arithmetically "caused". It is an attribute of universal machine (in > an even weaker sense than usual) related to their ideal self- > consistency. It generates the belief in a reality, and the infinities > of corrections which ensue. To me this has as much of an "explanatory gap" as materialism. Consciousness is caused by arithmetical relationships? Why would this be? Why would arithmetical relationships result in conscious experience? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Against Physics
On 9 Aug, 07:41, Rex Allen wrote: Rex, just a few general points on your posts. The various 'existence' arguments I've been putting forward recently are intended precisely to show how our first-person world of meaning and intention is embedded in a more general environment that is congruent with, rather than alien to, these self-evident features. What of course is striking about your proposals is that in reality nobody behaves as though they believe this sort of thing: which is not of course to say that this makes it uninteresting. In fact exactly the opposite: the very fact that the world according to physics presents itself in this chilling way makes challenging its assumptions all the more urgent. Hence my attempts to pump intuitions about the source of the presence, self-access and self-motivation inherent in the ontologically real, as contrasted with the provisional and fundamentally epistemological status of the theoretical constructions of physics. By ontologically real I mean of course what is self-evident in the form of the ontological first person. And in fact it really doesn't take that much intuitive tweaking to achieve this, whether applied to the putative primitive entities of physics, comp, or any other schema. Essentially the intuition is that these primitives reduce in the final analysis to the self-encounter of a primary, self-evident continuum: i.e. a primitive self-relativisation that collapses both perception (primitive self-access) and intention (primitive self-action) Such a self-relativising duality of continuousness and discreteness is indispensable to any personal account of 'owned' experience and action, via the inheritance of such ownership from the primitive context. From this it can naturally follow that whatever is perceived is MY perception, whatever is done is MY action, and whatever is determined is MY determination. The key to seeing this is a simple appeal to the reductio ad absurdum. Just assume the opposite (as the dogma asserts) and - pouf! - the very appearance and sensation of anything whatsoever is irretrievably lost. And it turns out that this assuming of the opposite is quite unjustified by the facts. It is merely the dogmatic adoption of the externalised 'view from nowhere' - a useful heuristic in context - as a universal alethiometer. Of course, these basic concepts find historic kinship with Vedantic and Buddhist insights, and in the Western tradition via Plotinus, Kant, et al - and even in the world-views of practising physicists such as Schroedinger and Eddington.. I wonder if I can encourage you to take a break from contemplating the block universe 'out there' and meditate on the intrinsic inwardness that lies all around us? David > On Sat, Aug 8, 2009 at 6:12 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: > > >> So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that > >> our conscious experience just exists. Why are my perceptions orderly > >> and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually > >> correct? Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether > >> you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious > >> experience exists uncaused. > > > This is not against physicalism, it is again rationalism. > > Ha! Well, maybe. What is the flaw that you see in my reasoning? > > I think that both the argument and conclusion are rational, just not > intuitive. > > So earlier you asked this: > > > By the way, what is the status of your theory with respect to comp? > > Which in part prompted this new thread. > > So I think that one of the things that we can be conscious of is a > descriptive theory referred to as "comp" that attempts to map the > contents of our "conscious experience over time" to > mathematically/logically defined "machines". > > And, I will not be surprised if you or someone else is ultimately > successful in doing so. But while this would be interesting, I don't > think that it means anything deeper. All that it will mean is "look, > here's an interesting way of representing the contents of your > conscious experience over time". > > It would just be a way of representing what "is". By which I mean: > It would just be a way of representing conscious experience. > > > > > I would say that consciousness has a reason, a purpose, and a power. > > > A reason: the many universal numbers and the way they reflect each > > other. > > This doesn't sound like a "reason" to me. It sounds like an > observation, along the lines of "adjacent gray and white veins exist > within this block of granite" (from my original post). > > > > > A purpose: truth quest, satisfaction quest. > > This purpose would only exist as part of someone's conscious > experience. The desire for truth and/or satisfaction are things that > only exist in the context of conscious experience. > > > > > A power: relative self-acceleration (can lead to catastrophes, (l
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
I am behind, because I was away delivering Science talk to Star Trek fans. I am uncertain what to take away from this thread, and could use the clarification. As an aside, I read(or tried to) read the SANE paper on the plane. Ronald On Aug 10, 11:24 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Peter, > > >> Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic > > > You keep saying this. This is a lie. > > I am not yet entirely sure of this. Let me correct my statement by > saying that this is just a common lie, similar to those who have been > made purposefully in the seventies, and repeated since then by people > who even brag on this in some private circles, as it has been reported > to me more than 20 times (since 1973). > > You have stated in this list many times recurrently that I assume > platonism without ever telling us why you think so, or what texts > makes you think so. > > Recently you have make the "progress" to attribute me only, now, an > implicit assumption of platonism. That is a progress, because it means > you have eventually realize that I am not making that assumption > explicitly, and that what I call Arithmetical Realism is a much weaker > statement. Good. > > But you still seems to want to attribute me platonism as an implicit > assumption. > > That is not enough to refute an argument. If you believe sincerely > that I am using an implicit assumption of platonism in the UDA > reasoning, you have to show us where in the reasoning the assumption > is implicitly used. > > If you dismiss this, you look like those materialist computationalist > who just assume there is an error because the result contradict their > theory, and then don't take the time to even read the argument. > > That is not a scientific attitude. It is an appeal to dogma. It > prevents serious people searching some possible "real" mistakes or > awkwardness in the reasoning. > > Sorry for having to make such remark. But it is highly confusing for > everybody when people ascribes to other people the product of their > own imagination, especially in difficult and new domains (new to > scientific attitude). > > At least you do it publicly, which makes me think you could still be > "not lying", but only under the spell of materialist wishful thinking. > > Bruno Marchal > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/8/10 Bruno Marchal : > But strictly speaking (I am also a stickler), the first person can > never identify herself to *any* representation, she share this with > the 0-person ONE, or the non differentiate (arithmetical) truth. The > knower does not know who he is. Relatively to probable histories, he > makes bets "all the time". Yes, I agree with this. This is why I've always said that the One is 'personal' to some minimum but not-eliminable degree (0-personal in your terminology). The first person inherits the "I" from the One: this is essential to make sense of duplicability and teleportation. >> Beyond this, that the unique qualitative nature of the OFP *is* as it >> appears, is in principle outside the scope of explanation itself. > > No! This is the "miracle" of comp. Machine cannot not discover the > incommunicable part of their experience, but they can, assume of bet > on comp, and justify that why it has to be so. That is AUDA. The gap > is justified from inside. It is a consequence from the fact that > machine can prove their own incompleteness theorems, and even study > the geometry of their ignorance. Apparently we don't agree :-( > The ultimate gap remains unavoidable, > so you are right saying that the unique qualitative nature of the OFP > is outside the scope of the explanation, but that fact, is an "easy" > theorem on and by the machine which introspect herself. > To sum up: > The unique qualitative nature of the OFP *is* beyond the scope of the > explanation-comp theory. But that very fact *is* in the scope of the > theory. Apparently we DO agree :-) IOW - as Bruno says above - they are theoretical constructions. >>> >>> Yes, but this does not mean those construction does not refer to >>> something real independently of us, and this is what I assume for >>> comp >> >> I agree, as above that it is the whole point of our endeavours to say >> that the construction *refers* to something real. But I think perhaps >> that the something thus referenced is not best characterised as being >> real *independently* of us, but rather *constitutive* of us and our >> (most general) environment. > > I agree with you, but this can be said among enlightened people who > understand the whole stuff. > Before the reasoning, you could be suspected to put the horse behind > the car. Or "put the horse before the cart", in our delightfully archaic phrase. I am doing this, would you say? > With comp, numbers, or finite things like combinators etc. have > clearly a relation with us, but a priori it is simpler to state their > laws without referring to us. I agree that simpler is better as long as we are clear on what is being assumed. > A number is even if and only its square is even. This is a law about > numbers. Those are the type of truth which we have to state as not > depending on us , even if it depends on us, or are us, > "there". OK >>> Even if the whole existence get annihilated, 17 would still be >>> prime. >> >> I understand that it is justifiable to take this as your point of >> departure and don't really wish to make an argumentative point out of >> it. Nonetheless, in passing, perhaps I have a more radical intuition >> of annihilation than you. One can waste a lot of breath speculating >> on 'nothing' because, strictly I guess, there can be nothing at all it >> can refer to. > > This I do not understand. There are many nothing everywhere, and other > absence, and I am open that absolute nothingness could be conceivable, > a bit like theories having no models. It seems you just point here on > a difficult open question. Yes >> I could demonstrate this, given infinite time, simply >> by flatly rejecting *any* survivor of such annihilation that you or >> anyone cared to propose, to the crack of doom. On this basis, even >> '17 is prime' is a goner. > > I still don't see why or how you could do that, except by convincing > me that Peano Arithmetic is inconsistent. I think we're at cross-purposes, but it really doesn't count much for our discussion here. >> Ah, but my argument attempts to distinguish a computation (immaterial >> dynamic object) and an implementation of a computation (material >> dynamic process) - again, per standard physical theory - as a >> refutation of standard comp *in these strictly physical terms*. My >> point is, that per physicalism, a computation must be implemented in >> some physical mechanism in order to have any real - i.e. physical - >> effects (at least this was true the last time I did any programming). >> Hence the existence of 'immaterial objects' in this case is simply >> irrelevant to any effects that would be strictly justifiable as >> ontologically real, per physicalism. > > Actually I do disagree with this, and Peter Jones made good point > here. If you were true, UDA could be simplified a lot. Physicalism > does not prevent dualism form/matter at all, like immaterial software > and physical hardware. Physicalism can still
Re: Dreaming On
On 10 Aug 2009, at 17:20, David Nyman wrote: > > 2009/8/10 Bruno Marchal : > > Bruno, I'm broadly in agreement with your comments, and merely > re-emphasise a few points below on which I'm being a stickler. All right. > Also, > I have some further comments and questions on step 8. Good. > > >>> In this light >>> it becomes self-evident that any and all explanatory entities - >>> physical, computational, or whatever - are severely restricted to >>> the >>> domain of epistemology. >> >> I don't see why. I would not put arithmetic in epistemology, or only >> in a very large sense of epistemology, the epistemology of the 0- >> person views!. It seems clearer to accept them ontologically like in >> the usual practice of math. Could be only a vocabulary problem here. > > Yes, I normally wouldn't dispute this point, but but I'm being a > stickler here. In the strictest sense the ontological equivalence of > anything whatsoever to the indexical OFP can only be an assumption - > albeit one that might be justifiable in the case of the best theory. OFP, OFP, ... ? Ah Ontological First Person. Actually in "indexical OFP" I could argue that "indexical and ontological" are just reminders on point where we already agree (and agree with the universal machine discourse, after some definition and theorems ...). But with comp, the first person does not necessarily identifies with any representation, like we don't have to identify ourselves with a body, but we can bet on "staying the same person in the sense that I stay the same person after drinking a cup of coffe" (SSPSSSPDCC, if you want :) for some digital body transformation. The 1-I, the 1-person, does not need to identify itself to any body, or representation (actually: the 1-person cannot do that, it can identify itself only to itself as a person). So the 1-person bet on some 3-person (the body, the code relatively to its most probable universal computation), and on its invariance for some (digital) body transformation. Assuming comp, the reasoning leads to make consciousness a larger invariant (and then you have more choice and latitude in the transformation, for example with amnesia, or false souvenirs, etc.). But strictly speaking (I am also a stickler), the first person can never identify herself to *any* representation, she share this with the 0-person ONE, or the non differentiate (arithmetical) truth. The knower does not know who he is. Relatively to probable histories, he makes bets "all the time". > > Beyond this, that the unique qualitative nature of the OFP *is* as it > appears, is in principle outside the scope of explanation itself. No! This is the "miracle" of comp. Machine cannot not discover the incommunicable part of their experience, but they can, assume of bet on comp, and justify that why it has to be so. That is AUDA. The gap is justified from inside. It is a consequence from the fact that machine can prove their own incompleteness theorems, and even study the geometry of their ignorance. The ultimate gap remains unavoidable, so you are right saying that the unique qualitative nature of the OFP is outside the scope of the explanation, but that fact, is an "easy" theorem on and by the machine which introspect herself. To sum up: The unique qualitative nature of the OFP *is* beyond the scope of the explanation-comp theory. But that very fact *is* in the scope of the theory. > > >>> IOW - as Bruno says above - they are >>> theoretical constructions. >> >> Yes, but this does not mean those construction does not refer to >> something real independently of us, and this is what I assume for >> comp > > I agree, as above that it is the whole point of our endeavours to say > that the construction *refers* to something real. But I think perhaps > that the something thus referenced is not best characterised as being > real *independently* of us, but rather *constitutive* of us and our > (most general) environment. I agree with you, but this can be said among enlightened people who understand the whole stuff. Before the reasoning, you could be suspected to put the horse behind the car. With comp, numbers, or finite things like combinators etc. have clearly a relation with us, but a priori it is simpler to state their laws without referring to us. A number is even if and only its square is even. This is a law about numbers. Those are the type of truth which we have to state as not depending on us , even if it depends on us, or are us, "there". > > >> Even if the whole existence get annihilated, 17 would still be >> prime. > > I understand that it is justifiable to take this as your point of > departure and don't really wish to make an argumentative point out of > it. Nonetheless, in passing, perhaps I have a more radical intuition > of annihilation than you. One can waste a lot of breath speculating > on 'nothing' because, strictly I guess, there can be noth
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
Hi Peter, >> Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic > > > You keep saying this. This is a lie. I am not yet entirely sure of this. Let me correct my statement by saying that this is just a common lie, similar to those who have been made purposefully in the seventies, and repeated since then by people who even brag on this in some private circles, as it has been reported to me more than 20 times (since 1973). You have stated in this list many times recurrently that I assume platonism without ever telling us why you think so, or what texts makes you think so. Recently you have make the "progress" to attribute me only, now, an implicit assumption of platonism. That is a progress, because it means you have eventually realize that I am not making that assumption explicitly, and that what I call Arithmetical Realism is a much weaker statement. Good. But you still seems to want to attribute me platonism as an implicit assumption. That is not enough to refute an argument. If you believe sincerely that I am using an implicit assumption of platonism in the UDA reasoning, you have to show us where in the reasoning the assumption is implicitly used. If you dismiss this, you look like those materialist computationalist who just assume there is an error because the result contradict their theory, and then don't take the time to even read the argument. That is not a scientific attitude. It is an appeal to dogma. It prevents serious people searching some possible "real" mistakes or awkwardness in the reasoning. Sorry for having to make such remark. But it is highly confusing for everybody when people ascribes to other people the product of their own imagination, especially in difficult and new domains (new to scientific attitude). At least you do it publicly, which makes me think you could still be "not lying", but only under the spell of materialist wishful thinking. Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/8/10 Bruno Marchal : Bruno, I'm broadly in agreement with your comments, and merely re-emphasise a few points below on which I'm being a stickler. Also, I have some further comments and questions on step 8. >> In this light >> it becomes self-evident that any and all explanatory entities - >> physical, computational, or whatever - are severely restricted to the >> domain of epistemology. > > I don't see why. I would not put arithmetic in epistemology, or only > in a very large sense of epistemology, the epistemology of the 0- > person views!. It seems clearer to accept them ontologically like in > the usual practice of math. Could be only a vocabulary problem here. Yes, I normally wouldn't dispute this point, but but I'm being a stickler here. In the strictest sense the ontological equivalence of anything whatsoever to the indexical OFP can only be an assumption - albeit one that might be justifiable in the case of the best theory. Beyond this, that the unique qualitative nature of the OFP *is* as it appears, is in principle outside the scope of explanation itself. >> IOW - as Bruno says above - they are >> theoretical constructions. > > Yes, but this does not mean those construction does not refer to > something real independently of us, and this is what I assume for > comp I agree, as above that it is the whole point of our endeavours to say that the construction *refers* to something real. But I think perhaps that the something thus referenced is not best characterised as being real *independently* of us, but rather *constitutive* of us and our (most general) environment. > Even if the whole existence get annihilated, 17 would still be > prime. I understand that it is justifiable to take this as your point of departure and don't really wish to make an argumentative point out of it. Nonetheless, in passing, perhaps I have a more radical intuition of annihilation than you. One can waste a lot of breath speculating on 'nothing' because, strictly I guess, there can be nothing at all it can refer to. I could demonstrate this, given infinite time, simply by flatly rejecting *any* survivor of such annihilation that you or anyone cared to propose, to the crack of doom. On this basis, even '17 is prime' is a goner. >> So far so obvious. But - as has again been recognised immemorially - >> solipsism is a dead-end and hence we seek a theory to capture the >> relation between the OFP and its environment. But immediately we are >> faced with the notorious 'explanatory gap', and it seems to me that >> its most precise expression is in the gap between ontology and >> epistemology. Indeed, what conceivable strategy could raise these >> theoretical constructions - to which the OFP uniquely lends existence >> - to the ontological certainty of their host? Is there a coherent way >> to conceive what it could mean to *be* a theoretical entity (as >> opposed to postulating or observing one)? > > It is the point of saying "yes" to the doctor. You don't say yes > because the new brain is a good modelisation of your brain, but > because you bet it will enact yourself completely, relatively to the > neighborhood. Yes indeed, this is my point. There is no way to *conceive* in advance what it would mean to *be* such an enactment (i.e. to be *sure*) so you can only bet that saying yes will not affect the state of the indexical OFP. > You may confuse the reality of number, and the reality of machine/ > theories talking about those numbers. Numbers are not viewed as > theoretical construction. The theoretical construction are our > theories on the numbers. It simplifies things. I agree that this assumption simplifies things, and as you say it is one shared by all mathematicians. But again, in the final analysis, numbers can only be 'viewed' as ontologically real, not *known* to be. But this is true of any assumption whatever, and I freely concede your points about the simplicity of the assumptions in the case of comp. > All theories demands faith, but the faith needed for understanding > that 17 is prime is not comparable to the act of faith needed to say > yes to the doctor. Agreed. >> It's no use appealing to >> notions of 'what it's like to be a brain' - nor what it's like to be a >> COMP-quale - because we can never say that it is 'like anything to be' >> the stuff of epistemology. > > Assuming comp we can still say that it is like you feel right now. > Only zombie cannot understand, but if they are good zombie, they will > have no problem to fake that they understand. Yes, *assuming* comp. We cannot *know* what it is like to be a comp-quale, but we may have sufficient faith to bet that it's like 'what you feel right now'. >> Hence we must see our theorising and >> observing - in physical, computational, or whatever terms - *in >> relation* to ontological certainty, not as constitutive of it. > > That's right. Hooray! > I thought this was obvious. You may have heard the following story.
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
On 10 Aug 2009, at 11:04, 1Z wrote (to Colin Hales): >> > > I am not sure what you are saying here. Computationalism is > generally taken to be a claim about the mind, and is quite a > respectable thesis I agree > > Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic You keep saying this. This is a lie. "comp" is the usual thesis in cognitive science. Except much weaker in the sense that comp, as I defined it, entails all the form of comp in the cognitive science literature (minus the *implicit* naturalist assumption). Naturalist or weak materialist forms of comp are shown epistemological contradictory, but this is the theorem, not the theory. Or I am wrong? Then please comment my last answer to you. Repeating falsities does not help anybody, and create confusions. If we disagree, let us find on what we disagree. I have explained already that there is no implicit assumption of platonism. Just an explicit assumption that we can apply classical logic in the realm of numbers. If you disagree on the fact that usual comp implies immateriality; just say that you don't understand UDA, or that you have an objection in UDA, and say which one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 10 Aug 2009, at 02:59, David Nyman wrote: > > 2009/8/7 Bruno Marchal : > > If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical > proofs only prove mathematical "existence", not onltolgical > existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 "exists" mathematically, > but is not RITSIAR. The same goes for the UD Is an atom RITSIAR? Is a quark RITSIAR? >>> >>> If current physics is correct. >> >> >> Then it is not "RITSIAR" in the sense of the discussion with David. >> Real in the sense that "I" am real. is ambiguous. >> Either the "I" refers to my first person, and then I have ontological >> certainty. >> As I said on FOR, I can conceive that I wake up and realize that >> quark, planet, galaxies and even my body were not real. I cannot >> conceive that I wake up and realize that my consciousness is not >> real. >> Ontological first person does not need an "IF this or that theory is >> correct". >> You are reifying theoretical constructions. > > I think need to take a hard line on RITSIAR. I feel that the key lies > in what Bruno terms the certainty of the ontological first person > (OFP): i.e. the sine qua non of reality as it is uniquely available to > us. I thought you were using "RITSIAR" in this 1-person way. But it seems that Peter Jones was using in in a 3-person way. But all the 3-things belong to the realm of the dubitable, and none can be real in the sense I am real. I can know that I am real, but I cannot *know* for sure that I have fingers, or that I am made of atom, or that my hair are brown. This "knowledge" is of the conjectural, theoretical type. > Since this is inescapably the foundation of any and all > judgements whatsoever, it is simultaneously both the both point of > departure and the 'what-is-to-be-explained' of RITSIAR. "to-be-explained" means to be explained in a theory. I show that comp leads to a simple theory for the ontology (any universal machine, like a tiny fragment of arithmetic will do), and a slightly less simple epistemology (arithmetic + the induction axiom, so that we get the self-awareness theorem: Bp -> BBp (if I believe p, I believe that I believe p). > In this light > it becomes self-evident that any and all explanatory entities - > physical, computational, or whatever - are severely restricted to the > domain of epistemology. I don't see why. I would not put arithmetic in epistemology, or only in a very large sense of epistemology, the epistemology of the 0- person views!. It seems clearer to accept them ontologically like in the usual practice of math. Could be only a vocabulary problem here. > IOW - as Bruno says above - they are > theoretical constructions. Yes, but this does not mean those construction does not refer to something real independently of us, and this is what I assume for comp. Even if the whole existence get annihilated, 17 would still be prime. > > > So far so obvious. But - as has again been recognised immemorially - > solipsism is a dead-end and hence we seek a theory to capture the > relation between the OFP and its environment. But immediately we are > faced with the notorious 'explanatory gap', and it seems to me that > its most precise expression is in the gap between ontology and > epistemology. Indeed, what conceivable strategy could raise these > theoretical constructions - to which the OFP uniquely lends existence > - to the ontological certainty of their host? Is there a coherent way > to conceive what it could mean to *be* a theoretical entity (as > opposed to postulating or observing one)? It is the point of saying "yes" to the doctor. You don't say yes because the new brain is a good modelisation of your brain, but because you bet it will enact yourself completely, relatively to the neighborhood. > There is something > quintessential that stubbornly eludes capture, because epistemological > access never tells us what an entity *is* - only what can be > ascertained of its 'externalised' properties. And lest we be tempted > to accept the sum of these properties as exhausting 'existence', we > need only turn to the self-evident corrective of the OFP. > > So the gap must remain, and I think that now I see why Bruno appeals > simply to the 'ordinary' mathematical sense of existence - because > COMP, under this analysis, is an epistemological schema, and its > entities are theoretical constructions. You may confuse the reality of number, and the reality of machine/ theories talking about those numbers. Numbers are not viewed as theoretical construction. The theoretical construction are our theories on the numbers. It simplifies things. > Hence the question of jumping > the ontological gap is in abeyance, perhaps permanently, but in any > case in the realm of faith. All theories demands faith, but the faith needed for understanding that 17 is prime is not comparable to the act of faith needed to say yes to the doctor. > And if this i
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
On 10 Aug, 03:54, Colin Hales wrote: > ronaldheld wrote: > > As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is > > well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of > > mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or > > something else? > > Ronald > > This is /the/ question. It always seems to get sidestepped in > discussions that fail to distinguish between (a) "/reality as some kind > of natural computation/" and (b) "/reality represented by formal > statements(laws of nature) of regularity, //apparent in an observer, > //that may be artificially computed/ /by a Turing style machine/". The > conflation of (a) and (b) is a constant in the discussions here. > > (a) does not need an observer. It /constructs/ an observer. > (b) involves an observer and are regularities constructed by the > observer made by (a) > > The (roughly 5) conflations (from my paper that refutes COMP) are: > > Conflation #1: Deploying an artificial scientist ? Bestowing > scientific knowledge > Conflation #2: COMP(utation) ? experience > Conflation #3: A Scientist ? Formal system > Conflation #4 Rules of a rule generator ? the generated rules > (except once) > Conflation #5 AC Artificial Turing style abstract symbol > manipulation ? NC The computation that is the natural world > > Note that all 5 of these permeate the discussions here. I see it all the > time. The main one is #5. When you realise how many combinations of > these can misdirect a discussion, you realise how screwed up things are. > The following statements summarise the effects: > > (A) The fact that the natural world, to an observer, happens to have > appearances predicted by a set of formal statements (Laws of > Nature/Physics) does not entail that those statements are in any way > involved in running/driving the universe. The hypothesis that laws somehow really exist is actually quite a reasonable abductive explanation for observed regularities. Like most scientific explanations it is less than certain, but that doesn't make it false. > Eg. The assumption that the > concept of a 'multiverse' is valid or relevant is another symptom of the > conflationthe reason? QM is a mathematical construct of type (b), > /not/ an example of (a). The whole concept of a multiverse is a malady > caused by this conflation. Is anything an example of (a)? > (B) The operation of a Turing Machine ( = hardware-invariant//artificial > abstract/ symbol manipulation) is /not /what is going on in the natural > world and, I'm not wild about the hypotheis, but howcome you are so sure it is wrong? >specifically, is /not/ what is happening in the brain (of a > scientist). Assuming 'cognition is computation' is unjustified on any level. > > I find the situation increasingly aggravating. It's like talking to cult > members who's beliefs are predicated on a delusion, and who a re so deep > inside it and so unable to see out of it that they are lost. Common > sense has left the building. The appropriate scientific way out of this > mess is to > > (i) let (a) descriptions and (b) descriptions be, for the purposes, > /separate scientific depictions of the natural world/ If they are not > then at some point in the analysis they will become > indistinguishable...in which case you have a /scientific/logical approach./ > (ii) Drop /all/ assumptions that any discussion involving Turing > machines as relevant to understanding the natural world. This means > accepting,/ for the purposes of sorting this mess out/, (a) as being a > form of computation fundamentally different to a Turing machine, where > the symbols and the processor are literally the same thing. If you > predicate your work on (i) then if COMP is true then at some point, if > (a) and (b) become indistinguishable, /then/ COMP will be a-priori > /predicted/ to be true. I am not sure what you are saying here. Computationalism is generally taken to be a claim about the mind, and is quite a respectable thesis (you haven't disproved, BTW, since formal systems *can* handle contradictons, contra your assumption) Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
On 10 Aug 2009, at 09:08, Colin Hales wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote: >> >>> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed >>> refutation of computationalism. >>> It's going through peer review at the moment. >>> >>> The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation >>> of 'physics-as-computation' with the type of computation that is >>> being carried out in a Turing machine (a standard computer). In >>> the paper I drew an artificial distinction between them. I called >>> the former NATURAL COMPUTATION (NC) and the latter ARTIFICIAL >>> COMPUTATION (AC). The idea is that if COMP is true then there is >>> no distinction between AC and NC. The distinction should fail. >> >> Why? COMP entails that physics cannot be described by a >> computation, but by an infinite sum of infinite histories. If you >> were correct, there would be no possible white rabbit. You are >> confusing comp (I am a machine) and constructive physics (the >> universe is a machine). >> >> > This is the COMP I have a problem with. It's the one in the > literature. It relates directly to the behaviour (descriptive > options of) of scientists: > COMP > > This is the shorthand for computationalism as distilled from the > various sources cited above. The working definition here: > > “The operational/functional equivalence (identity, > indistinguishability at the level of the model) of (a) a > sufficiently embodied, computationally processed, sufficiently > detailed symbolic/formal description/model of a natural thing X and > (b) the described natural thing X”. > > If this is not the COMP you speak of, then this could be the origins > of disparity in view. Also, the term "I am machine" says nothing > scientifically meaningful to me. This is not comp. Actually the definition above is ambiguous, and seems to presuppose natural things. I use comp in its older and standard sense in the cognitive science. "I am a machine" has the advantage of having an operational meaning by entailing the possible use of artificial brain. If you give a meaning to the word "consciousness", comp is the assertion that consciousness is an invariant for a precise set of transformation. > The term "The universe is a machine" also says nothing > scientifically meaningful to me. Well comp, in its indexical sense, entails "the universe is a machine" is inconsistent. > > > I offer the following distinction, which relates directly to the > human behaviour (observable, testable) called scientific behaviour. > (a) scientific descriptions of a natural world produced by an > observer inside it, built of it. (science currently 100% here) > and > (b) scientific descriptions (also produced inside it by (a) human > observers) of a natural world as a natural form of computation which > produces the above observer.(science currently Nil% here for no > justified reason) > and > (c) The natural world as an actual instantiation of (b)."Whatever it > is that we find ourselves in". > > When you utter the word "physics" above, I hear a reference to > descriptions of type (a) and nothing else. I assume no direct > relationship between them and (b) or (c). The framework of (a), (b), > (c) is all that is needed, justified because it exhausts the list of > possible views of our situation which have any empirical/explanatory > relevance. None of the descriptions (a) or (b) need be unique or > even exact. The only thing required of (a) is prediction. The only > thing required of (b) is prediction of an observer who is > predicting. Both (a) and (b) are justified empirically in predicting > a scientist. > > Now consider the ways I could be confused: > (i) computed (Turing) (a) is identical to (c) (all of it) > or > (ii) computed (Turing) (b) is identical to (c) (all of it) > or > (iii) computed (Turing) (a) of a piece of (c) is identical to the > piece of (c) within (c) > or > (iv) computed (Turing) (b) of a piece of (c) is identical to the > piece of (c) within (c) > > The COMP I refute above is of type (iii). I did not examine (iv) in > the paper. > > (iii) is the delusion currently inhabiting computer science in > respect of AGI expectations. The 'piece of (c)' I use to do this is > 'the human scientist'. It is expectations of AGI projects that I > seek to clarify - my motivation here. It is a 100% practical need. > > (i) and (ii) might be possible if you already knew everythingbut > that is of no practical use. > (iii) and (iv) viability depends on the "piece of (c)/rest of (c)" > boundary and how well that boundary facilitates an AGI. > > So... who's assuming stuff? :-) > But then your "non-comp" is a direct corollary of UDA. If we assume there is a "natural world", or a "primitive physicalness", comp, in the sense of INDEXICAL digital mechanism (and "indexical" refers to the use of "I"
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote: > >> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed >> refutation of computationalism. >> It's going through peer review at the moment. >> >> The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of >> 'physics-as-computation' with the type of computation that is being >> carried out in a Turing machine (a standard computer). In the paper I >> drew an artificial distinction between them. I called the former >> NATURAL COMPUTATION (NC) and the latter ARTIFICIAL COMPUTATION (AC). >> The idea is that if COMP is true then there is no distinction between >> AC and NC. The distinction should fail. > > Why? COMP entails that physics cannot be described by a computation, > but by an infinite sum of infinite histories. If you were correct, > there would be no possible white rabbit. You are confusing comp (I am > a machine) and constructive physics (the universe is a machine). > > This is the COMP I have a problem with. It's the one in the literature. It relates directly to the behaviour (descriptive options of) of scientists: *COMP* This is the shorthand for computationalism as distilled from the various sources cited above. The working definition here: “/The operational/functional equivalence (identity, indistinguishability at the level of the model) of (a) a sufficiently embodied, computationally processed, sufficiently detailed symbolic/formal description/model of a natural thing X and (b) the described natural thing X/”/./ If this is not the COMP you speak of, then this could be the origins of disparity in view. Also, the term "I am machine" says nothing scientifically meaningful to me. The term "The universe is a machine" also says nothing scientifically meaningful to me. I offer the following distinction, which relates directly to the human behaviour (observable, testable) called scientific behaviour. (a) scientific descriptions of a natural world produced by an observer inside it, built of it. (science currently 100% here) and (b) scientific descriptions (also produced inside it by (a) human observers) of a natural world as a natural form of computation which produces the above observer.(science currently Nil% here for no justified reason) and (c) The natural world as an actual instantiation of (b)."Whatever it is that we find ourselves in". When you utter the word "physics" above, I hear a reference to descriptions of type (a) and nothing else. I assume no direct relationship between them and (b) or (c). The framework of (a), (b),(c) is all that is needed, justified because it exhausts the list of possible views of our situation which have any empirical/explanatory relevance. None of the descriptions (a) or (b) need be unique or even exact. The only thing required of (a) is prediction. The only thing required of (b) is prediction /of an observer who is predicting/. Both (a) and (b) are justified empirically in predicting a scientist. Now consider the ways I could be confused: (i) computed (Turing) (a) is identical to (c) (all of it) or (ii) computed (Turing) (b) is identical to (c) (all of it) or (iii) computed (Turing) (a) of a piece of (c) is identical to the piece of (c) within (c) or (iv) computed (Turing) (b) of a piece of (c) is identical to the piece of (c) within (c) The COMP I refute above is of type (iii). I did not examine (iv) in the paper. (iii) is the delusion currently inhabiting computer science in respect of AGI expectations. The 'piece of (c)' I use to do this is 'the human scientist'. It is expectations of AGI projects that I seek to clarify - my motivation here. It is a 100% practical need. (i) and (ii) might be possible if you already knew everythingbut that is of no practical use. (iii) and (iv) viability depends on the "piece of (c)/rest of (c)" boundary and how well that boundary facilitates an AGI. So... who's assuming stuff? :-) colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
