Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Colin, > > We agree on the conclusion. We disagree on vocabulary, and on the > validity of your reasoning. > > Let us call I-comp the usual indexical mechanism discussed in this > list (comp). > Let us call m-comp the thesis that there is a primitive "natural > world", and that it can be described by a digital machine. > > UDA shows that I-comp entails NOT m-comp. > Obviously m-comp entails I-comp. > > So m-comp entails NOT m-comp. > > This refutes m-comp. My argument involves refuting what you call m-comp Where did you get the idea I am suggesting "/It can be described by a digital machine/"? I'll state it again There is a natural world (a) It is imperfectly described from within in 2 ways (b) and (c). A symbolic description which is predictive of appearances (b) needs no assumption that the natural world is computing (b) or is a computation of (b). A symbolic description which is predictive of structure (c) needs no assumption that the natural world is computing (c) or is a computation of (c). The 'describing' in (b) and (c) invokes no necessary 'digital machine'. The Turing computation of the descriptions (b) and (c) is /not claimable to be a natural world/ by anything more than a form of faith. This seems to be the sticking point ... this 'digital machine' idea the automatic attribution of symbolic regularities as some kind of computation then attributed some kind of involvement in the natural world. This extra attribution is not justified. Non-parsimonious, not logically connected in any necessary way. > Now you seem to believe in a stuffy natural reality, so you have to > abandon I-comp. This is coherent. Now you have to say "no" to the > doctor and introduce actual infinities in the brain. I find this very > unplausible, but it is not my goal to defend it. > > Now I find your reasoning based on informality not convincing at all, > to say the least. It is really based on level confusion s Peter Jones > was driving at correctly. You "B" above seems also indicate you have > not study the argument. > > Bruno The COMP that I refute is pragmatic and empirically tractable. Yes, m-comp is false. I don't need I-comp to reach that conclusion I need only go as far as the (a)/(b)/(c) framework in which (b) and (c) are imperfect, incomplete and non-unique symbolic descriptions of a natural world and which otherwise have no involvement in the natural world /at all/. Two different entities (human and Klingon :-) ) in our natural world could have completely different (b) formulations and be as predictive as each other. Study or not study? makes no difference. The whole idea of i-comp is unnecessary. BTW, just in case there's another issue behind thisthere's no such thing as 'digital'. Anyone who has ever done electronics will tell you that. It's all 'analogue' ...a construction of a quantised reality. By 'analogue' what I mean is "whatever it is that is the natural world (a)" above. All the digital machines on the planet are analogue. These are the ones people are using to do AGI. The virtual-discretisation we call digital <> quantisation of QM. So when you invoke a 'digital machine' you are talking about a fiction, anyway. Quantum computers merely facilitate multiple simultaneous executions within the same kind of "virtual-digital" structure ...doing lots more virtual-digital work doesn't make the computation any more digital than a standard PC. So in reality (a) there is no such "thing" as a Turing machine. There are only machines acting 'as-if' they are, by design, through constraint of analogue state transitions. I have personally played with the electronic transition between 0 and 1 on many occasions it's as real as the 0 and the 1 and you can walk all over it. There's multiple layers of misconception operating in this area. And they are not all mine! Colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2009/8/12 Colin Hales : > >> My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the delusion >> of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a mind. They are >> throwing away $millions based on a false belief. Their expectations need to >> be scientifically defined for a change. I have no particular interest in >> disturbing any belief systems here except insofar as they contribute to the >> delusion that COMP is true. >> >> 'nuff said. This is another minor battle in an ongoing campaign. :-) >> >> Colin >> > > You want so much COMP to be false that you've forget in the way that > your argument is flawed from the start... You start with, AI can't do > science to conclude that... tada... AI can't do science. It's absurd. > > Quentin > > > It is a 'reductio ad absudum' argument. My argument /does not start with AI can't do science/. It starts with the simple posit that if /COMP is true/ then all differences between a COMP world (AC) and the natural world (NC) should be zero under all circumstances and the AC/NC distinction would be false. That is the natural result of unconditional universality of COMP yes? OK. This posit is /not/ an assumption that AC cannot be a scientist. The rationale is that if I can find one and only one circumstance consistent/sustaining that difference, then the posit of the universal truth of COMP is falsified. The AC/NC distinction is upheld: . I looked and found one place where the difference is viable, a difference that only goes away if you project a human viewpoint into the 'artificial scientist' ( i.e. valid only by additional assumptions).that position is that the NC artificial scientist cannot ever debate COMP as an option. _Not because it can't construct the statements of debate, but because it will never be able to detect a world in which COMP is false, because in that world the informal systems involved can fake all evidence_ and lead the COMP scientist by the nose anywhere they want. If the real world is a place where informal systems exist, those informal systems can subvert/fake all COMP statements, no matter what they are and the COMP scientist will never know. It can be 100% right, think it's right and actually not be connected to the actual reality of it. A world in which COMP is false can never verify that it is. Do not confuse this 'ability to be fooled' with an inability to formulate statements which deal with inconsistency. The place where we get an informal system is in the human brain, which can 'symbolically cohere and explore' any/all formal systems. I specifically chose the human brain of a scientist, the workings of which were used to generate the 'law of nature' running the artificial (COMP) scientist (who must also be convinced COMP is true in order to bother at all!). I can see how, as a human, I could 100% fake the apparent world that the COMP entity examines COMP-ly and it will never know. (The same way that a brilliant virtual reality could 100% fool a human and we'd never know. A virtual reality that fools us humans is not necessarily made of computation either. ) I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/ operate formally like COMP and that '/formally handling inconsistency/' is not the same thing as '/delivering inconsistency by being an informal/ /system/'. BTW I mean informal in the Godellian sense...simultaneous inconsistency and incompleteness. This is a highly self referential situation. Resist the temptation to assume that a COMP/NC scientist construction of statements capturing inconsistency is equivalent to dealing the intrinsic inconsistency of the human brain kind. Also reject the notion that the brain is computing of the COMP (Turing) type. This is not the case. You might also be interested in *Bringsjord, S. 1999. The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX:41-69.* He ends with."/In the end, then, the zombie attack proves lethal: computationalism is dead./" It's a formal modal logic argument to the same end as mine in the end, they are actually the same argument. It's just not obvious. I like mine better because it has the Godellian approach. The informality issue has some elaboration here: *Cabanero, L. L. and Small, C. G. 2009. Intentionality and Computationalism: A Diagonal Argument. Mind and Matter 7:81-90.* Also here: *Fetzer, J. H. 2001. Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are Not Machines Kluwer Academic Publishers.* I am hoping that between these and a few others, the issue is sealed. I know it'll take a while for the true believers to come around. It's not such a big deal ... except when $$$ + wasted time promulgates bad science and magical thinking in the form of a kind a 'fashion preference' based on presumptions that the natural world is obliged to operate according to human-constructed 'isms. If
Re: The seven step series
On 11 Aug 2009, at 22:24, Mirek Dobsicek wrote:
>
>
>> Well, A^B is the set of functions from B to A. By definition of set
>> exponentiation.
>
> I'd just like to point out that Bruno in his previous post in the
> seven
> step serii made a small typo
>
> "A^B - the set of all functions from A to B."
>
> It should have been from B to A. The latest post is correct in this
> respect.
And now Simplicius is coming back and asks: " but why do you define
the exponentiation of sets, A^B, by the set of functions from B to A?".
The answer of the sadistic teacher: this is a DEFINITION, and is part
of the program. If you have complains about the program, write a
letter to the minister of education.
Hmm...
A better answer is given by the solution of the preceding exercise:
>> If card(A) = n, and card(B) = m. What is
>> card(A^B)?
>
It happens that if A^B is defined as the set of functions from B to A,
then card(A^B) is given by card(A)^card(B)
How many functions exist from a set with m elements in a set with n
elements? n^m.
Hope you see that n^m is NOT equal to m^n (when n and m are
different). 3^4 = 3x3x3x3 = 81, and 4^3 = 4x4x4 = 64.
2^7 = 128, 7^2 = 49.
In that way, A^B generalizes for set what n^m is for numbers.
And why card(A^B) = card(A)^card(B) ?
You can see this in the following way: let card(A) = m, and card(B) =
n. We must understand why card(A^B) = n^m.
For example a function from {a, b, c, d, e, f, g} in {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
To fix the idea. So m = 7, and n = 5. OK?
Let us build an "arbitrary" function F. Well,we begin with "F =
{(a, ...", and we have to say where "a" is sent. We have five (n)
choices, and then we have to choose where b is sent, and we have again
n choices, and for each first choice any second choice is acceptable
so we have 5 (n) choices multiplied by 5 (n) choices, itself
multiplied by 5 (n) choices, as many times there are elements in the
starting set, that is 7 (m). This gives 5 x 5 x 5 x 5 x 5 x 5 x 5,
that is 5^7. or more generally n x n x n x n x ... x n, m times.
OK?
We will be interested in N^N. That is, the set of functions from N to N.
The set of computable functions will be an important subset of that set.
Let me give a precise definition of bijection, as I promise.
I need two rather useful definitions.
- I will say that a function from A to B is ONTO, if all elements of
B appears in the couples of the function. Note that card(B) has to be
less or equal to card(A) to make that possible, by the functional
condition.
- I will say a function is ONE-ONE, if two different elements of A
are sent to two different elements of B. Note that card(A) has to be
less or equal to card(B) to make that possible.
The condition one-one is the reverse of the functional condition. The
functional conditions says that an element cannot be sent on two
different elements (a time cannot give two temperature!), and the one-
one condition says that two different elements cannot be sent on one
element.
Exercises: build many examples with little finite sets. You may search
examples for infinite sets.
OK. The definition of bijection. I will say that a function is a
bijection between A and B if it is both a function ONTO from A to B,
and a function ONE-ONE from A to B. we say more quicky that f is a
bijection if f is both onto and one-one.
Exercises: for "2)" below, the real needed exercise is: "do you
understand the question?" Unless you like to count things, but such
skills are not needed for the sequel.
1) Convince yourself that if A and B are finite sets, then there
exists a bijection between A and B if and only if card(A) = card(B).
2) If A has n elements (card(A) = n), how many bijections exists from
A to B?
Again start with simple examples, and try to generalize.
For example, how many bijections from {a, b, c} to {1, 2}. How
many bijections from (a, b, c} to {a, b, c}?
3) can you find, or define a bijection between the infinite set N, and
the infinite set E = {0, 2, 4, 6, 8, ...} (E for even).
4) Key questions for the sequel, on which you can meditate:
- is there a bijection between N and NxN? (NxN = the cartesian
product of N with N)
- is there a bijection between N and N^N?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Phd in philosophy of mind & in cognitive (neuro)science
Hi, I'm from Milan. I'm going to finish my studies in philosophy (of mind) and I'm looking for some phd in philosophy of mind & in cognitive (neuro)science...or something that is interdisciplinary. I found some interesting phd in Italy (at the university of In Milan, in Siena, in Turin & in Trento) and also in Edinburg. Do you know something else? all the best, Emanuele --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal : > I will not stickle on that point :) > > Can we say that? Sure - why be pointilleux about it? > Now, is the ONE a person? I still don't know if that make sense (in > "machine's theology"). Who knows? I suspect we need to interview the One. Maybe Oprah? D ;-) > > Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 12 Aug 2009, at 16:38, David Nyman wrote: > > 2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal : > >>> The solution then seems obviously to be to throw one or other of >>> these >>> supposed causal principles out, i.e.: >>> >>> 1) either it is the case that consciousness simply supervenes on >>> particular physical activities whose computational status is >>> irrelevant; >> >> ... but then comp is false. OK? And thus comp implies "2". > > Yes, absolutely Definitely. No question. > > 1) is what I always believed, for the reasons I've given, but I hadn't > taken 2) to be a serious possibility. Now I'm prepared to entertain > computational supervenience, because I'm intrigued by where it might > lead us. It's genuinely illuminating. I think it is. But, with Church thesis, it is even more so. We get the class of computable functions, which appears to be close for the most transcendental operation in the whole of mathematics, diagonalization. It is a arguably a "bit" more than "causally closed". And enough equivalence theorems makes computational supervenience a precise mathematical phenomenon. The seventh step of UDA, and indeed the Universal dovetailing itself, makes sense only through the assumed existence of universal machines. (Church thesis asserts that Lambda Calculus, Lisp, fortran, c++, game of life, quantum topology, are name of such universal machine/word/ number). > > >>> 2) or it is the case that consciousness supervenes on computation >>> itself independent of physical activity (the conclusion that you in >>> fact draw from the MGA). >>> >>> In the second case - i.e. the reversal of number and matter - I >>> agree >>> that you can save any role for primitive matter only at the cost of >>> rendering it dualistically epiphenomenal in the sense sometimes >>> attributed (IMO incoherently) to consciousness in materialist >>> accounts. >> >> But then by UDA1-7, not only "stuffy matter" would be epiphenomenal, >> but it would have absolutely no relationship with any observation, >> making it entirely spurious. > > Agreed. In any case, for me, epiphenomenal and spurious are hardly > distinguishable. I will not stickle on that point :) Can we say that? > > >> Note that what you describe here as MGA is Maudlin's later and >> different argument. MGA is also immune to an objection made by >> Russell, which is that QM does "realize" the couterfactuals. >> Maudlin's >> argument can be saved from this with a version where Olympia >> simulates >> classicaly the quantum evolution of the brain. So MGA is more simple >> and direct. Anyway, the conclusions are the same, comp forces the >> abandon of the physical supervenience thesis. So comp forces to >> restrict the supervenience thesis on the mathematical computations >> (computationalist supervenience). > > Yes, the argument is an explicit reductio ad absurdum, which is > contained within my own version by default. Intuition is of course > somewhat personal, but the form of the argument against physical > supervenience I presented - which I think first arose from the mix of > fascination and horror produced by reading Hofstadter, Dennett et al - > has always seemed obvious to me, and the defences against it just > wrong-headed. The belief in comp + physical supervenience strikes me > as the most arbitrary and incoherent form of dualism out there, and > why its proponents just don't get this is a complete mystery, as far > as I'm concerned. But then life is full of mystery. Fortunately :-) The problem is that many materialists use "physicalist comp" to hide, somehow, the mind body problem. We would be "mere machine." But if we are "mere digital machine", and if we don't eliminate consciousness and person, we have to justify the apparent computability of the sharable neighborhood from a sum on the whole universal dovetailing, which is a tiny (Sigma_1) part of arithmetic. We live in the "natural" matrix that you get with any universal system, be it the game of life or numbers with succession, addition and multiplication. The matrix is infinite, and, by first person indeterminacy, "we" are dense on its border (like the mandelbrot set). It remains to explain why, from inside, that infinite sum takes the shape of a quantum sum. The quantum sum does eliminate the white rabbits (WR), but with comp we have to show why in appearance the quantum WR-hunters win on all possible comp WR-hunters. The second "crazy", but obvious, fact: is that we can already have a chat with the universal machine, on that question. AUDA. But alas, this is obvious only through an understanding of some theorems: Gödel, Löb, Solovay and some others, which themselves requires some knowledge in mathematical logic. Comp, as it should be expected, gives a prominent role to computer science, logic and mathematics. And question concerning "I" and selves gives a prominent role to the mathematical theory of self-reference. Now, is th
Re: Dreaming On
2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal : >> The solution then seems obviously to be to throw one or other of these >> supposed causal principles out, i.e.: >> >> 1) either it is the case that consciousness simply supervenes on >> particular physical activities whose computational status is >> irrelevant; > > ... but then comp is false. OK? And thus comp implies "2". Yes, absolutely Definitely. No question. 1) is what I always believed, for the reasons I've given, but I hadn't taken 2) to be a serious possibility. Now I'm prepared to entertain computational supervenience, because I'm intrigued by where it might lead us. It's genuinely illuminating. >> 2) or it is the case that consciousness supervenes on computation >> itself independent of physical activity (the conclusion that you in >> fact draw from the MGA). >> >> In the second case - i.e. the reversal of number and matter - I agree >> that you can save any role for primitive matter only at the cost of >> rendering it dualistically epiphenomenal in the sense sometimes >> attributed (IMO incoherently) to consciousness in materialist >> accounts. > > But then by UDA1-7, not only "stuffy matter" would be epiphenomenal, > but it would have absolutely no relationship with any observation, > making it entirely spurious. Agreed. In any case, for me, epiphenomenal and spurious are hardly distinguishable. > Note that what you describe here as MGA is Maudlin's later and > different argument. MGA is also immune to an objection made by > Russell, which is that QM does "realize" the couterfactuals. Maudlin's > argument can be saved from this with a version where Olympia simulates > classicaly the quantum evolution of the brain. So MGA is more simple > and direct. Anyway, the conclusions are the same, comp forces the > abandon of the physical supervenience thesis. So comp forces to > restrict the supervenience thesis on the mathematical computations > (computationalist supervenience). Yes, the argument is an explicit reductio ad absurdum, which is contained within my own version by default. Intuition is of course somewhat personal, but the form of the argument against physical supervenience I presented - which I think first arose from the mix of fascination and horror produced by reading Hofstadter, Dennett et al - has always seemed obvious to me, and the defences against it just wrong-headed. The belief in comp + physical supervenience strikes me as the most arbitrary and incoherent form of dualism out there, and why its proponents just don't get this is a complete mystery, as far as I'm concerned. But then life is full of mystery. Fortunately :-) David > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
On 11 Aug 2009, at 02:06, ronaldheld wrote: > > I am behind, because I was away delivering Science talk to Star Trek > fans. > I am uncertain what to take away from this thread, and could use the > clarification. I will think about it. It could help if you were a bit more specific. > > As an aside, I read(or tried to) read the SANE paper on the plane. Ask any question, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
Colin, We agree on the conclusion. We disagree on vocabulary, and on the validity of your reasoning. Let us call I-comp the usual indexical mechanism discussed in this list (comp). Let us call m-comp the thesis that there is a primitive "natural world", and that it can be described by a digital machine. UDA shows that I-comp entails NOT m-comp. Obviously m-comp entails I-comp. So m-comp entails NOT m-comp. This refutes m-comp. Now you seem to believe in a stuffy natural reality, so you have to abandon I-comp. This is coherent. Now you have to say "no" to the doctor and introduce actual infinities in the brain. I find this very unplausible, but it is not my goal to defend it. Now I find your reasoning based on informality not convincing at all, to say the least. It is really based on level confusion s Peter Jones was driving at correctly. You "B" above seems also indicate you have not study the argument. Bruno On 12 Aug 2009, at 08:11, Colin Hales wrote: > Hi, > I guess I am pretty much over the need for any 'ism whatever. I can > re-classify my ideas in terms of an 'ism, but that process tells me > nothing extra and offers no extra empirical clue. I think I can > classify fairly succinctly the difference between approaches: > > (A) Colin > (a) There is a natural world. > (b) We can describe how it appears to us using the P-consciousness > of scientists. > (c) We can describe how a natural world might be constructed which > has an observer in it like (a) > Descriptions (b) are not the natural world (a) but 'about it' (its > appearances) > Descriptions (C) are not the natural world (a) but 'about it' (its > structure) > (b) and (c) need only ever be 'doxastic' (beliefs). > I hold that these two sets of descriptions (b) and (c) need not be > complete or even perfect/accurate. > Turing-computing (b) or (c) is not an instance of (a)/will not ever > make (a) > Turing-computing (b) or (c) can tell you something about the > operation of (a). > NOTE: > If (b) is a description of the rules of chess (no causality > whatever, good prediction of future board appearances), (c) is a > description of the behaviour of chess players (chess causality). > There's a rough metaphor for you. > - > (B) not-Colin (as seems to be what I see here...) > There are descriptions of type (b), one of which is quantum > mechanics QM. > The math of QM suggests a multiple-histories TOE concept. > If I then project a spurious attribution of idealism into this > then if I squint at the math I can see what might operate as a > 'first person perspective' > and I realise/believe that if I Turing-compute the math, it is > a universe. I can make it be reality. > Causality is a mystery solved by prayer to the faith of idealism and > belief in 'comp', driven by the hidden mechanism of the Turing 'tape > reader/punch'. > - > > What's happening here AFAICT, is that players in (B) have been so > far 'down the rabbit hole' for so long they've lost sight of reality > and think 'isms explain things! > > In (A) you get to actually explain things (appearances and causal > necessity). The price is that you can never truly know reality. You > get 'asymptotically close to knowing it', though. (A) involves no > delusion about Turing-computation implementing reality. The amount > of 'idealism', 'physicalism', 'materialism' and any other 'ism you > need to operate in the (A) framework is Nil. In (A) the COMP (as I > defined it) is obviously and simply false and there is no sense in > which Turing-style-computation need be attributed to be involved in > natural processes. It's falsehood is expected and natural and > consistent with all empirical knowledge. > > The spurious attributions in (B) are replaced in (A) by the > descriptions (c), all of which must correlate perfectly > (empirically) with (b) through the provision of an observer and a > mechanism for observation which is evidenced in brain material. The > concept of a Turing machine is not needed at all. There may be a > sense in which a Turing (C-T) equivalent of (c) might be > constructed. That equivalent is adds zero to knowledge systems (b) > and (c). Under (A) the C-T thesis is perfectly right but simply > irrelevant. > > My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the > delusion of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create > a mind. They are throwing away $millions based on a false belief. > Their expectations need to be scientifically defined for a change. I > have no particular interest in disturbing any belief systems here > except insofar as they contribute to the delusion that COMP is true. > > 'nuff said. This is another minor battle in an ongoing campaign. :-) > > Colin > > > Stephen Paul King wrote: >> >> Hi Colin, >> >> It seems that to me that until one understands
Re: Dreaming On
On 12 Aug 2009, at 04:32, David Nyman wrote: > > 2009/8/11 Bruno Marchal : > > Bruno, thanks for your detailed responses which I will peruse closely. > Meanwhile, I finally managed to locate on FOR an apparently coherent > summary of the MGA (which I understand to be the essence of UDA-8). > Here is my understanding of it: > > The MGA presents the case of a TM with a prepared tape that specifies > a computation deemed - per comp - to instantiate a specific phenomenal > conscious sequence. Since a TM is invariant to the details of > physical implementation, we can set out to produce a maximally > reduced, or 'lazy', version of this particular machine, called Olympia > (perhaps evoked as reclining languorously on her chaise longue). > Given the finite length and specific execution paths of the > computation, we can determine the precise sequence of tape location > states that it entails. Knowing this, we can arrange a simple > mechanism to produce precisely these states by turning the > corresponding tape locations on or off in a sequential left-to-right > process. We can further arrange for the machine to be able to produce > the states required for each non-invoked path by means of similar > additional pre-arranged mechanisms, even though these would not in > fact be activated by the computation as specified. In this way we can > ensure that both actual and counterfactual conditions could be dealt > with by the simplest possible combination of minimised and idle > mechanisms. > > If I've got this more or less right, the burden of the MGA seems to be > that a physical TM instantiating a specific computation deemed to > evoke a conscious state could have its activity reduced to such a > minimal level that it is no longer plausible that consciousness could > supervene on it. Whilst this does indeed strike one as intuitively > very strong, as long as there continues to be activity at *any* level > a diehard material-computationalist could still claim that it wasn't a > final knockdown blow. I see now that - as you remarked - my own > argument includes a first approximation of this, since my reference to > the arbitrarily many implementations of the computation would of > course include Olympia. > > But the burden of my argument is in fact different, since - setting > Olympia aside - it questions the very plausibility of what is assumed > by comp - i.e. that a conscious state fixed in the *same* state by > computational specification could be capable of invariance in the face > of entirely *different* physical activities, if it is deemed to be > *caused* by these activities. This idea in fact appeals > simultaneously to two separate causal principles - i.e. computational > and physical. Hence it strikes one as inherently a sort of > non-interactive dualism, as implied by the computation's - and hence > the conscious state's - insensitivity to changes in physical activity. > > The solution then seems obviously to be to throw one or other of these > supposed causal principles out, i.e.: > > 1) either it is the case that consciousness simply supervenes on > particular physical activities whose computational status is > irrelevant; ... but then comp is false. OK? And thus comp implies "2". > > 2) or it is the case that consciousness supervenes on computation > itself independent of physical activity (the conclusion that you in > fact draw from the MGA). > > In the second case - i.e. the reversal of number and matter - I agree > that you can save any role for primitive matter only at the cost of > rendering it dualistically epiphenomenal in the sense sometimes > attributed (IMO incoherently) to consciousness in materialist > accounts. But then by UDA1-7, not only "stuffy matter" would be epiphenomenal, but it would have absolutely no relationship with any observation, making it entirely spurious. > > > As to UDA1-7, I think I see now that of course you assume mechanism, > but that you reserve the argument for number-matter reversal until > UDA-8. Perhaps this order might better be reversed? Like in my theses? May be. MGA is far more subtle than UDA1-7, that is why I have eventually decide to put it at the end. Bruno Note that what you describe here as MGA is Maudlin's later and different argument. MGA is also immune to an objection made by Russell, which is that QM does "realize" the couterfactuals. Maudlin's argument can be saved from this with a version where Olympia simulates classicaly the quantum evolution of the brain. So MGA is more simple and direct. Anyway, the conclusions are the same, comp forces the abandon of the physical supervenience thesis. So comp forces to restrict the supervenience thesis on the mathematical computations (computationalist supervenience). http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post t
