Re: The past hypothesis

2010-05-05 Thread Rex Allen
On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 12:44 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
 I notice I didn't respond to your first question in this post. So...


I appreciate the response!


 On 5/3/2010 7:41 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
 So, given eternal recurrence, there are an infinite number of Rexs.
 And an infinite number of not-Rexs.  Let's pair the Rexs off in a
 one-to-one correspondence with the not-Rexs.  Then, let's go down the
 list and put an A sticker on the Rexs.  And a B sticker on the
 not-Rexs.  Then lets randomly arrange them in an infinitely long row
 and select one at random.  What's the probability of selecting a Rex?
 What's the probability of selecting an A sticker?


 I suppose your intent is to assign equal measure to each position on
 the list so, for any finite subsection of the list the measure of As
 and Bs will be equal.


 If that was my intent, what would your response be?


 The usual way of dealing with infinity is to use a measure that works for
 finite cases and converges in the limit as the number is arbitrarily
 increased.  Notice that there is no way to randomly arrange the infinite
 sets, except by some process that randomly selects elements and places
 them on the list.  So you're really back the generating frequency.

Okay, so this is my point.  So let's say we use a process to randomly
distribute our newly-stickered Rexs and not-Rexs so that they are
randomly arranged according to sticker-type.

Even though we have now rearranged them...these are still the same
Rexs and not-Rexs we started with when they were randomly arranged
according to the 6-sided die.

We haven't changed the relative number of Rexs and not-Rexs, we've
just labeled them with an extra property and then rearranged them
according to that additional property.  They retain their original
properties though.

So, we still have a countable infinity of Rexs, and a countable
infinity of not-Rexs.  Who can be placed into one-to-one
correspondence.

SO...what difference does the measure make when deciding, as Carroll
put it, which infinity wins?

What does winning mean in this context?  Okay, the not-Rexs have a
greater frequency, but so what.  They still don't outnumber the Rexs.
Frequency seems like an arbitrary definition of winning.

Cardinality seems like the correct measure to decide who won.  At
least in the case of Rexs and not-Rexs, as well as with Boltzmann
Brains and Normal Brains.

The only way for the not-Rexs to win is to not allow the eternal
part of eternal recurrence.  To keep it finite, where they win on
cardinality.

At the very least it seems like a defensible position...?

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Re: The past hypothesis

2010-05-05 Thread Rex Allen
On Mon, May 3, 2010 at 11:26 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
 On 5/3/2010 7:14 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

 On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 9:48 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
 wrote:
 That's assuming I believe some things are true in some absolute sense
 unrelated to usefulness.  I don't.


 I am having the experience of seeing a red book.


 But do you *believe* you are seeing a red book.  You could be mistaken about
 that (in fact you've argued you're probably mistaken).  No, you only believe
 that you are having an experience that is described as seeing a red book.
 But I will concede you may have confidence in such a belief (provided you
 know what see, red, and book mean - which requires references that are
 less than certain).  For myself I don't formulate such beliefs, although I
 suppose I could say, I believe I am experiencing something that could be
 described as looking at a computer display.

Do you really believe that you are experiencing looking at a computer
display, OR, do you only believe that you believe that you are
experiencing looking at a computer display?

Ha!

What is belief except another aspect of conscious experience?

So there are blind people with anosognosia, who deny being blind and
will invent visual experiences.  When they claim to see a red book,
what is their conscious experience?  I would guess that their
experience is not the same as mine, but who knows?  Maybe it is the
same.

Maybe the sincere belief that you're having a visual experience *is* a
visual experience.  If so, that works for me.  Maybe that explains the
visual aspects of dreams?

Maybe belief is all that exists?  Fundamental and uncaused...

OR maybe the blind anosognosiacs don't truly believe that they are
seeing a red book, but their impaired condition forces them to behave
as though they believed they were?

OR, maybe they aren't having any experience at all.  Maybe they have
become zombies...?

I can only work with what I know about my own experiences.  But,
thanks to Salvia Divinorum, I have some idea of what it's like to both
believe really strange things, and to experience really strange
things.

If you asked me what I was seeing on one of those Salvia outings, I
would have told you all sorts of crazy things.  The visual experience
was real, even if what I saw wasn't.


 It doesn't seem to be useful to obtain certainty by giving
 up all reference.  Is that what you are doing and that's
 why you regard your experiences as uncaused and not
 referring  - so you can have certainty?

Well.  I am trying to fit everything that I know into a single
consistent, coherent framework.

Why?  Well...I don't know.  Too much spare time on my hands?

In general though, it seems like a reasonable way to pass the time.


 When I say time and red are aspects of consciousness, I mean it in the
 same way that a scientific realist means that spin is an aspect of an
 electron.


 Red and time are mathematical attributes in a model of consciousness??  Ok,
 what's the model?

By definition, a scientific realist believes in the actual existence
of electrons and of the attribute of spin.  If he didn't, he wouldn't
be a scientific realist.  He might instead be a structural realist.


 On 5/1/2010 6:15 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
 I'm not switching positions, I'm saying that the honest physicalist
 should believe that his beliefs are determined only by the initial
 conditions and causal laws of the universe.


 Why would he be a determinist?


 If he's a physicalist, why wouldn't he believe that his beliefs are
 determined by the nature of the physical world?  What else would they
 be determined by?


 Maybe we're using determined in different ways.  I use it in contrast to
 random or stochastic.

I use deterministic in contrast to random or stochastic.


 So if the natural world has stochastic aspects then
 one's beliefs could be undetermined and yet still determined by the nature
 of the physical world.  For example, one of your momentary experiences
 might be due to the decay of a radioactive calcium atom in the blood stream
 of your brain.

Exactly.


 And what if they were?  According to the
 best physical models we have they are mostly determined by the recent
 history of the universe plus probabilistic laws (QM) -


 Probabilistic laws are still causal laws, right?


 Depends on what you mean by causal?  I take probabilistic to mean not
 entirely determined by the preceding (=within the past light cone) state.

If it's not entirely determined by the preceding state, then what *is*
it determined by?

So if a physical law is deterministic then under it's influence Event
A will cause  Result X 100% of the time.

Why does Event A always lead to Result X?  Because that's the law.
There is no deeper reason.

If a physical law is indeterministic, then under it's influence Event
B will cause Result Q, R, or S according to some probability
distribution.

Let's say that the probability distribution is 1/3 for each 

Re: The past hypothesis

2010-05-05 Thread Rex Allen
On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 2:54 PM, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:

 We haven't changed the relative number of Rexs and not-Rexs, we've
 just labeled them with an extra property and then rearranged them
 according to that additional property.  They retain their original
 properties though.

 So, we still have a countable infinity of Rexs, and a countable
 infinity of not-Rexs.  Who can be placed into one-to-one
 correspondence.

 SO...what difference does the measure make when deciding, as Carroll
 put it, which infinity wins?


To me this sounds very similar to the Tristram Shandy Paradox.  Yes?  No?

http://www.suitcaseofdreams.net/Tristram_Shandy.htm

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