Re: Against Mechanism
On Sun, Nov 28, 2010 at 10:15 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 4:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 12:49 PM, Rex Allen
> wrote:
> >> "Information" is just a catch-all term for "what is being
> >> represented". But, as you say, the same information can be
> >> represented in *many* different ways, and by many different
> >> bit-patterns.
> >>
> >> And, of course, any set of bits can be interpreted as representing any
> >> information. You just need the right "one-time pad" to XOR with the
> >> bits, and viola! The magic is all in the interpretation. None of it
> >> is in the bits. And interpretation requires an interpreter.
> >
> > I agree with this completely. Information alone, such as bits on a hard
> > disk are meaningless without a corresponding program that reads them.
> Would
> > you admit then, that a computer which interprets bits the same way as a
> > brain could be conscious? Isn't this mechanism? Or is your view more
> like
> > the Buddhist idea that there is no thinker, only thought?
>
> Right, my view is that there is no thinker, only thought.
>
Do you believe as you type these responses into your computer you are
helping bring new thoughts into existence? If I understood the other
threads you cited on accidentalism, it seems as though you do not believe
anything is caused. Wouldn't that lead to the conclusion that responding to
these threads is pointless?
>
> Once you accept that the conscious experience of a rock exists, what
> purpose does the actual rock serve? It's superfluous. If the rock can
> "just exist", then the experience of the rock can "just exist" too -
> entirely independent of the rock.
>
Believing thought alone exists doesn't give any explanation for why I see a
relatively ordered screen with text and icons I understand, compared to
something like this:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Tux_secure.jpg
There are far more possible thoughts that consist of a visual field that
looks random, do you find it surprising you happen to be a thought which is
so compressible?
Accepting that rocks exist allows the understanding that some of these rocks
have the right conditions for live to develop on them, and evolve brains to
use to understand the worlds they appear on. The thoughts of those life
forms is not likely to look like random snow, since that would not be useful
for their survival. If I start with thought as primitive, and try to
explain that thought under accidental idealism I can go no further. While
it explains the existence of thought (by definition) it seems like an
intellectual dead end.
>
> Once you accept the existence of conscious experiences, what purpose
> does the brain serve? It's superfluous. If the brain can "just exist",
> then the experiences supposedly caused by the brain can "just exist"
> also.
>
> If not, why not?
>
Rather than say the brain causes conscious experience to exist, I think it
is more accurate to say the brain is conscious, or the brain experiences.
Stated this way, it isn't superfluous.
>
>
> >> SO...given that the bits are merely representations, it seems silly to
> >> me to say that just because you have the bits, you *also* have the
> >> thing they represent.
> >>
> >> Just because you have the bits that represent my conscious experience,
> >> doesn't mean that you have my conscious experience. Just because you
> >> manipulate the bits in a way as to represent "me seeing a pink
> >> elephant" doesn't mean that you've actually caused me, or any version
> >> of me, to experience seeing a pink elephant.
> >>
> >> All you've really done is had the experience of tweaking some bits and
> >> then had the experience of thinking to yourself: "hee hee hee, I just
> >> caused Rex to see a pink elephant..."
> >>
> >> Even if you have used some physical system (like a computer) that can
> >> be interpreted as executing an algorithm that manipulates bits that
> >> can be interpreted as representing me reacting to seeing a pink
> >> elephant ("Boy does he look surprised!"), this interpretation all
> >> happens within your conscious experience and has nothing to do with my
> >> conscious experience.
> >
> > Isn't this just idealism? To me, the main problem with idealism is it
> > doesn't explain why the thoughts we are about to experience are
> predictable
> > under a framework of physical laws.
>
> But then you have to explain the existence, consistency, and
> predictability of this framework of physical laws.
>
I see no reason we should abandon this goal, there is no evidence that the
progress of human understanding has reached an impasse.
>
> You still have the exact same questions, but now your asking them of
> this framework instead of about your conscious experiences. You just
> pushed the questions back a level by introducing a layer of
> unexplained entities. Your explanation needs an explanation.
>
>
Mathematical or arithmetical realism seems like a good place
Re: Against Mechanism
On 11/28/2010 8:15 PM, Rex Allen wrote: ... Things might be that way. But this requires an explanation of the existence of the information and the interpreter. And then an explanation of the explanation. And then an explanation of the explanation of the explanation. And so on. Down the rabbit hole of infinite regress. Doesn’t seem promising, and doesn’t seem necessary. Why not just accept accidental idealism? Rex Maybe I would if you could explain it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 4:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 12:49 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>> "Information" is just a catch-all term for "what is being
>> represented". But, as you say, the same information can be
>> represented in *many* different ways, and by many different
>> bit-patterns.
>>
>> And, of course, any set of bits can be interpreted as representing any
>> information. You just need the right "one-time pad" to XOR with the
>> bits, and viola! The magic is all in the interpretation. None of it
>> is in the bits. And interpretation requires an interpreter.
>
> I agree with this completely. Information alone, such as bits on a hard
> disk are meaningless without a corresponding program that reads them. Would
> you admit then, that a computer which interprets bits the same way as a
> brain could be conscious? Isn't this mechanism? Or is your view more like
> the Buddhist idea that there is no thinker, only thought?
Right, my view is that there is no thinker, only thought.
Once you accept that the conscious experience of a rock exists, what
purpose does the actual rock serve? It's superfluous. If the rock can
"just exist", then the experience of the rock can "just exist" too -
entirely independent of the rock.
Once you accept the existence of conscious experiences, what purpose
does the brain serve? It's superfluous. If the brain can "just exist",
then the experiences supposedly caused by the brain can "just exist"
also.
If not, why not?
>> SO...given that the bits are merely representations, it seems silly to
>> me to say that just because you have the bits, you *also* have the
>> thing they represent.
>>
>> Just because you have the bits that represent my conscious experience,
>> doesn't mean that you have my conscious experience. Just because you
>> manipulate the bits in a way as to represent "me seeing a pink
>> elephant" doesn't mean that you've actually caused me, or any version
>> of me, to experience seeing a pink elephant.
>>
>> All you've really done is had the experience of tweaking some bits and
>> then had the experience of thinking to yourself: "hee hee hee, I just
>> caused Rex to see a pink elephant..."
>>
>> Even if you have used some physical system (like a computer) that can
>> be interpreted as executing an algorithm that manipulates bits that
>> can be interpreted as representing me reacting to seeing a pink
>> elephant ("Boy does he look surprised!"), this interpretation all
>> happens within your conscious experience and has nothing to do with my
>> conscious experience.
>
> Isn't this just idealism? To me, the main problem with idealism is it
> doesn't explain why the thoughts we are about to experience are predictable
> under a framework of physical laws.
But then you have to explain the existence, consistency, and
predictability of this framework of physical laws.
You still have the exact same questions, but now your asking them of
this framework instead of about your conscious experiences. You just
pushed the questions back a level by introducing a layer of
unexplained entities. Your explanation needs an explanation.
Also, you’ve introduced a new question: How does unconscious matter
governed by unconscious physical laws give rise to conscious
experience?
> If you see a ball go up, you can be
> rather confident in your future experience of seeing it come back down. It
> seems there is an underlying system, more fundamental than consciousness,
> which drives where it can go. In one of your earlier e-mails you explained
> your belief as "accidental idealism", can you elaborate on this accidental
> part?
Basically I’m just combining accidentalism and idealism.
Here’s the link to that earlier post that you refer to:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/msg/74a368a670efaf16
Also the Meillassoux paper that I attached to the original post
(“Probability, Necessity, and Infinity”) that spawned this thread is
in this same vein:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/18406fb83d9fbebd
This paper addresses the exact question you raise...how to explain the
consistency and predictability that we observe, but without invoking
the unexplained brute existence of “physical laws”.
Meillassoux’s solution uses Cantorian detotalization to counter
proposed resolutions to Hume’s “problem of induction” that involve
probabilistic logic depending upon a totality of cases.
Meillassoux's main point with this digression into Cantorian set
theory is that just as there can be no end to the process of set
formation and thus no such thing as the totality of all sets, there is
also no absolute totality of all possible cases.
In other words: There is no "set of all possible worlds". And thus
"we cannot legitimately construct any set within which the foregoing
probabilistic reasoning could make sense."
Another interesting Meillassoux thread:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/ff
Re: Compatibilism
On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 03:53:31PM -0500, Rex Allen wrote: > The only way you can get free will from this is to redefine free will. > And I still don't understand why your so desperate to do so. > > "Free will", like "square circle", refers to something that doesn't exist. > > "Free will" = "ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused" > "square circle" = "an object that is both a square and a circle" > What is the point of defining a term to mean a "square circle", unless it is to practise some sort of sophistry? Free will, as it is used everyday, is an imprecise term. I count myself in the camp that chooses to refine it as "the ability to do something stupid" (or irrational, if you prefer). It seems silly to refine it as something we agree as logically impossible, such as a non-random uncaused action. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
Rex, You're mention of whose definition was closer to that of the common person intrigued me. I decided to look up what some dictionaries said on the matter: From: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/free+will dictionary.com –noun 1. free and independent choice; voluntary decision: You took on the responsibility of your own free will. 2. Philosophy. the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces. world english dictionary —n 3. a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined b. Compare determinism the doctrine that such human freedom of choice is not illusory c. (as modifier): a free-will decision 4. the ability to make a choice without coercion: he left of his own free will: I did not influence him cultural dictionary: 5. The ability to choose, think, and act voluntarily. For many philosophers, to believe in free will is to believe that human beings can be the authors of their own actions and to reject the idea that human actions are determined by external conditions or fate. (See determinism, fatalism, and predestination.) Brittanica: 6. in humans, the power or capacity to choose among alternatives or to act in certain situations independently of natural, social, or divine restraints. Free will is denied by those who espouse any of various forms of determinism. Arguments for free will are based on the subjective experience of freedom, on sentiments of guilt, on revealed religion, and on the universal supposition of responsibility for personal actions that underlies the concepts of law, reward, punishment, and incentive. In theology, the existence of free will must be reconciled with God's omniscience and goodness (in allowing man to choose badly), and with divine grace, which allegedly is necessary for any meritorious act. A prominent feature of modern Existentialism is the concept of a radical, perpetual, and frequently agonizing freedom of choice. Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, speaks of the individual "condemned to be free" even though his situation may be wholly determined. -- I personally find many of the above definitions to be inconsistent, but do you agree that definitions 1 and 4 refer to something that is real? I think most on this list would agree that definition 2 is inconsistent, since it seems to posit will contains an unpredictable element outside of physics or arithmetical truth. None of the definitions above seem to explicitly mention compatibilism, but neither definition 1 nor 4 is incompatible with determinism in my opinion. The idea of predestination and predetermination is in itself interesting, because it implies it is possible to know what you would do before you ever did it, but how could any entity determine what you would do without actually seeing what you in fact do? If it is not possible to have such foreknowledge, it rescues free will since what you ultimately decide cannot be predicted, determined, or known without invoking you to make the decision. It is unknowable to any entity how some equation or formula unfolds without actually unfolding it. It is like knowing what the 16th number in the Fibonacci sequence is without first having to determine what the 15th and 14th were. By the same extension, one can't know what you will do without stepping through the process of your brain and seeing what your brain decides to do (according to its will). Also, when you asked: "If no conscious experiences are ruled out by arithmetical truth...then what good does it do to posit it as a factor in producing conscious experience?" It reminded me of something David Deutsch said in Fabric of Reality about impossible experiences. An example he gave was the conscious experience of factoring a prime number. To use your example, you could say: seeing a square circle. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 4:45 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > On 11/27/2010 12:53 PM, Rex Allen wrote: >> "Free will" = "ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused" >> > > This is a false dichotomy. If a deterministic algorithm evaluates the > probability of success for three different actions as A=0.5 B=0.45 and > C=0.05 and then a choice between A and B is made at random, then the process > has made a choice that is both deterministic and random. Then we have two processes. The deterministic process evaluated the probabilities and deterministically rejected C. Then the deterministic process deterministically chose between A and B by using the output from some other random process. The deterministic process's use of the random process’s output was deterministically constrained to A or B. If it had *become* a random process in the sense I mean - it might have gone in with the options of (A or B) but then ended up taking entirely unrelated action X. Or not taken any action at all. Or turned into a bird. By random, I’m using the Merriam-Webster definition of: “without definite aim, direction, rule, or method”. I don’t mean: “relating to, having, or being elements or events with definite probability of occurrence”. As I’ve said before, I think that probabilistic processes still count as "caused". Ultimately I think the difference between deterministic and probabilistic laws is not significant. If a law is deterministic then under it's influence Event A will "cause" Result X 100% of the time. Why does Event A always lead to Result X? Because that's the law. There is no deeper reason. If a law is probabilistic, then under it's influence Event B will "cause" Result Q, R, or S according to some probability distribution. Let's say that the probability distribution is 1/3 for each outcome. If Event B leads to Result R, why does it do so? Because that's the law. There is no deeper reason. Event A causes Result X 100% of the time. Event B causes Result R 33.% of the time. Why? For fundamental laws (if such things exist) there is no reason. That's just the way it is. Determinism could be seen as merely a special case of indeterminism...the case where all probabilities are set to either 0% or 100%. Yes? Or no? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
Hi Rex and Bruno, I think that you are both missing an important point by taking an from infinity view. The fact that the world is not given to us in terms where these is one and only one option given some condition forces us to deal with alternatives. We can go on and on about causation and determinism but let us get Real, there is only rarely a situation where there can only be one singular effect to a singular cause. In fact there is never a actual singular cause to some event so the argument falls flat because of a false premise. We can build and knock over straw men for ever or we can look at Nature honesty and see that our pet theories of Monolithic Static Structure will always be Incomplete. Free Will, illusory or otherwise is an attempt to deal with the reality that there are always alternatives that can occur. We promote a notion of Agency to act as a mechanism that chooses between alternatives without bias or cohesion and imagine that we have such an agency. Surely this is a falsehood from the point of view of infinity where we can imagine we can see all of the variables, but we are only thinking of ourselves as an observer that is external to the system that we observe and so can see its properties and *that our means of perception of such has no effect upon what those properties are*. This role used to be played by the notion of a Deity. Now we find a secular version of the same thing and wonder why we make no progress beyond this conundrum! We are not Omniscient, we are not Omnipresent and we most certainly are not Omnipotent. Deal with it. Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Rex Allen Sent: Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:49 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Compatibilism On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 3:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think we agree. Very good. So what we are really arguing about here is whether your definition or my definition is closer to what is generally meant when people use the term “free will”. I think your definition is not very close to what is generally meant, and so you should come up with a different term for it. I assume that you resist doing this because you are trying to convince the general populace that they don’t *NEED* what is generally meant by “free will” in order to continue with their lives pretty much as before. However, you (and the other compatibilists) don’t just come out and say “free will doesn’t exist, but you don’t need it anyway”. Instead you say: “I have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism!” And then you proceed with explicating your theory as to why they don’t need free will after all - hoping that they won’t notice the subtle switch from “free will is compatible with determinism” to “you don’t need free will”. Ultimately, you have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism: change the definition of free will. And maybe this is the best way to get the general populace on-board with a more reasonable view of things. But it’s still a rhetorical tactic, and not a valid argument. Nor would you find many people in agreement amongst the general populace. That is not an argument. Yet many compatibilists reason along similar lines, but this is not an argument either. But we’re arguing over whose definition is closer to the general usage of “free will”. The general usage by the general populace. Few people agree that mechanism entails that physics is a branch of theology, and that matter is an emerging pattern. Few people understand that QM = Many worlds. At each epoch few people swallow the new ideas / theories. Science is not working like politics. it is not democratic. Usually the majority is wrong as science history illustrates well. Many people today find hard the idea that "they are machine" (except perhaps in the DM large sense for people with a bit of education). I’m not necessarily saying that there’s something wrong or inconsistent or impossible with your proposal. All I’m saying is that it’s not free will. The vast majority of the populace certainly does not equate free will with ignorance of causes. Again that is not an argument. It would even be doubtful that humans would be naturally correct on such hard technical question, especially with the mechanist assumption which justified *why* most truth are just unbelievable. “What do you mean by ‘free will’” is not a technically hard question. Also, “do you believe in ultimate responsibility” is not a technically hard question. G* minus G is the precise logic of what is true but unbelievable. It shows that machine have genuine free-will. But humans already dislike the idea that their neighbors have free-will. They *love* the idea that their neighbors have free-will. Bertrand Russell: “Whatever may be thought about it as a matter of ultimate metaphysics, it is quite clear that nobody believes i
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 3:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think we agree. Very good. So what we are really arguing about here is whether your definition or my definition is closer to what is generally meant when people use the term “free will”. I think your definition is not very close to what is generally meant, and so you should come up with a different term for it. I assume that you resist doing this because you are trying to convince the general populace that they don’t *NEED* what is generally meant by “free will” in order to continue with their lives pretty much as before. However, you (and the other compatibilists) don’t just come out and say “free will doesn’t exist, but you don’t need it anyway”. Instead you say: “I have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism!” And then you proceed with explicating your theory as to why they don’t need free will after all - hoping that they won’t notice the subtle switch from “free will is compatible with determinism” to “you don’t need free will”. Ultimately, you have found a way to make free will compatible with determinism: change the definition of free will. And maybe this is the best way to get the general populace on-board with a more reasonable view of things. But it’s still a rhetorical tactic, and not a valid argument. >> Nor would you find many people in >> agreement amongst the general populace. > > That is not an argument. Yet many compatibilists reason along similar lines, > but this is not an argument either. But we’re arguing over whose definition is closer to the general usage of “free will”. The general usage by the general populace. > Few people agree that mechanism entails that physics is a branch of > theology, and that matter is an emerging pattern. Few people understand that > QM = Many worlds. At each epoch few people swallow the new ideas / theories. > Science is not working like politics. it is not democratic. Usually the > majority is wrong as science history illustrates well. Many people today > find hard the idea that "they are machine" (except perhaps in the DM large > sense for people with a bit of education). I’m not necessarily saying that there’s something wrong or inconsistent or impossible with your proposal. All I’m saying is that it’s not free will. >> The vast majority of the populace certainly does not equate free will >> with ignorance of causes. > > Again that is not an argument. It would even be doubtful that humans would > be naturally correct on such hard technical question, especially with the > mechanist assumption which justified *why* most truth are just unbelievable. “What do you mean by ‘free will’” is not a technically hard question. Also, “do you believe in ultimate responsibility” is not a technically hard question. > G* minus G is the precise logic of what is true but unbelievable. > It shows that machine have genuine free-will. But humans already dislike the > idea that their neighbors have free-will. They *love* the idea that their neighbors have free-will. Bertrand Russell: “Whatever may be thought about it as a matter of ultimate metaphysics, it is quite clear that nobody believes it in practice. Everyone has always believed that it is possible to train character; everyone has always known that alcohol or opium will have a certain effect on behaviour. The apostle of free will maintains that a man can by will power avoid getting drunk, but he does not maintain that when drunk a man can say "British Constitution" as clearly as if he were sober. And everybody who has ever had to do with children knows that a suitable diet does more to make them virtuous than the most eloquent preaching in the world. The one effect that the free- will doctrine has in practice is to prevent people from following out such common-sense knowledge to its rational conclusion. When a man acts in ways that annoy us we wish to think him wicked, and we refuse to face the fact that his annoying behaviour is a result of antecedent causes which, if you follow them long enough, will take you beyond the moment of his birth and therefore to events for which he cannot be held responsible by any stretch of imagination.” > People will not like that, but in > the long run, they will prefer that to the idea that *they* have no free > will themselves. It is still genuine partial free will. You can manage some > of your classes of futures, you have a partial control. What causes you to manage them one way as opposed to another way? >> If you ask “most people”, they will not agree that the human choice is >> random, and they will not agree that human choice can be explained by >> causal forces. > > Such question are known to be hot, and most people disagree with each other. > Many among those who criticizes determinism often relies on sacred texts, > and show an unwillingness to even reason. This is true. And it could be that your sneaky app
Re: Against Mechanism
On Nov 28, 9:02 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > on 28.11.2010 20:46 1Z said the following: > > > > > > > On Nov 27, 7:21 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > >> on 27.11.2010 20:08 1Z said the following: > > >>> On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allen wrote: > > Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your > information could be represented, how likely is it that your > experience really is caused by a biological brain? Or even by > a representation of a biological brain? > > >>> Occam's razor: BIV, matrix and other sceptical scenarios are > >>> always more complex, and therefore less likely than "things are > >>> the way they seem to be" > > >> Could you please tell what a hypothesis you consider as less > >> complex? > > > I did. > > >> As for Occam's razor. Let us consider the statement "The God has > >> created everything". Is this more or less complex as compared with > >> the modern scientific view? > > > Is "God+World" more or less simple than "World" ? > > I guess that people believing in God consider him as a part of the > world. That is definitely not Judaeo-Christian philosophy. > Hence here it would be better to compare > > "World where people believe in God" > > with > > "World where people believe that God does not exist" Those aren't ontologies -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
on 28.11.2010 20:46 1Z said the following: On Nov 27, 7:21 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 27.11.2010 20:08 1Z said the following: On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allenwrote: Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information could be represented, how likely is it that your experience really is caused by a biological brain? Or even by a representation of a biological brain? Occam's razor: BIV, matrix and other sceptical scenarios are always more complex, and therefore less likely than "things are the way they seem to be" Could you please tell what a hypothesis you consider as less complex? I did. As for Occam's razor. Let us consider the statement "The God has created everything". Is this more or less complex as compared with the modern scientific view? Is "God+World" more or less simple than "World" ? I guess that people believing in God consider him as a part of the world. Hence here it would be better to compare "World where people believe in God" with "World where people believe that God does not exist" Have no idea what is simpler. Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Nov 27, 10:49 am, Rex Allen wrote: > On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen wrote: > > The same goes for more abstract substrates, like bits of information. > Rex Assuming that by using the term ‘abstract’ it means ‘non-physical’, is it possible for information or anything to be ‘more’ or even ‘less’ abstract. Are not the physical and abstract realms pure unto themselves with no possibility of being more or less abstract or physical? In other words ‘abstract substrates” could be incongruous. Any clarification or examples on this issue would be helpful. Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 27, 8:53 pm, Rex Allen wrote: > On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:44 AM, 1Z wrote: > > On Nov 26, 6:31 am, Rex Allen wrote: > >> Any defense of "free will" must allow for ultimate responsibility for > >> actions. > > > Mine does > > Random events don't qualify as free will. So you say. I think that;s arbitrary. I think the real object is to irrational decision, and I have argued that rationality is compatible with FW I could "prove" you don;t exist by redefining "Rex Allen" to mean "square circle". So what? Philosophical questions always boil down to definitiions, and particularly, to how reaosnable they are. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 27, 8:17 pm, Rex Allen wrote: > On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:17 AM, 1Z wrote: > > On Nov 26, 6:01 am, Rex Allen wrote: > >> So Agrippa's Trilemma revolves around the question of how we can > >> justify our beliefs. > > >> It seems to me that an entirely acceptable solution is just to accept > >> that we can't justify our beliefs. > > > ..in an absolute way. We still can relative to other > > beliefs. And that isn;t a problem specific to higher-level > > categories such as reason and logic. The Trilemma applies > > just as much to microphysical causality > > How do you justify your belief that you can justify your beliefs > relative to other beliefs? Non-absolutely. > As for microphysical causality, right, it doesn’t solve any > ontological problems to introduce it as an explanation because it just > raises the question “what causes microphysical causality?” It isn't an absolute explanation. It's still an explanation. BTW *you* introduced causality in order to deprecate reason and logic. If you don't believe in physical causality either, then you should level down. > And also, if you buy multiple realizability, then you can’t justify > your belief in one particular microphysical causal structure instead > of some other functionally isomorphic one. Yes I can: Occam;s razor. Of course that isn't absolute... > As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability > and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. > Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. > > >>> Is human consciousness causally effective? > > >> I don't believe so, no. > > > Then the sense in which we are not robots is somewhat honorific: > > we are not because we have consciousness, but consc. doesn't > > explain out behaviour since it doesn't cause anything , so we behave > > as determined... > > OR, there is no reason we behave as we do. Whatever. I don't see how you can be a sceptic about everything and still insist its a fact you're not a robot. > >> And claiming that consciousness is itself caused just runs into > >> infinite regress, as you then need to explain what causes the cause of > >> conscious experience, and so on. > > > The claim is more that it causes. And it could be causal under > > interactive dualism (brain causes consc causes different brains state) > > and it could be causal under mind brain identity: mind is identical > > to brain; brain causes; therefore mind identically causes. > > If you anesthetize me, the brain is still there. Where is the mind? Pfft. If you switch your telly off, you don;t get a picture. Switch it on again, you do. That doesn't mean the picture is some additional immaterial thingumajig. > If you lightly smush my brain in a press, the brain is still there. > Is the mind still there? The brain is not there in a meaningful sense. You can't read a copy of War and Peace tat's been pulped. Obviously in these contexts "the brain" doesn't just mean so many electrons, protons, and neutrons, it means something material that has a certain structure and function. The atoms and molecules can be replaced over time, the structure and functions is vital > Assuming multiple realizability, if you run a simulation of me on a > computer, the mind is there. Where is the brain? If you have one, it is, under those circumstances, identical to the structural and functioning silicon substrate. Multiple realisability doesn't preclude token identity. > Mind-brain identity doesn’t seem so convincing to me. The world seems real to me. > >> Therefore, taking the same approach as with Agrippa's Trilemma, it > >> seems best to just accept that there is no cause for conscious > >> experience either. > > > Again, the trillema only means there is no non-arbitrary ultimate > > cause. > > Well, the Agrippa’s trilemma applies to justification, not “cause” per > se. I just said we should apply the same approach and do away with > the “causal trilemma” by denying its assumptions. > Though your right in that the causal trilemma does look pretty similar > to Agrippa’s trilemma. They are structurally identical >Our three choices are: > > 1) An uncaused first cause. > 2) Some sort of circular causation. > 3) An infinite number of prior causes. > > Kant was pretty close to this with his first antinomy of pure reason. > > > The trillema does not mean that nothing whatsoever is caused. > > In any case it is a rather poor reason for dismissing the causal > > efficacy of consciousness. > > The causal trilemma just shows that attempting to explain our > experiences by invoking a cause merely results in the question “what > causes the cause”. And *that* only means you don't have absolute non-arbitray causes, not that you don't have causes at all > You don’t get anywhere. > > You could just be satisfied with the predictive success of your > “useful” explanation and not inquire further...but people don’t seem > to like to stop there. They go
Re: Against Mechanism
On Nov 27, 7:21 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > on 27.11.2010 20:08 1Z said the following: > > > > > On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allen wrote: > > >> Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your > >> information could be represented, how likely is it that your > >> experience really is caused by a biological brain? Or even by a > >> representation of a biological brain? > > > Occam's razor: BIV, matrix and other sceptical scenarios are always > > more complex, and therefore less likely than "things are the way they > > seem to be" > > Could you please tell what a hypothesis you consider as less complex? I did. > As for Occam's razor. Let us consider the statement "The God has created > everything". Is this more or less complex as compared with the modern > scientific view? Is "God+World" more or less simple than "World" ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Nov 27, 7:40 pm, Rex Allen wrote: > On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 2:08 PM, 1Z wrote: > > > On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allen wrote: > > >> Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information > >> could be represented, how likely is it that your experience really is > >> caused by a biological brain? Or even by a representation of a > >> biological brain? > > > Occam's razor: BIV, matrix and other sceptical scenarios are > > always more complex, and therefore less likely than > > "things are the way they seem to be" > > Actually not. We have our experience of the world, which is not > direct (e.g. colors, illusions, delusions, dreams, etc.). How do you know? You can't maintain that indirect realism is true independent of any metaphysical presumptions. You can't maintain that it is true because that is the way the brain works, since it is a metaphysical presumption that there is such a thing as a brain as distinct from experience. You can't maintain that it is a direct subjective fact that your experiences are only of mental representations. There is nothing about an experience that labels it as indirect. You experience would be the same if it actually was direct experience of objects. > And then we > have the cause of our experience. > > This is true in all cases: scientific realism, scientific > materialism, BIV, matrix, other skeptical scenarios. It is not the same in all cases. World+Experience is simpler than World+Vat/Matrix+Experience > BIV, matrix, etc. don't introduce additional elements, they just > arrange the "causal" elements differently. Wrong. The vat is an additional element > None are more or less complex than the others. Wrong > *My* preferred option is simpler. Only conscious experience exists, > uncaused and fundamental. There is nothing else. That's non-explanatory. No-one thinks Occams' razor means you should give up on explanation. "Explanations should be as simple as possible, but no simpler" -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 11/28/2010 12:37 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 27.11.2010 22:19 Brent Meeker said the following: On 11/27/2010 11:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 27.11.2010 20:08 1Z said the following: On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allen wrote: Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information could be represented, how likely is it that your experience really is caused by a biological brain? Or even by a representation of a biological brain? Occam's razor: BIV, matrix and other sceptical scenarios are always more complex, and therefore less likely than "things are the way they seem to be" Could you please tell what a hypothesis you consider as less complex? As for Occam's razor. Let us consider the statement "The God has created everything". Is this more or less complex as compared with the modern scientific view? It is more complex than, "Things originated naturally." If you try to fill in the details to the same degree in each you have to first fill in all the details of "Things originated naturally." and *then* all the details of how God decided on doing that and how He executed his plan. Okay, but what then about the next two statements: "A car originated naturally" and "A car has been made according to the plan". What statement is more complex? You tell me. I don't consider Occam's razor the arbiter of truth. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
Hi, The word "planned" would seem to signify that there exists a mechanism (used the the most generic way) that selects that the object of the plan was chosen from a collection of possible alternatives with a bias that is not necessarily on that is "natural" and thus implies the existence of agency. So to say that "X has been made according to the plan" is to say that those properties of X result from a means that involves consciousness and thus that hypothesis requires the prior existence of a agent to act as the planner. The alternative hypothesis given, "X originated naturally." seems to not require agency but no measure is implied by either as to the number of entities involved so it seems that Occam's razor is unable to select one of these hypotheses to cut. This looks to me like a false choice fallacy in the making. Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Evgenii Rudnyi Sent: Sunday, November 28, 2010 3:37 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Against Mechanism on 27.11.2010 22:19 Brent Meeker said the following: On 11/27/2010 11:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 27.11.2010 20:08 1Z said the following: On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allen wrote: Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information could be represented, how likely is it that your experience really is caused by a biological brain? Or even by a representation of a biological brain? Occam's razor: BIV, matrix and other sceptical scenarios are always more complex, and therefore less likely than "things are the way they seem to be" Could you please tell what a hypothesis you consider as less complex? As for Occam's razor. Let us consider the statement "The God has created everything". Is this more or less complex as compared with the modern scientific view? It is more complex than, "Things originated naturally." If you try to fill in the details to the same degree in each you have to first fill in all the details of "Things originated naturally." and *then* all the details of how God decided on doing that and how He executed his plan. Okay, but what then about the next two statements: "A car originated naturally" and "A car has been made according to the plan". What statement is more complex? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 27 Nov 2010, at 20:08, 1Z wrote: On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allen wrote: Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information could be represented, how likely is it that your experience really is caused by a biological brain? Or even by a representation of a biological brain? Occam's razor: BIV, matrix and other sceptical scenarios are always more complex, and therefore less likely than "things are the way they seem to be" That is what explains the success of Aristotelianism. But we can easily understand how evolution programmed us to believe this. The rise of Platonism, and the birth of science and theology was a departure from the idea that "reality is what we see". Now my point is that if we assume mechanism, then we do have an explanation of why and how couplings "consciousness/realities" emerge from elementary arithmetic, and it seems to me that elementary arithmetic is conceptually simpler than any proposed theory so far. The main point is that elementary arithmetic, seen as the theory of 'everything-including-consciousness', is testable (and up to now confirmed). I can understand that the idea that we are in a matrix is not pleasing for some people, but science has to avoid as much as possible any form of wishful thinking. And I am not pretending this is true, only that it follows from the idea that the brain, or whatever my consciousness supervenes on, is Turing emulable. To avoid this you have to introduce big infinities in the picture, or, like Jacques Mallah, mysterious physical roles, in a computation, to objects having no physical activity in that computation. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: advice needed for Star Trek talk
On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote: Jason(and any others) Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's reality is equally hard to convincing present. Ronald Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in principle duplicable? This entails subjective indeterminacy. All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to understand UDA 1-7. UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle, but if you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to the physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case. With just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in presence of a primitively material universe). AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory. Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of UDA. I am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people don't grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could help. Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without rational arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first person) indeterminacy. Thanks. Bruno On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld wrote: Jason: I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I do not know how to present that in a technically convincing matter. Ronald Which message in particular do you think is difficult to present convincingly? Tegmark's ideas that everything is real, or the suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool for exploration? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
on 27.11.2010 22:19 Brent Meeker said the following: On 11/27/2010 11:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 27.11.2010 20:08 1Z said the following: On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allen wrote: Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information could be represented, how likely is it that your experience really is caused by a biological brain? Or even by a representation of a biological brain? Occam's razor: BIV, matrix and other sceptical scenarios are always more complex, and therefore less likely than "things are the way they seem to be" Could you please tell what a hypothesis you consider as less complex? As for Occam's razor. Let us consider the statement "The God has created everything". Is this more or less complex as compared with the modern scientific view? It is more complex than, "Things originated naturally." If you try to fill in the details to the same degree in each you have to first fill in all the details of "Things originated naturally." and *then* all the details of how God decided on doing that and how He executed his plan. Okay, but what then about the next two statements: "A car originated naturally" and "A car has been made according to the plan". What statement is more complex? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
