Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[ColinHales]

BM
I don't think AGI workers have ever promised consciousness - just
intelligence.  In fact for many purposes consciousness would be
regarded
as an unacceptable attribute (c.f. John McCarthy
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/consciousness/consciousness.html
).

CH
The AGI movement has been promising human level intellect for decades.
The link to the necessity for consciousness is easy to see ... That
COMP clerics like McCarthy must adopt a presupposition that _general_
intellect (human kind) can operate without consciousness, when the
only example of general intellect we have, humans, has exactly that,
seems rather odd. (Scientific) observation is _literally_ (mostly
visual) P-consciousness. Take it away and you have no (scientific)
observation, no learning, no adaptation = No general intelligence.
Seems rather straightforward to me. Like everyone else in this
religion, there's a presupposition that COMP is true.

Now say "humans are conscious? Prove it."
To which I say "COMP is true? Prove it"
Been around this loop many times. :-)

If McCarthy says consciousness is not a necessary condition for
general intelligence, when you can empirically prove, in the only
example we have, humans, that interfering with it  (eg TMS or TES)
kills/degrades it   is surely an act of blind faith in COMP. As
usual.

I told you I'd be going after this faith-based nonsense! My next
volley is in June?ish when my paper comes out "On the status of
computationalism as a law of nature". It ends up siding with Maudlin
but by a very different route that has nothing to do with Turing
machines. Interestingly, my paper does confirm that COMP is trivially
true, but only in the sense that if you already know everything (for
your program on the tape to be created), you can COMP the lot. It's
COMPing the _unknown_ that is the problem. In Maudlins paper the
'unknowns' are the 'counterfactual water-troughs' of the uber/mega
Olympia. Same thing.
cheers
colin

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/28/2011 8:00 PM, ColinHales wrote:

Hi folk,

Our belief system state in relation to the the truth/falsehood of COMP
is a truly bizarre corner of science. The concept is simple, yet as an
empirical proposition, it has eluded the kind of definitive testing
that, for example, basic physics would accept as conclusive.

If X is a potential scientific belief, then empirical examination of
the consequences of X adds weight to a body of evidence suggesting
that adopting the belief is of predictive utility. Fine Fine Fine. If
it works, then X is restated in some usable form ... say 'law of
nature X' or X_lon.

In the formulation of a testable version of belief X, however, is a
process of critical argument that helps us define what X means and
what evidence might be critically dependent on the truth of X. During
the critical argument, you find and weigh up the feasibility of X as a
law of nature and what easily accessible consequences might facilitate
an early decision on X. During this pre 'law of nature' phase, X might
be discarded because it is easy to find sets of conditions which are
inconsistent with X... so we then, sensibly, adopt the position that X
is untenable as a truth of the natural world. And we move on ... all
the while keeping X as a possibility ... albeit improbable.

In the greater environment of the claim X = 'computationalism', when
you look at the way science is behaving, one can empirically measure
psychologically bizarre belief systems. That is, critical examination
revealing low likelihood fails to become evidence consistent with
COMP's falsehood. The truth of COMP has never been proven in any
logical or empirical way. Yet legions of 'Artificial General
Intelligence'  (AGI) workers spend tens and hundreds of $millions on
projects whose outcomes are critically dependent on COMP being
true.  and the investors are _never_ told about the fundamental
act of faith they are embarked upon.  a level of faith that would
never be acceptable elsewhere.
   


I don't think AGI workers have ever promised consciousness - just 
intelligence.  In fact for many purposes consciousness would be regarded 
as an unacceptable attribute (c.f. John McCarthy 
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/consciousness/consciousness.html ).


Brent


We have multiple instances of people who have elevated the level of
doubt surrounding COMP way beyond the levels normally accepted as
making a proposition highly suspect yet here are the legions of
AGI workers ... all plodding along on faith, continuing to believe for
reasons that I cannot fathom.

I can cite many arguments that, despite attempts to confirm it, find
good reasons supporting COMP's falsehood. Anywhere else, where truths
are entertained despite good reasoning, acting as if COMP was true
makes it a religious proposition, not science.

Now, I am not a psychologist. But I have read a lot on the history of
science and have lived within it all my adult life. I am trying to
understand what broken logic underpins blind faith in COMP that is
also consistent with a more general belief_malfunction in science.
After several years of analysis I think I have a proposition that is
predictive of this strange state in science:

There seems to be a profound, institutionalized failure within
scientists that results, for whatever reason, in an inability to
distinguish between the actual natural world and a (mathematical)
model of its behaviour, as apparent to a scientist.

For reasons I cannot fathom, the idea that these two things can be
different is like a massive blind-spot. If you raise the possibility,
very bizarre objections arise that are indistinguishable from the
objections that a believer has in their religion.

I will continue to battle this blind spot as best I can.

Thanks for the Maudlin. I'll add it to the pile of COMP = FALSE
evidence.
By the way, I have a pile of zero height for COMP = TRUE. I do
however, have evidence of believers that number in the millions.

Weird, huh?

Cheers
Colin Hales



   


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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/28/2011 7:59 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
   

On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:48, Brent Meeker wrote:

 

On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
   

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker
  wrote:

 

What does "locally" mean in this context?  I doubt that consciousness is
strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact
with.

   

I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
interact with...?

 

Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted with the
world?
   


There are evidences (REM) that mammal fetus does dream.
Do you agree that DM implies that possibility.
 


What's DM?  You're theory that the world is a subset of the computations 
of the universal dovetailer?  In that case it certainly implies the 
possibility - in fact it seems to imply the possibility of far too much.



In practice most of our consciousness grounding heavily relies on the most
probable worlds arising from long deep (linear) computations.


How do you mean "linear" computations?  Is there a definition of the sum 
of two computations? or does it just refer to the computations being 
sequential?



Apes fetus can
dream climbing trees but they do that with ancestors climbing the most
probable trees of their most probable neighborhoods since a long period.
With classical mechanism, I would say, that to know is to believe p when
"luckily" p is true,


So what is your response to Gettier's problem?

Brent


and to be awaken is to be dreaming of a world when
"luckily" the world is real. But real means here first person sharable, and
may result from its stability on random oracles.
 

I agree with you that being correct is a matter of luck.  But isn't
this true of every metaphysical option, not just classical mechanism?

   


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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/28/2011 7:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 12:52 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
   

On 1/27/2011 10:08 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
 

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent Meeker
  wrote:

   

But if the
emulation attempts to be local then it must include inherent randomness -
which I think is not Turing computable.

 

The Turing machine could draw the required randomness from a tape of
random bits, couldn't it?

The question might then be asked:

"Where did the tape of random bits come from?"

To which I guess a response of sorts might be:

"Well, where did the Turing machine come from?  Probably from there."

If you can have unexplained order, then you can have unexplained
randomness, can't you?

   

Sure, but then you've gone beyond Turing emulation.  A tape providing the
random numbers would have to be a realized (not just potential) infinity.
 

Going beyond Turing emulation?  Doesn't the definition of a Turing
Machine involve infinite memory and and infinite tape?
   


And infinite tape which is all blank except for a finite header.


"Referring to his 1936 publication, Turing wrote that the Turing
machine, here called a Logical Computing Machine, consisted of:

...an infinite memory capacity obtained in the form of an infinite
tape marked out into squares, on each of which a symbol could be
printed. "

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine

OR:

"A Turing machine has an infinite one-dimensional tape divided into
cells. Traditionally we think of the tape as being horizontal with the
cells arranged in a left-right orientation. The tape has one end, at
the left say, and stretches infinitely far to the right. Each cell is
able to contain one symbol, either ‘0’ or ‘1’."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-machine/

But, beyond that...you believe that there are no actual infinities?
   
Why do you believe that?
   



I find it a concept that leads to logical problems.  In almost every 
instance "infinite" can be replaced by "arbitrarily large".  Where it 
can't it tends to be problematic.



You believe that space-time is finite?

You believe that there isn't an infinite causal chain behind us?  You
believe that there was a "first cause"?

   


 I think a "first cause" is probably incoherent.  But the past could be 
finite without there being a "first cause".


Brent

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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/28/2011 7:44 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 12:48 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
   

On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
 

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker
  wrote:

   

What does "locally" mean in this context?  I doubt that consciousness is
strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact
with.

 

I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
interact with...?

   

Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted with the
world?
 

Yes.  Why wouldn't I be able to?

I assume your point is, "Where would the contents of your dreams come from?"

Well, where do the contents of the "external world" come from?
   


Why do they have to "come from" somewhere?


You haven't answered any questions by introducing the "external
world"...every question you can ask about a dream is still a valid
question for the "external world".
   


Sure I have.  It explains why this interchange is different from a dream.


Isn't it?  What am I missing, do you think?  What has been
accomplished by introducing the extra metaphysical layer of the
"external world"?
   


You're missing the intellectual honesty to admit that live your life as 
if there is an external world with different people in it and that you 
are as certain of the existence of this world as you are of anything 
(which is not to say perfectly certain).



If you fall back on your recurring theme "usefulness", then does that
mean that any belief that someone finds useful, they are justified in
attributing ontological significance to this belief?

If  the usefulness of science's predictions justifies the belief in
quarks and electrons, then couldn't one equally say that if someone
gets some use out of their religion (say, motivating they and their
countrymen to win a war), then this justifies their belief in God?
   


Of course patently false beliefs may be useful in limited 
circumstances.  Science aims at propositions about which there will be 
intersubjective agreement that they work, what Stenger calls Point of 
View Invariance.




Isn't what's useful dependent on contingent circumstances and personal goals?


   

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent Meeker
 

  wrote:
On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
But then the material world we observe doesn't cause our
consciousness.  Rather, the underlying emulation substrate (which we
have no access to) causes both the material world and consciousness.

   

That's possible, or it may be that the emulatated matter causes the emulated
consciousness; in which case we have the same questions about consciousness
we had before assuming the world is an emulation.
 

But isn't "emulated matter" just patterns in the substrate?  So by
saying "emulated matter causes consciousness", aren't you effectively
saying that patterns cause consciousness?
   


I'm saying that emulated patterns in a particular substrate my cause 
consciousness to be an attribute of other patterns in that substrate.  
"Seeing patterns" is then a relation between processes in that substrate.


Brent



But then what are patterns?  Are patterns that no one sees still
patterns?  If so, don't "unseen" patterns exist all around us?  Shades
of Searle's wordstar walls and Putnam mappings...

   


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Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

[ColinHales]

Hi folk,

Our belief system state in relation to the the truth/falsehood of COMP
is a truly bizarre corner of science. The concept is simple, yet as an
empirical proposition, it has eluded the kind of definitive testing
that, for example, basic physics would accept as conclusive.

If X is a potential scientific belief, then empirical examination of
the consequences of X adds weight to a body of evidence suggesting
that adopting the belief is of predictive utility. Fine Fine Fine. If
it works, then X is restated in some usable form ... say 'law of
nature X' or X_lon.

In the formulation of a testable version of belief X, however, is a
process of critical argument that helps us define what X means and
what evidence might be critically dependent on the truth of X. During
the critical argument, you find and weigh up the feasibility of X as a
law of nature and what easily accessible consequences might facilitate
an early decision on X. During this pre 'law of nature' phase, X might
be discarded because it is easy to find sets of conditions which are
inconsistent with X... so we then, sensibly, adopt the position that X
is untenable as a truth of the natural world. And we move on ... all
the while keeping X as a possibility ... albeit improbable.

In the greater environment of the claim X = 'computationalism', when
you look at the way science is behaving, one can empirically measure
psychologically bizarre belief systems. That is, critical examination
revealing low likelihood fails to become evidence consistent with
COMP's falsehood. The truth of COMP has never been proven in any
logical or empirical way. Yet legions of 'Artificial General
Intelligence'  (AGI) workers spend tens and hundreds of $millions on
projects whose outcomes are critically dependent on COMP being
true.  and the investors are _never_ told about the fundamental
act of faith they are embarked upon.  a level of faith that would
never be acceptable elsewhere.

We have multiple instances of people who have elevated the level of
doubt surrounding COMP way beyond the levels normally accepted as
making a proposition highly suspect yet here are the legions of
AGI workers ... all plodding along on faith, continuing to believe for
reasons that I cannot fathom.

I can cite many arguments that, despite attempts to confirm it, find
good reasons supporting COMP's falsehood. Anywhere else, where truths
are entertained despite good reasoning, acting as if COMP was true
makes it a religious proposition, not science.

Now, I am not a psychologist. But I have read a lot on the history of
science and have lived within it all my adult life. I am trying to
understand what broken logic underpins blind faith in COMP that is
also consistent with a more general belief_malfunction in science.
After several years of analysis I think I have a proposition that is
predictive of this strange state in science:

There seems to be a profound, institutionalized failure within
scientists that results, for whatever reason, in an inability to
distinguish between the actual natural world and a (mathematical)
model of its behaviour, as apparent to a scientist.

For reasons I cannot fathom, the idea that these two things can be
different is like a massive blind-spot. If you raise the possibility,
very bizarre objections arise that are indistinguishable from the
objections that a believer has in their religion.

I will continue to battle this blind spot as best I can.

Thanks for the Maudlin. I'll add it to the pile of COMP = FALSE
evidence.
By the way, I have a pile of zero height for COMP = TRUE. I do
however, have evidence of believers that number in the millions.

Weird, huh?

Cheers
Colin Hales



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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Rex Allen]

On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:48, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker
>>>  wrote:
>>>
 What does "locally" mean in this context?  I doubt that consciousness is
 strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact
 with.

>>> I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
>>> counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
>>> interact with...?
>>>
>>
>> Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted with the
>> world?
>
>
> There are evidences (REM) that mammal fetus does dream.
> Do you agree that DM implies that possibility.
> In practice most of our consciousness grounding heavily relies on the most
> probable worlds arising from long deep (linear) computations. Apes fetus can
> dream climbing trees but they do that with ancestors climbing the most
> probable trees of their most probable neighborhoods since a long period.
> With classical mechanism, I would say, that to know is to believe p when
> "luckily" p is true, and to be awaken is to be dreaming of a world when
> "luckily" the world is real. But real means here first person sharable, and
> may result from its stability on random oracles.

I agree with you that being correct is a matter of luck.  But isn't
this true of every metaphysical option, not just classical mechanism?

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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Rex Allen]

On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 12:52 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> On 1/27/2011 10:08 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent Meeker
>>  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> But if the
>>> emulation attempts to be local then it must include inherent randomness -
>>> which I think is not Turing computable.
>>>
>>
>> The Turing machine could draw the required randomness from a tape of
>> random bits, couldn't it?
>>
>> The question might then be asked:
>>
>> "Where did the tape of random bits come from?"
>>
>> To which I guess a response of sorts might be:
>>
>> "Well, where did the Turing machine come from?  Probably from there."
>>
>> If you can have unexplained order, then you can have unexplained
>> randomness, can't you?
>>
>
> Sure, but then you've gone beyond Turing emulation.  A tape providing the
> random numbers would have to be a realized (not just potential) infinity.

Going beyond Turing emulation?  Doesn't the definition of a Turing
Machine involve infinite memory and and infinite tape?

"Referring to his 1936 publication, Turing wrote that the Turing
machine, here called a Logical Computing Machine, consisted of:

...an infinite memory capacity obtained in the form of an infinite
tape marked out into squares, on each of which a symbol could be
printed. "

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine

OR:

"A Turing machine has an infinite one-dimensional tape divided into
cells. Traditionally we think of the tape as being horizontal with the
cells arranged in a left-right orientation. The tape has one end, at
the left say, and stretches infinitely far to the right. Each cell is
able to contain one symbol, either ‘0’ or ‘1’."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-machine/

But, beyond that...you believe that there are no actual infinities?

Why do you believe that?

You believe that space-time is finite?

You believe that there isn't an infinite causal chain behind us?  You
believe that there was a "first cause"?

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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Rex Allen]

On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 12:48 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker
>>  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> What does "locally" mean in this context?  I doubt that consciousness is
>>> strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact
>>> with.
>>>
>>
>> I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
>> counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
>> interact with...?
>>
>
> Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted with the
> world?

Yes.  Why wouldn't I be able to?

I assume your point is, "Where would the contents of your dreams come from?"

Well, where do the contents of the "external world" come from?

You haven't answered any questions by introducing the "external
world"...every question you can ask about a dream is still a valid
question for the "external world".

Isn't it?  What am I missing, do you think?  What has been
accomplished by introducing the extra metaphysical layer of the
"external world"?

If you fall back on your recurring theme "usefulness", then does that
mean that any belief that someone finds useful, they are justified in
attributing ontological significance to this belief?

If  the usefulness of science's predictions justifies the belief in
quarks and electrons, then couldn't one equally say that if someone
gets some use out of their religion (say, motivating they and their
countrymen to win a war), then this justifies their belief in God?

Isn't what's useful dependent on contingent circumstances and personal goals?


> On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent Meeker
>>  wrote:
>>On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>> But then the material world we observe doesn't cause our
>> consciousness.  Rather, the underlying emulation substrate (which we
>> have no access to) causes both the material world and consciousness.
>>
>
> That's possible, or it may be that the emulatated matter causes the emulated
> consciousness; in which case we have the same questions about consciousness
> we had before assuming the world is an emulation.

But isn't "emulated matter" just patterns in the substrate?  So by
saying "emulated matter causes consciousness", aren't you effectively
saying that patterns cause consciousness?

But then what are patterns?  Are patterns that no one sees still
patterns?  If so, don't "unseen" patterns exist all around us?  Shades
of Searle's wordstar walls and Putnam mappings...

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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[John Mikes]

Dear Stephen (- and Friends, especially Bruno)

you quoted from Mauldin's p. 409:

 “If an active physical system supports a phenomenal state, how could the
presence or absence of a causally disconnected object effect that state? How
could the object enhance or impede or alter or destroy the phenomenal state
except via some causal interaction with the system? Since the phenomenal
state is entirely realized at the time of the experience, only the activity
of the system at that time should be relevant to its production. The
presence or absence of causally isolated objects could not be relevant. This
is all the supervenience thesis needs to say.”

which pushed me back into my doubts for 'causality': whatever we consider as
"causes" - of course WITHIN our mindset (=knowledge so far acquired about
anything) are parts of that knowledge of WITHIN (exclusivity, (rather
"inclusivity") what we sort of agreed upon during the past days). What does
NOT restrict the (unknown? unconsidered? not yet learned) content of
totality from influencing items 'within' (in our circle we include into our
'causality') from 'without' our limited knowledge circle. Influencing =
causing change etc., EXACTLY interacting - of  what is in our view of today
a "causally isolated object - contrary to the Mauldin text above.
Such argument requires (my?) totally interlaced (interactive?) complexity
image of the entire wholeness (aka "everything").
-
A remark to your PS-mentioned reincarnation of souls: I used to be a
reincarnationalist in my young years until I started to question the WHAT is
reincarnating? Carne = flesh, forget it. A teletransportation is more
usable, but "of what"? The "soul" is a religious item to imply fear of not
following the rules. The body dissipates at death, the atoms are re-used
many times over, the functions (mainly mental, what we don't understand
today at all) are attributes to certain body-parts (that disiipate), not
"ding an sich" activities without substrate. Or are they? Do we have a
menbtality irrespective of our bodily built? Does a dead person's "mind"
(oops: soul!) live on and function? in what connection to the dead (and
annihilated) body? If we do not remember any past 'incarnations', why would
our present body/complexity carry on to the future? People die with very
relevant ideas halfway thought out. Why are they not completed?
Gone forever. - Teleportation ideas are no better: if the teleported mental
activity (SIC!) is continuing its existence (?) and THINKS that would change
the original 'persona' connection completely.  So common sense does not
support the today thinkable reincarnation ideas. It is only 'believable' in
faith without raising any "HOWs".

John M
On Tue, Jan 25, 2011 at 4:04 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

>   Dear Bruno and Friends,
>
> I was re-reading the Mauldin paper again and something struck me that I
> had not noticed before. I hope that I am not way over my head on this one,
> but I think that there is something of a straw man in Mauldin’s definition
> of the supervenience thesis! He assumes the principle of 
> Locality.
>
>
> We read on page 409 of “Computation and Consciousness”:
>
> “If an active physical system supports a phenomenal state, how could
> the presence or absence of a causally disconnected object effect that state?
> How could the object enhance or impede or alter or destroy the phenomenal
> state except via some causal interaction with the system? Since the
> phenomenal state is entirely realized at the time of the experience, only
> the activity of the system at that time should be relevant to its
> production. The presence or absence of causally isolated objects could not
> be relevant. This is all the supervenience thesis needs to say.”
>
> Now, let us take a look at Bell’s theorem. From the wiki article
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell's_theorem
>
> “Bell's theorem has important implications for physics and the philosophy
> of science  as it
> indicates that every quantum theory must violate either 
> localityor counterfactual
> definiteness .
> In conjunction with the experiments verifying the quantum mechanical
> predictions  of
> Bell-type systems, Bell's theorem demonstrates that certain quantum effects
> travel faster than light  and
> therefore restricts the class of tenable hidden variable theories to the
> nonlocal  variety.”
> end quote
>
> While we are considering the idea of “causal efficacy” here and not
> hidden variable theories, the fact that it has been experimentally verified
> th

Re: A comment on Maudlin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:36, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Hi Bruno,

I am a little tired and testy so please forgive me if I am curt  
and rushed in my response. I have time now to write so I will, but  
be warned...



I appreciate the warnings very much. Thank you. I will display my  
massively destructive weapon too :)





This is only an avoidance of the problem by the claim that it  
does not exist, begging the question. I am asking questions about  
interactions, if you want to insist that only bodies (as immaterial  
numbers!) exist so be it.


You strike hard indeed!
But I think I see your point. After all numbers looks like particles,  
in the sense that each individual numbers seems not be able to do a  
lot of things.






I will keep asking how it is that their static relations generate  
the appearance of multiple mutually irreducible 1-p.



I am the one asking the question. I am not proposing any new theory. I  
am aware that many MAT appreciates MEC, and even take MEC as the  
'obvious' theory of mind, and then with a variety of person or  
consciousness elimination. I show more or less directly that MAT and  
MEC are epistemologically incompatible.
Am the one saying to those who keeps MEC, all right but now you have  
to derive a phenomenology for MAT, and explanation of where and how  
the physical laws, or they stable appearances come from.
But MEC has a tool, computer science and mathematical logic, which  
makes possible to already ask a (Löbian) universal numbers his opinion  
on all that. The measure one is given, in that interview, with  
motivated definitions, by the logic of Bp & Dp (& p) with p restricted  
to the Sigma_1 sentences. And "B" might depends on oracles, it does  
not change the logic (in general).

It is a part of the searched phenomenology.





We each share a common universe of experience and we, not being  
solipsist, believe that that universe that we can agree and bet on  
seems to involve interactions between what seems to be necessarily  
independent entities.



Absolutely.




I want to understand how you think that your argument can explain  
this appearance?


The argument is only that IF MEC is true, then MAT is useless. That is  
why the mind body problem is reduced to a body problem, or to a belief  
in Body problem. I don't hide the problem, I transform it into a  
mathematical question.
If you keep MEC, you can appreciate the shadow of the answer by asking  
the universal machines directly on the question.
To decipher what they say is a bit like deciphering Hubble images. It  
is a tiedous task, but I am lucky Gödel, Löb and Solovay and others  
have done a big part of the job. Solovay's completenes theorem of the  
logic G and G* of arithmetical (and set theoretical) self-reference  
has even somehow close the subject for many logicians. The  
propositional part of the interview is axiomatisable. Solovay's proof  
encapsulate all the Kleene's form of self-reference, which permits the  
reader of the universal mind to bypass recursion theory and even  
number theory. As the little book by Smullyan (Forever  
Undecided )illustrates well.



If you want MEC forces the mind and matter to arise simultaneously (in  
the logical space of the number's minds). Consciousness/realities  
coupling arize from the numbers, in many ways. I even think that it is  
very plausible that the complete distribution of the prime numbers  
emulate quantum chaos and may be a quantum dovetailer. But even if  
that is true, to get both the qualia and the quanta, you have to  
extract it from the arithmetical hypostases (or better if someone find  
better, but you have to say it in arithmetic if you want inherit the G/ 
G* splits).






I

[SPK] (Screaming and ranting is heard in the background.)

Have you noticed that I am proposing a way to model a  
competition between computations as a way to solve the measure  
problem?



Nice. That's the correct MEC way.
I am sorry you have to scream and rant when we agree ;)

That's my point. Below our level of substitution, matter results from  
the infinite limit of that competition.

Reality is the sum on all fictions roughly speaking.







SPK:   One idea that could be proposed is that information is  
a relationship in a triple such that a difference exists between  
two that makes a difference for the third. I am sure that this can  
be put into more formal terms. Turing Machines aside, we are not  
really getting to the problem until we have a good set of tools  
with which to examine the question of how to determine the  
substitution level of a given system and even if substitution is  
possible.


[BM]
Here I disagree 100%.
It is proved that if we are machine, then we cannot define and  
prove what is our substitution level. No machine can ever know  
which machine she is. This is what I have called the Benacerraf  
principle in older post (and my theses).
For any machine defined as such in a 3-way, the 

On the Lighter Side

[m.a.]

 HELL EXPLAINED

 BY A CHEMISTRY STUDENT

 The following is an actual question given on a University of Arizona 
chemistry mid-term, and an actual answer turned in by a student.


 The answer by one student was so 'profound' that the professor shared 
it with colleagues, via the Internet, which is, of course, why we now have 
the pleasure of enjoying it as well :


 Bonus Question: Is Hell exothermic (gives off heat) or endothermic 
(absorbs heat)? Most of the students wrote proofs of their beliefs using 
Boyle's Law (gas cools when it expands and heats when it is compressed) or 
some variant.


 One student, however, wrote the following:

 First, we need to know how the mass of Hell is changing in time. So we 
need to know the rate at which souls are moving into Hell and the rate at 
which they are leaving, which is unlikely.. I think that we can safely 
assume that once a soul gets to Hell, it will not leave. Therefore, no souls 
are leaving. As for how many souls are entering Hell, let's look at the 
different religions that exist in the world today.



 Most of these religions state that if you are not a member of their 
religion, you will go to Hell. Since there is more than one of these 
religions and since people do not belong to more than one religion, we can 
project that all souls go to Hell. With birth and death rates as they are, 
we can expect the number of souls in Hell to increase exponentially. Now, we 
look at the rate of change of the volume in Hell because Boyle's Law states 
that in order for the temperature and pressure in Hell to stay the same, the 
volume of Hell has to expand proportionately as souls are added.


 This gives two possibilities:

 1. If Hell is expanding at a slower rate than the rate at which souls 
enter Hell, then the temperature and pressure in Hell will increase until 
all Hell breaks loose.


 2. If Hell is expanding at a rate faster than the increase of souls in 
Hell, then the temperature and pressure will drop until Hell freezes over.


 So which is it? If we accept the postulate given to me by Teresa 
during my Freshman year that, 'It will be a cold day in Hell before I sleep 
with you,' and take into account the fact that I slept with her last night, 
then number two must be true, and thus I am sure that Hell is exothermic and 
has already frozen over. The corollary of this theory is that since Hell has 
frozen over, it follows that it is not accepting any more souls and is 
therefore, extinct. .leaving only Heaven, thereby proving the 
existence of a divine being which explains why, last night, Teresa kept 
shouting 'Oh my God.


 This student received an A+


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Re: Observers and Church/Turing

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 02:32:15PM -0800, Travis Garrett wrote:
> I am somewhat flabbergasted by Russell's response.  He says that he is
> "completely unimpressed" - uh, ok, fine - but then he completely
> ignores entire sections of the paper where I precisely address the
> issues he raises.  Going back to the abstract I say:

Sorry about that, but its a sad fact of life that if I don't get the
general gist of a paper by the time the introduction is over, or get
it wrong, I am unlikely to delve into the technical details unless a)
I'm especially interested (as in I need the results for something I'm
doing), or b) I'm reviewing the paper.

I guess I don't see why there's a problem to solve in why we observe
ourselves as being observers. It kind of follows as a truism. However,
there is a problem of why we observe ourselves at all, as opposed to
disorganised random information (the white rabbit problem) or simple
uninteresting information (the occam catastrophe problem).

I'm not sure you really address either of the latter two issues - you
seem to be assuming away white rabbits in restricting yourself to
"gauge invariant" information (which I assume can be formalised as the
set of programs of a universal machine). I would be interested to know
if your proposal could address the occam catastrophe issue though.

Cheers.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:52, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 1/27/2011 10:08 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent  
Meeker  wrote:



But if the
emulation attempts to be local then it must include inherent  
randomness -

which I think is not Turing computable.


The Turing machine could draw the required randomness from a tape of
random bits, couldn't it?

The question might then be asked:

"Where did the tape of random bits come from?"

To which I guess a response of sorts might be:

"Well, where did the Turing machine come from?  Probably from there."

If you can have unexplained order, then you can have unexplained
randomness, can't you?



Sure, but then you've gone beyond Turing emulation.  A tape  
providing the random numbers would have to be a realized (not just  
potential) infinity.


I hope Rex doesn't mind, but I don't understand Brent's remark.

Anyway, the UD compute all machines on all inputs, and big inputs acts  
like oracles from the first person point of views. We cannot enumerate  
the reals, but the dovetailer dovetails on all the finite sequences as  
parameters, and from the first person views, which abstracts from the  
UD-time delays, it already makes a background random noise. A priori.


Think about the iterated self-duplication. In that case it is easy to  
define a notion of normality, like when a laser beam split in two a  
sheaf of photon prepared in the complementary base.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:48, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent  
Meeker  wrote:


What does "locally" mean in this context?  I doubt that  
consciousness is
strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to  
interact

with.


I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
interact with...?



Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted with  
the world?



There are evidences (REM) that mammal fetus does dream.
Do you agree that DM implies that possibility.
In practice most of our consciousness grounding heavily relies on the  
most probable worlds arising from long deep (linear) computations.  
Apes fetus can dream climbing trees but they do that with ancestors  
climbing the most probable trees of their most probable neighborhoods  
since a long period.
With classical mechanism, I would say, that to know is to believe p  
when "luckily" p is true, and to be awaken is to be dreaming of a  
world when "luckily" the world is real. But real means here first  
person sharable, and may result from its stability on random oracles.






On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent  
Meeker  wrote:


I think the whole world probably is Turing emulable, but then that  
does not
get rid of materialism.  Material just becomes one of the things  
emulated

along with consciousness.


But then the material world we observe doesn't cause our
consciousness.  Rather, the underlying emulation substrate (which we
have no access to) causes both the material world and consciousness.



That's possible, or it may be that the emulatated matter causes the  
emulated consciousness; in which case we have the same questions  
about consciousness we had before assuming the world is an emulation.


Brent


For instance, it would not be the case that neurons cause
consciousness...neurons wouldn't be an extra layer that existed
between us and the emulation substrate.

What exists would be the emulation substrate, going about it's
business of existing.  As a (presumably) accidental side-effect of
that existence, there would be us with our experience of the world.

But, given the example of dreams - which aren't "of" anything  
external

to us (again, presumably) - why assume that there actually is a world
beyond our experience .

Perhaps the emulation substrate produces nothing but dreams?

Would there be any reason to predict that such an emulation substrate
would be governed by principles that we could comprehend?  How would
it be different from the Kantian noumenal realm?




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/27/2011 10:08 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
   

But if the
emulation attempts to be local then it must include inherent randomness -
which I think is not Turing computable.
 

The Turing machine could draw the required randomness from a tape of
random bits, couldn't it?

The question might then be asked:

"Where did the tape of random bits come from?"

To which I guess a response of sorts might be:

"Well, where did the Turing machine come from?  Probably from there."

If you can have unexplained order, then you can have unexplained
randomness, can't you?
   


Sure, but then you've gone beyond Turing emulation.  A tape providing 
the random numbers would have to be a realized (not just potential) 
infinity.


Brent

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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
   

What does "locally" mean in this context?  I doubt that consciousness is
strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact
with.
 

I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
interact with...?
   


Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted with the 
world?




On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
   

I think the whole world probably is Turing emulable, but then that does not
get rid of materialism.  Material just becomes one of the things emulated
along with consciousness.
 

But then the material world we observe doesn't cause our
consciousness.  Rather, the underlying emulation substrate (which we
have no access to) causes both the material world and consciousness.
   


That's possible, or it may be that the emulatated matter causes the 
emulated consciousness; in which case we have the same questions about 
consciousness we had before assuming the world is an emulation.


Brent


For instance, it would not be the case that neurons cause
consciousness...neurons wouldn't be an extra layer that existed
between us and the emulation substrate.

What exists would be the emulation substrate, going about it's
business of existing.  As a (presumably) accidental side-effect of
that existence, there would be us with our experience of the world.

But, given the example of dreams - which aren't "of" anything external
to us (again, presumably) - why assume that there actually is a world
beyond our experience .

Perhaps the emulation substrate produces nothing but dreams?

Would there be any reason to predict that such an emulation substrate
would be governed by principles that we could comprehend?  How would
it be different from the Kantian noumenal realm?

   


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Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
   

What does "locally" mean in this context?  I doubt that consciousness is
strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact
with.
 

I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
interact with...?
   


Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted with the 
world?




On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
   

I think the whole world probably is Turing emulable, but then that does not
get rid of materialism.  Material just becomes one of the things emulated
along with consciousness.
 

But then the material world we observe doesn't cause our
consciousness.  Rather, the underlying emulation substrate (which we
have no access to) causes both the material world and consciousness.
   


That's possible, or it may be that the emulatated matter causes the 
emulated consciousness; in which case we have the same questions about 
consciousness we had before assuming the world is an emulation.


Brent


For instance, it would not be the case that neurons cause
consciousness...neurons wouldn't be an extra layer that existed
between us and the emulation substrate.

What exists would be the emulation substrate, going about it's
business of existing.  As a (presumably) accidental side-effect of
that existence, there would be us with our experience of the world.

But, given the example of dreams - which aren't "of" anything external
to us (again, presumably) - why assume that there actually is a world
beyond our experience .

Perhaps the emulation substrate produces nothing but dreams?

Would there be any reason to predict that such an emulation substrate
would be governed by principles that we could comprehend?  How would
it be different from the Kantian noumenal realm?

   


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Re: A comment on Maudlin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Bruno,

I am a little tired and testy so please forgive me if I am curt and rushed 
in my response. I have time now to write so I will, but be warned... 

From: Bruno Marchal 
Sent: Friday, January 28, 2011 11:03 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: A comment on Maudlin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”
Dear Stephen, 


On 28 Jan 2011, at 01:13, Stephen Paul King wrote:


  Dear Bruno,

  Interleaving.

  From: Bruno Marchal 
  Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2011 1:23 PM
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Subject: Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

  On 25 Jan 2011, at 15:47, Stephen Paul King wrote:


SPK: The supervenience thesis is separate from the Turing thesis and 
Mauldin does a good job in distinguishing them.
  [BM]
  Just to be clear, what Maudlin call "supervenience thesis" is what I called 
"physical supervenience thesis", to distinguish it from the computationalist 
supervenience thesis.
  The computationalist supervenience thesis is basically what remains when we 
keep comp, and understand that the Phys. Sup. thesis has to go away in the comp 
frame.


  [SPK] 
  My claim is that we can push physical supervenience far into the 
background but in the cases where interaction between entities occurs it cannot 
be eliminated entirely. My proposal is that for interactions we must have both 
MEC and MAT, as MEC or MAT taken alone provide insufficient support for 
supervenience. This is what I see Maudlin’s argument proving.
  ***


SPK: The problem that I see is in the properties of physicality that are 
assumed in Mauldin’s argument. It is one thing to not be dependent on what 
particular physical structure a computation can be run on (assuming a realistic 
supervenience), it is another thing entirely to say that a Turing machine can 
be “run” without the existence of any physical hardware at all.

  [BM]
  Well, in the branch ~MEC v ~MAT, Maudlin seems to prefer MAT, so he seems 
with you on this, I think.

  [SPK] 
  No, I am claiming that for interactions between entities (and the models 
thereof) we must have MEC and MAT. In situations, like in most of your theory, 
interactions are not a factor thus your thesis follows smoothly in that frame. 
This is why I constantly ding you for being solipsistic. I would hope that you 
would do the same for me if I where equivalently in error. One must be able to 
defend one’s beliefs. Judge and prepare to be judged.
  ***
[BM]
The work has been done. It is up to you to tell me where is the error, which 
has to exist if you want have, like many, both MEC and MAT. 
I insist that I have no theory. I just show that MEC implies a reduction of the 
mind body problem to a body problem. You cannot use the fact that the body 
problem is not yet solved as a critic of the argument.
And then the arithmetization of the argument provides enough evidence that a 
good arithmetical tensor product can exist, so solipsism is also not proved 
from MEC. But ~MAT is proved from MEC. I cannot sum up a long argument in each 
paragraph, so I refer you to the explanation that I have already given.
Either you take the argument into account, or you refute it or at least explain 
why you are not convinced, in the course of the argument. Each time someone 
explain me why h/she is not convinced, if patient enough, come to understand 
he/she can no more say yes to a doctor without adding some magic in either 
consciousness or matter. 

[SPK]

This is only an avoidance of the problem by the claim that it does not 
exist, begging the question. I am asking questions about interactions, if you 
want to insist that only bodies (as immaterial numbers!) exist so be it. I will 
keep asking how it is that their static relations generate the appearance of 
multiple mutually irreducible 1-p. We each share a common universe of 
experience and we, not being solipsist, believe that that universe that we can 
agree and bet on seems to involve interactions between what seems to be 
necessarily independent entities. I want to understand how you think that your 
argument can explain this appearance? 
I accept your premise for the sake of the discussion and to try to 
understand your argument that proposes the reduction of the mind-body problem 
to a body problem, but this tells me nothing about how the resulting bodies 
(plural!) interact with each other. Maybe I need to go through my argument that 
the mere existence of a set of all possible representations of interactions 
between bodies is insufficient to derive the appearance that I have as 1-p. I 
will be doing this in the course to the conversation with Travis, if he is 
willing. It has to do with the Concurrence problem and the NP-Complete problems 
that are involved in any model of interactions between separable entities that 
are not synchronous. 





snip

  [BM]OK. And the problem with the word physical is that it means different 
things i

Re: A comment on Maudlin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Bruno Marchal]

Dear Stephen,


On 28 Jan 2011, at 01:13, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear Bruno,

Interleaving.

From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2011 1:23 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and  
Consciousness”


On 25 Jan 2011, at 15:47, Stephen Paul King wrote:


SPK: The supervenience thesis is separate from the Turing  
thesis and Mauldin does a good job in distinguishing them.

[BM]
Just to be clear, what Maudlin call "supervenience thesis" is what I  
called "physical supervenience thesis", to distinguish it from the  
computationalist supervenience thesis.
The computationalist supervenience thesis is basically what remains  
when we keep comp, and understand that the Phys. Sup. thesis has to  
go away in the comp frame.



[SPK]
My claim is that we can push physical supervenience far into the  
background but in the cases where interaction between entities  
occurs it cannot be eliminated entirely. My proposal is that for  
interactions we must have both MEC and MAT, as MEC or MAT taken  
alone provide insufficient support for supervenience. This is what I  
see Maudlin’s argument proving.

***

SPK: The problem that I see is in the properties of physicality  
that are assumed in Mauldin’s argument. It is one thing to not be  
dependent on what particular physical structure a computation can  
be run on (assuming a realistic supervenience), it is another thing  
entirely to say that a Turing machine can be “run” without the  
existence of any physical hardware at all.


[BM]
Well, in the branch ~MEC v ~MAT, Maudlin seems to prefer MAT, so he  
seems with you on this, I think.


[SPK]
No, I am claiming that for interactions between entities (and  
the models thereof) we must have MEC and MAT. In situations, like in  
most of your theory, interactions are not a factor thus your thesis  
follows smoothly in that frame. This is why I constantly ding you  
for being solipsistic. I would hope that you would do the same for  
me if I where equivalently in error. One must be able to defend  
one’s beliefs. Judge and prepare to be judged.

***


The work has been done. It is up to you to tell me where is the error,  
which has to exist if you want have, like many, both MEC and MAT.
I insist that I have no theory. I just show that MEC implies a  
reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem. You cannot use  
the fact that the body problem is not yet solved as a critic of the  
argument.
And then the arithmetization of the argument provides enough evidence  
that a good arithmetical tensor product can exist, so solipsism is  
also not proved from MEC. But ~MAT is proved from MEC. I cannot sum up  
a long argument in each paragraph, so I refer you to the explanation  
that I have already given.
Either you take the argument into account, or you refute it or at  
least explain why you are not convinced, in the course of the  
argument. Each time someone explain me why h/she is not convinced, if  
patient enough, come to understand he/she can no more say yes to a  
doctor without adding some magic in either consciousness or matter.






SPK: I am trying to make this distinction and trying to fix this  
problem that I found in the supervenience thesis within Mauldin’s  
argument. He does point out that there are contrafactuals that must  
have some physical instantiation. We see this on page 411 where he  
wrote:


“The only physical requirement that a system must met in order to  
instantiate a certain machine table are that (1) there must be at  
least as many physically distinguishable states of the system as  
there are machine states in the table, (2) the system must be  
capable of reacting to and changing the state of the tape, and (3)  
there must be enough physical structure to support the subjunctive  
connections specified in the table.”


It is in the subjunctive connections that we see the  
contrafactuals expressed. If one’s model of physical reality does  
not allow for the necessary subjunctive connections to be  
implemented then the supervenience thesis would fail independent of  
the Turing thesis.

[BM]
OK.

[SPK]
So if you agree with this then you must also agree that models  
that do not allow the necessary structure to support the subjunctive  
connections will fail to allow for consciousness to supervene. I am  
arguing that COMP +AR is insufficient for supervenience of  
consciousness other than in a crypto-solipsistic mode that is  
indistinguishable from a conscious state whose content has no  
information, i.e. is at best randomness. Such modes of consciousness  
would be of course included in the class of states of consciousness  
but we cannot identify our states of consciousness solely with them.  
Without the existence of multiple incarnations of mind to mutually  
restrain each other, the mind will have no means to limit what it is  
not and thus would be, by definition, at least insane. (T

Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jan 2011, at 01:58, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 1/27/2011 2:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 27 Jan 2011, at 22:12, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 1/27/2011 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 25 Jan 2011, at 15:47, Stephen Paul King wrote:




Mathematical structures do not “do” anything, they merely  
exist, if at all! We can use verbs to describe relations between  
nouns but that does not change the fact that nouns are nouns and  
not verbs. The movie graph is a neat trick in that is abstracts  
out the active process of organizing the information content of  
the individual frames and the order of their placement in the  
graph, but that some process had to be involved to perform the  
computation of the content and ordering cannot be removed, it is  
only pushed out of the field of view. This is why I argue that  
we cannot ignore the computational complexity problem that exist  
in any situation where we are considering a optimal  
configuration that is somehow selected from some set or ensemble.


I don't see how this would change anything in the argument,  
unless you presuppose consciousness is not locally Turing  
emulable, to start with.


What does "locally" mean in this context?  I doubt that  
consciousness is strictly local in the physical sense; it requires  
and world to interact with.


It means that, when saying yes to the doctor, you will not only  
survive, but you will feel the same physical laws.


Saying yes to the doctor who proposes to replace my brain with a  
digital computer still leaves my body and the rest of the world non- 
digital and non-local.


Yes. Be it the physical world or the "real" platonic reality.






You will not change the relative measure on your computations. It  
might be necessary to duplicate a part of the environment, which,  
in that case has to be supposed to be Turing emulable in that same  
sense.


But this seems to me dubious.  All known theories of physics assume  
a continuum of space, time, and probability.  Many people think  
these may be approximations to a finer, discrete structure, but so  
far as I know there have not been any successful theories showing  
how these discrete structures could emulate the continuum.  You may  
object that the part of the environment needed in a simulation of my  
consciousness is quite small and so can easily be emulated by a  
discrete computation.  But that is only the case when my brain+other  
is treated as not entangled with the rest of the universe.  If this  
entanglement (including the whole universe) is emulated then as in  
Bohmian or Everett's quantum mechanics, the world is deterministic  
and at some level of precision Turing emulable.  But if the  
emulation attempts to be local then it must include inherent  
randomness - which I think is not Turing computable.  So I think  
there is a tension here that is obfuscated by thinking of the doctor  
just replacing your brain or a part of your brain and helping  
yourself to the rest of the world.  Your brain is entangled with the  
rest of the world and either you need to leave the rest of the world  
in place so your Turing emulation can be entangled (non-local), or  
you need to emulate the whole world.


Only in the particular case where your 'generalized brain" is a  
quantum computer. It makes the substitution level very low, but  
quantum computer are Turing emulable and their executions are  
generated by universal dovetailing, so this will not change the  
reasoning. To get the quanta+qualia with the G/G splitting, we still  
have to justify why a quantum computer win the "measure" competition,  
in that case.

Perhaps I miss your point. Please elaborate if that is the case.




I think the whole world probably is Turing emulable,


I doubt this. I have no doubt the 'whole reality' is not Turing  
emulable. For the physical reality this is an open question (in the  
comp theory).



but then that does not get rid of materialism.  Material just  
becomes one of the things emulated along with consciousness.


In that case of a very low level, yes. The more the level is low, the  
more MEC looks like materialism is true. But in all cases, matter is a  
measure on infinities of infinite computations. The situation is made  
complex due to the fact that the UD can simulate matter, despite it  
can never emulate it. Actually, when I dig on this I can have the  
feeling that comp predicts that the physical universe is infinite and  
self-similar in all possible 'directions', but I have never really  
developed this. The comp-physics has too many open problems to figure  
out the general shape of the physical reality of course. It is not the  
goal. The goal of comp is to get a coherent account of both qualia and  
quanta, or at least a coherent formulation of the mind-body problem.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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