date:20110204

On 4 February 2011 19:59, Andrew Soltau  wrote:

> Your revelation that ' Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno
> follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. ' makes things very much
> clearer for me, I had got seriously bogged down in all this.
>
> My problem at present with either position is that I cannot see why the fact
> that an experiential sequence supervenes on more than one physical situation
> demonstrates anything about anything. (In my view, the entity having such an
> experience simply exists simultaneously in both physical situations) If
> anyone can cast some light on this I would be grateful.

Andrew, thank you for your (excessively) kind comments, but to quote
Father Dougal, when requested to elaborate, on the (to the best of my
recollection) sole occasion Father Ted praised him for his
perspicacity: "On no Ted, I want out - I can't take the pressure".

That out of the way, I'll say what I can, since that's why we're here.
 I've always had the intuition that Bruno is pointing to some really
important ideas, in problem areas that have worried me these many
years, but which I haven't got the technical equipment to get my head
around.  From time to time I try to formulate these in simpler terms
suitable, as it were, to explain the thing to grandma (grandma of
course being me).  The thing he emphasises most with respect to your
question above, it seems to me, is the additive or totalising aspect
of an infinity of computational classes, as opposed to their
individualisation.  That is, the "material content" of experience is
conceived as emerging from a "single perspective", as if filtered by a
unique consciousness through a sieve of computation.

The UD functions, in one sense, to create the structure, but
consciousness isn't conceived as operating by differentiating uniquely
along each computational path, but rather by integrating certain
classes of computational structure.  Consequently, neither
consciousness, nor the appearance of matter within it, is finitely
computable; both are artefacts of the integration of an infinity of
computation.  That's my understanding, more or less.  Of course any of
this may turn out to be unintelligible, inconsistent, or just wrong,
but Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for
an explanation of mind, then we should expect any "physics" extracted
from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics.

Anyway, I really must stop taking his name in vain in this shameless
manner, and leave the field to the man himself.

David

> Hi David
>
> I have just been trawling the list, and found your wonderfully clear
> summary:
>
> As I've understood Bruno over the years, he has
> never asserted that comp(utational science) necessarily is the
> fundamental science of body and mind.  Rather, he is saying that IF
> computational science is assumed (e.g. by proponents of CTM) to be the
> correct mind-body theory, THEN the appearance of the body (and
> consequently the rest of matter/energy) must emerge as part of the
> same theory.  In other words, EITHER the correctness of comp as a
> mind-body theory directly implies the "emptiness" of any fundamental
> theory of matter; OR alternatively (i.e. accepting a "fundamental"
> theory of matter) comp can't be the correct mind-body theory.
>
> This helps enormously, thanks.
>
> Your next paragraph is likewise wonderfully clear:
>
> The establishment of this disjunction depends on a number of logical
> steps, culminating in a class of "reductio" thought experiments
> including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of which
> is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of
> computationalism and materialism.  As it happens, Maudlin uses this
> result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting
> materialism.  There is some controversy over these results from
> supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with
> auxiliary assumptions.  Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as
> being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an
> authority.
>
> I have no problem with the basic concept of CTM, as I understand it. The way
> I understand it is as presented in the paper The Computational Theory of
> Mind at SEP (that Always makes me think of Douglas Adams' Somebody Else's
> Problem field, which is such a powerful human emotive force that it can make
> even a massive spaceship decending into the middle of a cup final,
> invisible!)
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/
>
> Your revelation that ' Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno
> follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. ' makes things very much
> clearer for me, I had got seriously bogged down in all this.
>
> My problem at present with either position is that I cannot see why the fact
> that an experiential sequence supervenes on more than one physical situation
> demonstrates anything about anything. (In my

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-04 Thread Brent Meeker


On 2/4/2011 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Feb 2011, at 01:59, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/3/2011 5:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Feb 2011, at 01:18, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/2/2011 2:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Feb 2, 2011 at 6:45 PM, Brent 
Meeker  wrote:



I think it very likely that the brain can be so modeled.  But the 
meaning
that simulated brain, as expressed in it's output decisions 
relative to
inputs is dependent on the rest of the world, or at least of it 
with which
the brain will interact - including the past evoutionary history 
which led
up to the brain.  Its computations have no canonical 
interpretation in

themselves.


You can connect the simulated brain to transducers which convert
environmental inputs into electrical signals. But then, what would
happen if the same electrical signals were input from data on disk
rather than the environment? Would the brain's experience be
different? If so, how would it know where the data was coming from?



It wouldn't know; and it's responses would have no meaning except 
to someone who did know.  Context is essential.  Otherwise you get 
the rock that calculates everything.




If the context is needed and is not Turing emulable, then comp is 
just false.
If it is Turing emulable then the reasoning go through, unless you 
have an objection, and it would be nice you try to say where.


Bruno


My reservation is that the context will be Turing emulable, but it 
will have to be so large as to constitute a whole world.  That this 
is what is required that be self-interpreting.



But that is not an objection at all. It is just an affirmation that 
our comp substitution level is so low that the doctor has to emulate 
the entire physical universe to get an artificial brain. 


No, the doctor doesn't have to do that because he's only substituting 
for a little part of it and allowing it to interact with the rest that 
is already existing.


But the reasoning still go through, and the laws of physics have still 
to be retrieved from computer science, and so we keep the 
qualia/quanta distinction, which is fine.


The only thing which *is* ruled out by having such a low substitution 
level is the idea of buying *in practice* an artificial brain. But 
this practice idea is not used in the reasoning. I


I think it rules out the movie graph kind of brain as being conscious of 
this world.


Brent

t is used in step 1-6 for making things easier, but is eliminated by 
the step seven. If the entire physical universe is Turing emulable, 
the UD will emulate it infinitely often, and the measure problem 
remains (a nice problem given that its current solution already 
explain many things, which are not explained, or are explained away, 
by physicalism).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Observers and Church/Turing


Hi David

I have just been trawling the list, and found your wonderfully clear 
summary:


As I've understood Bruno over the years, he has
never asserted that comp(utational science) necessarily is the
fundamental science of body and mind.  Rather, he is saying that IF
computational science is assumed (e.g. by proponents of CTM) to be the
correct mind-body theory, THEN the appearance of the body (and
consequently the rest of matter/energy) must emerge as part of the
same theory.  In other words, EITHER the correctness of comp as a
mind-body theory directly implies the "emptiness" of any fundamental
theory of matter; OR alternatively (i.e. accepting a "fundamental"
theory of matter) comp can't be the correct mind-body theory.

This helps enormously, thanks.

Your next paragraph is likewise wonderfully clear:

The establishment of this disjunction depends on a number of logical
steps, culminating in a class of "reductio" thought experiments
including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of which
is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of
computationalism and materialism.  As it happens, Maudlin uses this
result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting
materialism.  There is some controversy over these results from
supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with
auxiliary assumptions.  Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as
being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an
authority.

I have no problem with the basic concept of CTM, as I understand it. The way I 
understand it is as presented in the paper The Computational Theory of Mind at 
SEP (that Always makes me think of Douglas Adams' Somebody Else's Problem 
field, which is such a powerful human emotive force that it can make even a 
massive spaceship decending into the middle of a cup final, invisible!)

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/

Your revelation that ' Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno 
follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. ' makes things very much 
clearer for me, I had got seriously bogged down in all this.

My problem at present with either position is that I cannot see why the fact 
that an experiential sequence supervenes on more than one physical situation 
demonstrates anything about anything. (In my view, the entity having such an 
experience simply exists simultaneously in both physical situations) If anyone 
can cast some light on this I would be grateful.

Andrew



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 04 Feb 2011, at 19:09, David Nyman wrote:


On 4 February 2011 16:52, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Yes, obviously.  But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world  
"has

to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
only be true absent such difference.  It seems self-contradictory to
me.


?

I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the  
first

person indeterminacy.
So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed  
physics'

is different from the comp extracted physics.


Yes, but on the other hand, failing to find such a discrepancy can't
prove comp true, simply not false (like any other theory).  That said,
given the degree of prediction, agreement with observation + Occam
would make a pretty robust case in its favour, to say the least.

So Colin would indeed have to demonstrate empirical disagreement with
comp to prove it false - that's what you meant by "has to".  But in
principle it's still open to him to have some form of non-CTM
natural-world theory that turns out to be in equal agreement with
observation, isn't it?  That's all I was asking.



Yes. There is no problem. Colin has just to say no to its doctor, as I  
think he did, and Colin is more coherent than most naturalist who does  
believe or assume comp and materialism. There are no disagreement, we  
work in different theory. I think we agree on what we disagree, and  
those are just our different postulates. I bet on MEC. Colin, like  
almost everybody, bet on MAT.


Science never ruled out any theory. In the case of comp this is true  
with a revenge because the theory rather explicitly entails its non  
provability, and asks for a big leap of faith. It is a belief in a  
form of physical reincarnation, and the digitality entails the  
admittedly less obvious belief in an arithmetical form of  
reincarnation. The ethic of comp is the necessity of the right by any  
machine to say no to the doctor.


We cannot know that we are machine. We cannot know our level of  
substitution. We cannot name who we are.


The universal machines put a lot of mess in Platonia, even more when  
they begin to try to fix it. Understanding comp is understanding how  
big is or even could be our ignorance.


After Gödel we can figure out the infinitely many problems that  
universal numbers can encounter by reflecting each other.


I certainly react in part to some establishment trends that science  
would be, per se, on the side of materialism (even just weak  
materialism).
I have thought that scientist knew that the mind-body problem is not  
yet solved, and that it would be obvious that once we start to think  
on on the mind body problem with a simple and rather precise  
hypothesis, like comp which links philosophy/theology to computer  
science, we are directly aware that the Aristotle/Plato different  
kinds of fundamental reality has not yet been decided, really.


The incompatibility between MAT and MEC reflects the difference  
between Aristotle and Plato.


When MEC and MAT are taken together, like the naturalist and the  
materialist, I think you will arrive to the elimination of the person,  
and then nihilism.


So, as far as Colin is aware that MAT and MEC are incompatible, I have  
no disagreement with him. I might still not been convinced by the  
validity of some of his arguments, because I have counter-example in  
MEC for its reasoning. The validity of a reasoning can be made  
assumption independent.


Of course many people still believe that MAT and MEC are compatible.  
It is only by taking the notion of consciousness and of digital  
mechanism very seriously, through tought experiments made in principle  
possible,  that you might see that it is easier to explain the  
illusion of matter to numbers, than the illusion of numbers to matter.


And it is also true that you can make MEC and MAT coherent by adding  
enough magic to MEC and/or MAT. The reasoning goes through in the  
sense that it becomes just irrational to say YES to the doctor in  
virtue of betting on MEC + those magical links.


Bruno





David



On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote:


On 4 February 2011 12:34, 1Z  wrote:

What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of  
"has to"

in the above.


If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world,
because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of
a real world to emerge from


Yes, obviously.  But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world  
"has

to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
only be true absent such difference.  It seems self-contradictory to
me.


?

I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the  
first

person indeterminacy.
So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed  
physics'

is different from

Re: Observers and Church/Turing


On 04/02/11 19:22, David Nyman wrote:

On 4 February 2011 18:44, Andrew Soltau  wrote:


 From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language
problems.

Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*
experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you
account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality
that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations
of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date.

Forgive me butting in, but occasionally I find it helps to reconsider
the problem using less technical language (since I'm not very
technical).  I tend to think about this from a One-Many perspective.
Essentially, in talking about "consciousness" or observation, the comp
assumption implies that our perspective is always from the "point of
view" of the One.  The infinity of computation, in this analogy the
Many, is somehow "seen" from the point of view of the One.  So then
the question is - how can any particular set of experiences emerge, or
be filtered, from the totality of the Many, from such a perspective?
Simple ideas of "measure" may indeed seem to give the wrong answer,
very quickly.  It seems that we have to think combinatorially, in
terms of higher orders of "filtration" - perhaps an infinity of them.
The "Goldilocks enigma" of cosmology may be suggestive here - the
20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisite degree of
adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence, seems to imply a
pitiless winnowing of the Many such that vanishingly few experiential
realities with the observed characteristics can survive.  Hence the
remainder subside into non-experiential oblivion.

I suppose that was as clear as mud.  But it may give a flavour.

David



 From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language
problems.

Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*
experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you
account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality
that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations
of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date.

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Thank you David, 'butting in' very welcome!

It seems quite inevitable that any ordinary concept of measure must give 
the wrong answer. And it seems to me that since what is proposed is at 
least radically counter-intuitive, it requires some powerful rationale 
to support it. I am not clear what possible basis is provided for this 
rationale.


Yes indeed, 'the 20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisite 
degree of adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence' does indeed 
imply, surely to all of us, that there is 'a pitiless winnowing of the 
Many such that vanishingly few experiential realities with the observed 
characteristics can survive' but surely this implies, or tends to imply, 
a physical basis, a relativistic and quantum mechanical basis, to 
reality - it is the physical parameters, and their place in physics, 
which provides this brutal filtering. Or is there a point here with 
respect to computational mind that I am missing?


Andrew



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Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 4 February 2011 18:44, Andrew Soltau  wrote:

> From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language
> problems.
>
> Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*
> experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you
> account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality
> that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations
> of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date.

Forgive me butting in, but occasionally I find it helps to reconsider
the problem using less technical language (since I'm not very
technical).  I tend to think about this from a One-Many perspective.
Essentially, in talking about "consciousness" or observation, the comp
assumption implies that our perspective is always from the "point of
view" of the One.  The infinity of computation, in this analogy the
Many, is somehow "seen" from the point of view of the One.  So then
the question is - how can any particular set of experiences emerge, or
be filtered, from the totality of the Many, from such a perspective?
Simple ideas of "measure" may indeed seem to give the wrong answer,
very quickly.  It seems that we have to think combinatorially, in
terms of higher orders of "filtration" - perhaps an infinity of them.
The "Goldilocks enigma" of cosmology may be suggestive here - the
20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisite degree of
adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence, seems to imply a
pitiless winnowing of the Many such that vanishingly few experiential
realities with the observed characteristics can survive.  Hence the
remainder subside into non-experiential oblivion.

I suppose that was as clear as mud.  But it may give a flavour.

David

> From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language
> problems.
>
> Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*
> experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you
> account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality
> that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations
> of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date.
>
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>

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On 4 February 2011 15:20, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to"
>> in the above.
>
> It means that if we assume MEC, then, for explaining the mind whe have to
> explain the quanta from a theory which does NOT assume a real primary
> physical world.

I thought the point was that he does NOT assume MEC.  If I understand
him, he's trying to develop a non-MEC theory.  All theories, of
course, must undergo the test of agreement with observation.
Sometimes you seem to be saying that the UDA refutes all non-MEC
theories a priori.  I didn't think you claimed that - only that UDA
1-7 shows us that one's locus of observation must always be a
posteriori, insensible of interruption, and hence indeterminate.  Of
course, UDA assumes MEC (hence cut-and-paste) and this is why step 8
can provide the intuition that the assumption of a natural world is
irrelevant to what is observed.  In a natural-world non-MEC theory,
the possibility of cut-and-paste may be defeated by Heisenberg, but
nonetheless I can at least perform the same thought experiment, since
if I *could* be copied "physically", I still couldn't predict which
copy I would be, or what had occurred in the interim, and for similar
reasons.

David

>
> On 03 Feb 2011, at 22:34, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the
> physical
> world extracted from comp.
>>
>> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to"
>> in the above.
>
> It means that if we assume MEC, then, for explaining the mind whe have to
> explain the quanta from a theory which does NOT assume a real primary
> physical world.
> The "has to" is a modality of necessity.
> It means that the UDA has reduced a problem (the mind-body problem) into
> another problem (the problem ro explain why computers develop beliefs in a
> natural world).
> A natural world can still exist, if you really want it to exist, but is made
> entirely devoid of any explanatory purpose. Even if it exists, we can see it
> and it cannot interfere in anyway with pur consciousness, including the
> consicousness we have when doing experiments in physics. So it exists in the
> sense that you can say that, despite thermodynamics explain how car can
> moven you still believe that the real reason is that invisible horses pull
> the cars. With the usual omnipresent form of Occam, we can say that if comp
> is correct, there is no physical universe at all.
> Of course we don't know, the comp-physics is still in his infancy, and it
> might taken 1 biilions years to extract physics, and perhaps to refute comp.
> AUDA refutes just the simple idea that we know already that comp entials too
> much white rabbits. AUDA just reminds people that the psychologfy/theology
> of actual well defined ideally correct machine is hugely non trivial, and in
> particular that it gives an arithmetical interpretation of the usual initial
> theory of matter by Aristotle---Plotinus quite close to quantum mechanics.
>
>
>
>
>> What is supposed to follow from NOT finding any such
>> difference?
>
> Then we can abandon the idea of materialism, like the biologist have
> abandoned the principle of vitalism, and we can go back to the Platonist
> conception of reality.
> We know then that the theory of everything is elementary arithmetic (or any
> first order Turing universal system).
> We can explain both mind (qualia) and matter (quanta) in a simple coherent
> picture, which, contarary to materialism gives the big role to the notion of
> (Löbian) person.
>
>
>
>> As far as I follow you, the full entailment of "the
>> physical world extracted from comp" isn't entirely clear yet.
>
> UDA+MGA does not extracts physics from computer science, but it reduces the
> mind body problem to the problem of extracting physics (as common
> hallucination of universal machine, if you want, from computer
> science/number theory.
>
> Everett uses comp implicitly. So a consequence of UDA+MGA is that Everett
> has not finished its task. IF comp is correct, the SWE has to be deduced
> from comp, and not to be postulated.
>
> Have you understand UDA1-7? If you get each points of UDA1-7, you know that
> IF there is (primary) physical universe, and if that universe is enough big,
> then the reversal physics/machine-theology is proved. MGA (UDA-8) just
> remove the assumption of that big universe, and by doing so, it eliminates
> the assumption of any universe. Then with OCCAM, a 'believer' in comp has no
> reason at all to believe in a primary universe (big or little).
>
>
>
>
>
>> But if
>> this could eventually be achieved, and it could be shown to be
>> entirely consistent with what we observe (so that one couldn't find
>> the difference you mention above) what conclusion would this justify,
>> other than NOT RULING OUT comp as an ultimate theory?
>
> With occam, it rules out materialism and physical

Re: Observers and Church/Turing

From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in 
language problems.


Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all* 
experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you 
account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential 
reality that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day 
observations of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum 
experiments to date.


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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On 4 February 2011 16:52, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> Yes, obviously.  But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world "has
>> to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
>> only be true absent such difference.  It seems self-contradictory to
>> me.
>
> ?
>
> I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
> derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the first
> person indeterminacy.
> So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed physics'
> is different from the comp extracted physics.

Yes, but on the other hand, failing to find such a discrepancy can't
prove comp true, simply not false (like any other theory).  That said,
given the degree of prediction, agreement with observation + Occam
would make a pretty robust case in its favour, to say the least.

So Colin would indeed have to demonstrate empirical disagreement with
comp to prove it false - that's what you meant by "has to".  But in
principle it's still open to him to have some form of non-CTM
natural-world theory that turns out to be in equal agreement with
observation, isn't it?  That's all I was asking.

David

>
> On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 4 February 2011 12:34, 1Z  wrote:
>>
 What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to"
 in the above.
>>>
>>> If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world,
>>> because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of
>>> a real world to emerge from
>>
>> Yes, obviously.  But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world "has
>> to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
>> only be true absent such difference.  It seems self-contradictory to
>> me.
>
> ?
>
> I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
> derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the first
> person indeterminacy.
> So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed physics'
> is different from the comp extracted physics.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 04 Feb 2011, at 17:28, Johnathan Corgan wrote:

On Fri, Feb 4, 2011 at 7:20 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


IF comp is correct, the SWE has to be deduced from comp, and not to  
be

postulated.


How do you think this might be approached?

You have demonstrated a chain of reasoning (MGA+AUDA)


I guess you UDA+MGA



that starts with
the assumption of "yes doctor" and concludes that the subjective
appearance (both 1st and 3rd person perspective) of physical matter
must be explained by extracting digital physics from modal logic.
(Forgive the perhaps oversimplified summary.)

Let's assume, for the purposes of furthering the argument, that the
above is all sound and reasonable.

So what's next?


AUDA.

The Arithmetical version of the UDA.
Let us ask the self-referentially correct machine. What does she think?

Now a correct machine cannot prove the existence of any consistent  
extension of itself, still less of a universe. That would be a proof  
of their own consistency and contradict incompleteness(*). So the  
machine cannot know that the provability of p entails the consistency  
of p (although that is true); G does not prove Bp -> Dp; but G* does  
prove Bp -> Dp.
So, to transform provability into a measure one indeterminacy, from  
the machine points of view, you have to define a new connector by  
adding explicitly Dp to Bp: Bp & Dp.
To model comp and the UD itself in the language of the machine, you  
have to restrict the arithmetical interpretation of p by the sigma_1  
sentence.
Then you can verify that the logic of Bp & Dp obeys a quantum logic,  
so that you can define a quantization (BDp, in the new logic).
If from that quantization you can implement a quantum computer (say)  
then you know that a quantum computing dovetailing wins the measure  
battle in the limit, and that the SWE is a law of observation for  
almost all (correct) machine (all except those rare unlucky one living  
in white rabbits realities).








The SWE is exceptionally well supported empirically, so having it
"fall out" of your reasoning rather than being postulated would be a
very convincing argument in your favor.


You mean a very convincing argument for *comp*, (assuming the UDA+MGA  
is a valid reasoning). I agree. Finding an explicit equation of  
physics contradicting the quantum would refute comp.


My paper on plotinus summarizes AUDA. It is also the part II of  
sane04, where AUDA is called "the interview of the Löbian machine".


Bruno

(*) I assume here that the machine talks in first order predicate  
logic (like PA, ZF). It is then a consequence of Gödel's completeness  
(not incompleteness) theorem. But I don't need that really. It just  
simplifies the exposition. I identify Dp with the existence of a  
continuation where p is true (not necessarily with the existence of a  
model (in the logician's sense) satisfying p. That is equivalent for  
the machine talking first order language (Gödel's completeness  
theorem, 1930).


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote:


On 4 February 2011 12:34, 1Z  wrote:

What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has  
to"

in the above.


If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world,
because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of
a real world to emerge from


Yes, obviously.  But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world "has
to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
only be true absent such difference.  It seems self-contradictory to
me.


?

I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are  
derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the  
first person indeterminacy.
So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed  
physics' is different from the comp extracted physics.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Observers and Church/Turing



On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:43, Andrew Soltau wrote:




'White Rabbits' is Bruno's shorthand for physically impossible  
observations. At least, as I understand it.



Not really. Just subjective aberrance. Like seeing a white rabbit with  
clothes and looking at his clock and saying "too late, too late". It  
is physically and computationally possible, but occurs empirically  
only in dreams. That is what remains to be explained if we bet on comp.





My query is that, since we only ever observe the environment to be  
in accord with physical quantum law, how can a purely arithmetical  
environment, which necessarily includes all possible computations,  
give rise to only observations which are self evidently observations  
of a physical environment, and a quantum environment at that.


Yes, that's my point. That is the question which we have to solve if  
we take comp seriously into account.

QM solves the problem by phase randomization (Feynman).
Comp should solve the problem by the quantum logics related to self- 
reference, and their non trivial semantics.
And if just one comp white rabbit remains and is located on the dark  
side of the moon, we have to take a look there. If the white rabbit is  
there, comp is confirmed, and if it is not there comp is refuted.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Observers and Church/Turing



On 04 Feb 2011, at 10:29, Andrew Soltau wrote:


Hi Bruno


In step seven what is proved is that

MEC + 'big universe'  entails that physic is a branch of computer  
science.

Do you see that?


I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of  
computer science.


?

The point was that MEC + "big universe' entails that PHYSICS (not  
psychology) is a branch of computer science.





Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated  
for having your continuations determined by the first person comp  
indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in  
the physical universe.


In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is  
eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can  
distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws  
away the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by  
number relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1  
complete theory).


OK?
OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical  
reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a  
simulation, obviously.


It is more subtle than that. I actually said the contrary somehow: we  
can tell if we are in a simulation. We cannot tell if we are in a  
simulation for some finite time, but if we have the time to  
contemplate and the freedom to explore, we can see if we are in the  
natural emulation provides by the sum on all UD's fictions. That is  
why mechanism is testable, and the test (QM) confirms that we are in a  
simulation. The quantum weirdness can be seen as the trace of the  
infinitely many digital simulations occurring in arithmetic. If that  
simulations gives a different physics, it means that
- either we are in a secondary simulation (like in some alien made  
matrix or simulacron, but the first person probability of this  
happening is of the type white rabbit, by comp indeterminacy),

- or, much more probable in *that* case, that comp is not correct.






This leaves us with the white rabbit problem.


OK. Then. We have to solve it.





With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been  
done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to  
a body problem in computer science.

This seems straightforward.


So, you do agree UDA1-8 does reduce the mind-body problem to the  
problem of deriving the quantum equation (well the real physics, to be  
exact) from elementary arithmetic/computer science/machine theology?


I am not sure it is that  straightforward, although certainly simpler  
for quantum many-worlders. Even the few people who get it took a long  
time to understand this.


Many academic people still reject the first person indeterminacy (like  
some reject the notion of consciousness, or even of MW).
Straightforwardness is not straightforward in the inter or trans- 
disciplinary fields. What is obvious for some is not for others and  
vice versa!


If you understand this, you know that no fundamental theory (even on  
just matter) can still rely on anything inferred from observation. The  
TOE is already numbers + addition and multiplication (or anything  
recursively equivalent and of similar complexity).







At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a  
refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there  
might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is  
aberrant, or just "white noisy" experiences.


To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very  
difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search  
of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban  
machines are chosen because they have enough introspection power  
and cognitive abilities to describe what they can prove about their  
certainties, and what they can infer interrogatively. That is not  
entirely trivial and relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and  
Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.)
Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a  
restriction of white rabbits.


The possibility of such a restriction is provided by the non  
triviality of computer science, and of any notion of machine's point  
of view, and thus of Gödel, Löb solovay provability logic and their  
intensional variants. In practice computer science should augment the  
domain of indeterminacy allowing enough relative computation for  
stabilizing deep linear (self-multiplying computations). The quantum  
does it by linearity (mainly thanks to Gleason theorem, as Everett  
understood), but comp lacks his 'Gleason theorem". For this the  
arithmetical quantum logics (related to the Bp & Dt hypostases) have  
not been studied enough. To be sure other intensional variants could  
be at play, and when asked, I explain that all the B^n p & D^m p, with  
m > n, and with A^np meaning ...Ap (iterated modal operator) are  
playing some role. We do have graded "quantum logics" there.




Our

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-04 Thread Johnathan Corgan

On Fri, Feb 4, 2011 at 7:20 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> IF comp is correct, the SWE has to be deduced from comp, and not to be
> postulated.

How do you think this might be approached?

You have demonstrated a chain of reasoning (MGA+AUDA) that starts with
the assumption of "yes doctor" and concludes that the subjective
appearance (both 1st and 3rd person perspective) of physical matter
must be explained by extracting digital physics from modal logic.
(Forgive the perhaps oversimplified summary.)

Let's assume, for the purposes of furthering the argument, that the
above is all sound and reasonable.

So what's next?

The SWE is exceptionally well supported empirically, so having it
"fall out" of your reasoning rather than being postulated would be a
very convincing argument in your favor.

Johnathan Corgan

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

I agree with Jason.

I would even ask to those who say that a rock could think, to tell me
what is a rock.
A rock, as conceived by physicist, can be said to compute simple
linear equation, and not much more. Certainly not a UD, which requires
giant memory robustness.
Viewed at the level near Planck, you could say that the rock is made
partially of quantum vacuum, and that quantum vacuum emulate a quantum
dovetailer, but in that sense, we are back to the comp consequence
that a rock is really defined on the border of the UD, where all UDs
exist. In that sense, all the 'points' in all physical realities *are*
already universal dovetailers. That's quite possible, and reality
would even be more self-similar (like the Mandelbrot set) than we
think today. But that's an open problem with both comp and the
quantum. Such an internal homogenization of the UDs would not change
the measure problems. I do think that comp might imply such an
homogenization. That would be implied if the rational M set is Turing
universal.

Bruno

On 03 Feb 2011, at 23:40, Jason wrote:

On Feb 2, 6:18 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 2/2/2011 2:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Feb 2, 2011 at 6:45 PM, Brent
Meeker wrote:

I think it very likely that the brain can be so modeled. But the
meaning
that simulated brain, as expressed in it's output decisions
relative to
inputs is dependent on the rest of the world, or at least of it
with which
the brain will interact - including the past evoutionary history
which led
up to the brain. Its computations have no canonical
interpretation in

themselves.

You can connect the simulated brain to transducers which convert
environmental inputs into electrical signals. But then, what would
happen if the same electrical signals were input from data on disk
rather than the environment? Would the brain's experience be
different? If so, how would it know where the data was coming from?

It wouldn't know; and it's responses would have no meaning except to
someone who did know. Context is essential. Otherwise you get the
rock

that calculates everything.

People have argued that a rock computes everything, or that some wall
in their house is computing Microsoft Word, but I don't see it. If
that were true, what would it take in theory, for someone to hook up
their monitor and mouse to a rock to access the copy of Microsoft Word
which is executing in it?

Meaningful programs have stable states which are updated in well-
defined ways. It seems completely opposite to the chaotic small and
unstable operations taking place in a rock. One could pick out the
right random particle collisions, using "Turing's Demon" and say if
you choose and look at those computations occurring there and string
them together just right, then you have Microsoft Word. But how do
you identify what the right collisions are without computing them in
parallel and knowing them? Upon which memory do you record the
intermediate result to be use in future operations? Surely the rock
won't provide any mechanism for maintaining this state for you.

Where in the rock, for instance, is the function for determining if
some word is known by the dictionary or not? Does the rock contain
such a dictionary?

Jason

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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 04 Feb 2011, at 01:59, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/3/2011 5:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Feb 2011, at 01:18, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/2/2011 2:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Feb 2, 2011 at 6:45 PM, Brent Meeker>  wrote:



I think it very likely that the brain can be so modeled.  But  
the meaning
that simulated brain, as expressed in it's output decisions  
relative to
inputs is dependent on the rest of the world, or at least of it  
with which
the brain will interact - including the past evoutionary history  
which led
up to the brain.  Its computations have no canonical  
interpretation in

themselves.


You can connect the simulated brain to transducers which convert
environmental inputs into electrical signals. But then, what would
happen if the same electrical signals were input from data on disk
rather than the environment? Would the brain's experience be
different? If so, how would it know where the data was coming from?



It wouldn't know; and it's responses would have no meaning except  
to someone who did know.  Context is essential.  Otherwise you get  
the rock that calculates everything.




If the context is needed and is not Turing emulable, then comp is  
just false.
If it is Turing emulable then the reasoning go through, unless you  
have an objection, and it would be nice you try to say where.


Bruno


My reservation is that the context will be Turing emulable, but it  
will have to be so large as to constitute a whole world.  That this  
is what is required that be self-interpreting.



But that is not an objection at all. It is just an affirmation that  
our comp substitution level is so low that the doctor has to emulate  
the entire physical universe to get an artificial brain. But the  
reasoning still go through, and the laws of physics have still to be  
retrieved from computer science, and so we keep the qualia/quanta  
distinction, which is fine.


The only thing which *is* ruled out by having such a low substitution  
level is the idea of buying *in practice* an artificial brain. But  
this practice idea is not used in the reasoning. It is used in step  
1-6 for making things easier, but is eliminated by the step seven. If  
the entire physical universe is Turing emulable, the UD will emulate  
it infinitely often, and the measure problem remains (a nice problem  
given that its current solution already explain many things, which are  
not explained, or are explained away, by physicalism).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?



On 03 Feb 2011, at 22:34, David Nyman wrote:


On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the
physical
world extracted from comp.


What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to"
in the above.


It means that if we assume MEC, then, for explaining the mind whe have  
to explain the quanta from a theory which does NOT assume a real  
primary physical world.

The "has to" is a modality of necessity.
It means that the UDA has reduced a problem (the mind-body problem)  
into another problem (the problem ro explain why computers develop  
beliefs in a natural world).
A natural world can still exist, if you really want it to exist, but  
is made entirely devoid of any explanatory purpose. Even if it exists,  
we can see it and it cannot interfere in anyway with pur  
consciousness, including the consicousness we have when doing  
experiments in physics. So it exists in the sense that you can say  
that, despite thermodynamics explain how car can moven you still  
believe that the real reason is that invisible horses pull the cars.  
With the usual omnipresent form of Occam, we can say that if comp is  
correct, there is no physical universe at all.
Of course we don't know, the comp-physics is still in his infancy, and  
it might taken 1 biilions years to extract physics, and perhaps to  
refute comp.
AUDA refutes just the simple idea that we know already that comp  
entials too much white rabbits. AUDA just reminds people that the  
psychologfy/theology of actual well defined ideally correct machine is  
hugely non trivial, and in particular that it gives an arithmetical  
interpretation of the usual initial theory of matter by Aristotle--- 
Plotinus quite close to quantum mechanics.






What is supposed to follow from NOT finding any such
difference?


Then we can abandon the idea of materialism, like the biologist have  
abandoned the principle of vitalism, and we can go back to the  
Platonist conception of reality.
We know then that the theory of everything is elementary arithmetic  
(or any first order Turing universal system).
We can explain both mind (qualia) and matter (quanta) in a simple  
coherent picture, which, contarary to materialism gives the big role  
to the notion of (Löbian) person.





As far as I follow you, the full entailment of "the
physical world extracted from comp" isn't entirely clear yet.


UDA+MGA does not extracts physics from computer science, but it  
reduces the mind body problem to the problem of extracting physics (as  
common hallucination of universal machine, if you want, from computer  
science/number theory.


Everett uses comp implicitly. So a consequence of UDA+MGA is that  
Everett has not finished its task. IF comp is correct, the SWE has to  
be deduced from comp, and not to be postulated.


Have you understand UDA1-7? If you get each points of UDA1-7, you know  
that IF there is (primary) physical universe, and if that universe is  
enough big, then the reversal physics/machine-theology is proved. MGA  
(UDA-8) just remove the assumption of that big universe, and by doing  
so, it eliminates the assumption of any universe. Then with OCCAM, a  
'believer' in comp has no reason at all to believe in a primary  
universe (big or little).







But if
this could eventually be achieved, and it could be shown to be
entirely consistent with what we observe (so that one couldn't find
the difference you mention above) what conclusion would this justify,
other than NOT RULING OUT comp as an ultimate theory?


With occam, it rules out materialism and physicalism. And without  
occam it makes those theory pseudo-religious, given that they would  
explain nothing and just reintroduce a mysterious matter, a mysterious  
mind, and a mysterious link in between.


Comp on the contrary provides an explanation of a (non computable)  
matter, of a (non computable) mind and of no mysterious link between  
the two.
Besides comp explains rather easily, already, the quantum weirdness,  
given that indeterminacy, non locality, non clonability, MW, are  
direct consequences. And quantum computability is partially explained  
formally by the classical theory of knowledge and matter (by the  
greeks), when translated in the language of a Löbian machine.







 Of course such
an achievement would be a major, and pretty convincing, result in
itself, but is there some stronger reason why it would definitively
rule out ANY alternative, natural-world, non-CTM theory of mind-body?
If so, I haven't quite grasped the point yet.



Science never rules out any theory. Only a pseudo-religious conception  
of science does this. Science only suggests simpler theory, and thus  
less hypotheses. Evolution does not rule out creationism. It makes it  
just ridiculous. Likewise comp makes ridiclous the belief in a prmiary  
physical universe. Comp gives a simpler explanation for the origin of  
the belief by mach

Re: Observers and Church/Turing

2011-02-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau 

>  On 04/02/11 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> 2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau 
>
>> Hi Bruno
>>
>>
>>> In step seven what is proved is that
>>>
>>> MEC + 'big universe'  entails that physic is a branch of computer
>>> science.
>>> Do you see that?
>>>
>>
>>  I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of
>> computer science.
>>
>>  Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for
>>> having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy
>>> on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe.
>>>
>>> In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is
>>> eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish
>>> arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any
>>> universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or
>>> any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory).
>>>
>>> OK?
>>>
>>  OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical
>> reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation,
>> obviously.
>> This leaves us with the white rabbit problem.
>>
>>
>>> With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done,
>>> by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem
>>> in computer science.
>>>
>>  This seems straightforward.
>>
>>
>>> At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation
>>> of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche
>>> of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just "white noisy"
>>> experiences.
>>>
>>> To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very
>>> difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the
>>> logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen
>>> because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to
>>> describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can
>>> infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the
>>> work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.)
>>>
>>  Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of
>> white rabbits.
>> Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid of
>> white rabbits.
>>
>
> You can't infer that because you do not observe white rabbits that there is
> none ;)
>
> Quite like the anthropic principle, if at each moments there are
> overwelmingly more moments where you are just turned into gaz dust... there
> exists a continuation of you (at least one) that is consistent with a world
> devoid of WR. The WR problem seems the same question as ... Why am I in that
> particular universe ? You are because that is consistent with you... As you
> can't feel all the other you who have not your luck you can't say that
> because you do not observe it, it is not like that after all...
>
> If tomorrow you observe a WR (a magical one ;) ) well... You'll know at
> least you're no more in a physical world devoid of white rabbits... and you
> can begin to be really scared ;)
>
> Also I think you will agree that all continuation where you're not... have
> a zero measure (from your POV). So you can't be where you can't be, nothing
> to be astonished here ;)
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
>
>> Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is always
>> observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum formalism.
>> Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the
>> record of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can, at each
>> moment, even in principle, derive the sensory specific next moment,
>> according to quantum rules, from this structure of information.
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>
>
> --
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> Hi
>
> 'White Rabbits' is Bruno's shorthand for physically impossible
> observations. At least, as I understand it.
>

Yes, that's waht I meant to.


>
> My query is that, since we only ever observe the environment to be in
> accord with physical quantum law, how can a purely arithmetical e

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

On 4 February 2011 12:34, 1Z  wrote:

>> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to"
>> in the above.
>
> If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world,
> because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of
> a real world to emerge from

Yes, obviously.  But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world "has
to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
only be true absent such difference.  It seems self-contradictory to
me.

David

>
>
> On Feb 3, 9:34 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
>> On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>> >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the
>> >>> physical
>> >>> world extracted from comp.
>>
>> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to"
>> in the above.
>
> If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world,
> because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of
> a real world to emerge from
>
>  >>> including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of
> which
>> >>> is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of
>> >>> computationalism and materialism.  As it happens, Maudlin uses this
>> >>> result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting
>> >>> materialism.
>>
>> >>> Yes. The basic reason is as I said that it is more easy to explain the
>> >>> illusion of matter to a mind than the reality of mind to an assumed
>> >>> primary
>> >>> matter.
>> >>> Comp is delivered with a user guide: computer science.
>>
>> >>> There is some controversy over these results from
>> >>> supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with
>> >>> auxiliary assumptions.  Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as
>> >>> being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an
>> >>> authority.
>>
>> >>> Anyway, forgive me if this was already obvious, but I suppose the
>> >>> conclusion might be that, if you reject fundamental computational
>> >>> science as your basic theory of "matter", Bruno would expect you to
>> >>> take the same tack with respect to mind.  I'm sure both he and you
>> >>> will put me right on this.
>>
>> >>> To protect a natural world primary ontology, I think Colin has to provide
>> >>> a
>> >>> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature
>> >>> levels, and this without redefining the first person by its comp domain
>> >>> of
>> >>> indeterminacy. Well he has to justify (or not) why he would say no to all
>> >>> doctors. But he can develop a theory of mind along this line.
>> >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the
>> >>> physical
>> >>> world extracted from comp. I provide a tool for doing that (but it is
>> >>> mathematically involved (the main weakness of comp: it demands the study
>> >>> of
>> >>> computer science)).
>>
>> >>> Bruno
>>
>> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> >>> On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote:
>>
>> >>> Hi Bruno,
>>
>> >>> I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how you
>>
>> >>> regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ...
>>
>> >>> "Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..."
>>
>> >>> I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point.
>>
>> >>> By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, smelling
>>
>> >>> Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and the discovery of
>> >>> how
>>
>> >>> to handle self-duplication and self-reference in representational
>> >>> machine,
>>
>> >>> ...
>>
>> >>> I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of Church
>>
>> >>> thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization makes
>>
>> >>> universal machine extremely universal, if I can say.
>>
>> >>> This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have
>>
>> >>> established within your overall framework of thinking.
>>
>> >>> It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis.
>>
>> >>> Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate.
>>
>> >>> In my view
>>
>> >>> 
>>
>> >>> A) There is a natural world.
>>
>> >>>  We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it.
>>
>> >>>  This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols
>>
>> >>>  The natural 'symbols' interact naturally.
>>
>> >>>  This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing.
>>
>> >>>  Universe U ensues.
>>
>> >>>  Scientist S is being computed within U
>>
>> >>>  Scientist S can observe U from within.
>>
>> >>>  U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable
>>
>> >>>    observation, from within. Call this principle P-O
>>
>> >>> If by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with
>>
>> >>> addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)".
>>
>> >>> No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about the relation
>>
>> >>> bet

Re: Observers and Church/Turing


On 04/02/11 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi,

2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau >


Hi Bruno


In step seven what is proved is that

MEC + 'big universe'  entails that physic is a branch of
computer science.
Do you see that?


I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of
computer science.

Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be
annihilated for having your continuations determined by the
first person comp indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori
an omega point, is in the physical universe.

In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big
universe is eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine
at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything
else. This throws away the need of any universe. Physics has
to be justified by number relations only (numbers or any
elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory).

OK?

OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish
arithmetical reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are
in a simulation, obviously.
This leaves us with the white rabbit problem.


With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has
been done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body
problem to a body problem in computer science.

This seems straightforward.


At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a
refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited,
there might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits'
that is aberrant, or just "white noisy" experiences.

To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is
very difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to
the search of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian
machines. Löban machines are chosen because they have enough
introspection power and cognitive abilities to describe what
they can prove about their certainties, and what they can
infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies
mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post,
Turing, Kleene, etc.)

Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a
restriction of white rabbits.
Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely
devoid of white rabbits.


You can't infer that because you do not observe white rabbits that 
there is none ;)


Quite like the anthropic principle, if at each moments there are 
overwelmingly more moments where you are just turned into gaz dust... 
there exists a continuation of you (at least one) that is consistent 
with a world devoid of WR. The WR problem seems the same question as 
... Why am I in that particular universe ? You are because that is 
consistent with you... As you can't feel all the other you who have 
not your luck you can't say that because you do not observe it, it is 
not like that after all...


If tomorrow you observe a WR (a magical one ;) ) well... You'll know 
at least you're no more in a physical world devoid of white rabbits... 
and you can begin to be really scared ;)


Also I think you will agree that all continuation where you're not... 
have a zero measure (from your POV). So you can't be where you can't 
be, nothing to be astonished here ;)


Regards,
Quentin

Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is
always observed to be constrained precisely according to the
quantum formalism.
Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is
the record of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one
can, at each moment, even in principle, derive the sensory
specific next moment, according to quantum rules, from this
structure of information.




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Hi

'White Rabbits' is Bruno's shorthand for physically impossible 
observations. At least, as I understand it

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-04 Thread 1Z



On Feb 3, 9:34 pm, David Nyman  wrote:
> On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the
> >>> physical
> >>> world extracted from comp.
>
> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to"
> in the above.

If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world,
because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of
a real world to emerge from

 >>> including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of
which
> >>> is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of
> >>> computationalism and materialism.  As it happens, Maudlin uses this
> >>> result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting
> >>> materialism.
>
> >>> Yes. The basic reason is as I said that it is more easy to explain the
> >>> illusion of matter to a mind than the reality of mind to an assumed
> >>> primary
> >>> matter.
> >>> Comp is delivered with a user guide: computer science.
>
> >>> There is some controversy over these results from
> >>> supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with
> >>> auxiliary assumptions.  Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as
> >>> being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an
> >>> authority.
>
> >>> Anyway, forgive me if this was already obvious, but I suppose the
> >>> conclusion might be that, if you reject fundamental computational
> >>> science as your basic theory of "matter", Bruno would expect you to
> >>> take the same tack with respect to mind.  I'm sure both he and you
> >>> will put me right on this.
>
> >>> To protect a natural world primary ontology, I think Colin has to provide
> >>> a
> >>> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature
> >>> levels, and this without redefining the first person by its comp domain
> >>> of
> >>> indeterminacy. Well he has to justify (or not) why he would say no to all
> >>> doctors. But he can develop a theory of mind along this line.
> >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the
> >>> physical
> >>> world extracted from comp. I provide a tool for doing that (but it is
> >>> mathematically involved (the main weakness of comp: it demands the study
> >>> of
> >>> computer science)).
>
> >>> Bruno
>
> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >>> On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote:
>
> >>> Hi Bruno,
>
> >>> I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how you
>
> >>> regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ...
>
> >>> "Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..."
>
> >>> I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point.
>
> >>> By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, smelling
>
> >>> Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and the discovery of
> >>> how
>
> >>> to handle self-duplication and self-reference in representational
> >>> machine,
>
> >>> ...
>
> >>> I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of Church
>
> >>> thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization makes
>
> >>> universal machine extremely universal, if I can say.
>
> >>> This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have
>
> >>> established within your overall framework of thinking.
>
> >>> It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis.
>
> >>> Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate.
>
> >>> In my view
>
> >>> 
>
> >>> A) There is a natural world.
>
> >>>  We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it.
>
> >>>  This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols
>
> >>>  The natural 'symbols' interact naturally.
>
> >>>  This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing.
>
> >>>  Universe U ensues.
>
> >>>  Scientist S is being computed within U
>
> >>>  Scientist S can observe U from within.
>
> >>>  U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable
>
> >>>    observation, from within. Call this principle P-O
>
> >>> If by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with
>
> >>> addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)".
>
> >>> No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about the relation
>
> >>> between the abstractions for quantity we call numbers, and the natural
> >>> world
>
> >>> is one I do not make. All you can logically claim is that it is made of a
>
> >>> large set of 'something', these 'somethings' interact
>
> ...
>
> read more »

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Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.

2011-02-04 Thread 1Z



On Feb 4, 1:05 am, Colin Hales  wrote:
> Stathis (Down below...)
>
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 3, 2011 at 9:35 AM, Colin Hales
> >  wrote:
>
> >> This means we are hooked into the external world in ways that are not
> >> present in the peripheral nerves. Looking at the (nerves pulses) signals, 
> >> it
> >> is impossible to tell if they are vision, smell, touch or anything else.
> >> Those that think that a computer can add this extra bit of connectivity to
> >> the external world, believe in comp/COMP. When you replace the brain with a
> >> model of a brain using a computer, that "extra" bit, the connection with 
> >> the
> >> outside world we get from our qualia,...the qualia created by the brain
> >> matter itself, is replaced by the qualia you get by 'being' the computer.
>
> >> If you believe comp/COMP, then you believe that the computer's model -or -
> >> the computer hardware itself -  somehow replaces the function of the 
> >> qualia,
> >> by analysing the sensory signalling, which is fundamentally degenerately
> >> related to the external world. Only a human with qualia can, from sensory
> >> signals, provide any sort of model for our 'computer-in-a-vat' that might
> >> stand-in for an external world. Having done that, the world being explored
> >> by our computer-in-a-vat is the world of the human model generated from the
> >> sensory signals, not the world itself. When an encounter with the unknown
> >> happens, then the unknown will be chacterized by a human model's response 
> >> to
> >> the unknown, not the (unknown) actual world. The extent to which these
> >> things are different is the key.
>
> >> Neuroscience is beginning to progress from NCC (Neural correlates of
> >> consciousness) to EMCC (electromagnetic correlates of consciousness).
> >> Researchers are slowly discovering that certain aspects of cognition and
> >> behaviour correlate better with the LFP (local field 
> >> potential/extracellular
> >> field) than mere action potentials.
>
> >> If the EM fields are the difference, then in replacing the fields of the
> >> brain with the fields of the computer running a model...and your
> >> qualia/cognition go with it.
>
> >> So when you think of the 'input/output' relations for a computer, the
> >> sensory signalling is only part of it. There is another complete set of
> >> 'input' relations, qualia, that together with the sensory signals, form our
> >> real connection to the outside world. So the old black-box replacement idea
> >> is right - but only if the black box has a whole other set of 'input'
> >> signals, from the qualia. The only way you can computationally replace 
> >> these
> >> signals is to already know everything about the external world already. 
> >> Your
> >> alternative? Keep the qualia in your 'black box'. To me that means
> >> generating the fields as well.
>
> >> Don't get me wrong. Lots of really nifty AI can result from the
> >> 'computer-in-a-vat'. However, that's not what I am aiming at. I want AGI. G
> >> for General.
>
> > Can the behaviour of the neurons including the electric fields be
> > simulated? For example, is it possible to model what will happen in
> > the brain (and what output will ultimately go to the muscles via
> > peripheral nerves) if a particular sequence of photons hits the
> > retina? If that is a theoretical impossibility then where exactly is
> > the non-computable physics, and what evidence do you have that it is
> > non-computable?
>
> Lots of aspects to your questions and I'll try and answer Bruno at
> the same time.
>
> 1) I am in the process of upgrading neural modelling to include the
> fields in the traditional sense of simulation of the fields. The way to
> think of it is that the little capacitor in the Hodgkin-Huxley
> equilvalent circuit is about to get a whole new role.
>
> 2) Having done that, one can do simulations of single unit,  multiple
> unit, populations etc etc...You may be able to extract something
> verifiable in the wet-lab.
>
> 3) However, I would hold that no matter how comprehensive the models, no
> matter how many neurons ... even the whole brain and the peripheral
> nerves...they will NOT behave like the real thing in the sense that such
> a brain model cannot ever 'be' a mind. The reason is that we 'BE' the
> fields. We do not 'BE' a description of the fields. The information
> delivered by 'BE'ing the field acts in addition to that described by the
> 3rd-person-validated system of classical partial differential equations
> that are Maxwell's equations.
>
> 4) A given set of photons,  can result from an infinity of different
> configurations of the distal world. A single red photon can come across
> the room from your xmas decorations or across the galaxy from a
> supernova. It is a fundamentally degenerate relationship. Yet the brain
> inherits enough information to converge on a visual scene that captures
> the difference. HOW?

a) It guesses. It isn;t always right.
b) the

Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-04 Thread 1Z



On Feb 2, 10:35 pm, Colin Hales  wrote:
> Hi all,
> This is a response to all the vigor my comp/COMP decision has caused.
> First: Go Evgenii! That weirdest of weird substances, money, nothing
> more than a calibrated belief system in humans, gets us all in the end!
> You may be the only person in this list hooked into reality. :-)
>  back to issues.
> We've all been through the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. The recent
> questions raised in the discussion suggest to me that it may not be
> apparent to all that this experiment has actually been done. It's you.
> Me. Everyone. Already.
>
> Our brains are suspended in a bath of cerebral spinal fluid. One of the
> layers between the brain meninges. If you mentally expanded then to
> vat-sizes and took the outer layers off...you have a brain in a vat.
>
> We _are_ brains in a vat.
>
The pertinent sense of BiV is that sensory inputs are falsified

> This means we are hooked into the external world in ways that are not
> present in the peripheral nerves. Looking at the (nerves pulses)
> signals, it is impossible to tell if they are vision, smell, touch or
> anything else.

But looking at the nerves themselves, it is possible because
they are hooked up in certain ways. It's like an analog telphone
exchange: *this* line comes from Mr Smith's house, *that* line
goes to Mrs Brown's house

> Those that think that a computer can add this extra bit
> of connectivity to the external world,

It's not missing

>believe in comp/COMP. When you
> replace the brain with a model of a brain using a computer, that "extra"
> bit, the connection with the outside world we get from our qualia,...the
> qualia created by the brain matter itself, is replaced by the qualia you
> get by 'being' the computer.
>
> If you believe comp/COMP, then you believe that the computer's model -or
> - the computer hardware itself -  somehow replaces the function of the
> qualia, by analysing the sensory signalling, which is fundamentally
> degenerately related to the external world. Only a human with qualia
> can, from sensory signals, provide any sort of model for our
> 'computer-in-a-vat' that might stand-in for an external world. Having
> done that, the world being explored by our computer-in-a-vat is the
> world of the human model generated from the sensory signals, not the
> world itself. When an encounter with the unknown happens, then the
> unknown will be chacterized by a human model's response to the unknown,
> not the (unknown) actual world. The extent to which these things are
> different is the key.
>
> Neuroscience is beginning to progress from NCC (Neural correlates of
> consciousness) to EMCC (electromagnetic correlates of consciousness).
> Researchers are slowly discovering that certain aspects of cognition and
> behaviour correlate better with the LFP (local field
> potential/extracellular field) than mere action potentials.
>
> If the EM fields are the difference, then in replacing the fields of the
> brain with the fields of the computer running a model...and your
> qualia/cognition go with it.
>
> So when you think of the 'input/output' relations for a computer, the
> sensory signalling is only part of it. There is another complete set of
> 'input' relations, qualia, that together with the sensory signals, form
> our real connection to the outside world. So the old black-box
> replacement idea is right - but only if the black box has a whole other
> set of 'input' signals, from the qualia. The only way you can
> computationally replace these signals is to already know everything
> about the external world already. Your alternative? Keep the qualia in
> your 'black box'. To me that means generating the fields as well.
>
> Don't get me wrong. Lots of really nifty AI can result from the
> 'computer-in-a-vat'. However, that's not what I am aiming at. I want
> AGI. G for General.
>
> I am an engineer. Well not quite. I think I am some kind of
> neuroscientist now. Just handing my PhD in...I will build an AGI based
> on choices. My research suggests that replacing the fields, emulating
> the brain, is the way to go. That's why my PhD is all about how neurons
> originate the endogenous field system measured by scalp EEG/MEG. Having
> nutted it out, time to make hardware to do it.
>
> Gotta go.
>
> Colin Hales
>
> Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> > on 02.02.2011 11:00 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
> >> On Wed, Feb 2, 2011 at 6:45 PM, Brent Meeker
> >> wrote:
>
> >>> I think it very likely that the brain can be so modeled.  But the
> >>> meaning that simulated brain, as expressed in it's output decisions
> >>> relative to inputs is dependent on the rest of the world, or at
> >>> least of it with which the brain will interact - including the past
> >>> evoutionary history which led up to the brain.  Its computations
> >>> have no canonical interpretation in themselves.
>
> >> You can connect the simulated brain to transducers which convert
> >> environmental inputs into electrical

Re: Observers and Church/Turing

2011-02-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Hi,

2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau 

> Hi Bruno
>
>
>> In step seven what is proved is that
>>
>> MEC + 'big universe'  entails that physic is a branch of computer science.
>> Do you see that?
>>
>
> I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of computer
> science.
>
>  Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for
>> having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy
>> on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe.
>>
>> In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is
>> eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish
>> arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any
>> universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or
>> any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory).
>>
>> OK?
>>
> OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical
> reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation,
> obviously.
> This leaves us with the white rabbit problem.
>
>
>> With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done,
>> by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem
>> in computer science.
>>
> This seems straightforward.
>
>
>> At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation
>> of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche
>> of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just "white noisy"
>> experiences.
>>
>> To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very
>> difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the
>> logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen
>> because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to
>> describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can
>> infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the
>> work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.)
>>
> Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of
> white rabbits.
> Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid of
> white rabbits.
>

You can't infer that because you do not observe white rabbits that there is
none ;)

Quite like the anthropic principle, if at each moments there are
overwelmingly more moments where you are just turned into gaz dust... there
exists a continuation of you (at least one) that is consistent with a world
devoid of WR. The WR problem seems the same question as ... Why am I in that
particular universe ? You are because that is consistent with you... As you
can't feel all the other you who have not your luck you can't say that
because you do not observe it, it is not like that after all...

If tomorrow you observe a WR (a magical one ;) ) well... You'll know at
least you're no more in a physical world devoid of white rabbits... and you
can begin to be really scared ;)

Also I think you will agree that all continuation where you're not... have a
zero measure (from your POV). So you can't be where you can't be, nothing to
be astonished here ;)

Regards,
Quentin


> Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is always
> observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum formalism.
> Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the record
> of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can, at each moment,
> even in principle, derive the sensory specific next moment, according to
> quantum rules, from this structure of information.
>
>
>
>
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: Observers and Church/Turing