Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-06-13 Thread Terren Suydam
Hi Bruno,

Long time lurker here, very intrigued by all the discussions here when
I have time for them!

Earlier in response to Colin Hales you wrote: Actually, comp prevents
artificial intelligence.

Can you elaborate on this?  If we assume comp (I say yes to the
doctor) then I can be simulated... doesn't that imply the possibility
of an artificial intelligence?

Thanks, Terren

On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 Hi Colin,

 On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote:

 Hi,

 Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature',
 International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35.

 http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613


 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic!


 Congratulation Colin.

 Like others,  I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the
 university.

 From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our
 (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of
 building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp
 theory.  It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp+materialism, which
 is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This
 does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent
 machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the
 humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine we
 are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we don't
 know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also, descendent
 of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them serendipitously.
  It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine,
 which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one. We
 prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them
 (apparently).
 Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take
 that into account too.

 Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring
 spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is a
 universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in
 there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it.

 Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different:

 1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion

 and

 2) cleverness-competence-ingenuity-gifted-learning-ability

 1) is necessary for the developpment of 2), but 2) has a negative
 feedback on 1).

 I have already given on this list what I call the smallest theory of
 intelligence.

 By definition a machine is intelligent if it is not stupid. And a machine
 can be stupid for two reason:
 she believes that she is intelligent, or
 she believes that she is stupid.

 Of course, this is arithmetized immediately in a weakening of G, the theory
 C having as axioms the modal normal axioms and rules + Dp - ~BDp. So Dt
 (arithmetical consistency) can play the role of intelligence, and Bf
 (inconsistance) plays the role of stupidity. G* and G proves BDt - Bf and
 G* proves BBf - Bf (but not G!).

 This illustrates that 1) above might come from Löbianity, and 2) above
 (the scientist) is governed by theoretical artificial intelligence (Case and
 Smith, Oherson, Stob, Weinstein). Here the results are not just
 NON-constructive, but are *necessarily* so. Cleverness is just something
 that we cannot program. But we can prove, non constructively, the existence
 of powerful learning machine. We just cannot recognize them, or build them.
 It is like with the algorithmically random strings, we cannot generate them
 by a short algorithm, but we can generate all of them by a very short
 algorithm.

 So, concerning intelligence/consciousness (as opposed to cleverness), I
 think we have passed the singularity. Nothing is more
 intelligent/conscious than a virgin universal machine. By programming it, we
 can only make his soul fell, and, in the worst case, we might get
 something as stupid as human, capable of feeling itself superior, for
 example.

 Bruno





 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-06-13 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

Colin,

Thanks for the paper. I have just browsed it. Two small notes.

I like [Turing et al., 2008]. It seems that he has passed his test 
successfully.


I find term Natural Computation (NC) a bit confusing. I guess that I 
understand what you means but the term Computation sounds ambiguously, 
because then it is completely unclear what it means in such a context.


Evgenii

On 07.06.2011 09:42 Colin Hales said the following:

Hi,

Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature',
 International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011.
1-35.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613


The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic!

cheers

Colin



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Fwd: The final TOE?

2011-06-13 Thread Stephen Lin
Thank you for your reply! My response is interleaved below:

On Mon, Jun 13, 2011 at 1:03 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 This is a commonplace.  So far as I know there are *no* physicists who think
 there are singularities in spacetime (and haven't been for a long time).
  Everybody thinks that quantum effects prevent a singularity.  So as
 testable predictions goes thats (a) not very distinctive and (b) not really
 testable unless you fall into a black hole.

OK but I am not suggesting quantum effects do it, at least not quantum
effects as we understand it now.  I am suggesting that it all reduces
to gravity and topology.


 Therefore every
 apparent event horizon is really a separation of two universes,


 Be careful.  A Rindler wedge is also an event horizon for the accelerated
 frame - but it hardly separates two universes.

OK I'm not sure about what that is, but I will look into the concept later.


 where the outside universe is entangled geometrically with the inside
 universe.

 Yes, that's a common idea too.  Some speculate that information is lost from
 this universe but is transferred into another universe via the black hole.
  I don't know of any explicit calculation of this though.

 The Hubble volume is sitting inside of an expanding
 supermassive black hole, of another universe.

 The trouble with this is it implies a singularity is in our future.  But
 the experimental evidence points to accelerating expansion and a de Sitter
 universe.

Well, my point is that, since no singularity exists, the separation
between every volume of space and its outside could be seen as an
event horizon from some frame of reference.  There's no such thing as
a real event horizon because a black hole never truly forms, and
there is never enough gravity to make it so that light cannot escape
from any volume.  In fact, all the light that enters any volume of
space eventually comes out, in the future, from the point of view of
the outside.  From the point of view of the inside, the light
basically travels through a wormhole into a closed inner universe.
However, the inner and outer views are equivalent.  Both universes
see the other universe as the inner universe and its own universe
as the outer.  As you fall through the wormhole, you basically
travel along a torus and invert the view.


 However, because of
 uncertainty about the macrostate of the universe, this means the
 outside universe is effectively in a superposition of all possible
 universes consistent with our observations.

 Why isn't the inside universe in a superposition?  That's where we observe
 superpositions.

See above.  I mean to say that both views are equivalent.  If you're
inside, you see the outside as in a superposition.  If you're
outside, you see the inside as superposition.  It basically means
that the uncertainty principle holds macroscopically as well as
microscopically, because you have limited information in both cases.


 Equivalently, every
 classical black hole is really in a microscopic superposition of all
 possible states consistent with the outside world.

 However, the Hubble volume in not truly closed: it receives
 information one photon at a time

 Why one-at-a-time?  What would that even mean since there is no universal
 time?

Ok, I don't really mean one-at-a-time in some serial quantized manner.
 I just mean that, in some computable universe sense, the
information transfer is bit-by-bit, but that computation time might
not have any relationship to real time.


 from the outside in the form of
 cosmic background radiation,

 We already have a very good explanation for the CMB.

And this is another equivalent one.  I'm not supplanting any
explanation of cosmology right not, but merely adding to it in
conceptual terms.


 which is information being about the
 prior state of the otherwise casually disconnected universe, i.e. the
 CMB and other parts of the observable universe outside our Hubble
 volume.

 The CMB is well inside our Hubble volume.  Otherwise we couldn't see it.

Right maybe I was being imprecise about the CMB.  I mean, everything
outside of our Hubble volume but within the observable universe.  But
actually the Hubble volume is just an arbitrary choice too.  I mean to
say that this property of exchanging information bit-by-bit across
event horizons is true at the borders of every system and its
surroundings.  That's why length contraction and time dilation hold
universally around gravitational bodies.


 Similarity, every classical black hole must leak information
 to the outside world in the form of photons, i.e. Hawking radiation.

 Equivalence between the CMB and Hawking radiation implies that space
 must be compressed within a black hole in order to fit all the
 information that is to leak out later, i.e. length contraction.


 Current theories point to the information in a BH being proportional to the
 surface area, most think that it is actually encoded on or just above the
 event horizon.

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-06-13 Thread Colin Hales

Hi Evgenii,

I expect you are not alone in struggling with the Natural Computation 
(NC) vs Artificial Computation (AC) idea.  The difference is in the 
paper and should be non-existent of COMP is true. The paper then shows a 
place where it can't be true hence AC and NC are different .ie. the 
natural world is not computation of the Turing-machine kind( at least to 
the extent needed to construct a scientist, which includes the need to 
create a liar).
It's all quite convoluted, but nevertheless sufficient to help an 
engineer like me make a design choice... which I have done.


I hope over time these ideas will not grate on the mind quite so much.

cheers
colin



Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Colin,

Thanks for the paper. I have just browsed it. Two small notes.

I like [Turing et al., 2008]. It seems that he has passed his test 
successfully.


I find term Natural Computation (NC) a bit confusing. I guess that I 
understand what you means but the term Computation sounds ambiguously, 
because then it is completely unclear what it means in such a context.


Evgenii

On 07.06.2011 09:42 Colin Hales said the following:

Hi,

Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature',
 International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011.
1-35.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613


The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic!

cheers

Colin





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