date:20110731

On Jul 31, 7:07 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Sun, Jul 31, 2011 at 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
  The China brain can't simulate the interior sense of a neuron. It's
  just a dynamic sculpture.

 Maybe the same is true of brains. Just because something behaves as if
 it has feelings and understanding doesn't mean that it really has
 feelings and understanding. Besides, the very notion that a
 carbon-based construct could be conscious is clearly ridiculous!

 http://www.terrybisson.com/page6/page6.html 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gaFZTAOb7IE

Nice. You're making my point though. We would have no clue that our
brains could think by the exterior behavior of the neurons it's made
of. It's only because we are our brains that we know it is the case
that groups of neurons do think and feel. Therefore, designing
something based upon only what our brain appears to us to be doing
(not much...  just another interesting organ in the body doing it's
cell/organ things) doesn't mean that the thinking and feeling is going
to show up by itself. If we could modify our own minds first to be
able to see and feel the thoughts and feelings of another brain, then
we would be more likely to be able to tell whether we were on the
right track in designing a deep AGI. Without that sense, we're like
blind people comparing the beauty of the pictures we've painted -
insisting that if it feels like the Mona Lisa to touch then there's no
reason why it couldn't look exactly like the Mona Lisa. You need the
right brushstrokes, definitely, but if you can't see the color of the
paint and do it all in black it doesn't much matter.

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Math Question

Reblogging myself here, but curious to see what you think of the idea
that 1 cannot be proven greater than 0.

Someone’s comment on the previous chart mentioned the difficulty
(impossibility?) of proving that 1  0. It’s an interesting kernel
there, and it reminds me of the whole “time does not physically exist”
realization. On one level, I can think of zero as having no different
relation to 1 than it has with any other number. Zero does the same
thing to any number as it does to one and should be thought of more
properly as the hub of the decimal spiral.

I’m no mathematician, but I suppose that 0 is also formally defined as
an integer between 1 and -1 or something. Still it exposes the
question of whether the elemental underpinnings of our ability to
count is really anchored in anything at all other than our own
anthropological conventions of counting. Beyond numbers themselves, it
appears that the whole quantitative notion - of greater than or less
than, and of ‘equal’ is nothing but a figment of our feelings about
order. There may not be any inherent moreness to something than the
absence of something. If it’s the same thing, it actually seems more
palatable to see the absence of something being a condition predicated
upon the things’ a priori presence, no?

Even if we want to get into quantum atopoietic craziness where things
come out of nothing, rendering such a possibility discretely seems to
threaten the whole notion of mathematical coherence. If any or all
quantities, variables, and formulas can be generated arbitrarily from
0, then 0 would seem to be the same thing as ∞, and greater than 1 or
any other arithmetic expression.

Anthrodeximal Numberline
Maybe it’s time to create a new numberline, without all of the
repetitive decimal numerals. Instead there could be a Wiki of new
quantitative symbols and names which anyone can add to and own as a
permanent vector in the schema. It would be easy to translate them to
and from Arabic numerals online and some interesting possibilities for
informal encryption and unanticipated mathematic-linguistic
synchronicity.

By removing the aspect of repetition, we would unmask the semantic
bias of the math logos and arrive at a pure generic linear calibration
defined only in it’s own idiosyncratic a-signifying terms. Sort of
like breaking the mantra of math, it’s trance-like rhythms that
disguise it’s human neurological origin from us. By adding more unique
qualitative sense to the thing, the quality-flattening power drains
out and the system seems to disqualify itself.

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Re: bruno list


Hi Craig,

Sorry for having take some time to comment your posts. I will be busy  
the two next weeks, so be patient for possible comments.

I comment all your 3 posts addressed to me in one mail.

On 30 Jul 2011, at 15:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Chipping away at it.. more later.

On Jul 29, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 28 Jul 2011, at 17:41, Craig Weinberg wrote:



A machine cannot have an experience, it is the
container, it is that which is experienced,


No. The machine itself is not experienced. The experience of the
machine is experienced, and it may, or not, refer to some
representational level.


Fair enough. From a truly objective perspective though, how could the
experience of the machine NOT refer to some phenomenological level.


Of course.



To
say that it is representational is to conflate the referent and the
signifier.


Not at all. It is a bet on the invariance of our subjective experience  
on a substitution level. Biology illustrates already the idea in the  
language of chemistry.
Comp does not imply that everything is representational, nor that  
Turing machine can simulate everything. On the contrary, some  
machine's attributes are not Turing emulable.





In order for the machine to STOP, there doesn't
automatically need to exist a 1p experience of a red sign.


It depends on the machine. In the case of human, there usually are 1p  
experience. I assume comp.





In our 1p,
we see a red stop sign as a qualitative image, we understand it as a
symbolic text, we interpret it as a pragmatic condition that motivates
us to respond with motor commands to our body to push the brake, the
brake stops the car.


Yes. But that is not an argument that some machine cannot do that. In  
the comp theory, there is no need to eliminate the 1p experience.  
Don't confuse the comp theory, and its misuse by materialists.






Through our interpretation we re-present the
signifier, which is a representation-neutral experience of presented
color, shape, size, and context. As the machine is a reverse
engineered logic, we have no reason to presume that our signifier -
the red light or sign, is presented just because a command is sent to
the processor queue to stop the car when the ccd in the camera
encounters electromagnetic changes of a particular sampled
configuration.


You are right, but this only means that we fail on the correct  
substitution level.
If we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, nor really  
which computations go through, but we still face something partially  
explainable.





It's going to stop the car whether there is an
experience of a sign or not. I say that there is an experience, but
it's likely not remotely like a human signifier and would compare as
one piano note compared to an entire symphony, if not the sum of
hundreds of symphonies filtered through different molecular, cellular,
physiological, neurological, and psychological audiences.


My point works even if you decided that your generalized brain (the  
part of reality I need to emulate to get your consciousness preserved)  
is given by the quantum rational Heisenberg matrix, of the whole  
cluster of galaxies, at the level of strings.







but it has no capacity to
experience anything as an abstract design.


What is abstract? What is concrete?


An abstraction is an ideal teleological signifier, having no relevant
physical qualities itself but the capacity to be used as a template to
inform both physical and ideal forms. Concrete is the opposite, a
material referent which exists physically as an objective phenomena
which is subject to the teleonomy of physical, chemical, biological
consequences.


That seems quite abstract to me.





I don't buy that there is necessarily a given physical universe. It  
is

only an Aristotelian rumor, based on a gross extrapolation on our
animal experience. But it fails, both on mind *and* matter.


I hear what you're saying, and I agree in the sense that from the
absolutely objective 0/∞p perspective there is no special difference
between physical and non-physical phenomena,


You miss the point. Comp shows and makes it possible to illustrate the  
needs to explain how the physical arises or is build from conceptually  
simpler non physical notions, already well known, which are the  
mathematical relations.







but in SEE, the idea is
that existence is a relation of essential phenomena confronting it's
tail,


I think that you might confuse existence with consciousness.
I think a scientist does not commit himself ontologically, beyond the  
terms of its theory.



through the involution of time-space characteristics.


This does not help.



In this
sense both mind and matter the notions of mind and matter lose all
absolute character of abstract or concrete - it is only through
perceptual relativity which the tail is assigned material qualities
from the 1p of it's 'head'. Perceptual relativity bundles the
individual piano notes of

Re: Math Question

On 31 Jul 2011, at 14:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Reblogging myself here, but curious to see what you think of the idea
that 1 cannot be proven greater than 0.

In which theory?

The notion of proof is theory and definition dependent. (contrary to
computability, which is absolute, by Church thesis).

If you agree to define x y by Ez(z+x = y)E = It exists. I
assume classical logic + the axioms:

x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)

0 denotes the number zero, and s(x) denotes the successor of x, often
noted as x+1. Cf the whole theory I gave last week. I use only a
subset of that theory here.

So we have to prove that 0 s(0). By the definition of above, we
have to prove that Ez(z + 0 = s(0))

But s(0) + 0 = s(0) by the axiom x + 0 = x given above.
So Ez(0 + z = s(0)) is true, with z = s(0). (This is the usual use of
the existence rule of classical logic).

Of course we could have taken the theory with the unique axiom 1 is
greater than 0. For all proposition we can always find a theory which
proves it. The interesting thing consists in proving new fact in some
fixed theory, and change only a theory when it fails to prove a fact
for which we have compelling evidences.

Bruno

Someone’s comment on the previous chart mentioned the difficulty
(impossibility?) of proving that 1 0. It’s an interesting kernel
there, and it reminds me of the whole “time does not physically
exist”

realization. On one level, I can think of zero as having no different
relation to 1 than it has with any other number. Zero does the same
thing to any number as it does to one and should be thought of more
properly as the hub of the decimal spiral.

I’m no mathematician, but I suppose that 0 is also formally defined
as

an integer between 1 and -1 or something. Still it exposes the
question of whether the elemental underpinnings of our ability to
count is really anchored in anything at all other than our own
anthropological conventions of counting. Beyond numbers themselves, it
appears that the whole quantitative notion - of greater than or less
than, and of ‘equal’ is nothing but a figment of our feelings
about

order. There may not be any inherent moreness to something than the
absence of something. If it’s the same thing, it actually seems more
palatable to see the absence of something being a condition predicated
upon the things’ a priori presence, no?

Even if we want to get into quantum atopoietic craziness where things
come out of nothing, rendering such a possibility discretely seems to
threaten the whole notion of mathematical coherence. If any or all
quantities, variables, and formulas can be generated arbitrarily from
0, then 0 would seem to be the same thing as ∞, and greater than 1
or

any other arithmetic expression.

Anthrodeximal Numberline
Maybe it’s time to create a new numberline, without all of the
repetitive decimal numerals. Instead there could be a Wiki of new
quantitative symbols and names which anyone can add to and own as a
permanent vector in the schema. It would be easy to translate them to
and from Arabic numerals online and some interesting possibilities for
informal encryption and unanticipated mathematic-linguistic
synchronicity.

By removing the aspect of repetition, we would unmask the semantic
bias of the math logos and arrive at a pure generic linear calibration
defined only in it’s own idiosyncratic a-signifying terms. Sort of
like breaking the mantra of math, it’s trance-like rhythms that
disguise it’s human neurological origin from us. By adding more
unique

qualitative sense to the thing, the quality-flattening power drains
out and the system seems to disqualify itself.

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
specification of any universal machine, will do.
Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.
You
just have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and
logically.

You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each
universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,
Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen
Robinson Arithmetic.

The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the
axioms:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers project
realities. With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little
ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend
on the choice of the first initial universal system.
All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,
that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not depend
on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a
lot, which are equivalent for the fundamental matter. They lead all
to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of
knowledge (Theaetetus).

We can debate the terms. I think calling universal systems a TOE is a bit of
a stretch. The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything. I don't think this can be
done through universal systems. It appears to me COMP allows for
uncomputable, and therefore unpredictable phenomena.
I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be predicted
precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?

COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which really
means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable. So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being a gap.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the
axioms:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which really
means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable. So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being a gap.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the
axioms:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which really
means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable. So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being a gap.
--
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Re: Math Question

On Jul 31, 9:49 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 In which theory?

 The notion of proof is theory and definition dependent. (contrary to  
 computability, which is absolute, by Church thesis).

 If you agree to define x  y by Ez(z+x = y)    E = It exists. I  
 assume classical logic + the axioms:

 x+0 = x
 x+s(y) = s(x+y)

 0 denotes the number zero, and s(x) denotes the successor of x, often  
 noted as x+1. Cf the whole theory I gave last week. I use only a  
 subset of that theory here.

 So we have to prove that 0  s(0). By the definition of  above, we  
 have to prove that Ez(z + 0 = s(0))
 But s(0) + 0 = s(0) by the axiom x + 0 = x given above.
 So  Ez(0 + z = s(0)) is true, with z = s(0). (This is the usual use of  
 the existence rule of classical logic).

 Of course we could have taken the theory with the unique axiom 1 is  
 greater than 0. For all proposition we can always find a theory which  
 proves it. The interesting thing consists in proving new fact in some  
 fixed theory, and change only a theory when it fails to prove a fact  
 for which we have compelling evidences.

How do we know that 0 has a successor though? If 0 x = x and x -0 = x
then maybe s(0)=0 or Ezs(0)... Can we disprove the idea that a
successor to zero does not exist? Sorry, I'm probably not at the
minimum level of competence to understand this.

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 31 Jul 2011, at 16:14, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order  
logical

specification of any universal machine, will do.

Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.
You
just have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and
logically.



You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each
universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,
Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen
Robinson Arithmetic.

The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and  
the

axioms:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers project
realities. With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little
ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend
on the choice of the first initial universal system.
All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,
that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not  
depend

on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a
lot, which are equivalent  for the fundamental matter. They lead all
to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of
knowledge (Theaetetus).



We can debate the terms.


OK.




I think calling universal systems a TOE is a bit of
a stretch.



Just to be precise, the TOE is not the universal system, but some  
first order classical logic, with equality, extension of the chosen  
universal system. OK. (the UMs and the LUMs are more like hero and  
heroin in the dramas the TOE allows)






The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.


A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is  
predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can  
predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you  
will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.





I don't think this can be
done through universal systems. It appears to me COMP allows for
uncomputable, and therefore unpredictable phenomena.


A lot. All surprises hide surprises.



I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much  
sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be  
predicted

precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?


The exact contrary. Comp is not just a change in  
'perspective' (Aristotle - Plato), but the discovery of a creative  
bomb (the UM).
With comp we begin to know that we don't know what we are doing. We  
can (machines can) understand that by trying to control it, we make it  
less controllable. A bit like a mother with a baby. That is not  
something entirely new, but here it appears in the 3-theories.






COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which  
really

means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable.


Absolutely so (assuming comp). comp = CT + yes doctor. CT subsumes  
arithmetic.





So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being  
a gap.


OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of  
almost everything.


But, you know, it is more than the necessity for a gap, it is the  
discovery that the gap 'kick back', it has a geometry, it is  
something and machines have access to it, they can point  
mathematical telescope on it, also.


Comp leads to a generalization of Everett's idea to apply QM to the  
observer. Comp applies arithmetic and meta-arithmetic (a part of  
arithmetic by Post, Gödel, Kleene  Co.) to the 'body' of the  
mathematician, or at least the one who say yes doctor to a doctor  
which serendipitously opts for the correct level, in a mathematical  
precise sense: in this case it inherits of the hypostases, and the  
logic of it determine the views you can have from inside. But the  
simplest thing you can say on those views is that they all make us  
more ignorant. The concrete relative Löbian machines get interesting  
on the border of the computable and non computable, where very deep  
sharable histories develop, in all case, from all views some mysteries  
subsists, and some key mystery, the gap, have a quasi life of its own.  
But *that* fact, that there are mysteries, is no more a mystery. And  
in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent picture of  
almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and  
this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.

And the point is not that this is true, but that this is testable.
Comp, not so much unlike salvia perhaps, put you

Re: Math Question



On 31 Jul 2011, at 17:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Jul 31, 9:49 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


In which theory?

The notion of proof is theory and definition dependent. (contrary to
computability, which is absolute, by Church thesis).

If you agree to define x  y by Ez(z+x = y)E = It exists. I
assume classical logic + the axioms:

x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)

0 denotes the number zero, and s(x) denotes the successor of x, often
noted as x+1. Cf the whole theory I gave last week. I use only a
subset of that theory here.

So we have to prove that 0  s(0). By the definition of  above, we
have to prove that Ez(z + 0 = s(0))
But s(0) + 0 = s(0) by the axiom x + 0 = x given above.
So  Ez(0 + z = s(0)) is true, with z = s(0). (This is the usual use  
of

the existence rule of classical logic).

Of course we could have taken the theory with the unique axiom 1 is
greater than 0. For all proposition we can always find a theory  
which

proves it. The interesting thing consists in proving new fact in some
fixed theory, and change only a theory when it fails to prove a fact
for which we have compelling evidences.


How do we know that 0 has a successor though? If 0 x = x and x -0 = x
then maybe s(0)=0 or Ezs(0)... Can we disprove the idea that a
successor to zero does not exist?


No. 0 is primitive term, and the language allows the term s(t) for all  
term t, so you have the terms 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.
The rest follows from the axioms For all x 0 ≠ s(x), s(x) = s(y) - x  
= y (so that all numbers have only one successor.  So you can, prove,  
even without induction, that 0 has a unique successor, different from  
itself.





Sorry, I'm probably not at the
minimum level of competence to understand this.



I look on the net, but I see errors (Wolfram's definition is Dedekind  
Arithmetic!)? On wiki, the definition of Peano arithmetic seems  
correct. You need to study some elementary textbook in mathematical  
logic. Most presentation assumes you know what is first order  
predicate logic. You can google on those terms. There are good books,  
but it is a bit involved subject and ask for some works. Peano  
Arithmetic is the simplest example of Löbian theory or machines or  
belief system. It is very powerful. You light take time to find an  
arithmetical proposition that you can prove to be true and that she  
can't, especially without using the technics for doing that. Most  
interesting theorem in usual (non Logic) mathematics can be prove in  
or by PA. And PA, like all Löbian machine, can prove its own Gödel  
theorem (if I am consistent then I cannot prove that I am  
consistent). The I is a 3-I.


Bruno




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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
relations exist
and all else is an epistemological view on that is a very narrow
interpretation.

Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
combinatoric truth, etc.
It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
How exactly do we know that these epistemological truths are secondary / not
ontological? I don't really see how COMP does tell us that, as it could well
be that the assumptions COMP makes (including consciousness exists, in
order to say yes, doctor) are in some sense equivalent to the
epistemological points of view whose existence we derive from the
assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be proven),
but for me it seems like this is the case.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On 31 Jul 2011, at 18:24, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

order to say yes, doctor) are in some sense equivalent to the
epistemological points of view whose existence we derive from the
assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be
proven),

but for me it seems like this is the case.

It is just that we don't need to assume them. It is like the invisible
horses pulling a car. You can reify the epistemological truth in some
ontology, but there is no need to do that, and it makes the MB problem
more difficult. In science, you can never proof that a theory is
wrong, by changing ad-hocly the way you interpret the data. The
epistemological view are secondary because they are recovered by the
way machine looks at the arithmetical reality. The simplest ontology
are the numbers, and the internal view, including the physical, are
given by the arithmetical modalities, like Bp and Bp Dp, or the less
arithmetical one, like Bp p, Bp Dp p, etc. At least in the toy
theology based on the Theaetetus definition of knowledge (justified
opinion which happens to be God's opinion (I mean which happens to be
true)).

Bruno

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Re: bruno list

2011-07-31 Thread Stephen P. King


On 7/31/2011 1:19 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Jul 30, 10:30 pm, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com  wrote:


So the only sturcture in the universe that can perceive are neurons or
groups of neurons?

No, not at all. Everything perceives like what it is,

Even software?

Software isn't a thing in the way I'm using the word. It's an idea
that informs a thing.


What determines what software feels?

The thing it runs on. When you play a computer game, you are running
software on your brain. It feels like a computer game to you. If it
runs on a computer with nobody playing it, there is no computer game
being played, just circuits switching rhythmically.


It can build a something larger, it just doesn't necessarily cohere as
a single entity, and if it did, it may not resemble ourselves.

But it could?

I don't see why not. There might be a reason, but we wouldn't likely
know it.


And if it were designed with the same organization as a smaller sized brain,
why wouldn't it?

Organization alone is meaningless. To change the size of the brain
runs into problems with the chemistry.


The conjoined twins show that brains can be combined. It's the
material and the function.

 From this it follows that a China brain would have mental states: it has the
same material and function.

A person standing next to another person is not the same thing as a
molecule next to another molecule. If the Earth as a whole has a
mental state, it may very well be able to use some arrangement of
human bodies as a kind of neuron or something. On the scale of a
planet, all of that molten iron and nickel swirling around may have a
kind of consciousness that dwarfs our own. It won't be an animal
feeling, with adrenaline and oxytocin emotions, but it could be
unfathomably beautiful to be the biosphere and atmosphere, crust,
mantle, and core with centuries passing like minutes.



how do you figure? A human body is the same thing as a molecule in a
neuron?

A human brain is made of neurons, the china brain is made of neurons.  (The
brains of many individuals each functioning as a neuron does in a more
conventional brain)

Oh hold on. I read it wrong. Sorry . I thought the whole group was
collectively acting as a single neuron. The problem is that acting
like we think a neuron acts and being a neuron are two different
things. If they did a China match instead, where each person pretended
to be a molecule of phosphorous or whatever, there would be no way to
make them act like fire so that there would be heat, flame, etc. The
fact that the brain scales up from neurons is a crazy miraculous
fragile thing, not a mechanical consequence of any old thing times a
billion acting in a certain way. The way it acts is important, but
only if what it is that's acting that way is the appropriate match for
the actions.



Church-Turing is false.

If you can demonstrate this you will become famous, and probably win a
Turing award (comes with $250,000).

It's false and it's not falsifiable because it's defining one process
as a function of the other, when in fact they are the same process.


  Explain why fire cannot be
simulated by water?

Because fire is a reaction which produces heat and light, and water
does not.

That is not an argument against my assertion that a Turing machine made of
water can simulate the heat light and reaction products of fire.

Heat and light cannot be simulated. They are experiences. It doesn't
matter what the Turing machine is made of if it is not combustible.


Again, you're just bringing the assumptions of a flawed model to their
absurd conclusions. Not trying to criticize you personally, I'm just
saying it's plain that water cannot simulate fire.

You are confusing the exterior and interior.  On the interior there is fire,
in the exterior there is a Turing machine made of water.

I understand what you're saying, but you're not getting my points. The
interior of a machine made of ice has the interior experience of a
machine made of ice, regardless of what that machine is doing. The
experience you have is an experience you are having regardless of what
you are doing or perceiving - it's a human experience.


On the interior
there is thought and sensation, in the exterior there is a brain.  On the
interior is thought and sensation, in the exterior there is a man-made
computer.

Yes, except the thought of a computer is not understanding, it's just
circuit navigation. The computer isn't a gestalt entity except in our
experience. Pieces can burn out and it will never know the difference
as a whole, different components will just have shorter circuits to
run.


Your ice fire makes
no heat, consumes no fuel.

Not externally, but it would internally.

I understand why that makes sense, but it's incorrect. Heat cannot be
simulated and it cannot be generated by an abstraction. There is no
numerical formula which can create heat in and of itself.

Craig


Hi Guys,

Strangely enough, our best explanation of heat tells us that heat 
is

Re: Math Question

2011-07-31 Thread Stephen P. King




On 7/31/2011 8:15 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Reblogging myself here, but curious to see what you think of the idea
that 1 cannot be proven greater than 0.

Someone’s comment on the previous chart mentioned the difficulty
(impossibility?) of proving that 1  0. It’s an interesting kernel
there, and it reminds me of the whole “time does not physically exist”
realization. On one level, I can think of zero as having no different
relation to 1 than it has with any other number. Zero does the same
thing to any number as it does to one and should be thought of more
properly as the hub of the decimal spiral.

I’m no mathematician, but I suppose that 0 is also formally defined as
an integer between 1 and -1 or something. Still it exposes the
question of whether the elemental underpinnings of our ability to
count is really anchored in anything at all other than our own
anthropological conventions of counting. Beyond numbers themselves, it
appears that the whole quantitative notion - of greater than or less
than, and of ‘equal’ is nothing but a figment of our feelings about
order. There may not be any inherent moreness to something than the
absence of something. If it’s the same thing, it actually seems more
palatable to see the absence of something being a condition predicated
upon the things’ a priori presence, no?

Even if we want to get into quantum atopoietic craziness where things
come out of nothing, rendering such a possibility discretely seems to
threaten the whole notion of mathematical coherence. If any or all
quantities, variables, and formulas can be generated arbitrarily from
0, then 0 would seem to be the same thing as ∞, and greater than 1 or
any other arithmetic expression.

Anthrodeximal Numberline
Maybe it’s time to create a new numberline, without all of the
repetitive decimal numerals. Instead there could be a Wiki of new
quantitative symbols and names which anyone can add to and own as a
permanent vector in the schema. It would be easy to translate them to
and from Arabic numerals online and some interesting possibilities for
informal encryption and unanticipated mathematic-linguistic
synchronicity.

By removing the aspect of repetition, we would unmask the semantic
bias of the math logos and arrive at a pure generic linear calibration
defined only in it’s own idiosyncratic a-signifying terms. Sort of
like breaking the mantra of math, it’s trance-like rhythms that
disguise it’s human neurological origin from us. By adding more unique
qualitative sense to the thing, the quality-flattening power drains
out and the system seems to disqualify itself.


Hi Craig,
Umm, what would be the point of coming up with yet another 
representation system for quantities? We already established that a 
description is not its referent even though for every referent there is 
at least one description and for every description there is at least one 
referent. Zero, 0, null, the empty set is an absence of sorts; a 
placeholder. So in that sense it is a referent and just as space is 'the 
place where referents could be but are not', so too is 0.


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.

A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is
predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can
predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you
will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.
OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end. Is there a
result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical laws
from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much
sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be
predicted
precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?

The exact contrary. Comp is not just a change in
'perspective' (Aristotle - Plato), but the discovery of a creative
bomb (the UM).
With comp we begin to know that we don't know what we are doing. We
can (machines can) understand that by trying to control it, we make it
less controllable. A bit like a mother with a baby. That is not
something entirely new, but here it appears in the 3-theories.
Right. That's why we could almost say COMP is an anti-TOE.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being
a gap.

OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of
almost everything.
Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at all.
Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever explain,
as there is infinitely much to explain!). If anything, it shows there is an
infinite hierarchy of ever more efficient theories.
Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's not make
the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist materialists.
This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and honest
seems more important to me.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

But *that* fact, that there are mysteries, is no more a mystery.
At the cost that the very foundation of our theory is mysterious! We use a
mystery to explain that there are more mysteries. Which is the best we can
ever do - how exciting!

Bruno Marchal wrote:

And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent picture of
almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an encoding
scheme, still we wouldn't call . a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 Jul 2011, at 18:24, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
combinatoric truth, etc.
It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
How exactly do we know that these epistemological truths are
secondary / not
ontological? I don't really see how COMP does tell us that, as it
could well
be that the assumptions COMP makes (including consciousness
exists, in
order to say yes, doctor) are in some sense equivalent to the
epistemological points of view whose existence we derive from the
assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be
proven),
but for me it seems like this is the case.

It is just that we don't need to assume them. It is like the invisible
horses pulling a car.

True, but consciousness is there without being assumed. The theory cannot
just ignore that.
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Re: bruno list

2011-07-31 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 31.07.2011 19:12 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 7/31/2011 1:19 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


...


Your ice fire makes no heat, consumes no fuel.

Not externally, but it would internally.

I understand why that makes sense, but it's incorrect. Heat cannot
be simulated and it cannot be generated by an abstraction. There is
no numerical formula which can create heat in and of itself.

Craig


Hi Guys,

Strangely enough, our best explanation of heat tells us that heat is
a statistical properties of the motions of molecules. How is that?


You can formally define heat in classical thermodynamics as well, for 
example


dQ = dU + dW

Well, the First Law is used to define the internal energy, but there is 
a trick. You start with an adiabatic process then you have the internal 
energy through the pure work and then you can go for the heat.


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Re: bruno list

On Jul 31, 9:16 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 Hi Craig,

 Sorry for having take some time to comment your posts. I will be busy
 the two next weeks, so be patient for possible comments.
 I comment all your 3 posts addressed to me in one mail.

Thanks, yeah no rush. It seems like we might be going in circles, I
keep thinking that I should try to sum up the core issues where we
agree and disagree: Mainly I think that your model features arithmetic
as a primitive, whereas I see arithmetic as a subjective experience,
and that the relation of subjectivity to objectivity is primitive to
me. Consequently it follows from your model that we would be able to
produce Turing consciousness mathematically in any physical or
informational medium whereas my model posits that consciousness is not
produced but rather is the elaborated 1p correlate to 3p neurology x
zoology x biology x chemistry x physics.

  On 28 Jul 2011, at 17:41, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  To
  say that it is representational is to conflate the referent and the
  signifier.

 Not at all. It is a bet on the invariance of our subjective experience
 on a substitution level. Biology illustrates already the idea in the
 language of chemistry.
 Comp does not imply that everything is representational, nor that
 Turing machine can simulate everything. On the contrary, some
 machine's attributes are not Turing emulable.

What machine attributes are not Turing emulable? I thought Church says
that all real computations are Turing emulable.

  In order for the machine to STOP, there doesn't
  automatically need to exist a 1p experience of a red sign.

 It depends on the machine. In the case of human, there usually are 1p
 experience. I assume comp.

But stopping can be accomplished without the existence of any specific
1p experience, right?

  In our 1p,
  we see a red stop sign as a qualitative image, we understand it as a
  symbolic text, we interpret it as a pragmatic condition that motivates
  us to respond with motor commands to our body to push the brake, the
  brake stops the car.

 Yes. But that is not an argument that some machine cannot do that. In
 the comp theory, there is no need to eliminate the 1p experience.
 Don't confuse the comp theory, and its misuse by materialists.

I'm trying to establish that a machine does not automatically do this.
I only know comp theory from what I've learned from you.

  Through our interpretation we re-present the
  signifier, which is a representation-neutral experience of presented
  color, shape, size, and context. As the machine is a reverse
  engineered logic, we have no reason to presume that our signifier -
  the red light or sign, is presented just because a command is sent to
  the processor queue to stop the car when the ccd in the camera
  encounters electromagnetic changes of a particular sampled
  configuration.

 You are right, but this only means that we fail on the correct
 substitution level.
 If we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, nor really
 which computations go through, but we still face something partially
 explainable.

Yes, substitution level is the thing. I don't see the level as a
simple point on a one dimensional continuum though. It's punctuated by
qualitative paradigmatic leaps of synergy. Thus the big deal between
an organism being alive or not. The entropy cost is not uniform, just
as the different hues in the visible spectrum seem to appear to us as
qualitative regions of color despite the uniform arithmetic of
frequency on the band. Let's say that human consciousness spans the
spectrum from red (sensation) to violet (abstract thought) with
phenomena such as emotion, ego, etc in the orange-yellow-green zone. I
think that a computer chip is like taking something which is pre-
sensation (silicon detection = infra-red) and reverse engineering
around the back of the spectrum to ultra-violet: abstraction without
thought. If we want to go further backward into our visible spectrum
from the end, I think we would have to push forward more from the
beginning. You need something more sensitive than stone semiconductors
to get into the visible red wavelengths in order to have the 1p
experience get into the violet level of actual thought. Or maybe that
wouldn't work and you would have to build through each level from the
bottom (red) up.

  It's going to stop the car whether there is an
  experience of a sign or not. I say that there is an experience, but
  it's likely not remotely like a human signifier and would compare as
  one piano note compared to an entire symphony, if not the sum of
  hundreds of symphonies filtered through different molecular, cellular,
  physiological, neurological, and psychological audiences.

 My point works even if you decided that your generalized brain (the
 part of reality I need to emulate to get your consciousness preserved)
 is given by the quantum rational Heisenberg matrix, of the whole
 cluster of galaxies, at the level of

Re: bruno list

On Jul 31, 1:12 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:

 Hi Guys,

      Strangely enough, our best explanation of heat tells us that heat
 is a statistical properties of the motions of molecules. How is that?


I say that's the 3p view of it. Heat definitely makes molecules move,
but it is the interior 1p excitement of molecules which corresponds to
the movement. Both the 1p and 3p phenomena are both causes and
symptoms of heat.

Craig

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Re: Math Question

On Jul 31, 11:58 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  How do we know that 0 has a successor though? If 0 x = x and x -0 = x
  then maybe s(0)=0 or Ezs(0)... Can we disprove the idea that a
  successor to zero does not exist?

 No. 0 is primitive term, and the language allows the term s(t) for all  
 term t, so you have the terms 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.

It sounds like you're saying that it's a given that 0 has a successor
and therefore doesn't need to be proved.

 The rest follows from the axioms For all x 0 ≠ s(x), s(x) = s(y) - x  
 = y (so that all numbers have only one successor.  So you can, prove,  
 even without induction, that 0 has a unique successor, different from  
 itself.

  Sorry, I'm probably not at the
  minimum level of competence to understand this.

 I look on the net, but I see errors (Wolfram's definition is Dedekind  
 Arithmetic!)? On wiki, the definition of Peano arithmetic seems  
 correct. You need to study some elementary textbook in mathematical  
 logic. Most presentation assumes you know what is first order  
 predicate logic. You can google on those terms. There are good books,  
 but it is a bit involved subject and ask for some works. Peano  
 Arithmetic is the simplest example of Löbian theory or machines or  
 belief system. It is very powerful. You light take time to find an  
 arithmetical proposition that you can prove to be true and that she  
 can't, especially without using the technics for doing that. Most  
 interesting theorem in usual (non Logic) mathematics can be prove in  
 or by PA. And PA, like all Löbian machine, can prove its own Gödel  
 theorem (if I am consistent then I cannot prove that I am  
 consistent). The I is a 3-I.

Thanks, I'll see if I can nibble on it sometime.

Craig

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Re: Math Question