Re: Stenger reviews "The Grand Design"
Yes, excellent review - but I don't think they have yet broached the central mechanist concept of immateriality. I haven't read the book but I don't think Hawking has ever referred explicitly to the contradiction inherent in the mind-body problem. It may be that Bruno is ahead of the lot of them - Deutsch included. Kim Jones On 14/08/2011, at 3:40 PM, meekerdb wrote: > My friend, Vic Stenger, sees Hawking and Mlodinow as adopting theory close to > Bruno's > > http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/the-grand-accident_b_777249.html > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Stenger reviews "The Grand Design"
My friend, Vic Stenger, sees Hawking and Mlodinow as adopting theory close to Bruno's http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/the-grand-accident_b_777249.html Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 13, 8:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > The artificial device must replicate all the I/O behaviour of the > original neurons at the interface with the rest of the brain. This is > purely a problem for engineers who neither know nor care about qualia. What I and others are pointing out is that how you define 'I/O behavior' is the determining factor of the thought experiment. For example (from http://themedicalbiochemistrypage.org/nerves.html): "Acetylcholine (ACh) is a simple molecule synthesized from choline and acetyl-CoA through the action of choline acetyltransferase. Neurons that synthesize and release ACh are termed cholinergic neurons. When an action potential reaches the terminal button of a presynaptic neuron a voltage-gated calcium channel is opened. The influx of calcium ions, Ca2+, stimulates the exocytosis of presynaptic vesicles containing ACh, which is thereby released into the synaptic cleft. Once released, ACh must be removed rapidly in order to allow repolarization to take place; this step, hydrolysis, is carried out by the enzyme, acetylcholinesterase. The acetylcholinesterase found at nerve endings is anchored to the plasma membrane through a glycolipid." So, in order to replicate the I/O behavior of a single axon of a neuron that traffics in ACh, are you talking about engineering a nanotech factory which eats the right amount of choline (if not, you'd have an excess of choline building up in the replaced areas of the brain), and produces genuine ACh? Are you talking about having an artificial glycolipid holding a supply of acetylcholinesterase to accomplish hydrolysis to enable repolarization like the other neurons of that type? You can't simulate the production of those substances electronically or produce them inorganically, so any replacement system would be based on organic chemistry. If you were able to accomplish the production of those substances as well as conduct electric signals properly, that still only scratches the surface of the physiological issues. From http://www.mind.ilstu.edu/curriculum/neurons_intro/neurons_intro.php : "While we are considering numbers, it is worth noting that there are as many as 50 times more glia than neurons in our CNS! Glia (or glial cells) are the cells that provide support to the neurons. In much the same way that the foundation, framework, walls, and roof of a house prove the structure through which run various electric, cable, and telephone lines, along with various pipes for water and waste, not only do glia provide the structural framework that allows networks of neurons to remain connected, they also attend to the brain's various house keeping functions (such as removing debris after neuronal death). " If your replacement neurons don't die, then you're changing the relationship of them to 98% of the cells in the brain and the I/O is different to the ecosystem overall. If you could manage to engineer a replacement component which satisfies all of those electrical, biological, and chemical roles, but still somehow manages to be, in some significant way 'not a living cell' then there is still the matter of whether or not the cell body itself is the thing that actually experiences the various inputs and determines the outputs according to uncomputable awareness-based algorithms or whether experience somehow arises metaphysically through the aggregate of unexperienced mechanical I/Os which can be replicated deterministically. If the former case is true, the replacement cell body may not be able to produce the organic sense required to modulate the functions of the cell in it's native improvisational mode so that it will neither fool surrounding tissues nor perform the critical experiential function in between inputs and outputs which would form the meat of perception and awareness. If the latter case is true, there is no way to tell whether the metaphysical requirements form instantiating high level awareness could be satisfied by the design of the replacement. The exact mechanism by which dumb I/Os are translated into nonphysical emergent properties would have to be fully understood in order to accomplish substitution by engineering. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 8/13/2011 5:00 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sun, Aug 14, 2011 at 12:47 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: How could the rest of your brain possibly respond differently if it receives exactly the same stimulation? Perhaps you mean that it would be able to tell that there is an artificial device there due to electric fields and so on; but in that case the artificial device is not appropriately reproducing the I/O behaviour of the original tissue. The question is what does it mean the same stimulation. I guess that you mean now only electrical signals. However, it well might be the qualia plays the role as well. The artificial device must replicate all the I/O behaviour of the original neurons at the interface with the rest of the brain. This is purely a problem for engineers who neither know nor care about qualia. The question is, given that the engineering problem is solved, would consciousness necessarily be preserved? I think it would, because otherwise we would have a partial zombie. If I understand you correctly, you presume that conscious experience could be resolved within 'normal science' (there is no Hard Problem). Jeffrey Gray on the other hand acknowledges the Hard Problem and he believes that a new scientific theory will be needed to solve it. In the recent posts I do not propose any theory of consciousness, I am just interested in whether consciousness would be preserved if I had my brain replaced with artificial components. If the answer is "yes" that still does not explain why we are conscious at all or how consciousness is generated. "Preserved" is ambiguous. If you mean "unchanged" then I don't think the argument shows that, since the replacement part has some part of consciousness associated with it which could be different even though the interface with the biological part is perfectly replicated for almost all possible input/output. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Sun, Aug 14, 2011 at 12:47 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >> How could the rest of your brain possibly respond differently if it >> receives exactly the same stimulation? Perhaps you mean that it >> would be able to tell that there is an artificial device there due >> to electric fields and so on; but in that case the artificial device >> is not appropriately reproducing the I/O behaviour of the original >> tissue. > > The question is what does it mean the same stimulation. I guess that you > mean now only electrical signals. However, it well might be the qualia plays > the role as well. The artificial device must replicate all the I/O behaviour of the original neurons at the interface with the rest of the brain. This is purely a problem for engineers who neither know nor care about qualia. The question is, given that the engineering problem is solved, would consciousness necessarily be preserved? I think it would, because otherwise we would have a partial zombie. > If I understand you correctly, you presume that conscious experience could > be resolved within 'normal science' (there is no Hard Problem). Jeffrey Gray > on the other hand acknowledges the Hard Problem and he believes that a new > scientific theory will be needed to solve it. In the recent posts I do not propose any theory of consciousness, I am just interested in whether consciousness would be preserved if I had my brain replaced with artificial components. If the answer is "yes" that still does not explain why we are conscious at all or how consciousness is generated. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
We are going in circles, because I am just totally unable to explain what I mean. I guess because words can't convey what I want to convey. Probably I am trying to argue something that is incommunicable, like you kindly reminded me. On many levels I could just agree with you. But on a very important level I disagree, but unfortunately the point I disagree with is subtle. It seems to me you are confusing representation and actuality, but I am not sure this is precisely it, either. So I am not going to argue anymore, it seems pointless. I am just making a few comments regardless. If you want to respond, I am happy, but I will probably not get into a debate about what's right and wrong. All I can say to the debate whether your TOE is dependent on consciousness is that it may not assume consciousness, but this doesn't mean it's independent of it, or prior to it. And the fact that it derived from numbers within the theory still doesn't mean that it is in actuality the reason for it. But obviously I can't prove that it isn't. I am just stating a (strong) intuition. I guess there is no point argueing over that. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> It's self-reliant, and is making >> sense of itself. > But what is it? People never agree on any definition of consciousness. > I have no clue what consciousness really is, or how to define it. But I feel that it is still obvious (on some level), somehow. I guess we will eternally learn about it, without ever figuring it out completely. Probably we will infinitely continue opening ever more astonishing mysteries that are answers and questions at the same time. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> But there is >> no need to do this, as consciousness is perfectly self-explanatory and >> self-explaining. > > If that was true, we would not need to have this conversation. There > would not be journals on consciousness studies, etc. There would be no > question like "is and how would consciousness be related to the > brain?", or "can computer thinks?", Etc. > All of this things are consciousness explaining itself to itself! Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I got the feeling you are confusing the inner god and the outer god, > like you might confuse consciousness and cosmic consciousness. I know > that from the point of view of cosmic consciousness they are > equivalent. But from that point of view the physical universe does not > exist, and does not need to be explained. > >From my perspective the physical universe is a manifestation of cosmic consciousness, so it is very real, and needs an explanation (but not an explanation apart from consciousness, but within it). Bruno Marchal wrote: > > The question is why do you take as obvious that consciousness cannot > be explained, or explained at some degree n%. > I can't answer this question in some logical sense. It is just obvious that there can be no external explanation, as there is obviously no exterior to consciousness. And it is equally obvious that all internal explanations are incomplete, as explaining yourself is always a bit like a dog chasing its tail (well, a lot more productive and interesting ;) ). Bruno Marchal wrote: > > So the needle falling in the forest not only does not make any noise, > but it makes also no vibrations in the air? I doubt it. > It makes a noise, and it makes vibrations. We are just not very aware of it. It is part of our sub-conscious. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Let us assume that physician are correct and that there has been a big > bang. What was the qualia when the first particles appeared? > I don't think it can be attributed a particular qualia. The closer we get to the big bang, the less the notions of attributing a particular qualia to particular things make sense, because there was no differentiation of consciousness there. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Hmm... With comp, God knows if there is an infinity of twin primes. > The inner God tends to know almost nothing of that kind. It knows just > a finite extendible part of it. > > Do *you* know if there is an infinity of twin primes? > One moment I believe there is. One moment I believe there is not. If we define knowledge as true belief, I knew it either at the first, or the second moment. :P Seriously, I believe that God doesn't need to be explicitly aware of every single fact as a single fact. This would just make God go insane. It is enough that he knows the answer sub-consciously. Whether he can recover this fact, and so bring it to the center of his attention doesn't really matter. God's attention is not logically forced to be on every single fact as a seperate fact. Actually, this would be extremely tedious, even hellish. It isn't necessary, either, as there is a unfying truth behind it all (at least I bet on it). Bruno Marchal wrote: > > The sense you do is a making of your brain. The absolute sense, of > 1+1=2, is what God's sense, as you told me. You continue to talk like > if you were God. With
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
On 8/13/2011 12:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: True, but why doesn't the millions of odd electron interactions within the cell cancel out the effect of the straightness of the photon paths? I would think that the retina would have to be an immaculate crystalline surface rather than a lumpy community of breathing protein sacs in order to retain the integrity of the photon pattern. If the visual cortex can compensate for all of that, as well as movements of the eyeball and head, it seems like it could read through the patterns of photon interactions just as our auditory nerve hears through the acoustic collisions of charged particles as they interact and interfere. Sorry, I don't have the time to teach physics on this list. Others may be better qaulified anyway or you could read a textbook. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Should Math Be Taught in School
By not teaching math to kids, we are dumbing down the next generation. Of course, most people do not have a talent for math, but then most people do not have a talent for writing either. A few hundered years ago, only a small fraction of the population was taught to read and write. If you had proposed hat everyone should learn it, you would have been ridiculed. The argument that we shouldn't teach math to children because it isn't of direct use to most people, is a nonsensical argument. We don't apply that argument to any school subject, except to math and physics (perhaps also astronomy, we don't teach anything about that in school). So, while there isn't much practical use in knowing a lot about Europe in the Middle ages, we do spend quite a lot of time about this subject already in primary school. This does add a lot to the cultural baggage of children as they grow up. You can make the same argument about astronomy, physics and math. Surely, being able to understand at some appropriate level how the elements were formed in stars, how the Sun formed etc. etc. would add a lot to the general background of citizens. If people would not learn about history, literature, etc. a lot of our culture would de-facto go to waste. If no one knows about the works of Shakespeare, then it wouldn't matter if Shakespeare had not bothered to write his plays. In case of math and physics, we are actually in this sort of a situation. The great masses are scientific illiterates, most of the scientific achievements, even the ancient ones are inaccesible to most, simply because we choose not teach science in schools, beyond the very basics. This does have some negative consequences for society. E.g. most people cannot see through the nonsensical arguments put forward by climate change deniers, the position people have on this is then determined by their political color, (particularly in the US as there the Republican party mostly denies global warming caused by man). Saibal Citeren Pilar Morales : I agree that math should probably not be taught in school, but algebra. In elementary school. But, all the student's questions would lead to math... On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 11:33 AM, John Mikes wrote: After a resounding "NO" the question: "who's math?" I find it absolutely inevitable to include in the obligatory general school curriculum "a certain" math, necessary to calculate, to balance a check-book, to file a tax return, to make (basic) business accounting and the practical 'figuring out' of life's quantitative aspects. Not the Euler theorem, or a Cauchy integral. Also a glimps of concepts like imaginary, complex, infinite, calculus, etc. not to the level of application, but at least to a dictionary identification. I find it belonging to a general educational level, way above of the average newscast. There are many kids with definite 'antitalent' for math, they should not be tortured, just taught conceptually. It should not be a go/no go for college, in general. Somebody can write beautiful historic poems, paint, or write a symphony without calculus-knowledge. A heart-surgeon can operate without knowing the math of a pacemaker-physics. And it may be a 'godsend' if economists would not be mathematicians, rather normal, logical people. Anyway the "pretty girls" are no real authorities in the question. On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb wrote: ** Are you the kind of person who knows math? http://videosift.com/video/Miss-USA-2011-Should-Math-Be-Taught-In-Schools Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/e
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 13, 1:39 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 12 Aug 2011, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > The further our imaginary reality is from our own > > PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences > > that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically. > > How would you justify that? Because the interior of the PRIF is private, and the more morphologically different the target PRIF is, the smaller the bandwidth we have to describe it in our own PRIF's terms. It's signal attenuation by the density of aggregate semantic mismatch, sort of like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple privacies. > >> What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in front > >> of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a > >> reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive belief in > >> a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief > >> in > >> a separation between the believer and the believed. > > > I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as to > > what they will be able to believe or develop. > > What do you mean by "physically"? What kind of materials they are physically composed of. Metal, cells, organisms, etc. > > If you execute the > > machine in silicon, you're going to have a polite glass sculpture of > > belief, not a fierce, viscerally passionate belief. > > So mind is something physical and non Turing emulable. It's both non Turing emulable physical and Turing emulable logical. The intersection of the overlap between the two topologies. >But we don't > know anything physical which is not either Turing emulable, or > recovered by self-indetermination (like in quantum superposition). So, > to solve a problem, you are introducing more mystery than there is > already. I don't see how this can solve anything. In french we call > that a "fuite en avant" (forward-escape). It's not the topology of the physical objects which we can encounter externally which is non Turing emulable, it's the private interior which we can only guess at through out own imagination. It's not a cypher though, it's just metaphorical. Objects cannot tell us what they mean, but through our understanding of what they mean to us, personally and collectively, we can get a reading through the alchemical prism that may partially correlate to external emulables. It's not necessary to solve the mystery but to acknowledge that mystery is a legitimate primitive phenomena of the cosmos. > > The math alone can > > create a correspondence as-if it were true, but only the physics > > With the comp theory, physics is an emerging pattern in the mind of > numbers. A good thing, because I don't take physics for granted, at > least not in a primitively grounded way. It can still be an emerging pattern in the mind, but the experience of it goes beyond what could be achieved or anticipated through pure mathematics. It's a pattern with one side as quantitative sequential sophistication and the other as qualitative simultaneous simplicity. > > can > > create the conditions of true through experience in spite of logic, > > which is what gives the believer not only separation but something of > > a trump-card privilege over the believed. > > I can follow you, but it makes both mind and matter rather magical. It's not magical but it explains the existence of the feeling of, or desire for magical. It's the potential of teleology to actualize itself, defined by and in contradistinction to, the inertial of teleonomy to limit teleological actualization. > > In a contest of math v > > physics, I think the physical can generate novelties in advance of > > math, > > But what is the physical? Physical is the tails side of the coin of awareness. Awareness and experience inside out. It's like your two universal machines except that they are the same machine twisted into a Mobius strip, meeting itself through the mutual ignorance of objectification rather than through mathematical correspondence - scrambled through the maximal decoherence and mystery to slow down the inevitable rush toward re- singularity so that every part must fight to find it's place in the whole. > > so that the arithmetic is an analytical afterthought. > > How to explain that the physical obeys to the arithmetical? How will > you explain the role of math in physics? Our perception obeys mathematical laws when it examines physical external phenomena. That is how physical objects are rendered as separate from hallucinations which are dynamic, fluid, self referential, metaphorical, and non-mathematical. Physics is mathematical...to us. Our experiences may very well be mathematical to the universe (which is a comp friendly thought, right?) but to try to execute our own mathematical sense as if it were universally mathematical I think fails because we are missing the perspectives outside of our minds. We need help from the work that has already been done by
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 13, 1:10 pm, Pilar Morales wrote: > Craig, I'm wondering what would make my internal processes come up with not > identical, but similar conclusions to what your theory seems to suggest. I love it. That's what I'm looking for, agreement or disagreement that I can agree with. > I went through your page and could relate to the questions you posed and saw a > reflection of my own tendencies to integrate absolutely everything I > observe, internally and externally into a category to explain everything. To > me, anything I think that sounds new-agey is an internal tell tale that I'm > going in the wrong direction. It's just the way my compass is calibrated, > but I don't deny its existence. It's hard for me to get across two seemingly paradoxical motivations I have with this info. On the one hand I feel like I have to really come down hard on the OMMM worldview because I feel like our intelligence, individually and collectively, is at the far extreme of the pendulum swing at this time in our history, and that many of the problems of civilization are a consequence of this extremism. It seems like if I don't take a really critical stance at the problems I see with it, then my ideas will automatically be seen as able to be integrated or dismissed within the prevailing paradigm rather than offer a comprehensive shift from it. On the other hand, I want to make it clear that individually and collectively we NEED this extreme quantitative logical skill as well. I'm not anti-science, I'm saying that science needs to go further and embrace all phenomena that we encounter and not just what can be neatly nailed down. We need to be objective about subjectivity and not be seduced by the sentimental attachment to literalism when understanding processes of metaphor. So yes, it's extremely important that some of us focus exclusively on the their specialty areas of consciousness, but I think the world desperately needs a new general worldview that embraces subjectivity scientifically, without reducing it to mechanism, so that civilization doesn't regress into fundamentalism, and so that we can move forward into an era of post- religion, post-materialism. > My... intuition? tells me that it is all math, holy math if you will. An > abstract class where we, humans and atoms alike, invoke and experience its > instantiations. I agree, holy math is part of it, but I think that profane physics is the other part. Pain and pleasure are not reducible to numbers. Qualia must be experienced first hand or not at all. In the qualitative realm, math is a forensic afterthought that is of limited use, just as New Age intuition is a naive jumping to conclusions that is is of limited use in the quantitative realm. It's still in there though, otherwise anyone could be a math genius. You have to have a feel for numbers, know them intimately, love their patterns rather than fear them, etc. There is subjectivity there too. > Regarding your thoughts on photon behavior, it seemed to me that you are > saying that photons are the quantum entanglement of spacetime. Close, but I also think that spacetime itself doesn't exist independently of matter and energy. Space is literally nothing but the relation between two material objects and time is nothing but the relation between experiences (energy, events, and experience are more or less the same thing. It's an inter-subjective perception of change from one state to another). >That they > don't really travel through a medium, but that they will manifest through > the entanglement of a sender and a receiver? Right. It's sort of an unimagining of the model we assume when we turn on a radio. We have been taught that there are radio waves in the atmosphere, whereas my model describes an antenna imitating a broadcast tower by tuning into the same metallic mood frequency. You are listening to your ears hearing a speaker amplified antenna which is hearing a radio tower that is broadcasting a microphone that is hearing vocal chords being motivated by a human mind. They are all calling out to each other in their own languages to share the same mathematical invariance, yet the math is meaningless without being listened to in the right way by the right organizations of the right materials. The organization alone is not a radio show. The math is wavy, and it propagates in a wave like pattern terrestrially, but there is no literal wave propagates in space. What I'm thinking then, is that photons are useful figments of mathematics used to describe the logical underpinnings of this process. On the microcosmic level, it could be considered molecular quorum sensing. Like biological quorum sensing only without a chemical substrate; it's just telesemantic, jumping across a vacuum like these words are jumping across the internet, your screen, your eyes, brain, and mind. The message is not a projectile traveling through space, it is sensorimotive process executed electromagnetically across a temporary separat
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12 Aug 2011, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 12, 5:01 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Aug 2011, at 14:16, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 11, 1:14 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. Consciousness itself leads to conceptual difficulties. Except for the fact that we cannot ignore that it is undeniable, we could never logically conceive of consciousness. Can we logically conceive a reality? Sure, as long as it's a reality within our own perceptual relativity frame of reference. That is too vague for me to comment. I don't know what you are assuming. The further our imaginary reality is from our own PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically. How would you justify that? What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in front of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive belief in a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief in a separation between the believer and the believed. I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as to what they will be able to believe or develop. What do you mean by "physically"? If you execute the machine in silicon, you're going to have a polite glass sculpture of belief, not a fierce, viscerally passionate belief. So mind is something physical and non Turing emulable. But we don't know anything physical which is not either Turing emulable, or recovered by self-indetermination (like in quantum superposition). So, to solve a problem, you are introducing more mystery than there is already. I don't see how this can solve anything. In french we call that a "fuite en avant" (forward-escape). The math alone can create a correspondence as-if it were true, but only the physics With the comp theory, physics is an emerging pattern in the mind of numbers. A good thing, because I don't take physics for granted, at least not in a primitively grounded way. can create the conditions of true through experience in spite of logic, which is what gives the believer not only separation but something of a trump-card privilege over the believed. I can follow you, but it makes both mind and matter rather magical. In a contest of math v physics, I think the physical can generate novelties in advance of math, But what is the physical? so that the arithmetic is an analytical afterthought. How to explain that the physical obeys to the arithmetical? How will you explain the role of math in physics? Physics cannot be anticipated from the math alone, Why? I can understand that is true for geography, but why to assert this for physics? What is physics? it can only be reverse engineered from factual physical observations. But what is that? Math can of course be used to build on physics as well (nuclear fission, etc) but it still requires a priori indexes of atomic behaviors which are independent from pure arithmetic. Why? I mean, even if comp is false, why would we a priori reject an explanation, if the goal was not for justifying that sort of silicon racism. It seems to me that you make matter, mind, the relation between awfully mysterious just to justify a segregation among possible entities for personhood. At least you are coherent, you seems to need stuffy matter, like the EM field, then mechanism cannot make sense, unless I am wrong somewhere 'course. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 12 Aug 2011, at 18:56, meekerdb wrote: On 8/12/2011 2:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Aug 2011, at 19:24, meekerdb wrote: On 8/11/2011 7:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: In any case, I have made the thought experiment simpler by *assuming* that the replacement component is mechanically equivalent to the biological tissue. We can imagine that it is a black box animated by God, who makes it tickle the surrounding neural tissue in exactly the right way. I think installation of such a device would *necessarily* preserve consciousness. What do you think? Are you assuming that there is no "consciousness" in the black box? The problem is there. In fine, if the brain works like a machine, consciousness is not related to its physical activity---which is a sub level notion, but to the mathematical relation defining the high level computation leading to the subject computational state. A related problem: is the back box supposed to be counterfactually correct or not, or is the black box accidentally correct for one execution. Answering that question in keeping the mechanist assumption leads to the "in fine" just above. I think we are close to the question: does comp entails the 323 principle? Right. If you idealize the brain as a digital computer then it seems that register 323 is unnecessary. Ah! Nice. But then comp makes physics a (very precise and constrained) branch of machine's self-reference theory. Well, you cannot say that comp idealizes the brain as a digital machine. It makes the brain physically replaceable by a digital computer with you not noticing any difference. But the brain, like every thing else, ... like every physical object (I guess) ... is a quantum object Very plausibly. OK. and it is characteristic of QM that possible interactions that don't occur make a difference. Yes. This is made clear by Hardegree's work on quantum logic. Quantum logic's sazaki hook makes it a logic of counterfactual. But the Bp & Dt logics too. And ... but I see that you foresee the objection: Of course you may object that QM can be computed by a (classical) digital computer - Yes. So even if the brain is a quantum computer (contra Tegmark, and you, actually), this would just push the 323-principle on a lower level. but that's on true on in an Everttian interpretation. Yes. And Everett's interpretation is the only one coherent with comp, indeed. In both direction. Comp can be seen as a generalization of Everett: comp provides a first person account of the collapse and the swe (if the swe is correct). The digital computer can't compute which interactions occur and which don't; that probabilistic. In copenhagen theory, or in the GRW theory. Well, in all those non sensical theories. To be short. All it can do is compute the probabilities for all the possible outcomes, *inculding* the 323 ones. But only on the level where the quantum brain operates. In the UD*, all level are simulated, so that would not change the "arithmeticalist" ontological conclusion. I don't insist on that, but it is a key to get the *necessary* ontological reduction to arithmetic (which does not entail an epistemological reduction). I agree with what you say in another post: the term "behavior" is ambiguous. The notion of substitution level disambiguates a part of it, and the notion of counterfactuality disambiguates an orthogonal part of it. Am I right in thinking that the counterfactuality includes *everything* that didn't happen? Every possible inputs, yes. I'm not sure that's a coherent concept. Well, the UD will generates those counterfactuals, and we have to show some of them relatively rare. You can certainly conceive that your inputs might be chosen randomly (including the skin inputs). That refers still to very huge but finite numbers. Now, I don't think the doctor has to do an artificial brain equivalent to mine satisfying *all* counterfactuals. He might as well suppress 'register' that are no more needed (like those perhaps related to childhood's needs or something like that). This is certainly the case if you agree that comp entails the 323 principle. But then ... the coupling realities/consciousness emerges from addition and multiplication, only, by the movie graph (or by Maudlin's argument). If you agree that the physical activity for one specific computation is enough, then consciousness cannot be associated with the physical activity, and only to the (abstract, arithmetical) computations. Jacques Mallah tried coherently, sometimes ago on this list, to block the movie graph argument by attempting to define a physical notion of counterfactuals, but this needs to believe that comp does not entail the 323-principle, even if the brain is a quantum computer, which I find doubtful. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received thi
Re: bruno list
On 13 Aug 2011, at 15:19, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 7:00 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Aug 2011, at 19:24, meekerdb wrote: On 8/11/2011 7:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>In any case, I have made the thought experiment simpler by *assuming* >>that the replacement component is mechanically equivalent to the >>biological tissue. We can imagine that it is a black box animated by >>God, who makes it tickle the surrounding neural tissue in exactly the >>right way. I think installation of such a device would *necessarily* >>preserve consciousness. What do you think? > Are you assuming that there is no "consciousness" in the black box? The problem is there. In fine, if the brain works like a machine, consciousness is not related to its physical activity---which is a sub level notion, but to the mathematical relation defining the high level computation leading to the subject computational state. A related problem: is the back box supposed to be counterfactually correct or not, or is the black box accidentally correct for one execution. Answering that question in keeping the mechanist assumption leads to the "in fine" just above. I think we are close to the question: does comp entails the 323 principle? I don't insist on that, but it is a key to get the *necessary* ontological reduction to arithmetic (which does not entail an epistemological reduction). I agree with what you say in another post: the term "behavior" is ambiguous. The notion of substitution level disambiguates a part of it, and the notion of counterfactuality disambiguates an orthogonal part of it. If the black box did not have consciousness if it functioned without the right counterfactual behaviour (for example if it happened to provide the right inputs randomly for a period) then that would allow the creation of partial zombies. What do you think of partial zombies as a concept? It does not make sense. Chalmers argument is valid. But this is only part of an (older) argument which leads to the complete abandon of the physical supervenience thesis. Suppose a teacher is in front of his classroom answering questions of the student. Then at time t, his brain stops completely to function, but a cosmic explosion, happening ten years before, sent, by pure chance, a flux of cosmic rays which supplies correctly the inputs to its muscle (but NOT inside its brain), so that his behavior remains unchanged for the time of the student lesson. Then he dies. Was the guy a zombie? Imagine that the student don't ask any question. Then the cosmic rays needs only to make it looks just quiet behind its desk. No neurons works at all, and the cosmic rays supplies very little information in its cerebral stem so that he does not fall. Is the guy a zombie? I would say it is. But now, the very fact that I do not think that a partial zombie is possible makes me abandon the idea that consciousness is related to the physical activity of the brain. The consciousness of the guy supervenes on all computations (in a continuum of digital computations (as viewed from inside from a first person perspective). It does not supervene on a physical body, because a physical body does not exist, it is only part of coherent mind projections. In a sense, we, as we see ourselves as bodies, *are* zombies (total zombie). But this is misleading, because this makes sense only when we understand that the bodies are already creation of the mind, in the way computer science can explain with the UD (the sigma_1 sentences), and the self-reference logics. Could you be a partial zombie now; for example, could you be blind or unable to understand language but just not realise it? I could suffer an agnosologia which makes me blind and amnesic on anything related to vision, so that personally I don't see the difference. But I will have to infer that there is some kind of problem about finding objects and walking without bumping into the furniture. But in that case I would not say that I am a partial zombie. I am fully conscious, but handicapped and amnesic. I don't believe the notion partial zombie make sense in the absolute. Total zombie can make sense, in a partial sense different from above, like a fake policeman on the road, which behave like a policeman in the eyes of the drivers, but has presumably no consciousness. Incidentally, I don't understand why philosophers and contributors to this list are affronted by the idea that a random device or a recording could sustain consciousness. There seems to be no logical contradiction or empirical problem with the idea, but people just don't like it. With comp consciousness is associated with a computation, and then with an infinity of them. Something random can only be a first person geographical or contingent type of experience, like in the iteration of the WM duplications. So indeed, I think i
Re: Unconscious Components
Craig, I'm wondering what would make my internal processes come up with not identical, but similar conclusions to what your theory seems to suggest. I went through your page and could relate to the questions you posed and saw a reflection of my own tendencies to integrate absolutely everything I observe, internally and externally into a category to explain everything. To me, anything I think that sounds new-agey is an internal tell tale that I'm going in the wrong direction. It's just the way my compass is calibrated, but I don't deny its existence. My... intuition? tells me that it is all math, holy math if you will. An abstract class where we, humans and atoms alike, invoke and experience its instantiations. Regarding your thoughts on photon behavior, it seemed to me that you are saying that photons are the quantum entanglement of spacetime. That they don't really travel through a medium, but that they will manifest through the entanglement of a sender and a receiver? On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 10:30 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Aug 13, 7:26 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > > > I cannot exclude this, hence who knows. Still, it would be nicer not > > only to get the answer but also how it has appeared. > > It appeared in stages over many years of thinking about these issues, > first in 1987 noticing the underlying four-fold symmetry of popular > divination systems; Tarot, I Ching, numerology, and astrology and > correlating that with theories of consciousness like Leary's 8- > neurocircuit model to arrive at a sort of a nuclear mandala of qualia > logic, a kind of wheel of stereotypes: > http://www.stationlink.com/mystic/meta4.gif. > > There are three main patterns to this mandala, one which cycles around > the circumference as a progressive narrative, another which emanates > from the center as binary symmetry of archetypal opposites, and a > third which modulates the spectrum between the other two. As you push > out from the center, the pattern becomes less digital-discrete- > quantitative and more analog-compact-qualitative, bringing in > personality themes and storytelling. > > I did have some interesting experiences with my own consciousness > since then, unintentionally through lack of sleep and obsessive > painting and debating with people online which contributed to my > thinking on the subject. I guess that I must have applied my nuclear > mandala logic to the types of arguments and style of arguments that I > ran into, particularly over months debating on an atheist forum. I > could see a clear dialectic between the extremism of atheist > materialism and the opposite extremism of the new-age spirituality > that I had been familiar with already. That led to the mural I > collaged together to illustrate the themes of that opposition: > http://s33light.org/ACMEOMMM > > The hypothesis of photon agnosticism (http://s33light.org/fauxton) > came around the same time, and although our house was struck by > lightning shortly after developing the idea, I'm not sure that there > was a revelatory moment at it's inception. I think a general > dissatisfaction with the ugly sprawl of the Standard Model in service > of the arithmetic of QM led me to suggest an alternative which > reconciles mind/body dualism and perception. A simple flip of the > topology at the subatomic level seemed to have an appeal for me that > reminded me of other times in my life when I had seen a simple > underlying pattern which others had not questioned. In kindergarten, I > actually was mentioned in the local newspaper because I was the only > kid who was able to see the Formal Operation logic of Piaget's > cylinder tasks (http://www.jstor.org/pss/748) at age 4 or 5 > (rather than the expected 8-10). This is what photon agnosticism seems > like to me. > > I think that I may very well be ahead the curve on this, as I have > actively pursued any arguments which could falsify the hypotheisis, > debating with physics students and professors. I not only have not > found any compelling falsification for the idea, but my conversations > with the academics on this has consistently reinforced my perception > that the questioning of this assumption of dumb-particle photons is > not within the scope of the typical mind, suited as it would be for > the purely quantitative approach of contemporary physics. > > Rather than a spirit of scientific curiosity or polite correction of > what my theory had overlooked, I found only seething anger and ad > hominem attacks on me personally - my style of writing or debating, my > lack of formal training, my iconoclastic attitude, all manner of > arguments from authority but nothing remotely addressing the simple > question: "What evidence do we have that photons physically exist?" > The irony of course, is that this kind of treatment is exactly what my > ACME-OMMM model predicts - that those who are most comfortable with > quantitative, literal logics will meet their qualitative, figurative > symmetry wi
Re: Should Math Be Taught in School
I agree that math should probably not be taught in school, but algebra. In elementary school. But, all the student's questions would lead to math... On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 11:33 AM, John Mikes wrote: > After a resounding "NO" the question: "who's math?" I find it absolutely > inevitable to include in the obligatory general school curriculum "a > certain" math, necessary to calculate, to balance a check-book, to file a > tax return, to make (basic) business accounting and the practical 'figuring > out' of life's quantitative aspects. Not the Euler theorem, or a Cauchy > integral. Also a glimps of concepts like imaginary, complex, infinite, > calculus, etc. not to the level of application, but at least to a dictionary > identification. > I find it belonging to a general educational level, way above of the > average newscast. > There are many kids with definite 'antitalent' for math, they should not be > tortured, just taught conceptually. It should not be a go/no go for college, > in general. Somebody can write beautiful historic poems, paint, or write a > symphony without calculus-knowledge. > A heart-surgeon can operate without knowing the math of a > pacemaker-physics. > And it may be a 'godsend' if economists would not be mathematicians, rather > normal, logical people. > Anyway the "pretty girls" are no real authorities in the question. > > > > On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb wrote: > >> ** >> Are you the kind of person who knows math? >> >> http://videosift.com/video/Miss-USA-2011-Should-Math-Be-Taught-In-Schools >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Should Math Be Taught in School
After a resounding "NO" the question: "who's math?" I find it absolutely inevitable to include in the obligatory general school curriculum "a certain" math, necessary to calculate, to balance a check-book, to file a tax return, to make (basic) business accounting and the practical 'figuring out' of life's quantitative aspects. Not the Euler theorem, or a Cauchy integral. Also a glimps of concepts like imaginary, complex, infinite, calculus, etc. not to the level of application, but at least to a dictionary identification. I find it belonging to a general educational level, way above of the average newscast. There are many kids with definite 'antitalent' for math, they should not be tortured, just taught conceptually. It should not be a go/no go for college, in general. Somebody can write beautiful historic poems, paint, or write a symphony without calculus-knowledge. A heart-surgeon can operate without knowing the math of a pacemaker-physics. And it may be a 'godsend' if economists would not be mathematicians, rather normal, logical people. Anyway the "pretty girls" are no real authorities in the question. On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb wrote: > ** > Are you the kind of person who knows math? > > http://videosift.com/video/Miss-USA-2011-Should-Math-Be-Taught-In-Schools > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 13.08.2011 14:08 Stathis Papaioannou said the following: On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 9:45 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: If your visual cortex is replaced by an electronic device that produces the appropriate outputs at its borders, the rest of your brain will respond normally. This is just an assumption. I guess that at present one cannot prove or disprove it. Let me quote an opposite assumption from Jeffrey Gray (p. 232, section 15.5 Consciousness in a brain slice?) How could the rest of your brain possibly respond differently if it receives exactly the same stimulation? Perhaps you mean that it would be able to tell that there is an artificial device there due to electric fields and so on; but in that case the artificial device is not appropriately reproducing the I/O behaviour of the original tissue. The question is what does it mean the same stimulation. I guess that you mean now only electrical signals. However, it well might be the qualia plays the role as well. If I understand you correctly, you presume that conscious experience could be resolved within 'normal science' (there is no Hard Problem). Jeffrey Gray on the other hand acknowledges the Hard Problem and he believes that a new scientific theory will be needed to solve it. "Might it be the case that, if one put a slice of V4 in a dish in this way, it could continue to sustain colour qualia? Functionalists have a clear answer to this question: no, because a slice of V4, disconnected from its normal visual inputs and motor outputs, cannot discharge the functions associated with the experience of colour. But, if we had a theory that started, not from function, but from brain tissue, maybe it would give a different answer. Alas, no such theory is to hand. Worse, even one had been proposed, there is no known way of detecting qualia in a brain slice!". It's not clear that an isolated piece of brain tissue would have normal qualia since it may require the whole brain or at least a large part of the brain to produce qualia. A neuron in the language centre won't have an understanding of a small part of the letter "a". We do not know this now. It was just an idea in the book (among many other ideas). It seems to me though that such an idea is at the same level as to suppose that a robot will have conscious experience automatically. Evgenii http://blog.rudnyi.ru -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 13, 7:26 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > I cannot exclude this, hence who knows. Still, it would be nicer not > only to get the answer but also how it has appeared. It appeared in stages over many years of thinking about these issues, first in 1987 noticing the underlying four-fold symmetry of popular divination systems; Tarot, I Ching, numerology, and astrology and correlating that with theories of consciousness like Leary's 8- neurocircuit model to arrive at a sort of a nuclear mandala of qualia logic, a kind of wheel of stereotypes: http://www.stationlink.com/mystic/meta4.gif. There are three main patterns to this mandala, one which cycles around the circumference as a progressive narrative, another which emanates from the center as binary symmetry of archetypal opposites, and a third which modulates the spectrum between the other two. As you push out from the center, the pattern becomes less digital-discrete- quantitative and more analog-compact-qualitative, bringing in personality themes and storytelling. I did have some interesting experiences with my own consciousness since then, unintentionally through lack of sleep and obsessive painting and debating with people online which contributed to my thinking on the subject. I guess that I must have applied my nuclear mandala logic to the types of arguments and style of arguments that I ran into, particularly over months debating on an atheist forum. I could see a clear dialectic between the extremism of atheist materialism and the opposite extremism of the new-age spirituality that I had been familiar with already. That led to the mural I collaged together to illustrate the themes of that opposition: http://s33light.org/ACMEOMMM The hypothesis of photon agnosticism (http://s33light.org/fauxton) came around the same time, and although our house was struck by lightning shortly after developing the idea, I'm not sure that there was a revelatory moment at it's inception. I think a general dissatisfaction with the ugly sprawl of the Standard Model in service of the arithmetic of QM led me to suggest an alternative which reconciles mind/body dualism and perception. A simple flip of the topology at the subatomic level seemed to have an appeal for me that reminded me of other times in my life when I had seen a simple underlying pattern which others had not questioned. In kindergarten, I actually was mentioned in the local newspaper because I was the only kid who was able to see the Formal Operation logic of Piaget's cylinder tasks (http://www.jstor.org/pss/748) at age 4 or 5 (rather than the expected 8-10). This is what photon agnosticism seems like to me. I think that I may very well be ahead the curve on this, as I have actively pursued any arguments which could falsify the hypotheisis, debating with physics students and professors. I not only have not found any compelling falsification for the idea, but my conversations with the academics on this has consistently reinforced my perception that the questioning of this assumption of dumb-particle photons is not within the scope of the typical mind, suited as it would be for the purely quantitative approach of contemporary physics. Rather than a spirit of scientific curiosity or polite correction of what my theory had overlooked, I found only seething anger and ad hominem attacks on me personally - my style of writing or debating, my lack of formal training, my iconoclastic attitude, all manner of arguments from authority but nothing remotely addressing the simple question: "What evidence do we have that photons physically exist?" The irony of course, is that this kind of treatment is exactly what my ACME-OMMM model predicts - that those who are most comfortable with quantitative, literal logics will meet their qualitative, figurative symmetry with blind fanaticism that eclipses the very spirit of the Enlightenment worldview. In atheists and physicists alike I met Inquisitors - sneering sophists devoted to an unquestionable anti- theological orthodoxy. So far in this group I have been quite pleasantly surprised at the higher level of scientific curiosity as well as depth of knowledge. I still don't know whether anyone has really considered that possibility that that my hypothesis might be right, but it has been helpful to me in refining my ideas further (http://www.stationlink.com/art/ SEEmap2.jpg). My entry into physics is really unintentional, so I am completely unqualified to translate my idea into that language. It's really not critical to my TOE, as sense could just occur on the subatomic level instead - it could be quarks that are sensing each other rather than molecules, so I have no major investment in being correct about photons, I just think that there is a chance that the weirdness of QM observations can be attributed entirely to the topological shift at the microcosm being overlooked. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything L
Re: Should Math Be Taught in School
On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 10:41 PM, David Nyman wrote: > On 13 August 2011 03:03, meekerdb wrote: > > Are you the kind of person who knows math? > > > > http://videosift.com/video/Miss-USA-2011-Should-Math-Be-Taught-In-Schools > > > > Brent > > Is it just me, or is there something about this that doesn't add up? I couldn't watch the whole thing. But I have somewhat of a moral issue with teasing and treating meanly almost *any* group. I mean, what's the implication here? That everyone should know math? That everyone should be "smart" as defined by some subjective measure? And if not, face derision? On what objective basis do you determine that this group is deserving of shame? Should we make fun of you because you don't know some particular facet of an area they deem important? Why not, instead, try to understand where any given group comes from, how they got there, and try to simply get along? I think it's complete rubbish, and it should be kept from the list. -- Noon Silk Fancy a quantum lunch? http://groups.google.com/group/quantum-lunch?hl=en "Every morning when I wake up, I experience an exquisite joy — the joy of being this signature." -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 7:00 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 11 Aug 2011, at 19:24, meekerdb wrote: > > On 8/11/2011 7:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > In any case, I have made the thought experiment simpler by *assuming* > that the replacement component is mechanically equivalent to the > biological tissue. We can imagine that it is a black box animated by > God, who makes it tickle the surrounding neural tissue in exactly the > right way. I think installation of such a device would *necessarily* > preserve consciousness. What do you think? > > > Are you assuming that there is no "consciousness" in the black box? > > > The problem is there. In fine, if the brain works like a machine, > consciousness is not related to its physical activity---which is a sub level > notion, but to the mathematical relation defining the high level computation > leading to the subject computational state. > A related problem: is the back box supposed to be counterfactually correct > or not, or is the black box accidentally correct for one execution. > Answering that question in keeping the mechanist assumption leads to the "in > fine" just above. > I think we are close to the question: does comp entails the 323 principle? > I don't insist on that, but it is a key to get the *necessary* ontological > reduction to arithmetic (which does not entail an epistemological > reduction). > I agree with what you say in another post: the term "behavior" is ambiguous. > The notion of substitution level disambiguates a part of it, and the notion > of counterfactuality disambiguates an orthogonal part of it. If the black box did not have consciousness if it functioned without the right counterfactual behaviour (for example if it happened to provide the right inputs randomly for a period) then that would allow the creation of partial zombies. What do you think of partial zombies as a concept? Could you be a partial zombie now; for example, could you be blind or unable to understand language but just not realise it? Incidentally, I don't understand why philosophers and contributors to this list are affronted by the idea that a random device or a recording could sustain consciousness. There seems to be no logical contradiction or empirical problem with the idea, but people just don't like it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Should Math Be Taught in School
On 13 August 2011 03:03, meekerdb wrote: > Are you the kind of person who knows math? > > http://videosift.com/video/Miss-USA-2011-Should-Math-Be-Taught-In-Schools > > Brent Is it just me, or is there something about this that doesn't add up? David > Are you the kind of person who knows math? > > http://videosift.com/video/Miss-USA-2011-Should-Math-Be-Taught-In-Schools > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
On 13 August 2011 07:52, Roger wrote: > My view of philosophy is not so much to argue endlessly about > these things but to try and use as few assumptions as possible along > with consistent reasoning to come up with some framework and use it to > build a realistic model of things and to try and make predictions with > that model. This lets philosophy transition into science. I agree with this sentiment and it's very much the spirit of discussion on this list. I do see what you are trying to say, and indeed the impossibility of a truly "radical absence" - given the indubitable presence of "something" - has always seemed inescapable to me. Of course I am sympathetic to any attempt to derive systematic results from clearly defined premises. Nonetheless, the question, as traditionally posed, can still lead to a different conclusion, albeit one with an ineliminable element of paradox. "Nothing" implies the elimination of "absolutely everything". This entails that the very point of origin, whatever it may be, of "the indubitable presence of something" must itself be eliminated. Since the elimination of its fons et origo would logically exclude even the possibility of the thought itself, we have a stark paradox. Such "absolute absence" would seem to be something of which we could truly never have spoken; our permanent silence on the matter would have been assured. By the same token, of course, our very presence effectively eliminates it as a possibility. I suspect that this insight is in practice the starting point for your own argument; i.e. that since the presence of anything at all leads directly to the conclusion that a truly "radical" absence is simply ruled out, whatever we conceive of as "nothing" must actually possess definable characteristics. And that's when things get really interesting. David > David, > > In regard to my point that "non-existence" itself (not our mind's > conception of non-existence) is actually an existent state, you > suggest that > > equating the "existence" of some state with the "absence" of all > existent states is a direct contradiction. > > But, it's only a contradiction if what we've traditionally called non- > existence really is a non-existing state. What I'm suggesting is that > when we get rid of all the states we've traditionally thought of as > existing (matter, energy, space, time, volume, ideas/concepts, > mathematical constructs, minds/perception, etc.), we've always thought > of what's left as not existing, or non-existence. But, what I'm > saying is that we really haven't yet gotten rid of all existent > states. What's left is also an existent state, just not one of the > traditional ones. It's an existent state because it completely > describes or defines the entirety of what is there. Another way of > saying all this is that "non-existence" is an incorrect term; it's a > misnomer. We've always referred to this thing, "non-existence", as > not existing because that's the only we and our existent minds can > think of it, as the lack of existence. But, this "non-existence" > itself, not our mind's conception of it, doesn't have this constraint > of being defined in terms of the lack of the traditional existing > states. It's on its own, and on its own, completely describes the > entirety of what is there and is thus an existent state. > > What this all leads me to is that there really is no such thing as > a true non-existing state. Even what we've traditionally called "non- > existence" and thought of as a non-existing state is, when thought of > as described above, really just another existing state. This means > that the question of "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is > an incorrect way of stating things. What we've always called > "nothing" isn't really no-thing or a non-existing state; it also is an > existent state, or "something". So, "something" has always been > here, which is what I concluded in the paper at my website. All of > this may seem like an exercise in futility as you mentioned, but why I > think it's valuable is that: > > - It forces us to think about why a thing exists in the first place. > That is, what is the mechanism or reason for why a thing exists? What > I came up with, as described in that paper is that a thing exists if > what is contained within or meant by that thing is completely > defined. This complete definition is like an edge or boundary > defining what is contained within and giving "substance" or existence > to the thing. This is more fully explored in that paper. > > - It provides a way, as described in the paper at the website, to > start building a model of the universe that is similar to ours and > that contains a symmetry-asymmetry transition (symmetry-breaking), a > big bang-like creation and expansion of space and a mechanical, > natural reason for why there is energy in the universe. > > My view of philosophy is not so much to argue endlessly about > these th
Re: bruno list
On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 9:45 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >> If your visual cortex is replaced by an electronic device that >> produces the appropriate outputs at its borders, the rest of your >> brain will respond normally. > > This is just an assumption. I guess that at present one cannot prove or > disprove it. Let me quote an opposite assumption from Jeffrey Gray (p. 232, > section 15.5 Consciousness in a brain slice?) How could the rest of your brain possibly respond differently if it receives exactly the same stimulation? Perhaps you mean that it would be able to tell that there is an artificial device there due to electric fields and so on; but in that case the artificial device is not appropriately reproducing the I/O behaviour of the original tissue. > "Might it be the case that, if one put a slice of V4 in a dish in this way, > it could continue to sustain colour qualia? Functionalists have a clear > answer to this question: no, because a slice of V4, disconnected from its > normal visual inputs and motor outputs, cannot discharge the functions > associated with the experience of colour. But, if we had a theory that > started, not from function, but from brain tissue, maybe it would give a > different answer. Alas, no such theory is to hand. Worse, even one had been > proposed, there is no known way of detecting qualia in a brain slice!". It's not clear that an isolated piece of brain tissue would have normal qualia since it may require the whole brain or at least a large part of the brain to produce qualia. A neuron in the language centre won't have an understanding of a small part of the letter "a". -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
> If your visual cortex is replaced by an electronic device that > produces the appropriate outputs at its borders, the rest of your > brain will respond normally. This is just an assumption. I guess that at present one cannot prove or disprove it. Let me quote an opposite assumption from Jeffrey Gray (p. 232, section 15.5 Consciousness in a brain slice?) "Might it be the case that, if one put a slice of V4 in a dish in this way, it could continue to sustain colour qualia? Functionalists have a clear answer to this question: no, because a slice of V4, disconnected from its normal visual inputs and motor outputs, cannot discharge the functions associated with the experience of colour. But, if we had a theory that started, not from function, but from brain tissue, maybe it would give a different answer. Alas, no such theory is to hand. Worse, even one had been proposed, there is no known way of detecting qualia in a brain slice!". Evgenii http://blog.rudnyi.ru On 13.08.2011 05:18 Stathis Papaioannou said the following: On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 3:22 PM, meekerdb wrote: John Searle claims to be a physicalist but he believes that if part of your brain is replaced by a functionally identical computer chip your behaviour will remain the same but your consciousness will fade away. Incidentally, Searle accepts that there is no problem in principle with making such a zombie chip. However, this is not possible under a physicalist theory as defined above. If the computer chip has the same I/O behaviour as the volume of tissue it replaces, the brain that does the noticing And what part would that be? The homunculus in the Cartesian theater. I don't think functionalism entails that there is some "noticing" neuron in the brain. If functionalism is correct, "noticing" must be distributed. Noticing is distributed, but the parts of the brain are interconnected. Visual perception occurs in the visual cortex, then the information may be sent to the limbic system causing an emotional reaction to what is seen and the language centre allowing you to describe what you see, and on to the motor cortex leading to muscle contraction in the limbs. If something changes in your visual cortex then all these other areas in the brain receive different inputs, and so produce different outputs. You feel different and you behave differently, and that constitutes noticing that there has been a change. If your visual cortex is replaced by an electronic device that produces the appropriate outputs at its borders, the rest of your brain will respond normally. You will watch a film, understand the story and be able to describe it afterwards, have the appropriate emotional responses, and so on. In other words as far as the qualia in the rest of your brain go there is no difference. Now, is it possible that your actual visual qualia have disappeared and you just can't notice? If you think this is possible, how can you be sure that didn't go blind last Tuesday and just haven't noticed? If you are actually blind in this strange way what have you lost? cannot tell that anything has changed. Only if consciousness is disconnected from brain activity, due for example to an immaterial soul, could the subject notice a change even though his brain is responding normally. The conclusion is that IF the replacement is functionally identical THEN the consciousness is also preserved, But the question is what "functionally identical" means. Can it mean only the same input/output or must it be similar inside at some lower level. If you specify the same input/output for all possible input sequences, including "environmental" ones, then I agree that your argument goes through. But failing that, it seems to me the consciousness that is within or due to the AI hemisphere can be different AND noticed in that hemisphere. It can be noticed separately in that hemisphere but if it is not communicated it will be a separate consciousness. If my liver suddenly gained self-awareness that would not necessarily mean that I (the person generated by my brain) would share in it or vice versa. Your argument seems to assume that consciousness is localized and must be outside the AI part, but that would lead to philosophical zombies when you replaced the whole brain and there was no "outside". No, because the argument shows that the replaced part must contribute normally to the consciousness of the whole, due to the conceptual difficulty with partial zombies - being blind without knowing you are blind. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 2:58 AM, meekerdb wrote: > Just to be clear, I'm interested in a slightly different question which > relative to Stathis might be phrased as "function of what?" If we look at > the whole person/robot we talk about behavior, which I think is enough to > establish some kind of consciousness, but not necessarily to map each > instance of a behavior to a specific conscious thought. People can be > thinking different things while performing the same act. So unless we > specify "same behavior" to mean "same input/output for all possible input > sequences" there is room for same behavior and different consciousness. And > this same kind of analysis applies to subsets of the brain as well as to the > whole person. So in Stathis example of replacing half the brain with a > super AI module which has the same input/output relation with the body and > the other half of the brain, it is not at all clear to me that the person's > consciousness is unchanged. Stathis relies on it being *reported* as > unchanged because the speech center is in the other half, but where is the > "consciousness center"? It may be that we're over-idealizing the isolation > of the brain. If the super AI half were perfectly isolated except for those > input/output channels which we are hypothesizing to be perfectly emulating > the dumb brain then Stathis argument would show that what ever change in > consciousness might be inside the super AI side it would be undetectable. > But in fact the super AI side cannot be perfectly isolated to those > channels, even aside from quantum entanglement there are thermal > perturbations and radioactivity. This means that the super AI will produce > different behavior because it will respond differently under these > perturbations. This different behavior will evince its different > consciousness. There will be a certain level of engineering tolerance in brain replacement since there is a level of tolerance in the normal brain. We might not notice a change despite a significant physical change such as thousands of neurons dying. > So in saying 'yes' to the doctor you should either be ready to assume some > difference in consciousness or suppose that the substitution level may > encompass a significant part of the Milky Way down to the fundamental > particle level. I'd be happy if the new brain didn't change my consciousness any more than getting through a normal day would. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12.08.2011 22:20 meekerdb said the following: On 8/12/2011 12:37 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 12.08.2011 20:40 meekerdb said the following: You robot do. It gets tagged with some notes, timestamped, and stuck in the database for further reference and adjustment of learning algorithms. That's it. There's no homunculus who watches it in the Cartesian theater. That it is referenced and used in your cogitation to influence your speech and other actions is what constitutes your being conscious of it. A quote from Jeffrey Gray (p. 110, it is just one of hypotheses in the book, this time on the verge of dualism) "(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium, that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells; I don't know what this means. I might agree with it as a metaphor, but I have no idea what "the medium of conscious perception" refers to. It seems to assume what it purports to explain. Yes, in the book it is just some metaphor to express how qualia functions, the author does not know either what it could mean. (2) it inspects the conscious constructed display; This has the brain inspecting itself. Again it seems metaphorical. It might be a metaphor for my AI robot tagging stuff it puts in its database. This is already not a metaphor but rather an open question. Why evolution has created consciousness when this is just a means for a brain to inspect itself? Presumably this has opened new opportunities as compared with unconscious behavior. Please note that this step (with step 3) gives conscious experience casual power. Evgenii (3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its usual electrochemical medium." Is this close to what you have said? Maybe. Brent Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12.08.2011 22:05 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 12, 3:41 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: It would be interesting to see how do you know this. Some revelation or something else? I don't know it, I just think that it could be the case. If you can fully and finally reject the proposition that your own experiences could be metaphysical, then you are left with describing what I cannot exclude this, hence who knows. Still, it would be nicer not only to get the answer but also how it has appeared. Evgenii experience is in objective terms as a phenomena. Since we find ourselves perceiving the world from the interior of a body, then it's not all that outrageous to hypothesize that this interior-exterior relationship between being a body and an experiencer of bodies might not be a unique invention in the universe, and that the many and fundamentally significant diametrically complimentary qualities of subjective phenomena compared to objective might not be a meaningless coincidence. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 3:22 PM, meekerdb wrote: >> This is why the thought experiment involves *partial* replacement. The >> behaviour we are considering is the low level behaviour of the neurons >> as well as the high level behaviour of the subject. The original >> biological tissue is constrained to behave normally if it receives the >> normal inputs from the replacement, and if consciousness supervenes on >> the physical it is therefore constrained not to notice that anything >> has changed. > > That doesn't follow. Your argument assumes that consciousness supervenes on > the biological part, but not on the replacement. In the first instance the consciousness supervenes only on the the biological part, since we assume the replacement part to lack consciousness. But then this leads to conceptual difficulties. As I have discussed, it would mean that you could be completely blind but behave normally and not notice you were blind with any of your other faculties. Or you could be aphasic, unable to understand speech, but have a normal conversation, listen to an argument and come up with a counterargument, plan your revenge on an enemy when informed of his treachery, etc. etc. It's not such a conceptual problem with a full zombie, which has no consciousness of anything at all, but it is a problem if we consider that an arbitrary part of your brain could be zombified and you wouldn't notice. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 3:22 PM, meekerdb wrote: >> The claim is that (a) he would not notice any change, and (b) >> therefore his consciousness would not change. (a) is not begging the >> question but is a consequence of any physicalist theory of mind, i.e. >> mental events occur because of physical events in the brain, so that >> if the same physical events occur the same mental events will also >> occur. > > But ex hypothesi the physical events in the "brain" are no longer the same > because some of them are in the chip or the AI hemisphere. If the mental supervenes on the physical that means the relationship physical -> mental can be one -> one or many -> one but not one -> many. Several physical states could lead to the same mental state; for example, wearing a hat might compress the brain slightly without altering cognition. However, if your physical state does not change it is not possible for your mental state to change unless mental states are due to some non-physical process, such as an immaterial soul. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
On Aug 13, 1:09 am, meekerdb wrote: > If they interacted with other photons they wouldn't travel in straight > lines and we could form images. The images aren't photons though. We can see images clearly in our imagination without anything physically traveling anywhere, as far as I know. Also, the molecules that make up the air don't travel in a straight line, yet we are able to hear sound clearly. > > Why do they seem to be able to interact with our rod and cone cells? > > They have charged particles in them, e.g. electrons. True, but why doesn't the millions of odd electron interactions within the cell cancel out the effect of the straightness of the photon paths? I would think that the retina would have to be an immaculate crystalline surface rather than a lumpy community of breathing protein sacs in order to retain the integrity of the photon pattern. If the visual cortex can compensate for all of that, as well as movements of the eyeball and head, it seems like it could read through the patterns of photon interactions just as our auditory nerve hears through the acoustic collisions of charged particles as they interact and interfere. I'm not arguing against optics, and I can see that density of materials can account for the relative lack of distortion of image through hundreds of miles of atmosphere yet be completely blocked by a nanometers-thin sheet of gold leaf, but I still think that our explanation of photon projectiles traveling millions of miles through space into our retina really doesn't hold water. It would seem that all of the gas and water vapor in the atmosphere would add up to be one thin sheet of metal if flattened, so that if each atmospheric electron absorbed one or more photons of energy, I would expect some kind of elaborate moire pattern where the cumulative distribution of molecular shadows would end up causing random blotches of darkness to appear on a clear sunny day. In order to do what the retina does, it seems to me that the photons would have to fill in these miles long molecular shadows and reconstruct the straight line path that could have been there had not the layers of gas gotten in the way. I think if all that were necessary to see an image were photons, then we would be able to see out of our skin. We would feel light in images. Light is just too unlike any kind of physical substance. It makes no sense for it to be invisible as a ray in a vacuum, for it not to exist independently as a substance. If it were a particle, it should behave in some macrocosmic, commonsense way like other phenomena composed of particles and not like a phantom non-substance that is the invisible source of all vision. You can't see light, you can only see something that is illuminated, and since we can imagine illumination without having photons input, it makes sense that illumination is a condition that occurs within our nervous system's experience, yet is common to matter that is being illuminated as well. The addition of endless torrents of massless, chargeless, intangibles filling the universe just to connect one self-illuminating material object to another through a vacuum seems superfluous. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
