Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations. I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out to be extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory. Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption, which does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide conditional or relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by predicting anything different for a repeatable experience. If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be refuted. Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole physics, so it is hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory. Depends on what you mean by "the whole of physics". Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality. But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But the logic of self-reference explains why such logics does not collapse, and why there are physical laws, indeed the quantum laws. Of course, this leads to many open problems, but that is the interest of mechanism (believed by most scientist). What has been thought to be the "whole of physics" has been refuted. Newtonian physics was refuted by special and general relativity. General relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. OK, I just answered this above. So which "whole of physics" does Comp predict? Is it inconsistent with the "physics" of computer games? It is has to be consistent with the physics of "all computer games played at once", as it is the case in arithmetic, and persons observe a sort of average. What does Comp predict about dark matter? Will it be a new particle? A modified gravity? This will remain the job of the usual physicist. Just that if we assume mechanism, we have to understand its consequence. To use mechanism to solve the "dark matter problem" is like to use string theory to prepare tea. We have already the logic of measure one. I don't understand what measure there is on logics. There is no measure on logics, but on sigma_1 sentences proofs. There are logics of the measure *one*, and I have explained what it is (mainly the logic of the intensional variant Bp & p (& Dt). The explanation is quasi literal if you grasp UDA, and is arithmetical (by AUDA). If physics was newtonian or boolean, comp would be refuted already. How would it be inconsistent with a Newtonian world? With a newtonian world the logic of observable proposition is boolean. It is already proved that the logic of the observable proposition invariant for all UMs and LUMs cannot be boolean (and is already proved to be a variant of von Neumann quantum logic). Bruno Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but concrete "mental" objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean without any concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there nothing to measure or count about the object in question? It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you get the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. But that does this *mean*? These are just a bunch of words. You could as well write "It means that when you colmüd the pööl of ämpod with itself you get the pööl of trübda, or the pööl of the pööl of ämpod.". Exactly! That is the point of axiomatization. Hilbert said this to explain what his axiomatic geometry means: "you can replace the terms 'points', 'lines', and 'planes', by the term 'elephant', 'table' and 'glass of bear'. Now, doing this would not be pedagogical, and we use the most commonly used symbols. That is "+" for colmüd, "s" for pööl, and the symbol "0" for your ämpod. We already have some axioms for logic and equality, and all you need consists in agreeing or not with the following principles: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) -> x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x The intended meaning being 0 is not a successor of any number, etc. You can say "the ämpod is different from all pööls". No problem, but it is obviously quite unpedagogical, I think. You don't get the point. Of course I can agree with these principles concerning countable and measureable things. But then, unless you see a flaw in the reasoning, you should know that at the obtic level, we don't need more, nor can we use more than the countable collection of finite things, once we assume mechanism. The point is that successor and 0 become meaningless, or just mere symbols, when removed from that context. What context are you talking about. The theory is interpretation independent. The interpretations themselves are part of model theory. For using the axiom you need only the inference rules. I don't agree with these axioms removed from any context, as without it, they are meaningless. I don't necessarily disagree with them, either, I just treat them as mere symbols then. They are much more than that. There are symbols + finitist rule of manipulation. The difference is as big as the difference between what you can feel looking at the string "z_n+1 = (z_n)^2 + c" and what you can feel looking at a rendering of what it describes, like this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7JLHxBm0eY Of course we can still use them in a meta-sense by using .. = "2" as a representation for, say a nose, and ... = "3" as a representation for a rose and succesor= "+1" as a representation for smelling, and then 2+1=3 means that a nose smells a rose. But then we could just as well use any other symbol, like ß or more meaningfully ":o) o-". I am not sure that you are serious. There are intented meaning, and logics is a science which study the departure between intended meaning and a mathematical study of meaning. Logic studied both the syntactical transformation (a bit like neurophysiologist study the neuronal firings) and the space of the possible interpretations. Interesting things happen for the machine doing that on themselves. Bruno Marchal wrote: Personally, I might prefer to use the combinators. But we have to agree on some principle about some initial universal system to see how they reflect UDA, in such a way that we can explain the quanta and the qualia, with the comp assumption in the background, and in the theory itself. Yes, you can use any universal system, which is going to be just as meaningless as numbers. That is like saying that a brain, which only manipulate finite meaningless information pattern (assuming comp) is useless. Are you just telling me that, like Craig, you assume non-comp? Let's take a programming language. When the code says "while(i<5) then i++; print "Nose smells rose" end" then this make sense for the user as he can read "nose smells rose". But in an abstract context, "nose smells rose" has no particular meaning and the while loop is just a loop, which also has no particular meaning (though it has a particular function). This is false, it has a meaning (mainly that if the condition occur it has to print some string). What you do with that information is more complex, as it needs to study your brain, body, context (indeed). But you illustrate that you agree that "xhile (i<5) ..." has a meaning. Obviously, it
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn blue or taste like broccoli. Assuming non-comp. There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say that arithmetic has an internal view. If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using non comp. If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some sense in which it is a category error. It makes as much sense to say that a concept has an internal view. nternal view just applies to the only thing that can have/is a view, namely consciousness. It applies to person. It might be a category error to say that consciousness has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even cosmic consciousness. This is not a belief, this is just the obvious reality right now. Obvious for you. But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for. Can you find any number(s) flying around that has any claim to an internal view right now? Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3-describable. But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest ourself relatively to each other. The only thing that you can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person that consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in consciousness). Here you present a theory like if it was a fact. If that was obvious, we would not even discuss it. Consciousness, despite being an obvious fact for conscious person, is a concept. As you say, concept does not think. You abstract so much that you miss the obvious. In interdisciplinary researches it is better to avoid the term "obvious". I do agree that consciousness is obvious from the first person point of view of a conscious person, but do you agree that a silicon machine can emulate a conscious person, indeed yourself (little ego)? Do you agree that this is not obvious for everybody (Craig believes it is false). I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism, despite being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 9 October 2011 14:37, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Can you find any number(s) flying around >> that has any claim to an internal view right now? > > Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only > to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A > person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3-describable. > But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest > ourself relatively to each other. Very succinctly put. However, speaking as a (grateful!) survivor of many conversations on this topic, on this list, over the years, I would venture to suggest that confusion about, or even ignorance of, the very distinctions you draw in the above remark are responsible for many of the more commonly encountered (perhaps simplistic) misunderstandings of your ideas. I know that you have (indefatigably) attempted to explain, in various places, the distinctively different roles of the various concepts you mention above - i.e. programs, numbers, persons, brains, bodies and what have you. However, it still seems to be the case that various correspondents are quite confused (and indeed differently confused) about what motivates this particular approach in the first place, why and how the entities and roles in question then appear in the theory, and finally precisely how they are related and matched up in terms of the theory. Of course, I realise that these topics can all be studied in much more detail via your published papers, but in terms of this list, how might one best set out these motivations and distinctions for pedagogical purposes? David > > On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: > > I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn blue or taste like broccoli. >>> >>> Assuming non-comp. >> >> There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say >> arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say that >> arithmetic has an internal view. > > If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using non > comp. > If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some sense in > which it is a category error. > > > >> It makes as much sense to say that a >> concept has an internal view. >> nternal view just applies to the only thing >> that can have/is a view, namely consciousness. > > It applies to person. It might be a category error to say that consciousness > has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even cosmic consciousness. > > > >> This is not a belief, this is >> just the obvious reality right now. > > Obvious for you. But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think so. > Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her point of view. > It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for. > > >> Can you find any number(s) flying around >> that has any claim to an internal view right now? > > Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only > to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A > person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3-describable. > But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest > ourself relatively to each other. > > > >> The only thing that you >> can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person that >> consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in >> consciousness). > > Here you present a theory like if it was a fact. If that was obvious, we > would not even discuss it. Consciousness, despite being an obvious fact for > conscious person, is a concept. As you say, concept does not think. > > > >> You abstract so much that you miss the obvious. > > In interdisciplinary researches it is better to avoid the term "obvious". > I do agree that consciousness is obvious from the first person point of view > of a conscious person, but do you agree that a silicon machine can emulate a > conscious person, indeed yourself (little ego)? Do you agree that this is > not obvious for everybody (Craig believes it is false). > I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that is the > case (that you can survive without any conscious change with such a silicon > prosthesis), then we have to come back to the Platonician theologies, and > naturalism and weak materialism, despite being a fertile simplifying > assumption (already done by nature) is wrong. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-
Re: COMP is empty(?)
In the Bruno - Brent exchange I enjoyed Bruno''s remarks Usually I agree with BrentM. Probability (in my terms) means a distribution within infinite bounds, no specifics for probable/non probable. The 'fantasy-world' of physics is a time-related explanatory Procrustean bed for those partly (maybe at all?) understood phenomena that transpired (BY OBSERVATION - Bruno) till 'yesterday into our knowledge-base (forget about oomniscient Comp). It works "almost well" in circumstances we realize today. (Consider some mishaps that occur,,,) "Whole Physics" IMO is the conventional science we carry as of yesterday. It includes the ancient 'facts' (measurements?) ad their refutations by fantasy-land theories (Q-chapters) as well as the modifications by math (another fantasy-land IMO.) Granted: we travel in space, predict genetics, screw-up economics, have societal predictions and ruin our environment very successfully. We don't understand anything. Comp does (if it exists) but it is not understandable to us. Logic? which one? the Zarathustrian octimality(8)? or the equation of opposites? (which is btw. a true outcome of the infinite everything). I THINK (not sure!) self-reference is anchoring ourselves into our ignorance. Unfortunately we have no better means to contemplate with than our material infested brain-function, a poor excuse for mentality. Even the R.Rosen version infinite complexity worldview (with a base of unknowable everything) is restricted to our models made up of human-mind approved topics and features, processes and happenings - an array of conventional thinking. (I have no proof that the 'model-content' indeed represents anything from the infinite complexity and its relations.) BTW there is no proof at all. Only in a restricted limitational view. Evidence: ditto. So what do we have? a thinking agnosticism - acknowleged ignorance, but we use it very skillfully. Sorry to blunderize the holly Grail of science thinking. John Mikes On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 6:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the > problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, > contradicting the observations. > I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out to be extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory. >>> >>> Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption, which >>> does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide conditional or >>> relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by predicting anything different >>> for a repeatable experience. >>> If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be refuted. >>> Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole physics, so it is >>> hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory. >>> >> >> Depends on what you mean by "the whole of physics". >> > > Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no > conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy > level of generality. > But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and > physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the > material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such > would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But the > logic of self-reference explains why such logics does not collapse, and why > there are physical laws, indeed the quantum laws. Of course, this leads to > many open problems, but that is the interest of mechanism (believed by most > scientist). > > > > > > What has been thought to be the "whole of physics" has been refuted. >> Newtonian physics was refuted by special and general relativity. General >> relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. >> > > OK, I just answered this above. > > > > So which "whole of physics" does Comp predict? Is it inconsistent with the >> "physics" of computer games? >> > > It is has to be consistent with the physics of "all computer games played > at once", as it is the case in arithmetic, and persons observe a sort of > average. > > > What does Comp predict about dark matter? Will it be a new particle? A >> modified gravity? >> > > This will remain the job of the usual physicist. Just that if we assume > mechanism, we have to understand its consequence. > To use mechanism to solve the "dark matter problem" is like to use string > theory to prepare tea. > > > > >> We have already the logic of measure one. >>> >> >> I don't understand what measure there is on logics. >> > > There is no measure on logics, but on sigma_1 sentences proofs. > There are logics of the me
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: > > I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn blue or taste like broccoli. >>> >>> Assuming non-comp. >> There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say >> arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say >> that >> arithmetic has an internal view. > > If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using > non comp. The point is that we don't need any assumptions for that. It is just an observation. There is only the internal view viewing into itself, and it belongs to no one. It is just not possible to find an owner, simply because only objects can be owned. It is a category error to say subjectivity (consciousness) can be owned, just like, for example, numbers can't be owned. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some sense > in which it is a category error. I think what you call arithmetical truth has nothing to do with arithmetical truth in particular and thus doesn't deserve its name. You can use arithmetic to point towards truth, but you can use anything for it. Thus it doesn't really make sense to call it arithmetical truth, except if you only mean the part that is provably true within arithmetic. As soon as you use Gödel, you go beyond arithmetic, making the label "arithmetical truth" close to meaningless. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> It makes as much sense to say that a >> concept has an internal view. >> nternal view just applies to the only thing >> that can have/is a view, namely consciousness. > > It applies to person. No. There is no person to find that has consciousness. The is just a belief that is not validated by experience. The experience of a person having consciousness is just the experience of consciousness trying to make itself an object that belongs to someone (because consciousness first starts to learn to be conscious in terms of objects, as this is seemingly requiring less introspective ability). Actually consciousness just is (aware of itself) and objects appear in that, including the object "the person as relative subject". Treating the relative subject, the person, as having the absolute subject (consciousness) is the illusion of ego, that creates samsara, suffering. The absolute subject can't suffer, as it has nothing to suffer from, nor any notion of difference that is required to suffer (suffering vs suffering ceasing). Bruno Marchal wrote: > > It might be a category error to say that > consciousness has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even > cosmic consciousness. Right, consciousness doesn't really "have" consciousness, this is just a manner of speaking that I borrowed from "a person having consciousness", I think the former is more accurate than the latter. Actually consciousness just is (and through that it knows itself). Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> This is not a belief, this is >> just the obvious reality right now. > > Obvious for you. Obvious for anyone (as there is only one that can be consciousness of obviousness, namely consciousness). Right now the only absolute thing you find in your experience is consciousnes, without any owner. Only the intellect makes it possible for anything to "have" consciousness. In actuality there is no such thing to find. It can be non-obvious to a person, not to consciousness. Consciousness can't even conceive of an owner of itself, actually it can't directly conceive of anything. Conceiving of something appears in it (and as it). Bruno Marchal wrote: > > But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think > so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her > point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for. PA is just an object within consciousness. It can't have a point of view. Nothing has a point of view in the sense you mean it. Points of views are just relative manifestations inside/of consciousness. PA could have a point of view in a relative sense, if you choose to indentify with PA and then defend its position. But one could as well say that a triangle has a point of view, if I identify with it and defend its "position" (imagining it has any). Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Can you find any number(s) flying around >> that has any claim to an internal view right now? > > Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer > only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number > can have. Or, to put it another way, the 1-person will not feel to be a number at all; and thus will not be a number(s), for all intents and purposes, contradicting the very premise (maybe not logically, but it doesn't really make sense to bet on being a machine if the conclusion says that for all intents and purposes you are not a machine at all). Anyw
Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 9, 12:09 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 8:06 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg > >> wrote: > >> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can > >> >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you > >> >> have the inputs. > > >> > What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or > >> > delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell > >> > me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking > >> > about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's > >> > turning or something? > > >> If you send me the plans of your car and the inputs - which way you > >> intend to steer and so on - > > > *which > > way > > you > > intend > > to steer* > > > WHT? > > > Did you think you were just going to slip that in and I wouldn't > > notice? > > > So cool, as long as I give you the schematics of my car and tell you > > where I'm going to drive to, you will be able to deduce where I'm > > going to drive to? Wow, that's almost better than nothing at all. > > There is no way that you are serious. You are trolling me, brother. > > Quentin responded to this. I'm not sure what he means. If he is pointing out that we were talking about determining where a car was going to go and not about the intentions of the driver, then I agree with him. Your entire argument is that there must be some physical cause within neuron which determines what it does. I pointed out that you cannot determine where a car is going to go based on physical observations of the car. You then erroneously reached for a deus ex machina by suddenly contradicting yourself to say that indeed the car's direction cannot be determined by physical observation but in fact you would need an anecdotal report from a subjective entity called a 'driver'. > > Apart from the philosophical issues there are two scientific issues > you misunderstand. The first is what it means to simulate something. > It appears you think that the simulation must include the whole > universe and not just the thing being simulated. No, it's just that I understand that simulation is a subjective proposition. There is no such thing as an objective simulation. That would require that one thing be replaced by another which is identical in every way, which is impossible or else it would be the same thing. I have a much more realistic understanding of simulation, that it in fact depends upon which criteria can be perceived by what audience and the degree to which those thresholds of perceptual substitution can be exceeded. Since we have no idea whatsoever how deeply inseparable the physical underpinnings of the psyche are, there is absolutely no reason to arbitrarily assume a particular substitution level. > The second is the > belief you seem to have that microscopic events can happen without an > empirically observable cause. You cite scientific articles discussing > spontaneous neural activity and you think that that is what they are > talking about: that the transmembrane voltage in a neuron can just > change because the subject wills it. It's not my belief, it is the scientific consensus. If your beliefs that subjective will does not change electromagnetic current in the nervous system have any validity, then all you have to do is give me a link or two of studies which support this. Since you cannot, I will assume that underneath it all, you understand that you are factually incorrect but are incapable of admitting it, even to yourself. How else do you explain voluntary action being different from involuntary actions? Do you think that when you take control of your breathing manually that nothing has changed in your nervous system? That we suddenly have a hallucination that we are controlling our own breathing? Your accusations are empty. Your view explains nothing. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 8, 7:21 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2011/10/8 Craig Weinberg > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg > > wrote: > > > >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can > > > >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you > > > >> have the inputs. > > > > > What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or > > > > delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell > > > > me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking > > > > about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's > > > > turning or something? > > > > If you send me the plans of your car and the inputs - which way you > > > intend to steer and so on - > > > *which > > way > > you > > intend > > to steer* > > > WHT? > > > Did you think you were just going to slip that in and I wouldn't > > notice? > > You were talking about cars not about you. > > If you want a model about brain + car just say so. I don't understand. I'm the one talking about cars. He is the one defining the physical mechanics of a car to include the steering intentions of a driver. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 09 Oct 2011, at 16:46, David Nyman wrote: On 9 October 2011 14:37, Bruno Marchal wrote: Can you find any number(s) flying around that has any claim to an internal view right now? Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3- describable. But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest ourself relatively to each other. Very succinctly put. However, speaking as a (grateful!) survivor of many conversations on this topic, on this list, over the years, I would venture to suggest that confusion about, or even ignorance of, the very distinctions you draw in the above remark are responsible for many of the more commonly encountered (perhaps simplistic) misunderstandings of your ideas. I know that you have (indefatigably) attempted to explain, in various places, the distinctively different roles of the various concepts you mention above - i.e. programs, numbers, persons, brains, bodies and what have you. However, it still seems to be the case that various correspondents are quite confused (and indeed differently confused) about what motivates this particular approach in the first place, The study of molecular biology made me think that it was plausible that we are "natural" machine. I have harbored a doubt due to the fact that molecular biology relies on biochemistry, and biochemistry relies on chemistry which relies on quantum physics, which seemed to me to have a non mechanical feature, until I understood that the non mechanical feature (the wave collapse) was an ad hoc principle introduced to prevent the physical reality to multiply. At that time I knew already that the mechanist assumption multiply us infinitely in a tiny corner of the arithmetical truth. So when reading Everett I got the feeling that the quantum, like Gödel + Turing + Tarski were completely rescuing the possibility of Mechanism. I am just studying the consequence of Mechanism. They are startling. The motivation is the holly fun. The "possible big picture awe feeling". why and how the entities and roles in question then appear in the theory, and finally precisely how they are related and matched up in terms of the theory. Of course, I realise that these topics can all be studied in much more detail via your published papers, but in terms of this list, how might one best set out these motivations and distinctions for pedagogical purposes? What is simple and obvious for one person, is not for another one. My papers have all been ordered by people having some notion in theoretical computer science and logic. Some awareness of the "non understanding of QM" can help. I did make some attempt to explain logic in more detail on the list, but it is rather difficult. I pointed on some good books too. UDA is already a form of AUDA made accessible to layman. Computer scientists are themselves "layman" in the philosophy of mind---alias fundamental cognitive science. I think it is good to distinguish UDA and AUDA. UDA can be understood by anyone having a passive understanding of how work at least one universal system, like a computer, or an interpreter. I present UDA in steps, so that people can tell me at which step they have difficulties. I have discovered that many people can have a problem to do reasoning, or to understand what is a valid reasoning, and what is a non valid reasoning (I have made the same finding when trying to show non valid step in prohibitionist argument. Or just by reading newspaper. This I think illustrates that some people want use their emotion at the place of reason. The brain tend to make association, which can optimize short term goal, and many keep association intact even when they are logically or statistically debunked. The strategy in the UDA is 1) to give a quasi operational definition of mechanism (roughly: we can survive with an artificial brain, and it is a programmed computer, or engrammed if it is a copy of an non decodable information), 2) to derive what we can derive from that. It leads to a rational view of reality, quite different than the aristotelian one, but similar to view already developed by many ancient greeks and Chinese and Indians (it is not "new"). For AUDA, it is more difficult, because it is theoretical computer science/mathematical logic. Logicians have discovered how finite entities can refer to themselves relatively to universal entities, and how some can reflect those self-references, etc. The Bp will mean "the machine asserts p", or "the machine believes p", as described in the language of the machine itself. That is what Gödel as shown possible, when the beliefs are either axioms or deducible from them, in the case of the ideally correct machine (the toy case, if you want). Then
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/9/2011 3:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Depends on what you mean by "the whole of physics". Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality. But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But it seems that everything theories and the string theory landscape and Tegmark's all of mathematics threaten to do exactly that - make of all of physics geographical, an accident of where you find yourself with the anthropic principle as the all-purpose explanation. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote: >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: >>> >>> I don't see why. >>> Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about >>> numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for >>> others. >> Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but >> concrete >> "mental" objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean >> without any >> concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there >> nothing to >> measure or count about the object in question? > > It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you > get > the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. But that does this *mean*? These are just a bunch of words. You could as well write "It means that when you colmüd the pööl of ämpod with itself you get the pööl of trübda, or the pööl of the pööl of ämpod.". >>> >>> Exactly! That is the point of axiomatization. >>> Hilbert said this to explain what his axiomatic geometry means: "you >>> can replace the terms 'points', 'lines', and 'planes', by the term >>> 'elephant', 'table' and 'glass of bear'. >>> Now, doing this would not be pedagogical, and we use the most >>> commonly >>> used symbols. That is "+" for colmüd, "s" for pööl, and the symbol >>> "0" for your ämpod. We already have some axioms for logic and >>> equality, and all you need consists in agreeing or not with the >>> following principles: >>> >>> 0 ≠ s(x) >>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y >>> x+0 = x >>> x+s(y) = s(x+y) >>> x*0=0 >>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x >>> >>> The intended meaning being 0 is not a successor of any number, etc. >>> You can say "the ämpod is different from all pööls". No problem, >>> but >>> it is obviously quite unpedagogical, I think. >> You don't get the point. Of course I can agree with these principles >> concerning countable and measureable things. > > But then, unless you see a flaw in the reasoning, you should know that > at the obtic level, we don't need more, nor can we use more than the > countable collection of finite things, once we assume mechanism. For the flaw in the reasoning, see my post above. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> The point is that successor and 0 become meaningless, or just mere >> symbols, >> when removed from that context. > > What context are you talking about. The theory is interpretation > independent. The interpretations themselves are part of model theory. > For using the axiom you need only the inference rules. But just rules give just rules. The context I am talking about are particular measurements, or particular countable things. COMP uses it outside of this context, making it meaningless. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> I don't agree with these axioms removed from any context, as without >> it, >> they are meaningless. I don't necessarily disagree with them, >> either, I just >> treat them as mere symbols then. > > They are much more than that. There are symbols + finitist rule of > manipulation. Which are just symols as well. The rules are just more then symbols with unspecified meaning if they represent something. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > The difference is as big as the difference between what > you can feel looking at the string "z_n+1 = (z_n)^2 + c" and what you > can feel looking at a rendering of what it describes, like this: > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7JLHxBm0eY This just works if we give the rules meaning in terms of particular objects, namely pixels on the screen. In this context they aren't removed from context, because an image of a screen with measureable distance is an obvious context for numbers. The equation without an geometrical context means very little to an average human (of course to mathematician it means a lot in terms of other mathematical things, which is no valid context for the average human). COMP doesn't give an adequate context. If it would, you could give particular predictions of what COMP entails in term of measureable or countable objects. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Of course we can still use them in a meta-sense by using .. = "2" as a >> representation for, say a nose, and ... = "3" as a representation >> for a rose >> and succesor= "+1" as a representation for smelling, and then 2+1=3 >> means >> that a nose smells a rose. But then we could just as well use any >> other >> symbol, like ß or more meaningfully ":o) o-". > > I am not sure that you are serious. I am serious, I just presented it in a ";)"-manner. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > There are intented meaning, and logics is a science which study the > depart
Re: COMP is empty(?)
benjayk wrote: > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote: > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: > I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. >>> Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but >>> concrete >>> "mental" objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean >>> without any >>> concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there >>> nothing to >>> measure or count about the object in question? >> >> It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you >> get >> the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. > But that does this *mean*? These are just a bunch of words. You > could as > well write > "It means that when you colmüd the pööl of ämpod with itself you > get > the pööl of trübda, or the pööl of the pööl of ämpod.". Exactly! That is the point of axiomatization. Hilbert said this to explain what his axiomatic geometry means: "you can replace the terms 'points', 'lines', and 'planes', by the term 'elephant', 'table' and 'glass of bear'. Now, doing this would not be pedagogical, and we use the most commonly used symbols. That is "+" for colmüd, "s" for pööl, and the symbol "0" for your ämpod. We already have some axioms for logic and equality, and all you need consists in agreeing or not with the following principles: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) -> x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x The intended meaning being 0 is not a successor of any number, etc. You can say "the ämpod is different from all pööls". No problem, but it is obviously quite unpedagogical, I think. >>> You don't get the point. Of course I can agree with these principles >>> concerning countable and measureable things. >> >> But then, unless you see a flaw in the reasoning, you should know that >> at the obtic level, we don't need more, nor can we use more than the >> countable collection of finite things, once we assume mechanism. > For the flaw in the reasoning, see my post above. > Sorry, I mean below! -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32621211.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/6/2011 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but concrete "mental" objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean without any concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there nothing to measure or count about the object in question? It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you get the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. Bruno Marchal wrote: The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact does not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say that concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that naive materialism might be false, so why would little "concrete" pieces on stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what: there are no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the simple equation x^2 = 2y^2. This is just a consequence of using our definitions consistently. Not really. In this case, we can indeed derived this from our definitions and axioms, but this is contingent to us. The very idea of being realist about the additive and multiplicative structure of numbers, is that such a fact might be true independently of our cognitive abilities. We don't know if there is an infinity of twin primes, but we can still believe that "God" has a definite idea on that question. That the diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution, is considered to be a discovery about natural numbers. It is not a convention, or the result of a vote, nor of a decision. For the early Pythagoricians that was a secret, and it seems they killed the one who dare to make that discovery public (at least in some legend). Of course we can say 1+2=3 is 3 just because we defined numbers in the way that this is true, without resorting to any concreteness. Yes. Mathematical realism stems from the intuition that abstract entities can have theor own life (relations with other abstract or concrete entities). My point is that we can't derive something about the fundamental nature of things just by adhering to our own definitions of what numbers are, since these ultimately are just a bunch of definitions, You are right. We need some philosophical principles (like comp) to understand that eventually we don't need those philosophical principle. In the case of comp, we can understand why some (relative) numbers will bet on it, and why some other numbers will not. In fine, it is like with the south american, we can feel them enough close to us to listen to them. whereas the "actual" thing they rely on (what numbers, or 0 and succesor actually are), remains totally undefined. Not with comp. An apple becomes something very complex when defined in pure number theory. It will involve infinite sets of long computations, complex group of symmetries, etc. But it is definable (in principle) from numbers (some including LUM observers). So whatever we derive from it is just as mysterious as consciousness, or matter, or whatever else, since the basis is totally undefined. The problem does not consist in finding the ultimate definitions, but to agree on elementary propositions, and to explain the rest, of as much as possible from them. Bruno Marchal wrote: If it isn't, the whole idea of an abstract machine as an independent existing entity goes down the drain, and with it the consequences of COMP. Yes. But this too me seems senseless. It like saying that we cannot prove that 17 is really prime, we have just prove that the fiollowing line . cannot be broken in equal non trivial parts (the trivial parts being the tiny . and the big . itself). But we have no yet verify this for each of the following: . . . . . . . . . . . etc. On the contrary: to understand arithmetic, is quasi-equivalent with the understanding that a statement like 17 is prime, is independent of all concrete situation, in which 17 might be represented. Lol, the funny thing is that in your explantion you used concrete things, namely ".". Is that a problem? Of course concrete is relative. I think so. It's concreteness is not really relevant, the point is that numbers just apply to countable or measurable things. Yes. The natural numbers are somehow the type of the finite discrete or discernible entities. Without being countable natural numbers don't even make sense. In order for COMP to be applicable to reality, reality had to be count
