Faster than light communication
Hello! Just watched this google presentation done by a software engineer that has done lots of reading on QM and QIT. He practically says that entanglement is akin to measurement and he presents a experiment (not undertaken yet and that involves some kind of quantum erasement using polarisation filters) that would prove faster than light communication. I've searched the net. He seems not to be a nut. He denies that the Copenhagen Interpretation is the correct one for describin reality and he supports zero-worlds interpretation (quantum information theory, we're all entangled qbits) as his prefered one; he doesn't deny multiverse theories might be a valid explanation also. Here si the video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfcfeature=my_liked_videoslist=LLui4mNA-D-4wLpBTVqkii9g I've found his video interesting because there are some similiarities between Russell Standish's bitstrings from the multiverse and the entangled qbits that Ron Garret's is talking about. What do you think about Ron Garret's video? Is it all just information in a cosmic computer where physical reality is an illusion? Or does even my question make sense in a quantum world? Thanks! Alex. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: was Relativity of Existence
On 27 May 2012, at 20:59, meekerdb wrote: On 5/27/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As Bruno said, Provable is always relative to some axioms and rules of inference. It is quite independent of true of reality. Which is why I'm highly suspicious of ideas like deriving all of reality from arithmetic, which we know only from axioms and inferences. We don't give axioms and inference rule when teaching arithmetic in high school. We start from simple examples, like fingers, days of the week, candies in a bag, etc. Children understand anniversary before successor, and the finite/infinite distinction is as old as humanity. In fact it can be shown that the intuition of numbers, addition and multiplication included, is *needed* to even understand what axioms and inference can be, making arithmetic necessarily known before any formal machinery is posited. But only a small finite part of arithmetic. I don't think so. Our arithmetical intuition is already not formalizable. If it was, we would be able to capture it by a finite number of principle, but then we would be persuade that such finite theory is consistent, and that intuition is not in the theory. I suspect that our intuition is full second order arithmetic, which is not axiomatizable. In fact it is the very distinction between finite and infinite that we cannot formalize. Like consciousness, we know very well what finite/infinite means, but we cannot defined it, without using implicitly that distinction. The natural numbers are *the* mystery, and it has to be like that: no machine will ever been able to define what they are. Assuming comp, neither will we. Arithmetical truth per se, as no corresponding complete TOE. It is inexhaustible. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: was Relativity of Existence
On 27 May 2012, at 23:56, John Mikes wrote: Thanks, Brent and Bruno. You are kind to respond. The point I wanted to approach (far approach, indeed) is that whatever we derive (mentally) about Nature comes from our human mind, be it binary or not. We don't know that. We believe that. I might be a butterfly only dreaming that he is human. I might be an amnesic God, just playing to himself that he is a human. Nor do we know if something like Nature exist. We do know that we are conscious, but not much more. We believe more, and that's OK, if we grant that those are beliefs, which means that we are aware that they might be wrong. And: it is not BINDING (restricting?) upon Nature, there may be more we cannot even imagine within our limited capabilities. And here computationalism, the theory or hypothesis, makes it possible to say more, like the fact that Nature is necessarily, in that theory, a sort of surface emerging from the vaster volume of a sort of mind, itself emerging in a precise way from arithmetic or alike. We think in our 'model of knowables' and it is incredible how far we got. Except that I can argue that if COMP is true, then we have regressed since +500. We have made some progress in technology, and even, I think, in politics (at least conceptually), but we have transformed science into religion, and religion into superstition. As long as we oppose mysticism and rationalism, we can only regress. We are hiding the data since 1500 years. Modernity has existed from -500 to +500, in some limited circle. Since then we are in the obscurantist era. The most fundamental science, theology, is still abandoned to authoritarians. A figment of a physical world, an 'almost' perfect technology with a reductionist (conventional) science and I don't even mention: math. I read your discussions with awe and keep my agnostic indeterminism. That is the genuine scientific attitude. Bruno JohnM On Sat, May 26, 2012 at 6:06 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/26/2012 9:35 AM, John Mikes wrote: Brent wrote: 1. Presumably those true things would not be 'real'. Only provable things would be true of reality. Just to be clear, I didn't write 1. above. But I did write 2. below. 2. Does arithmetic have 'finite information content'? Is the axiom of succession just one or is it a schema of infinitely many axioms? Appreciable, even in layman's logic. In '#1' - I question provable since in my agnosticism an 'evidence' is partial only, leaving open lots of (so far?) unknown/ able aspects to be covered. In the infinity(?) of the world also the contrary of an evidence may be 'true'. As Bruno said, Provable is always relative to some axioms and rules of inference. It is quite independent of true of reality. Which is why I'm highly suspicious of ideas like deriving all of reality from arithmetic, which we know only from axioms and inferences. #2 is a technically precise formulation of what I tried to express in my post to Bruno. IFF!!! anything (i.e. everything) can be expressed by numerals, the information included into arithmetic IS infinite, I see no reason to suppose that. Everything ever expressed so far has been done with a finite part of arithmetic. Assuming every integer has a successor is just a convenience for modeling things; you don't have to worry about running out of counters. There is a book Ad Infinitum, The Ghost in Turing's Machine by Rotman that proposes what he calls non-euclidean arithmetic which does not assume the integers are infinite. I can't really recommend the book because most of it is written in the style of French deconstructionist philosophy, but the Appendix has some interesting ideas. however as it seems: in our (restricted) view of the world (Nature?) there seem to be NO numbers to begin with. In our human 'translation' we see 1,2, or 145, or a million OF SOMETHING - no the (integer?) numerals. Axioms? in my vocabulary: imagined things, necessary for certain theories we cannot substantiate otherwise. Axioms are just part of a logical, i.e. self-consistent, system. Mathematicians don't even care if they are true of reality. They may or may not refer to imagined things; they are just assumed true for some inferences. I could take I am typing on a keyboard as an axiom, which I also happen to think is true, or I could take I am a projection in a Hilbert space which might be true, but is much more dubious. In another logic than human, in another figment of a physical world different axioms would serve science. Logic is about the relations of propositions, statements in language. Humans already have invented different logics. 2+2=4? not necessarily in the (fictitious) octimality of the '[Zarathustran' aliens in the Cohen-Stewart books (still product of human minds). 2+2=11 Brent The world consists of 10
Re: The limit of all computations
On 28 May 2012, at 04:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 06:20:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 May 2012, at 12:15, Russell Standish wrote:
I still don't follow. If I have proved a is true in some world, why
should I infer that it is true in all worlds? What am I missing?
I realize my previous answer might be too long and miss your
question. Apology if it is the case.
Here is a shorter answer. The idea of proving, is that what is
proved in true in all possible world. If not, a world would exist as
a counter-example, invalidating the argument.
I certainly missed that. Is that given as an axiom?
That would be a meta-axiom in a theory defining what is logic. But
that does not exist. It is just part of what logic intuitively
consists in.
Logicians are not interested of truth or interpretation of statements.
They are interested in validity. What sentences follow from what
sentences, independently of interpretations, and thus true in all
possible worlds.
It seems like that
would be written p - []p.
This means that if p then p is provable. p - Bp, if B = provable,
is completeness (with the meaning of completeness = its meaning in
incompleteness). This is false in non rich theory (by the fact that
their are non rich) and false in rich theory, by the fact that rich
theory obeys to the incompleteness theorem. So, it is true for rare
exception (like the first order theory of real numbers) which is not
rich (not sigma_1 complete).
Take the proposition (a v b) in propositional logic. Take the world
{(a t), (b, f)}, i.e. the world with a true, and b false. Let p = (a v
b). This provides a counter-example to p - Bp. p is true in that
world (because a v b is true if a is true), yet it is not provable,
because it is false in some other world, like the world with both a
and b false.
Or take p = Dt. Dt - BDt contradicts immediately the second
incompleteness theorem which says that Dt - ~BDt.
When I say p is true in a world, I can only prove that p is true in
that world.
I don't think so. If p is true, that does not mean you can prove it,
neither in your world, nor in some other world.
I am mute on the subject of whether p is true in any other
world (unless I can use an axiom like the above).
By the logicians notion of proof, if you prove a proposition, it is
true in all worlds/model/interpretation.
In what class of logics would such an axiom be taken to be true.
All.
(Of
course it is true in classical logic, but there is only one world
there).
In classical propositional logic, a world is just anything to which we
attach a valuation t, or f, to the atomic proposition, p, q r, ...
This makes 2^aleph_zero worlds. A world can be identified with a
function from {p, q, r, ...} to {t, f}.
In first order logic, worlds can be identified with interpretations,
or models. All first order theories have many models. In fact for any
cardinal, there is a model having that cardinal. The number of worlds
exceeds the cardinals nameable in set theory.
Bruno
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Re: Max Velmans' Reflexive Monism
On 27.05.2012 23:04 Stephen P. King said the following: On 5/27/2012 4:07 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... A good extension. Velmans does not consider such a case but he says that the perceptions are located exactly where one perceives them. In this case, it seems that it should not pose an additional difficulty. Hi Evgenii, This does seem to imply an interesting situation where the mind/consciousness of the observer is in a sense no longer confined to being 'inside the skull but ranging out to the farthest place where something is percieved. It seems to me that imply a mapping between a large hyper-volume (the out there) and the small volume of the brain that cannot be in a one-to-one form. The reflexive idea looks a lot like a Pullback in category theory and one can speculate if the dual, the Pushout, is also involved. See http://www.euclideanspace.com/maths/discrete/category/universal/index.htm for more. If you say that mind/consciousness confined to being 'inside the skull' you have exactly the same problem as then you must accept that all three dimensional world that you observe up to the horizon is 'inside the skull'. The mapping problem remains though. ... Yes, the third-person view belongs to another observer and Velmans plays this fact out. He means that at his picture when a person looks at the cat, the third-person view means another person who looks at that cat and simultaneously look at the first person. This way, two person can change their first-person view to third-person view. However, it is still impossible to directly observe the first-person view of another observer. Everything that is possible in this respect are neural correlates of consciousness. Does this ultimately imply that the 3-p (third person point of view) is merely an abstraction and never actually occurring? WE make a big There is no clear answer in the book (or I have missed it). ... Not really. As usual, the positive construction of own philosophy is weaker as the critique of other philosophies. Yes, that is true. An already existing target makes for a sharper attack. In Russian to this end, one says Ломать не строить, душа не болит. I would translate this idiom as To destroy something is much easier than to build it, as this way the soul does not hurt. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On 28 May 2012, at 10:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 May 2012, at 04:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 06:20:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 May 2012, at 12:15, Russell Standish wrote:
I still don't follow. If I have proved a is true in some world, why
should I infer that it is true in all worlds? What am I missing?
I realize my previous answer might be too long and miss your
question. Apology if it is the case.
Here is a shorter answer. The idea of proving, is that what is
proved in true in all possible world. If not, a world would exist as
a counter-example, invalidating the argument.
I certainly missed that. Is that given as an axiom?
That would be a meta-axiom in a theory defining what is logic. But
that does not exist. It is just part of what logic intuitively
consists in.
Logicians are not interested of truth or interpretation of
statements. They are interested in validity. What sentences follow
from what sentences, independently of interpretations, and thus true
in all possible worlds.
It seems like that
would be written p - []p.
This means that if p then p is provable. p - Bp, if B = provable,
is completeness (with the meaning of completeness = its meaning in
incompleteness). This is false in non rich theory (by the fact that
their are non rich) and false in rich theory, by the fact that rich
theory obeys to the incompleteness theorem. So, it is true for rare
exception (like the first order theory of real numbers) which is not
rich (not sigma_1 complete).
Take the proposition (a v b) in propositional logic. Take the world
{(a t), (b, f)}, i.e. the world with a true, and b false. Let p = (a
v b). This provides a counter-example to p - Bp. p is true in that
world (because a v b is true if a is true), yet it is not provable,
because it is false in some other world, like the world with both a
and b false.
Or take p = Dt. Dt - BDt contradicts immediately the second
incompleteness theorem which says that Dt - ~BDt.
When I say p is true in a world, I can only prove that p is true in
that world.
I don't think so. If p is true, that does not mean you can prove it,
neither in your world, nor in some other world.
I am mute on the subject of whether p is true in any other
world (unless I can use an axiom like the above).
By the logicians notion of proof, if you prove a proposition, it is
true in all worlds/model/interpretation.
In what class of logics would such an axiom be taken to be true.
All.
Oops. I realize that you were perhaps alluding to p-Bp. In that
case, I should have answered almost none.
In modal logic p-Bp is called TRIV, for trivial. The reason is
that before Löb, most modal logic have Bp - p as an axiom, and with
both p-Bp and Bp-p, we have p - Bp, and so the modal logic can
collapse into classical propositional logic.
But this actually not true for the provability logics, which are very
subtle.
Indeed, with B = Gödel's provability (the talk of the Löbian machine),
although p - Bp is usually false (cf p = Dt and incompleteness) we
still have that p - Bp is true for all p = sigma_1 arithmetical
sentence.
You can intuit this easily. If p = ExP(x) with P decidable, the the
truth of p makes it provable, because if a number has a verifiable
property, you can find it by testing 0, 1, 2, 3, ... That is exactly
what all universal machine can do. Sigma_1 completeness (= p-Bp
with p sigma_1) is a provability characterization of Turing
universality.
So by adding p-Bp we characterize the logic of provability of the
sigma_1 sentences, and that is how I model the UD in arithmetic.
The miracle is that this does not make the modal logic collapsing. I
can come back on this issue some later day. Perhaps in the FOAR list,
or here, depending of the comments.
But this is very exceptional, and illustrates that G and G*, and
S4Grz, etc. are very special logics, quite counter-intuitive.
p- Bp, added to G adds the quantum p-BDp to the intensional
variants, and makes the intelligible and sensible matter obeying
arithmetical quantum logics, leading to the beginning of the
extraction of physics from arithmetic.
Bruno
(Of
course it is true in classical logic, but there is only one world
there).
In classical propositional logic, a world is just anything to which
we attach a valuation t, or f, to the atomic proposition, p, q
r, ... This makes 2^aleph_zero worlds. A world can be identified
with a function from {p, q, r, ...} to {t, f}.
In first order logic, worlds can be identified with interpretations,
or models. All first order theories have many models. In fact for
any cardinal, there is a model having that cardinal. The number of
worlds exceeds the cardinals nameable in set theory.
Bruno
--
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425
Re: The limit of all computations
On 28 May 2012, at 11:35, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 28, 2012 at 10:37:53AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2012, at 04:00, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 06:20:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 May 2012, at 12:15, Russell Standish wrote: I still don't follow. If I have proved a is true in some world, why should I infer that it is true in all worlds? What am I missing? I realize my previous answer might be too long and miss your question. Apology if it is the case. Here is a shorter answer. The idea of proving, is that what is proved in true in all possible world. If not, a world would exist as a counter-example, invalidating the argument. I certainly missed that. Is that given as an axiom? That would be a meta-axiom in a theory defining what is logic. But that does not exist. It is just part of what logic intuitively consists in. Well, I can tell you, it is not intuitive! Perhaps there is some background understanding that is missing. Yes. Logic, I am afraid. Logic the field, not logic as we use it everyday. Don't worry, virtually all non professional logicians miss it. And logicians miss that non logician miss it. It is a very technical field. But the idea that proof, or Bp, entails truth in all world/model is given by the completeness theorem of Gödel, or by Kripke semantics (with all worlds becoming all accessible worlds). See my previous post. Logicians are not interested of truth or interpretation of statements. They are interested in validity. What sentences follow from what sentences, independently of interpretations, and thus true in all possible worlds. It seems like that would be written p - []p. This means that if p then p is provable. p - Bp, if B = provable, []p means (primarily) true in all worlds. In Kripke semantics, it is relativised to mean true in all accessible worlds. Yes. The meaning of provability is a different interpretation. Yes. But then there are relations linking them. See my previous post on Solovay theorem which makes such a relation, and which can be sum up by: G is the modal logic of provability. When I say p is true in a world, I can only prove that p is true in that world. I don't think so. If p is true, that does not mean you can prove it, neither in your world, nor in some other world. p may be true, but if I don't know it (or can't prove it), I shouldn't be asserting it :). OK. But the fact is that p might be true in your world, and you can know or not that fact, independently of the fact that you can prove it or not. We have to distinguish p is true with p is proved, p is known, p is observed, etc. All those modalities obeys different logics. Besides, if you can prove p, this does not make it true in your world, as Bp - p, might be non provable, or even false. In that cse your world is not accessible from your world: the accessibility relation is not reflexive (that is the case for G). In a cul-de-sac world, Bf - f is false for example. Typically, a cul- de-sac world does not access to itself, indeed it accesses to no world at all. I am mute on the subject of whether p is true in any other world (unless I can use an axiom like the above). By the logicians notion of proof, if you prove a proposition, it is true in all worlds/model/interpretation. Even if the proof relied upon some facet that may or may not be true in all worlds? Yes, because that facets will need to be 'conditionalized upon' in your world ... to have a proof. A world is a semantic notion, and you cannot refer to it in a proof (an error well illustrated by Craig, with all my respect). Bruno In what class of logics would such an axiom be taken to be true. All. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Max Velmans' Reflexive Monism
On May 28, 4:55 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In first person, space is figurative and time is literal. Why? The split between interior significance (doing*being)(timespace) and exterior entropy (matter/energy)/spacetime prefigures causality. Causality is part of 'doing', a semantic temporal narrative of explanation which circumscribes significance and priority. If you try to push causality back before causality, you can only come up with anthropic or teleological pseudo first causes which still don't explain where first cause possibilities come from. Does the totality exist in this way because it has to exist? Because it wants to exist? Because it can't not exist? Because it just does exist and why is unknowable? Yes, yes, yes, yes and no, no, no, no. It's the totality. All questions exist within it and cannot escape. In that respect it is like a semantic black hole. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: was Relativity of Existence
On 5/28/2012 12:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 May 2012, at 20:59, meekerdb wrote: On 5/27/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As Bruno said, Provable is always relative to some axioms and rules of inference. It is quite independent of true of reality. Which is why I'm highly suspicious of ideas like deriving all of reality from arithmetic, which we know only from axioms and inferences. We don't give axioms and inference rule when teaching arithmetic in high school. We start from simple examples, like fingers, days of the week, candies in a bag, etc. Children understand anniversary before successor, and the finite/infinite distinction is as old as humanity. In fact it can be shown that the intuition of numbers, addition and multiplication included, is *needed* to even understand what axioms and inference can be, making arithmetic necessarily known before any formal machinery is posited. But only a small finite part of arithmetic. I don't think so. Our arithmetical intuition is already not formalizable. If it was, we would be able to capture it by a finite number of principle, but then we would be persuade that such finite theory is consistent, and that intuition is not in the theory. I suspect that our intuition is full second order arithmetic, which is not axiomatizable. In fact it is the very distinction between finite and infinite that we cannot formalize. Like consciousness, we know very well what finite/infinite means, but we cannot defined it, without using implicitly that distinction. The natural numbers are *the* mystery, and it has to be like that: no machine will ever been able to define what they are. Assuming comp, neither will we. Arithmetical truth per se, as no corresponding complete TOE. It is inexhaustible. Bruno Our intuition is that space is euclidean, the earth is stationary and flat, and that there is only one world. It seems to me that the infinity of arithmetic is just the intuition we should always be able to add one more. But intuition fails us in precisely in questions like Hilbert's hotel. Why should you be so trusting of your intuition is just this particular instance. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A Computable Universe: Understanding and Exploring Nature As Computation
On 28.05.2012 17:48 John Mikes said the following: Evgenij: to your last par (small remark): (and I repeat the outburst of a religious scientist upon my post questioning his 'faith'): Who gave you the audacity to feel so superior to (some?) WORKING CLASS? (I apologize: you seem to be only the messenger) Then again (in the message): GENTLEMEN? and WHAT moral norms? Would gays be included? and why would women excluded? WHAT morality would be required? Read the SCRIPTs (maybe more than just the Jewish Bible) and you will be shaken in your morals of the past centuries' mostly western belief. Girls in good standing, i.e. Ishtar's virgins (whores?) who had to conceive by a stranger for money to prove their fertility and find a decent husband? Consequently the offering of the first born because they were most likely the offspring of other than the husband? and so on and on. Pompei was later, but still in the 'biblical' morals. Remarks of this kind should be explained/understood better. Sorry for the outburst LohnM Hi John, I was just kidding. I should say though that the movie Pornography: A Secret History of Civilization is very enjoyable when they describe how the Victorian society has reacted to findings in Pompei. See for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erotic_art_in_Pompeii_and_Herculaneum Do you have other explanation why this book is so expansive? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A Computable Universe: Understanding and Exploring Nature As Computation
On 5/28/2012 12:18 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 28.05.2012 17:48 John Mikes said the following: Evgenij: to your last par (small remark): (and I repeat the outburst of a religious scientist upon my post questioning his 'faith'): Who gave you the audacity to feel so superior to (some?) WORKING CLASS? (I apologize: you seem to be only the messenger) Then again (in the message): GENTLEMEN? and WHAT moral norms? Would gays be included? and why would women excluded? WHAT morality would be required? Read the SCRIPTs (maybe more than just the Jewish Bible) and you will be shaken in your morals of the past centuries' mostly western belief. Girls in good standing, i.e. Ishtar's virgins (whores?) who had to conceive by a stranger for money to prove their fertility and find a decent husband? Consequently the offering of the first born because they were most likely the offspring of other than the husband? and so on and on. Pompei was later, but still in the 'biblical' morals. Remarks of this kind should be explained/understood better. Sorry for the outburst LohnM Hi John, I was just kidding. I should say though that the movie Pornography: A Secret History of Civilization is very enjoyable when they describe how the Victorian society has reacted to findings in Pompei. See for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erotic_art_in_Pompeii_and_Herculaneum Do you have other explanation why this book is so expansive? Evgenii It is expensive because demand for many copies of it is low and thus costs per unit are high. Usually only university libraries purchase such books. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On 5/28/2012 1:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I am mute on the subject of whether p is true in any other world (unless I can use an axiom like the above). By the logicians notion of proof, if you prove a proposition, it is true in all worlds/model/interpretation. But the 'worlds' are defined by the axioms and rules of inference. So you could change or add axioms and get different 'worlds'. In this logicians idea of 'world' it is not the case that you only prove things in the one world you're in. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Twilight Zone
Dear Friends, For your entertainment. ;-) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4XbwWAXimI -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will in MWI
On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 2:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: Did I ever once say that free will means acting for no reason? That is a very hard question to answer, you said that people don't do things for a reason but you also said people don't don't do things for a reason, so is that one reason or two reasons or a infinite number of reasons or no reason at all? Who can say? Trying to answer a gibberish question is futile. I only say that reason is irrelevant I agree that reason is of no help whatsoever in understanding your arguments. I'm not asking what caused you to write, I'm asking why you caused that to be written. ^^^ So you want to know why; that is to say you think I'm a middle man and something cause me to cause that to be written and you want to know what that something is, and you think that if I can not identify what that something is then my argument is idiotic. In other words despite what you say your actions prove that you assume I'm either as mechanical as a cuckoo clock or a complete idiot. I agree with you, smart people do things for reasons and dumb people and maniacs do things for no reason. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Max Velmans' Reflexive Monism
Bruno, I believe that this time I could say that you express your position. For example in your two answers below it does not look like I don't defend that position. On 28.05.2012 10:55 Bruno Marchal said the following: I comment on both Evgenii and Craig's comment: On May 26, 11:57 am, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: ... Velmans introduces perceptual projection but this remains as the Hard Problem in his book, how exactly perceptual projection happens. It does not make sense. This is doing Aristotle mistake twice. Velmans contrast his model with reductionism (physicalism) and dualism and interestingly enough he finds many common features between reductionism and dualism. For example, the image in the mirror will be in the brain according to both reductionism and dualism. That does not make sense either. There are no image in the brain. In fact there is no brain. As for Aristotle, recently I have read Feyerabend where he has compared Aristotle's 'Natural is what occurs always or almost always' with Galileo's inexorable laws. Somehow I like 'occurs always or almost always'. I find it more human. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: was Relativity of Existence
On 28 May 2012, at 18:02, meekerdb wrote: On 5/28/2012 12:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 May 2012, at 20:59, meekerdb wrote: On 5/27/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As Bruno said, Provable is always relative to some axioms and rules of inference. It is quite independent of true of reality. Which is why I'm highly suspicious of ideas like deriving all of reality from arithmetic, which we know only from axioms and inferences. We don't give axioms and inference rule when teaching arithmetic in high school. We start from simple examples, like fingers, days of the week, candies in a bag, etc. Children understand anniversary before successor, and the finite/infinite distinction is as old as humanity. In fact it can be shown that the intuition of numbers, addition and multiplication included, is *needed* to even understand what axioms and inference can be, making arithmetic necessarily known before any formal machinery is posited. But only a small finite part of arithmetic. I don't think so. Our arithmetical intuition is already not formalizable. If it was, we would be able to capture it by a finite number of principle, but then we would be persuade that such finite theory is consistent, and that intuition is not in the theory. I suspect that our intuition is full second order arithmetic, which is not axiomatizable. In fact it is the very distinction between finite and infinite that we cannot formalize. Like consciousness, we know very well what finite/infinite means, but we cannot defined it, without using implicitly that distinction. The natural numbers are *the* mystery, and it has to be like that: no machine will ever been able to define what they are. Assuming comp, neither will we. Arithmetical truth per se, as no corresponding complete TOE. It is inexhaustible. Bruno Our intuition is that space is euclidean, the earth is stationary and flat, and that there is only one world. It seems to me that the infinity of arithmetic is just the intuition we should always be able to add one more. Not really. I think there are complete theories of (N, successor). But we have an intuition of adding and multiplying and this makes that intuition inexhaustible. Intuition is not entirely a given, it is something which develop with the familiarity and life working. It is different for all of us, so it nice that we can share some big initial segment of the arithmetical truth. Comp does not need more than the sigma_1 intuition, at the ontic level. But intuition fails us in precisely in questions like Hilbert's hotel. Why? Not sure, but it does not concern us, as comp builds on the intuition of the finite things. Why should you be so trusting of your intuition is just this particular instance. Do you doubt elementary arithmetic? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Church Turing be dammed.
Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course. Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care. It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston. You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert. It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom. It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of flight. It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today. No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion. No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly. We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked. This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any value. Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion. Q. What scientific discipline could this be? A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence. It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you, the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an artificial intelligence like us. This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the Seine. It is exactly like expecting your computer simulated furnace roasting you a toilet bowl. Think about it. If there was no difference
Re: Church Turing be dammed.
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course. Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care. It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston. You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert. It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom. It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of flight. It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today. No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion. No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly. We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked. This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any value. Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion. Q. What scientific discipline could this be? A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence. It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you, the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an artificial intelligence like us. This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the Seine. It is exactly like expecting
