Re: Autonomy?
On 23 Jun 2012, at 18:02, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Something is not primitive if you can derive it from something simpler. You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive its mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler. We must first derive its existence/appearance. But the beginning is given by AUDA. You have to be sure to grasp the first person indeterminacy, because it is the building brick of the derivation of physics, which I recall, is given by a statistics on computations as seen by internal points of view, captured informally by the logics of self-reference and its modal variants imposed by incompleteness. Most plausibly electrons and particles arise from universal group symmetries, and formally braiding operators should appears in the semantics of some of those hypostases. It is also possible that some properties of the electron are geographical, so that comp would make existing consistent physical realities with electron having different properties, which would no more be physical, but contingent. Open problem. But you can already understand, if you do the work, why we have to do this when assuming comp, which is the technical point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 1p-indeterminacy and brains
On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 2:37 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Hameroff is a crackpot. If microtubles were the source of consciousness my finger would be conscious; microtubles are in almost all cells. This does not follow. The ion channels which support the propagation of event potentials down the length of an axon in the central nervous system also exist in a variety of forms outside the brain. Yet it is only in the brain these ion channels have become organized by evolution to sustain complex patterns of firing. Likewise, it is logically possible that microtubules could have one function in the brain and yet another in the rest of the body. That said, I find Hameroff's argument for entangled microtubules very unconvincing. Crackpot? Perhaps--there does indeed seem to be an element of consciousness is weird, quantum entanglement is weird, therefore brains must work by quantum entanglement. Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive its mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler. We must first derive its existence/appearance. But that was exactly what I asked you to do! If you tell me what the mass, spin and electrical charge of electrons are you've told me just about all there is to say about the existence/appearance of electrons. So if you don't think electrons are primitive you must be able to derive them from something simpler. What is that derivation? Most plausibly electrons and particles arise from universal group symmetries, and formally braiding operators should appears in the semantics of some of those hypostases. Well that all sounds real nice, real scholarly, but the trouble is there is no reason for me to think you're right until your theory can actually produce some numbers. We know that the mass of the electron is 9.10938291×10 -31 kg, we know this from experiment, so show me how to derive this number from something simpler and I will concede that there is something to your theory after all. You have to be sure to grasp the first person indeterminacy Show me how to calculate the number 9.10938291×10-31 from first person indeterminacy and I will be sure that first person indeterminacy is something that is worth grasping. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 1p-indeterminacy and brains
On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hammeroff answered those critiques to my satisfaction. Hammeroff can not explain how quantum entanglement can happen at the enormous temperature of 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit when it's hard to do even at liquid helium temperatures of minus 459, and even if the entanglement does exists he can't explain how it produces consciousness, and he's vague about how microtubules help this situation and can't explain why microtubules in your big toe don't do the same thing. Worst of all he has not made a prediction that biologists can confirm or refute with a experiment. I think that the sensitivity might be set too high on your crackpot meter. ;-) Better to set that meter too high than too low because it is a well known law of science that for every unappreciated Galileo or Einstein there are 6.02 *10^23 crackpots. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 24 Jun 2012, at 17:16, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive its mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler. We must first derive its existence/appearance. But that was exactly what I asked you to do! If you tell me what the mass, spin and electrical charge of electrons are you've told me just about all there is to say about the existence/appearance of electrons. So if you don't think electrons are primitive you must be able to derive them from something simpler. What is that derivation? What I try to explain is NOT a derivation of physics from arithmetic. But a proof of its existence and necessity in all theories consistent with the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science. You confuse somehow ( === for derivation) COMP === PHYSICS and COMP - necessary(COMP === PHYSICS). Yet, the reasoning is enough constructive to show how to do the derivation, and in particular, accepting the most common analytical definition of belief and knowledge, to derive the logic of the observable, which can already be compared to the logic inferred from observation. Up to now it fits. How to do the derivation is what I have begun to describe on FOAR (starting from zero). Most plausibly electrons and particles arise from universal group symmetries, and formally braiding operators should appears in the semantics of some of those hypostases. Well that all sounds real nice, real scholarly, but the trouble is there is no reason for me to think you're right until your theory can actually produce some numbers. The theory already produces some geometries, and modalities that we can much more easily compared to nature than using the particular numbers, which might as well be geographical. But that theory is not mine, it *is* the theory of all self- referentially correct universal machine looking inward. And the main part has been isolated through well known work, like Gödel, Löb, Solovay, Matiyasevich. The theory explains the distinction of qualia and quanta, and prevents the universal machine from reductionist conception of the person. It does not put consciousness under the rug, it starts from its association with relative computational states. We know that the mass of the electron is 9.10938291×10-31 kg, we know this from experiment, so show me how to derive this number from something simpler and I will concede that there is something to your theory after all. I have explained the necessity (the main result, UDA) in FOAR. here I have made an attempt, but you remained stuck on step 3. You have to be sure to grasp the first person indeterminacy Show me how to calculate the number 9.10938291×10-31 from first person indeterminacy and I will be sure that first person indeterminacy is something that is worth grasping. You might just not be interested in comp and its consequence. The first person indeterminacy is a fact, with respect to comp. It is a logical consequence of comp (and of much of its many possible weakening up to the simple assumption of self-duplicability). In a sense, it is the most simple impossibility theorem in computer science: there are no programs capable to predict what they will write about self-localization after a backup will be splitted. If *you* can write such a program, then I will believe first person indeterminacy doesn't exist. And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10-31kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else. I am a logician. I just show that: if we can survive a digital transplant, then the physical reality emerges from a peculiar arithmetical process involving *many* computations, self-reference and inductive inference, and this in a sufficiently precise way so that we can already make some comparisons. UDA is COMP - necessary(COMP === PHYSICS). And AUDA is a piece of COMP === PHYSICS You just need to understand step 3, then 4, up to 8. (although 7 is already quite well). For AUDA you need mathematical logic and theoretical computer science. You need also to be interested in consciousness, and capable of distinguishing first and third person points of view (and later logical indexical modalities). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 1p-indeterminacy and brains
On 6/24/2012 7:49 AM, Johnathan Corgan wrote: On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 2:37 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: Hameroff is a crackpot. If microtubles were the source of consciousness my finger would be conscious; microtubles are in almost all cells. This does not follow. The ion channels which support the propagation of event potentials down the length of an axon in the central nervous system also exist in a variety of forms outside the brain. Yet it is only in the brain these ion channels have become organized by evolution to sustain complex patterns of firing. Right. And the evidence of the organization of neurons is plain. But there's no evidence that the microtubles are organized differently in neurons than in other cells. And it seems they already have functions in cell structure and reproduction. On the other hand there is a sound theory of how neurons connected by excitatory and inhibitory synapses can perform general computation. Likewise, it is logically possible that microtubules could have one function in the brain and yet another in the rest of the body. That said, I find Hameroff's argument for entangled microtubules very unconvincing. Crackpot? Perhaps--there does indeed seem to be an element of consciousness is weird, quantum entanglement is weird, therefore brains must work by quantum entanglement. And gravity is weird. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: truth
Bruno: Doesn't it emerge in this respect WHAT truth? or rather WHOSE truth? is there an accepted authority to verify an absolute truth judgeable from a different belief system? JohnM On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Jun 2012, at 09:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 22.06.2012 08:03 Stephen P. King said the following: On 6/22/2012 1:50 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote: I have many questions. One is what if truth were malleable? -- HI Brian, If it was malleable, how would we detect the modifications? If our standards of truth varied, how could we tell? This reminds me of the debate between Leibniz and Newton regarding the notion of absolute space. If one assumes the correspondence theory of truth, then the question would be if a reality were malleable. Right. Which leads to the question; what does Brian mean by truth is malleable? Would this entail that arithmetical truth is malleable? What would it mean that the truth of 17 is prime is malleable. It looks like we need a more solid truth than arithmetic in which we can make sense of the malleability of the truth in arithmetic, but I cannot see anything more solid than elementary arithmetic. Some truth can be malleable in some operational sense, but this will be only metaphorical. For example the truth that cannabis is far more safe than alcohol, appears to be quite malleable, but this is just because special interest exploits the lack of education in logic. People driven by power are used to mistreat truth, but it is just errors or lies. I guess Brian's question is more metaphysical, but then in which non malleable context can we make sense of metaphysically malleable truth? Perhaps Brian should elaborate on what he means by truth is malleable? It seems to me that such an idea is similar to complete relativism, which defeats itself by not allowing that very idea to be relativized. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10^-31 kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else. Well if you do it by luck... But of course I'd be very impressed if you could calculate it just from comp+arithmetic. But I'd be less impressed if you just showed that it must be one of all possible numbers. More realistically, shouldn't comp+arithmetic be able to make some basic predictions like: QM must be based on complex Hilbert spaces (not real, quateronic or octonic). Or the level at which spacetime is discrete (if it is). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 1p-indeterminacy and brains
On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 11:42:21AM -0400, John Clark wrote: I think that the sensitivity might be set too high on your crackpot meter. ;-) Better to set that meter too high than too low because it is a well known law of science that for every unappreciated Galileo or Einstein there are 6.02 *10^23 crackpots. John K Clark I would imagine we would adjust this sensitivity according to how busy we are. On idle days, it can be fun to listen to crackpots, whether for sport (practice in demolishing ridiculous arguments), or because occasionly they might have a germ of an great idea. But when the boss is breathing down your neck to get the next software release done, or next paper written, then it is time to ignore the crackpots, just so you can get work done. Just as one probably needs to ignore this list, for the same reason :). The crackpot index can be a useful tool for getting the crackpot to shut up (provided it fits, of course). Its not actually a serious diagnostic otherwise. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 01:29:31PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10^-31 kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else. Well if you do it by luck... But of course I'd be very impressed if you could calculate it just from comp+arithmetic. But I'd be less impressed if you just showed that it must be one of all possible numbers. More realistically, shouldn't comp+arithmetic be able to make some basic predictions like: QM must be based on complex Hilbert spaces (not real, quateronic or octonic). I do think this is a very interesting question. I do have a good reason for supposing it is must be complex, not real, but then it fails to say why it shouldn't be quarternionic in preference to complex. The trouble is it is so difficult to work out what a quarternionic QM would really mean. Or the level at which spacetime is discrete (if it is). Spacetime must emerge from relationships between events. The set of events must be countable, but the relationships between them is a power set of this, which is uncountable. This would imply continuity of spacetime, I think. This is a flipside of Bruno's argument that COMP entails physics (ie phenomenal physics) is not computable. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
