Re: Autonomy?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Jun 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How  
could we verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the  
W and M reconstituted person. And from their points of viex, the  
prediction of being in both place is simply refuted.


Refuted?? As I said before if you really had complete information  
then you could make 2 predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Washington and only Washington".


2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Moscow and only Moscow".


Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested  
proving that there was no indeterminacy and the prediction is  
confirmed to be completely correct.


But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction are  
incompatible. So you can make one more which is "1) OR 2)".




Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there  
can only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be  
untrue.


Things become contradictory when you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov, leading  
to "1) and 2)" which is non sense.
The assumption is not that there is only one Bruno Marchal, but that  
all those Bruno Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel to be  
only one of them. "Oh I am the one in Moscow, and not the one in  
Washington, and I was unable to predict that fact, unless using a "or".







> You have a machine with some button, and you are asked to make a  
prediction on the immediate personal outcome of a simple experiment.


Right, and the prediction is easy to make and it is perfect.


1) or 2). But that leads to the indeterminacy.




 > you sill confuse 1 and 3 views.

You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a  
possibility  it is you that is confused.


It is up to you to show this, but, here again, you deny that after the  
duplication, whoever you will be, will recognize that he was not able  
top have predicted with certainty the particular outcome. This can  
only be "I will be in such city", and this will be refuted by the one  
in the other city. With comp, we agree that there are both "bruno  
marchal", and so the prediction was wrong. It was a selection in  
disguise.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Jun 2012, at 20:01, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 11.04.2012 11:11 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 10 Apr 2012, at 21:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...



Hence if you know something in Internet or in the written form, I
would appreciate your advice. The best about 20 pages, not too
little, and not to much.


OK I found the paper by Turing:
http://www.thocp.net/biographies/papers/turing_oncomputablenumbers_1936.pdf

Of course, the language is old, and we prefer to talk today in term
of functions instead of real numbers.

You can try to read it. I will search other information, but there
are many, and of different type, and most still blinded by the
aristotelian preconception. So it is hard to find a paper which would
satisfy me. But you can get the intuition with Turing's paper I
think.


Bruno,

I have finally come to mechanism. Thank you for your suggestion. I  
have browsed Turing's paper.


Do I understand correctly, that mechanism is something that could be  
implemented by some Turing's machine?


You can say that. But you could take "fortran program" instead of  
Turing machine. The choice of the initial formal system is not  
important.





Do you some paper about it that does not have equations but that  
discusses this term philosophically?


Hmm... Not really. The start is simple, but without doing a minimum of  
technical work, you can't get the correct intuition, for the field is  
quickly counter-intuitive. I am currently explaining the whole  
computability stuff on the FOAR list, where I have a very good  
"candid" correspondent. You might try take the wagon.
If not I would suggest you to study a good book, like Cutland's book,  
or even the first hundred pages of the Rogers' book. Many popular  
account on computability are just invalid, or not precise enough to do  
serious philosophy, I'm afraid.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 30.06.2012 11:14 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 29 Jun 2012, at 20:01, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 11.04.2012 11:11 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 10 Apr 2012, at 21:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...



Hence if you know something in Internet or in the written form,
I would appreciate your advice. The best about 20 pages, not
too little, and not to much.


OK I found the paper by Turing:
http://www.thocp.net/biographies/papers/turing_oncomputablenumbers_1936.pdf



Of course, the language is old, and we prefer to talk today in
term of functions instead of real numbers.

You can try to read it. I will search other information, but
there are many, and of different type, and most still blinded by
the aristotelian preconception. So it is hard to find a paper
which would satisfy me. But you can get the intuition with
Turing's paper I think.


Bruno,

I have finally come to mechanism. Thank you for your suggestion. I
 have browsed Turing's paper.

Do I understand correctly, that mechanism is something that could
be implemented by some Turing's machine?


You can say that. But you could take "fortran program" instead of
Turing machine. The choice of the initial formal system is not
important.


I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with 
materialism. How this follows then?


Evgenii





Do you some paper about it that does not have equations but that
discusses this term philosophically?


Hmm... Not really. The start is simple, but without doing a minimum
of technical work, you can't get the correct intuition, for the field
is quickly counter-intuitive. I am currently explaining the whole
computability stuff on the FOAR list, where I have a very good
"candid" correspondent. You might try take the wagon. If not I would
suggest you to study a good book, like Cutland's book, or even the
first hundred pages of the Rogers' book. Many popular account on
computability are just invalid, or not precise enough to do serious
philosophy, I'm afraid.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: Autonomy?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Jun 30, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> As I said before if you really had complete information then you could
>> make 2 predictions:
>> 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in
>> Washington and only Washington".
>> 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in
>> Moscow and only Moscow".
>>
>> Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested proving
>> that there was no indeterminacy and the prediction is confirmed to be
>> completely correct.
>>
>
> > But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction are
> incompatible.
>

There are incompatible from the "1-pov" ONLY if you assume there can be
only one Bruno Marchal and there is no logical reason for making that
assumption, therefore I at this "1-pov" will not do so.

>> Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there can
>> only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be untrue.
>>
>
> >  you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov,
>

You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a
possibility  it is you that is confused.

>> Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there can
>> only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be untrue.
>>
>
> > all those Bruno Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel to be
> only one of them.
>

Yes, and there is rock solid proof that is exactly precisely what was
predicted to happen, if you doubt this just look and see what was written
in the diary before the experiment started, it's right there clear as a
bell in black and white. So where is this spectral "first person
indeterminacy" you keep talking about?

> we agree that there are both "bruno marchal"
>

Exactly.

> and so the prediction was wrong.
>

WHAT??  He could have also written in his diary "the Bruno Marchal who
calls himself "I" and sees Washington will not be the Bruno Marchal who
calls himself "I" who does NOT see Washington". He could have added that to
his official prediction, but I think writing something so thunderously
obvious would be a waste of ink.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 30.06.2012 11:14 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 29 Jun 2012, at 20:01, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 11.04.2012 11:11 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 10 Apr 2012, at 21:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...



Hence if you know something in Internet or in the written form,
I would appreciate your advice. The best about 20 pages, not
too little, and not to much.


OK I found the paper by Turing:
http://www.thocp.net/biographies/papers/turing_oncomputablenumbers_1936.pdf



Of course, the language is old, and we prefer to talk today in
term of functions instead of real numbers.

You can try to read it. I will search other information, but
there are many, and of different type, and most still blinded by
the aristotelian preconception. So it is hard to find a paper
which would satisfy me. But you can get the intuition with
Turing's paper I think.


Bruno,

I have finally come to mechanism. Thank you for your suggestion. I
have browsed Turing's paper.

Do I understand correctly, that mechanism is something that could
be implemented by some Turing's machine?


You can say that. But you could take "fortran program" instead of
Turing machine. The choice of the initial formal system is not
important.


I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with  
materialism. How this follows then?


Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all  
universal system are equivalent.


Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can  
emulate any Turing machine  by a fortran program, and you can emulate  
any fortran program by a Turing machine.


More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing  
machine, and you can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal  
interpreter (or compiler). This means that not only those system  
compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they can compute  
those function in the same manner of the other machine.


Now, it happens that a tiny part of arithmetic is already Turing  
universal, and thus fortran universal, lisp universal, etc. So the  
arithmetical relations emulates already all computations, in Fortran,  
in Lisp, in all conceivable universal system (with Church thesis).


If you take the first person indeterminacy into account, and if you  
see that we cannot have both that consciousness supervenes on physical  
activity and that consciousness supervene on computations,  you can  
see, with some work,  that the laws of physics have to emerge from  
self-referential modalities put on the computations, and that this  
does not depend on the choice of the initial system. I use arithmetic  
only for illustrative purpose, and because it is easier to be realist  
on an arithmetical relations than on fortran programs, by lack of  
familiarity.


I hope this answer your question. The sequel and explicit derivation  
of measureble values is based on work by Gödel and Kleene, and  
others.  I am using computer science to translate precisely the mind  
body problem, in the computationalist theory, into a mathematical  
problem of justifying physics by a statistics on dreams (computation  
as seen through a modality of self-reference). It extends the many- 
worlds of QM to a many-"dreams" in Arithmetic, in a sufficiently  
precise way as to be tested.
I explain this in the sane04 paper. The main point, UDA, needs only a  
small amount of passive understanding of Church thesis and the basic  
of computer science. The explicit translation in the arithmetic (the  
part 2 of sane04) needs much more.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

This provides also an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus and many  
mystics' talks.


Bruno




Evgenii





Do you some paper about it that does not have equations but that
discusses this term philosophically?


Hmm... Not really. The start is simple, but without doing a minimum
of technical work, you can't get the correct intuition, for the field
is quickly counter-intuitive. I am currently explaining the whole
computability stuff on the FOAR list, where I have a very good
"candid" correspondent. You might try take the wagon. If not I would
suggest you to study a good book, like Cutland's book, or even the
first hundred pages of the Rogers' book. Many popular account on
computability are just invalid, or not precise enough to do serious
philosophy, I'm afraid.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to 

Re: Autonomy?

[meekerdb]

On 6/30/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Jun 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

> You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could we 
verify
that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the W and M reconstituted 
person.
And from their points of viex, the prediction of being in both place is 
simply refuted.


Refuted?? As I said before if you really had complete information then you could make 2 
predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and 
only Washington".


2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only 
Moscow".


Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested proving that there was 
no indeterminacy and the prediction is confirmed to be completely correct.


But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction are incompatible. So 
you can make one more which is "1) OR 2)".


I think it's "1) AND 2)".





Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there can only be one 
Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be untrue.


Things become contradictory when you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov, leading to "1) and 2)" 
which is non sense.
The assumption is not that there is only one Bruno Marchal, but that all those Bruno 
Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel to be only one of them. "Oh I am the one 
in Moscow, and not the one in Washington, and I was unable to predict that fact, unless 
using a "or".


Suppose you predict "I will be in Washinton."  Then the Bruno in Washington will be right 
and the Bruno is Moscow will say, "Oh, I was wrong."


Brent









> You have a machine with some button, and you are asked to make a 
prediction on
the immediate personal outcome of a simple experiment.


Right, and the prediction is easy to make and it is perfect.


1) or 2). But that leads to the indeterminacy.




> you sill confuse 1 and 3 views.


You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a possibility  it is 
you that is confused.


It is up to you to show this, but, here again, you deny that after the duplication, 
whoever you will be, will recognize that he was not able top have predicted with 
certainty the particular outcome. This can only be "I will be in such city", and this 
will be refuted by the one in the other city. With comp, we agree that there are both 
"bruno marchal", and so the prediction was wrong. It was a selection in disguise.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything 
List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

[meekerdb]

On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How 
this follows then?


Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system are 
equivalent.


Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any 
Turing machine  by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a 
Turing machine.


More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you can 
find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means 
that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they 
can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.


But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical 
realization?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: Autonomy?

[Craig Weinberg]

It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be 
different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something 
like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.

My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can 
you move Gettysburg to Moscow?

Do you see what I am getting at? Human identity is not made of only matter. It 
is made partly of unique interactions of unique events. Even without first 
person fragmentation (which brain conjoined twins suggest is not a problem - 
"I" can be spread out beyond an individual body), there is nothing to suggest 
that the event specific entanglement-momentum of any system can be reproduced 
independently of context. If you duplicate Bruno's body, you get a newborn baby 
in an adult body. If you duplicate Gettysburg you get a bunch of confused 
amnesiac babies in uniforms. Each neuron has to discover its own connections 
for the first time, recapitulating the experience of the individuals or 
historic events as a whole as they struggle to cohere like a mass of 
fibrillating cardiac cells unable to synch.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/CwBs3ZQOFP0J.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: Autonomy?

[meekerdb]

On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be 
different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something 
like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.

My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can 
you move Gettysburg to Moscow?


We could send Craig there.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: Autonomy?

[Stephen P. King]

On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot 
necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional 
interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of 
dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.


My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the 
Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow?


We could send Craig there.

Brent


Hi Brent,

The copy and paste idea of teleportation tacitly requires an entire 
entity and not a system that is just the interactions of many entities. 
We can copy wholes, not parts, and preserve invariant their identities.


--
Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: Autonomy?

[meekerdb]

On 6/30/2012 5:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be 
different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a 
war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.


My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can you move 
Gettysburg to Moscow?


We could send Craig there.

Brent


Hi Brent,

The copy and paste idea of teleportation tacitly requires an entire entity and not a 
system that is just the interactions of many entities. We can copy wholes, not parts, 
and preserve invariant their identities.




Craig wasn't even talking about duplication; so we can 'teleport' him there by commercial 
airliner.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: Autonomy?

[Stephen P. King]

On 6/30/2012 9:56 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/30/2012 5:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot 
necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional 
interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of 
dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.


My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the 
Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow?


We could send Craig there.

Brent


Hi Brent,

The copy and paste idea of teleportation tacitly requires an 
entire entity and not a system that is just the interactions of many 
entities. We can copy wholes, not parts, and preserve invariant their 
identities.




Craig wasn't even talking about duplication; so we can 'teleport' him 
there by commercial airliner.


Brent
-


Brent,

You are not even trying to understand what Craig is talking/writing 
about. Please don't pretend otherwise.


--
Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.