Re: Losing Control
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 8:54:35 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: > > On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 7:38 AM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > >> "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I > >> control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my > >> wishes. > > > > > > What do you see as being the difference between free will and the > ability to > > determine the behavior of something according to your wishes? > > You insist that "free will" is incompatible with determinism or > randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible. > "Control" can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if > free will is impossible. I don't think that control can be defined in such a way that it is possible without free will. Not literally. We can project control onto an inanimate system figuratively, via the pathetic fallacy, and say that rainfall controls crop yields or something like that, but there is no intention on the part of rainfall to manipulate crop yields. While it may not always be easy to discern what exactly makes a given process unintentional or intentional when it is a public observation, but privately the difference between what we can possibly control and what we may not ever be able to control is abundantly clear. > However, if you define control as > incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible > I would not say that free will/self-control>control is incompatible from unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the yellow traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green lights, there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention. > also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was > previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our > discussions. > Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate? Craig > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:15:43 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 15 Mar 2013, at 20:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Friday, March 15, 2013 3:04:24 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> No, I think that you haven't understood it, >> > > That's because you are only working with a straw man of me. What is it > that you think that I don't understand? The legacy view is that if you have > many molecular systems working together mechanically, you will naturally > get emergent properties that could be mistaken for teleological entities. > You can't tell the difference between a brain change that seems meaningful > to you and a meaningful experience which causes a brain change. Just > because you feel like you are moving your arm doesn't mean that isn't just > a narrative fiction that serves a valuable evolutionary purpose. > > All of that is fine, in some other theoretical universe. In our universe > however, it can't work. There is no evolutionary purpose for consciousness > or narrative fictions. The existence of the feeling that you can control > your body makes no sense in universe where control is impersonal and > involuntary. There is no possibility for teleology to even be conceived in > a universe of endless meaningless chain reactions - no basis for > proprietary attachment of any kind. It's circular to imagine that it could > be important for an epiphenomenal self to believe it is phenomenal. > Important how? It's like adding a steering wheel to a mountain. > > >> due to whatever biases have led you to invest so much in your theory - a >> theory which is AFAICT completely unfalsifiable and predicts nothing. >> > > No theory which models consciousness will ever be falsifiable, because > falsifiability is a quality within consciousness. As far as prediction > goes, one of the things it predicts that people who are bound to the > extremes of the philosophical spectrum will be intolerant and misrepresent > other perspectives. They will cling pathologically to unreal abstractions > while flatly denying ordinary experience. > > > Materialism + computationalism can lead to nihilism. But computationalism, > per se, does not deny ordinary experiences. It starts from that, as it is > a principle of invariance of consciousness for a digital substitution made > at some level. > It may not deny ordinary experiences, but it doesn't support them rationally either. What is a reason why computation would be processed as an ordinary experience, when we clearly can be accomplished through a-signifying mechanical activities? Craig > > Bruno > > > > > Craig > > >> > >> >> >> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:02 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, March 15, 2013 1:55:26 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: >>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > Exactly. It is interesting also in that it seems to be like one of > those ambiguous images, in that as long as people are focused on one > fixed > idea of reality, they are honestly incapable of seeing any other, even if > they themselves are sitting on top of it. > > The irony in that statement is staggering. I couldn't satirize you any better if I tried. >>> >>> Why, do you think that I have never considered the bottom up model of >>> causation? >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com . > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: G.K. Chesterton on Materialism
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 6:41:58 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: > > On 3/16/2013 3:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > "For we must remember that the materialist philosophy (whether true or >> not) is certainly much more limiting than any religion. In one sense, of >> course, all intelligent ideas are narrow. They cannot be broader than >> themselves. A Christian is only restricted in the same sense that an >> atheist is restricted. He cannot think Christianity false and continue to >> be a Christian; the atheist cannot think atheism false and continue to be >> an atheist. >> >> But, as it happens, there is a very special sense in which materialism >> has more restrictions than spiritualism� The Christian is quite free to >> believe that there is a considerable amount of settled order and inevitable >> development in the universe, but the materialist is not allowed to admit >> into his spotless machine the slightest speck of spiritualism or miracle. >> The Christian admits that the universe is manifold and even miscellaneous, >> just as a sane man knows that he is complex. But the materialist�s world >> is quite simple and solid� The materialist is sure that history has been >> simply and solely a chain of causation�" >> > > Like most philosophers Chesterton did keep up on the science of his time > and so writes as though Lagrange was the last word. > I think that this list shows that the view that "history has been simply and solely a chain of causation" is alive and well in the 21st century. Craig > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 7:38 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I >> control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my >> wishes. > > > What do you see as being the difference between free will and the ability to > determine the behavior of something according to your wishes? You insist that "free will" is incompatible with determinism or randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible. "Control" can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if free will is impossible. However, if you define control as incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our discussions. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On 3/16/2013 3:15 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 15 Mar 2013, at 20:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> >> >> On Friday, March 15, 2013 3:04:24 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: >> No, I think that you haven't understood it, >> >> That's because you are only working with a straw man of me. What is it >> that you think that I don't understand? The legacy view is that if you >> have many molecular systems working together mechanically, you will >> naturally get emergent properties that could be mistaken for >> teleological entities. You can't tell the difference between a brain >> change that seems meaningful to you and a meaningful experience which >> causes a brain change. Just because you feel like you are moving your >> arm doesn't mean that isn't just a narrative fiction that serves a >> valuable evolutionary purpose. >> >> All of that is fine, in some other theoretical universe. In our >> universe however, it can't work. There is no evolutionary purpose for >> consciousness or narrative fictions. The existence of the feeling that >> you can control your body makes no sense in universe where control is >> impersonal and involuntary. There is no possibility for teleology to >> even be conceived in a universe of endless meaningless chain reactions >> - no basis for proprietary attachment of any kind. It's circular to >> imagine that it could be important for an epiphenomenal self to >> believe it is phenomenal. Important how? It's like adding a steering >> wheel to a mountain. >> >> due to whatever biases have led you to invest so much in your theory - >> a theory which is AFAICT completely unfalsifiable and predicts nothing. >> >> No theory which models consciousness will ever be falsifiable, because >> falsifiability is a quality within consciousness. As far as prediction >> goes, one of the things it predicts that people who are bound to the >> extremes of the philosophical spectrum will be intolerant and >> misrepresent other perspectives. They will cling pathologically to >> unreal abstractions while flatly denying ordinary experience. > > Materialism + computationalism can lead to nihilism. But > computationalism, per se, does not deny ordinary experiences. It starts > from that, as it is a principle of invariance of consciousness for a > digital substitution made at some level. > Dear Bruno, Could you elaborate on what you mean by 'nihilism' here? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: G.K. Chesterton on Materialism
On 3/16/2013 3:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: "For we must remember that the materialist philosophy (whether true or not) is certainly much more limiting than any religion. In one sense, of course, all intelligent ideas are narrow. They cannot be broader than themselves. A Christian is only restricted in the same sense that an atheist is restricted. He cannot think Christianity false and continue to be a Christian; the atheist cannot think atheism false and continue to be an atheist. But, as it happens, there is a very special sense in which materialism has more restrictions than spiritualism… The Christian is quite free to believe that there is a considerable amount of settled order and inevitable development in the universe, but the materialist is not allowed to admit into his spotless machine the slightest speck of spiritualism or miracle. The Christian admits that the universe is manifold and even miscellaneous, just as a sane man knows that he is complex. But the materialist’s world is quite simple and solid… The materialist is sure that history has been simply and solely a chain of causation…" Like most philosophers Chesterton did keep up on the science of his time and so writes as though Lagrange was the last word. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
G.K. Chesterton on Materialism
> > "For we must remember that the materialist philosophy (whether true or > not) is certainly much more limiting than any religion. In one sense, of > course, all intelligent ideas are narrow. They cannot be broader than > themselves. A Christian is only restricted in the same sense that an > atheist is restricted. He cannot think Christianity false and continue to > be a Christian; the atheist cannot think atheism false and continue to be > an atheist. > > But, as it happens, there is a very special sense in which materialism has > more restrictions than spiritualism… The Christian is quite free to believe > that there is a considerable amount of settled order and inevitable > development in the universe, but the materialist is not allowed to admit > into his spotless machine the slightest speck of spiritualism or miracle. > The Christian admits that the universe is manifold and even miscellaneous, > just as a sane man knows that he is complex. But the materialist’s world is > quite simple and solid… The materialist is sure that history has been > simply and solely a chain of causation…" > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 1:42:29 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 14, 2013 Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > > What does the popularity of porn and gossip have to do with the >> capacity of computers to think and feel? >> > > I have no idea, but that's one of the best Zen Koans I've ever heard. > > There is no other logical conclusion to make given the FACT that if > your brain chemistry changes your emotions change, AND if your emotions > change your brain chemistry changes. > >>> So if I type comments on my computer and I see your answers on my computer, then there is no other logical conclusion to make than that you live in my computer. >>> >>> >> In this lame analogy of yours what is the counterpart of my typing >>> into the computer, who the hell is typing into my brain? >>> >> >> > John K Clark, who else? >> > > So the correct answer to the question "Why does John K Clark do what he > does?" would not involve Quantum Mechanics or biochemistry or neurons or > genes or the environment or psychology or even cause and effect; according > to you the correct answer to the question "Why does John K Clark do what he > does?" is "Because of John K Clark". Wow, what a deep theory! > QM, biochemistry, neurons, genes, the environment, psychology, and causality all contribute to why you do what you do, and you contribute to why all of those things do what they do. With all of the other phenomena, you can trace it back to this force or that Law of physics, but where you exclude your own personal perspective as a viable influence, I do not. I see that as an anthropocentric (inverted) compulsion. It is a compulsion which makes a lot of sense in the wake of the success of post-Copernican science, but in the end, the careful study of consciousness reveals this impulse to be a simple minded counter-neurosis which tells us more about how we react to fear, failure, hope, and success than the scientific reality of self and the universe. Just because God is not a giant person in the sky does not automatically mean that the universe is a giant machine with no personality. This opens the door to an entirely new dimension of the universe - perceptual relativity, significance, panpsychic or quorum mechanics, etc. Why do we disinvite ourselves from the universe? and when we do, why do we seem to take it so personally one way or the other? > > consciousness can't be a byproduct of anything because it would be >> completely unexplainable and superfluous > > > It is in the very nature of byproducts to be superfluous, otherwise they > wouldn't be byproducts; and you can't explain a byproduct until you > explaine something else. You can't explain how a spandrel came to be until > you explain a arch and you can't explain consciousness until you explain > intelligence. > Byproducts aren't superfluous, they are just unintentional. The interaction of substances and surfaces can cause 'dust' to accumulate - that is a byproduct. If instead the same dry conditions and particle shedding caused invisible semi-hypothetical alternate universes to appear and disappear, that would be unacceptably surprising. The idea of spandrels is really a relativistic term that only makes sense within a context of aesthetic teleology. We see things in terms of primary effects and side effects based on the projection of intention, but in natural selection, features can be adaptive whether they serve their presumed 'original purpose' or not. It's a strange judgment to be inserting in a process which has no purposes. > > no matter what you try to attach it to. It is completely implausible in >> every way. >> > > You're telling me something is implausible?! Craig, you continue to insist > that X being not X and X being not not X makes perfect sense, > Only in real life. There are a number of rigid logical systems in which such subtleties are not allowed. > and you say that if changing X always changes Y and changing Y always > changes X that does not in any way mean that the change in X caused the > change in Y. > Right, just like I can go East by walking either forward or backward without either one causing 'East' at the expense of the other. It all depends what direction I am facing. Moving East by walking forward doesn't mean I can't also walk forward and move West. > Having thus inoculated yourself against the disease of logic you > The logic that I am using is more flexible to accommodate the nuances of reality is all. If you are going swimming, you might want to ditch the suit of armor. are bewildered when I say you are not interested in finding the truth but > rather have first decided what you would prefer to be true and then > resolved to shut your eyes if something that contradicts your preference > should dare to enter your view. > To the contrary, nothing that I have found contradicts my view, which does not follow my
Re: Losing Control
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:15:58 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: > > On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > >> You persist in saying that if the components of the system are > >> mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the > >> way the phrase is normally used. > > > > > > What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it? > > "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I > control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my > wishes. > What do you see as being the difference between free will and the ability to determine the behavior of something according to your wishes? Craig > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A Consistent QM Histories explanation of synchronicity and Sheldrake's morphisms.
On 3/16/2013 10:55 AM, tjp.bay...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:39:55 PM UTC, Roger Clough wrote: We live in an indefinite world of superposed quantum states, Doesn't it depend what you mean by 'live'? As far as I can see, I live in a definite world, but I am aware of having an imagination and a bunch of concepts about life (same thing?) Since I observe my imagination I can say it is also definite, though what it purports to reference is not observed and therefore is not definite. Linking this with another current thread, if you have a QM-realistic view of life, can you hold to a materialist view of consciousness? I have the impression that on this list "materialist" has come be an epithet. It is applied to physicists who think the world consists of a ray in an infinite dimensional complex Hilbert space - which is about as "material" as Bruno's modal logic. Apparently anything that is well defined and makes definite predictions is "material". Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On 15 Mar 2013, at 22:14, Terren Suydam wrote: "Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts." - Feynman A great quote that admonishes us to never trust our beliefs 100%. Very few people I have met have Feynman's humility. Wonderful (and funny) quote. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On 16 Mar 2013, at 08:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: You persist in saying that if the components of the system are mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the way the phrase is normally used. What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it? "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". Nice! We might define free-will by self-control, perhaps. Bruno I control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my wishes. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On 15 Mar 2013, at 21:18, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> No that is the exact opposite of the truth, we cannot follow our own self determination. If you tell me that a system is deterministic you have added exactly zero information by telling me that the system also has "free will", thus "free will" means nothing and is just a noise. >If you tell me that a system is deterministic you have added exactly zero information by telling me that the system also has "consciousness", thus "consciousness" means nothing and is just a noise. Loss of consciousness such as in sleep or anesthesia has observable consequences for me, I formed no new memories and the external universe seems to have instantaneously jumped ahead, but loss of "free will" has no observable consequences to me or to anybody else because nobody has a clue what the dumb thing is supposed to mean. Well it is either the loss of the will, like in some severe depression, or the loss of freedom, like in jail or camps. > if you tell me that a black hole is deterministic you have added exactly zero information by telling me that the black hole also has also a mass, thus "mass" means nothing and is just a noise. What the hell are you talking about?? Change the mass of a Black Hole and you change the event horizon and that can be measured. Black holes are the simplest macroscopic objects in the known universe but you've got to know the mass, if you know the mass, spin and electrical charge that the Black Hole has then you know everything that can distinguish one Black Hole from another. You can know all there is to know about a Black Hole with just 3 numbers (2 really because for a actual Black Hole the electrical charge is always zero, or at least very small) but one of those numbers is the mass. My point was just to invalidate the kind of reasoning you were doing. > Having self-determination does not entail that we can self- determine ourself completely. I did not say "total self- determination". So all "free will" means is that sometimes we can make correct predictions about what we will do before we do it, and sometimes we cannot, and in general beforehand there is no way to tell which ones we can make good predictions for and which ones we can't. And even when we make a correct prediction about what we will do (I will never do X for example) sometimes we'll have to wait literally forever to know it was the correct prediction. A pretty useless definition don't you think? It is useful to decide if some one must be send in a jail or in an hospital, or asylum, etc. >> You're walking down a road and spot a fork in the road far ahead. You know of advantages and disadvantages to both paths so you aren't sure if you will go right or left, you haven't finished the calculation yet, you haven't decided yet. Once you get to the fork you find yourself on the left path and retroactively conclude that you must have "decided" to go left. > Yes. That's what I mean by free will. Roughly speaking. And a powerful demon could be able to look into your head and quickly deduce that you would eventually choose to go to the left. Meanwhile you, whose mind works much more slowly than the demon's, hasn't completed the thought process yet. You might be saying to yourself "I haven't decided yet, I'll have to think about it, I'm free to go either way" but the demon already knows for a fact that despite your present uncertainty by the time you reach the fork you will decide to go to the left. No problem with that, unless the daemon interfere, but I am remain free to contradict him, if he decides to talk. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On 15 Mar 2013, at 20:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 15, 2013 3:04:24 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: No, I think that you haven't understood it, That's because you are only working with a straw man of me. What is it that you think that I don't understand? The legacy view is that if you have many molecular systems working together mechanically, you will naturally get emergent properties that could be mistaken for teleological entities. You can't tell the difference between a brain change that seems meaningful to you and a meaningful experience which causes a brain change. Just because you feel like you are moving your arm doesn't mean that isn't just a narrative fiction that serves a valuable evolutionary purpose. All of that is fine, in some other theoretical universe. In our universe however, it can't work. There is no evolutionary purpose for consciousness or narrative fictions. The existence of the feeling that you can control your body makes no sense in universe where control is impersonal and involuntary. There is no possibility for teleology to even be conceived in a universe of endless meaningless chain reactions - no basis for proprietary attachment of any kind. It's circular to imagine that it could be important for an epiphenomenal self to believe it is phenomenal. Important how? It's like adding a steering wheel to a mountain. due to whatever biases have led you to invest so much in your theory - a theory which is AFAICT completely unfalsifiable and predicts nothing. No theory which models consciousness will ever be falsifiable, because falsifiability is a quality within consciousness. As far as prediction goes, one of the things it predicts that people who are bound to the extremes of the philosophical spectrum will be intolerant and misrepresent other perspectives. They will cling pathologically to unreal abstractions while flatly denying ordinary experience. Materialism + computationalism can lead to nihilism. But computationalism, per se, does not deny ordinary experiences. It starts from that, as it is a principle of invariance of consciousness for a digital substitution made at some level. Bruno Craig On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:02 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 15, 2013 1:55:26 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Exactly. It is interesting also in that it seems to be like one of those ambiguous images, in that as long as people are focused on one fixed idea of reality, they are honestly incapable of seeing any other, even if they themselves are sitting on top of it. The irony in that statement is staggering. I couldn't satirize you any better if I tried. Why, do you think that I have never considered the bottom up model of causation? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A Consistent QM Histories explanation of synchronicity and Sheldrake's morphisms.
tjp, If you allow that physical consciousness resides in a materialistic BEC in the brain, and that the matter-BEC is entangled with a mind-BEC where realistic quantum computations (comp) are manifest, then yes physics is consistent with physical consciousness. Richard Ruquist On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 1:55 PM, wrote: > > On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:39:55 PM UTC, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> We live in an indefinite world of superposed quantum states, >> > Doesn't it depend what you mean by 'live'? As far as I can see, I live in a > definite world, but I am aware of having an imagination and a bunch of > concepts about life (same thing?) Since I observe my imagination I can say > it is also definite, though what it purports to reference is not observed > and therefore is not definite. Linking this with another current thread, if > you have a QM-realistic view of life, can you hold to a materialist view of > consciousness? > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A Consistent QM Histories explanation of synchronicity and Sheldrake's morphisms.
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:39:55 PM UTC, Roger Clough wrote: > > We live in an indefinite world of superposed quantum states, > > Doesn't it depend what you mean by 'live'? As far as I can see, I live in a definite world, but I am aware of having an imagination and a bunch of concepts about life (same thing?) Since I observe my imagination I can say it is also definite, though what it purports to reference is not observed and therefore is not definite. Linking this with another current thread, if you have a QM-realistic view of life, can you hold to a materialist view of consciousness? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie
On Thu, Mar 14, 2013 Craig Weinberg wrote: > What does the popularity of porn and gossip have to do with the capacity > of computers to think and feel? > I have no idea, but that's one of the best Zen Koans I've ever heard. There is no other logical conclusion to make given the FACT that if your brain chemistry changes your emotions change, AND if your emotions change your brain chemistry changes. >>> >>> >>> So if I type comments on my computer and I see your answers on my >>> computer, then there is no other logical conclusion to make than that you >>> live in my computer. >>> >> >> >> In this lame analogy of yours what is the counterpart of my typing >> into the computer, who the hell is typing into my brain? >> > > > John K Clark, who else? > So the correct answer to the question "Why does John K Clark do what he does?" would not involve Quantum Mechanics or biochemistry or neurons or genes or the environment or psychology or even cause and effect; according to you the correct answer to the question "Why does John K Clark do what he does?" is "Because of John K Clark". Wow, what a deep theory! > consciousness can't be a byproduct of anything because it would be > completely unexplainable and superfluous It is in the very nature of byproducts to be superfluous, otherwise they wouldn't be byproducts; and you can't explain a byproduct until you explaine something else. You can't explain how a spandrel came to be until you explain a arch and you can't explain consciousness until you explain intelligence. > no matter what you try to attach it to. It is completely implausible in > every way. > You're telling me something is implausible?! Craig, you continue to insist that X being not X and X being not not X makes perfect sense, and you say that if changing X always changes Y and changing Y always changes X that does not in any way mean that the change in X caused the change in Y. Having thus inoculated yourself against the disease of logic you are bewildered when I say you are not interested in finding the truth but rather have first decided what you would prefer to be true and then resolved to shut your eyes if something that contradicts your preference should dare to enter your view. Therefore I will let you have the last word on this thread when you reply to this message with one of your patented "yeah but this this and this is conscious but that that and that is not and I know this because I have free will". John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 12:41:27 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 4:34 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > > So all "free will" means is that sometimes we can make correct >> predictions about what we will do before we do it, >> > That's what you say, not me. I guess now you are trying your hand at putting words in my mouth and agreeing with your own positions. > > Then a Turing Machine has free will because it can correctly predict > No, prediction has nothing to do with free will. Intention is not a passive knowledge or belief that is true in the future, it is the active power to change aspects of public reality to suit your preference. > that it will list all the factors of 128 and then stop, and it can > correctly it will never list all the prime numbers and then stop. The > Turing machine doesn't know if it will ever print out the smallest even > number greater than 4 is not the sum of two primes greater than 2 because > neither it nor we currently have a proof to show its true or a > counterexample to show its false. > If a Turing machine had free will, then it would decide what it would list and what it wouldn't. Craig > > John K Clark > > > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 12:22:19 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 , Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > >If someone sells you into slavery, or brainwashes you in a cult, can you >> not see that you have lost something? >> > > Yes. > > >> > Can you not 'control' your lungs to a greater extent than you can >> control your heartbeat? >> > > Yes > > > How do you define this difference in your worldview? >> > > The only logical conclusion to make is that not everything the brain does > has something to do with consciousness, there must be more than one > subsystem in operation inside that bone box resting on your shoulders. > Sigmund Freud figured that out a long time ago. > Sure, but why do some subsystems have a quality of being under our control and some don't? What is the meaning of this quality? Craig > > John K Clark > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 4:34 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > So all "free will" means is that sometimes we can make correct > predictions about what we will do before we do it, > Then a Turing Machine has free will because it can correctly predict that it will list all the factors of 128 and then stop, and it can correctly it will never list all the prime numbers and then stop. The Turing machine doesn't know if it will ever print out the smallest even number greater than 4 is not the sum of two primes greater than 2 because neither it nor we currently have a proof to show its true or a counterexample to show its false. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 , Craig Weinberg wrote: >If someone sells you into slavery, or brainwashes you in a cult, can you > not see that you have lost something? > Yes. > > Can you not 'control' your lungs to a greater extent than you can > control your heartbeat? > Yes > How do you define this difference in your worldview? > The only logical conclusion to make is that not everything the brain does has something to do with consciousness, there must be more than one subsystem in operation inside that bone box resting on your shoulders. Sigmund Freud figured that out a long time ago. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
A Consistent QM Histories explanation of synchronicity and Sheldrake's morphisms.
Hi This non-technical video suggests (to me) a possible QM explanation of synchronicity and Sheldrake's morphisms based on relational QM states and consistent QM histories ( R. Griffiths, Gell-Mann, Hartle , Omnes, and others). We live in an indefinite world of superposed quantum states, which only appears actual when we view it and collapse the wave function. Under the right conditions, namely that of consistent quantum histories the observation can result in synchronity, which is one which is particularly meaningful in that situation. This is a talk given at the Science and Non-duality Conference in October of 2010, San Rafael, CA. The topic is Sky Nelson's paper on the physics of synchronicity, based on Relational quantum mechanics and Consistent Histories QM. Given to a non-technical audience, but with some (simplified) technical details. By nondual he refers to wave-particle duality, so that all of reality before observation consists of a Macro Quantum Superposition (MQS) state. Upon observation, as with Leibniz's monadic perceptions, the world can only be seen from a single perspective (is not absolute). My understanding of QM is somewhat limited, but it seems that synchronicity arises from the collapse of two "consistent QM histories" events (self and other) upon observation by self. This suggests that Sheldrake's morphisms may be nonlocal memories of of previous events that have a consistgent QM history with a current event. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3he4YHDjizo Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 3/16/2013 "Coincidences are God's way of remaining anonymous." - Albert Einstein -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 12:26:24 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: > > This has to be my last response on this for a while. I will just say, > about consciousness arising from other premises: It is not the material > itself that is important, but the organization of it. > I understand that premise completely, and as I have tried to clarify several times, my model of reality was that the universe was simply that - organization or 'pattern'. The big breakthrough however was more recently in the realization that pattern supervenes on pattern recognition and intention/projection (motive). The pattern/organization itself is an empty vehicle. If it were true that organization was the principle responsible for consciousness then we would expect anything this was organized in the same way would have the dame consciousness. An emoticon that looks like it is winking and smiling would literally have to at least be more winking and smiling than the same characters in a different arrangement. Common sense should tell us that cannot be true, and that this sequence of characters ;-) is not symbolic in its own right and relies entirely on human expectations to define it as smiling. There are countless examples of where 'the map is not the territory', and the 'menu is not the meal' which should help us understand that this 'pretending' or 'seeming like' is in the eye of the beholder and the sender (to some extent), not in the function of the form. There is a such thing as 'acting like' and that is all that a form or function can do. > Consciousness *might* be what happens when certain kinds of organization > arise. > I used to think that also. It's no less magical or religious than any other explanation though. Hand waving. Circumstantial evidence. > The human brain might represent one particular kind of organization that > is conscious. > I don't think that an organization can represent anything except within the presentation of some sensory experience. > I am interested in theories of consciousness that describe that > organization, and what kinds of organization support consciousness and what > kinds don't. > Well, since the organization of someone who has just died no longer supports consciousness, I would focus on that difference. What is the difference in the way that a dead person's brain is organized? > Note that when we take the emphasis off material and put it on > organization, it means that there many different kinds of structures that > could support consciousness, including virtual structures, structures made > out of networks of people, and so on. I'm not saying this is right. But I > am saying that it is conceivable. > It is conceivable in the sense that a square circle is conceivable. Yes, the idea that organization, function, or pattern could generate consciousness is an idea that is understandable, but does it really make sense beyond that? Does it make more sense than the idea of vitalism or materialism or idealism? > You seem utterly closed to that possibility, and I don't understand why, > Because I already have explored that possibility thoroughly, but with a clearer understanding of semiotics I began to see precisely why it is unworkable. Once you do, it all makes sense that what we see is neither what is 'real' nor is it unreal in every way at once, but rather all experience is filtered through various sense modalities, including the logical, cognitive, arithmetic, material, etc... all are senses and nothing more or less. > except that you appear to be locked into your own beliefs, unwilling to > even set them aside for the sake of argument. > You have to first assume that my ideas are true, and then try to disprove them. If you don't accept the premise, then you are still looking at my ideas through the filter of your own expectations and that of the legacy worldview. > > Feynman's quote might make more sense if you realize that he was also > talking about himself. Obviously, he was one of the experts he warns about > in that quote. > Eh, not so much. I have seen Feynman humble, maybe, but mostly he was an *extremely* confident person, especially when it comes to clever insights - and for good reason. That quote refers specifically to his distrust of authority and intellectual elites and the recognition of that distrust as a key factor in thinking for yourself. He is not saying 'never trust yourself', but rather 'don't let someone's credentials make you doubt your own understanding'. Craig > Terren > > > On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 5:42 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > > > On Friday, March 15, 2013 5:14:16 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: > > > On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 4:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Friday, March 15, 2013 4:11:32 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: > > > On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Friday, March 15, 2013 3:04:24 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: > >
Re: Losing Control
On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> You persist in saying that if the components of the system are >> mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the >> way the phrase is normally used. > > > What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it? "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my wishes. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis
On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 12:07 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> The scientific conception of neurons is that *nothing* in them happens >> without a physical reason, ever. > > > Which is why we those scientists have no idea what consciousness is. > Physical is a meaningless term. Whatever happens is physical, whether it is > smiling at a neighbor or welding a trashcan shut. The only good use for > physical in my view is to discern relative presentations from > representations. The letter A is not physical, but any particular > instantiation of experience of object that we read as A is physical. Can we stick to "physical" as something that can be observed and measured? Smiling at a neighbour has a component that can be observed and measured, the objective component, and a component that can't, the subjective component. The scientific conception of neurons is that nothing in them that can be observed and measured happens without a physical reason that can be observed and measured. So you could say "his desire to move caused him to get up", which would be true at one level, but at the microscopic level it will be ionic fluxes, electrostatic forces between molecules, and so on that caused him to get up. The desire to move cannot in itself be observed and measured, so if it directly caused depolarisation of cell membranes that would appear as miraculous to a scientist. Membrane depolarisation is something that can be observed and measured so it cannot happen without a physical reason that can itself be observed and measured. Now, do you think that the desire to move can cause membrane depolarisation without any physical reason? Do you agree that, given that scientists define "physical reason" as above, it would appear miraculous to them if this happened? >> When a person decides to do >> something, this corresponds to certain changes in his brain, and these >> changes all follow absolutely rigidly from the physical laws >> describing electrochemical reactions. > > > No, not all changes in the brain cannot be predicted at all from > electrochemical reactions. If I decide to go on vacation next week, there is > no electrochemical chain reaction which can explain why my body will drive > to work today but not in a week. The explanation is only realized in the > semantic content of the mind. This is why there is a clear and important > different in our awareness between voluntary and involuntary reactions. To > be addicted, coerced, enslaved, trapped, etc, are among the most dire > conditions which humans confront, yet they have no chemical correlate at > all. Whether someone is picking up trash on a prison chain gang or they are > picking up trash on the grounds of their vast estate, there is no functional > basis for either option being chemically preferable. For every mental change there is a corresponding physical change. The reverse is not the case. If it were possible to have a mental change without a physical change then that would indicate that the mind had an existence independent from the body - an immaterial soul, in effect. >> This applies to every molecule >> in the brains in those fMRI pictures you have referenced. > > > There were mostly spontaneous changes of large groups of molecules and > neurons in those images. That's why I included them, because it is so > obvious that this is not some kind of rippling, ricocheting, cymatic pattern > which could conceivably propagate from bottom up chemistry. If you show a video of an avalanche would it be reasonable to suppose that it happened "spontaneously" in your sense or would it be reasonable to suppose that even though the physical cause is not obvious, it must be there somewhere? >> You may not >> be able to predict exactly what the brain will do but you can't >> predict much simpler systems such as where a billiard ball will end up >> after bouncing off several cushions either, and that does not lead you >> to doubt that it is mechanistic. > > > Prediction is not the test. We know for a fact that we experience direct > participation in our lives. That cannot be explained by chemistry as it is > currently assumed to be. The model is incomplete, not the validity of our > own experience. Even if you are right about that chemistry can *completely* explain the observable behaviour of any biological system. >> In the standard scientific view, > > > which is wrong. > >> >> spontaneously excitable cells are >> just a special subtype of excitable cells and still follow absolutely >> rigidly the physical laws describing electrochemical reactions. Google >> "excitable cells" and you can read about it. If I understand your >> view, you think that "spontaneous" means there is neuronal activity >> not explained by these rigid physical laws. > > > Nothing is explained by any physical laws which cannot conceive of top-down > voluntary control of muscle tissue, cells, and molecules. Excitable doesn't > exhaustively determine what it is excited by. In some cases
